Philosophical Justification for Fundamental Human Rights

Abstract

We are brought face to face with one of those singularly lamentable lacunae in
nearly the whole of philosophy: there just does not seem to be any reasoned accounting for why and on what grounds we human beings can properly be said to have rights or duties.
People the world over often lay claims to fundamental human rights without giving thought to the justification for them. They forget that the assertion of one's right without justification would not be enough. Thus, it is not enough for man to assert his rights; he must justify them in some way. For example a liquor dealer must be able to exhibit a license obtained from the state in order to vindicate his right to practise his trade. Whenever the legitimacy of his practice is questioned he immediately refers to the law that establishes and supports it. Also, it is common to see people laying claim to one form of right or the other. They are quick to tell you all the rights they have as human beings. In most cases, they would let you know how the constitution of the land has justified these rights. They are oblivious of the fact that the justification for fundamental human rights goes beyond the
mere expression of it in the constitution of any nation. For if we are to accept the constitution of any country as the justification for fundamental human right it means that the moment the constitution ceases to exist, the rights of man automatically cease to exist. In essence, there is a need for justification for fundamental human rights. So our intention in this paper is to fill that lacuna by providing a philosophical justification for fundamental human rights. The philosophical justification would be a radical departure from the erroneous notion that the constitution of a country guarantees the fundamental human rights of its citizenries.

LWATI: A Journal of Contemporary Research Vol. 5 2008: pp. 355-366