Construction Delays in Local Government Authority Procurement: Decentralisation Policy Perspectives from Tanzania

Abstract

The aim of this study was to find out whether the level of decentralisation for the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) in Tanzania causes  construction delays or not. Focus group discussions were used to collect data from eight district councils in Kigoma and Dodoma  regions, and analysis was undertaken utilising New Institutional Economics (NIE) perspectives, specifically the principal–agency (t) theory.  It was found that there were construction delays where degree of autonomy in exante and ex-post contracting was less than  expected, while Tanzania’s central government retains partial autonomy over the LGAs and exercises authority over large construction  contracts, due to the many hierarchies involved in planning, tendering and contract supervision. Where autonomy and authority over procurement were high, agency problems related to self-interest, adverse selection, and bound rationality due to lack of capacity among  actors was evident, which also caused construction delays. Capacity building for all construction procurement actors could minimise  construction delays in the LGAs.