The nexus between ‘person’, personhood, and community in Kwame Gyekye’s philosophy

Abstract

It is not the case that ‘person’ and ‘personhood’ could always be used in the same contexts. In African philosophy, especially, they are deemed as concepts that are connected but significantly different in some respects. While the concept of a person is discussed only sometimes in connection with the notion of community, personhood seems to be discussed always in connection with latter. In the philosophy of the renowned Ghanaian thinker, Kwame Gyekye, evidence of this is found. However, the relationships between these concepts are so complex that in the works of Gyekye, a clear, simple position of his is sometimes difficult to find. This article does not discuss the usual subject of the clash of rights between the individual and the community. However, it offers to show how the concepts of ‘person’, personhood, and community are presented in Gyekye’s works. The article argues that Gyekye’s interpretation of personhood in Akan philosophy is unclear and that given the relationship which personhood has with the concept of the community, aspects of his arguments for moderate communitarianism are negatively affected.