The Quest for a Sure Foundation of Cognitive Beliefs: Karl Popper’s Fallibilist Critique of Rationalism and Empirisism

Abstract

The question of sure foundation of cognitive beliefs is a problem in epistemology and has defied solution. Both rationalism and empiricism lead to a common philosophical dead end: all we know is idea so that the existence of the external world remains an unjustifiable posit. This realization unleashed epistemology from its foundationalist moorings and occasioned theoretical renunciations. Karl Popper is one of the formidable contemporary thinkers to break ranks with foundationalism. He abandoned the search for proof which is a fundamental assumption of foundationalism and asserted that such rejection is necessitated by virtue of the fallibility of human knowledge. He therefore held that our problem is to find better and bolder theories; and that critical preference counts, but not belief. The upshot is that the search for a sure foundation or certainty of our cognitive belief is a philosophical will o’ the wisp. All we need is a pragmatic choice of methods and theories to get on in the world.