Subjective Welfarism, Communitarian Paternalism and the Aristotelian Quest for the Good Society

Abstract

In this essay, we examine the philosophical debate between advocates of liberal welfarism and communitarian paternalism on the role of the individual and the state in actualising the Aristotelian quest for the good society. The paternalistic implications of a state imposing a general conception of the good on individuals’ personal and subjective inclinations were examined, against the welfarist’s exaltation of the private preferences of individual citizens as the only justifiable platform for the legitimacy of government decisions, legislations and policies. While admitting with the subjective welfarists that each individual has his/her own autonomous vision of a good society and the good life, the essay contends that such autonomy can only be formulated within the ambit of state protectionism and that this provides the basis for government’s regulation and intervention in the processes of preference formation. Resolving the controversy between subjective welfarism and communitarian paternalism on the role of the individual and the state, in the quest for the good life and the good society would, the essay concludes, require more empirical arguments than what both the subjective liberal welfarists and the communitarian paternalists have so far felt disposed to provide.

Key Words: Ethics, Politics, The good society, Paternalism, Subjective welfarism,