



Tanzania Journal of Community Development (TAJOCODE)



Online: ISSN 2773-675X
Copyright @ TAJOCODE

The Journal that advances the profession and practice of Community Development



JOURNAL INFORMATION

The Department of Agricultural Extension and Community Development owns as well as offers its expertise and oversees the management and the review process of the journal. Even though, editorial decisions are based on the quality of submissions and appropriate peer review, rather than on any political, financial, or personal influences from the department, Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA), and other stakeholders. TAJOCODE follows Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) guidelines (visit www.publicationethics.org for details) to manage its peer-review process. All authors are welcome to submit complaints and appeals to the editor's decisions. Please contact the Chief Editors for any queries.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Chief Editors:

- Dr. Rasel Mpuya Madaha (PhD), *Sokoine University of Agriculture, Tanzania*,
Email: rasel.madaha@sua.ac.tz
- Dr. Regina Malima (PhD), *the Open University of Tanzania*
Email: reginamalima@out.ac.tz or regina.malima@yahoo.co.uk

Associate Editors

- Dr. Ponsian Sewando (Tengeru Institute of Community Development-TICD: ponsiansewando@gmail.com)
- Novatus Justinian Kaijage (Community Health and Social Welfare Africa, COMHESWA: kaijagecd@yahoo.com)

Other Members of the Editorial Board

- James O. Bukenya, Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics and Director of the Office of Research Compliance at Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University (AAMU), P. O. Box 1042 Normal, AL 35762, P. O. Box 1042 Dawson Building Rm 316K | Alabama A&M University | Normal, AL 35762 (office) 256-372-5729 | (fax) 256-372-5906 email:james.bukenya@aamu.edu
- Krijn Peters (Associate Professor in Post-war Reconstruction, Rural Development and Transport Services, Department of Political & Cultural Studies, Swansea University, James Callaghan Building, Singleton Park, Swansea SA2 8PP, Wales, UK. Tel (44) (0)1792 295183, K.Peters@swansea.ac.uk)
- Prof. Nyankomo Marwa, Professor of Development Finance and Econometrics at the University of Stellenbosch Business School, as well as visiting Professor at University of New Brunswick and the University of Saskatchewan, Canada as well as the Mwalimu Nyerere University of Science and Technology, Tanzania, Email nyankomo@usb.ac.za and nyankomo.marwa@gmail.com
- Robin Neustaeter, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Adult Education, Program Teaching Staff, Coady International Institute, St. Francis Xavier University, 4545 Alumni Cres., P.O. Box 5000, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada, B2G 2W5: rneustae@stfx.ca)
- David James Manyerere, Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at Mkwawa University College of Education (A Constituent College of the University of Dar es Salaam). Email: davidmanyerere@gmail.com/manyerere@muce.ac.tz
- Brianne Peters. Brianne is an expert on Asset Based and Citizenled Development (ABCD) and Program Teaching Staff at Coady International Institute St. Francis Xavier University, bpeters@stfx.ca
- Zena M. Mabeyo (PhD)Senior Lecturer, Ag.Deputy Rector, Planning Finance and Administration, Institute of Social Work, P.O.Box 3375, Dar es Salaam. East African Regional Representative - Association of Schools of Social Work in Africa (ASSWA) Emails: mabeyo@isw.ac.tz and Zlyuwo@yahoo.com
- Solomon Mhango (Agricultural innovations and Gender, Tengeru Institute of Community Development-TICD: mhangos2004@yahoo.co.uk)
- Elimeleck Parmena Akyoo (Senior Lecturer, Tanzania Institute of Accountancy-TIA: eparmena@gmail.com)
- Respikius Martin (Senior Lecturer, Sokoine University of Agriculture-SUA: rmartin@sua.ac.tz)
- Godfrey Martin Mubyazi, Chief Research Scientist (Head), Department of Library, Medical Museums & Publications (Since April 2021), (Former Head), Department of Health Systems & Policy Research (2010 - March 2021), (Currently & Newly Appointed): Editor-In-Chief, Tanzania Journal of Health Research (TJHR), National Institute for Medical

Research (NIMR) 3 Barack Obama Drive P.O Box 9653, 11101 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, email: godfrey.mubyazi@nimr.or.tz and gmmubyazi@gmail.com

- Mirau Mbise, Lecturer in Economics at Mkwawa University College of Education (A Constituent College of the University of Dar es Salaam), email mirau2010@gmail.com
- Japhace Ponsian,, Senior Lecturer of Political Economy, extractive governance, and Community Engagement at Mkwawa University College of Education (MUCE), Email jponcian@yahoo.co.uk
- Msaki Juda Leonard, Senior Lecturer Finance & Economic Systems Researcher/Consultant Banking & Finance | MoCU [University], minajuda@yahoo.com and jmsaki@gmail.com
- Chakupewa Joseph Mpambije, Senior Lecturer of History, Political Science, Health systems, local government reforms, and Development Studies at Mkwawa University College of Education (MUCE), Email chakjomba@yahoo.com
- Dr. Boniphace Shimba Francis, Lecturer of Political Economy and Management Science, the University of Dodoma, Email: shimbabony@gmail.com
- Amon Exavery, Statistics, Epidemiology, and economics. Senior Research & Learning Advisor at Pact/Tanzania, Plot No 1387c, Uporoto St, Dar es Salaam, email: amonexavery@gmail.com
- Gabriel K. Nzalayaimisi(Ph.D) Senior Lecturer, Sokoine University of Agriculture-ganzalayaimisi@yahoo.co.uk
- Dr. Boniphace Shimba Francis, Lecturer of Political Economy and Management Science, the University of Dodoma, Email: shimbabony@gmail.com
- Dr Lancina Doumbia, University of Sciences, Techniques and Technology of Bamako (USTTB) (Mali), ldoumbia007@gmail.com, Cell: +22376429139
- Rose Mtei (Ph.D ongoing), Tengeru Institute of Community Development-TICD: mteirose@gmail.com
- Juma Almas Mhina, (Ph.D ongoing), Tengeru Institute of Community Development-TICD: mhinaa75@gmail.com and juma@ticd.ac.tz- Ph.D. Ongoing

Information on submission

TAJOCODE is a peer reviewed journal. Visit journal's website for details <https://www.coa.sua.ac.tz/extension/tanzania-journal-of-community-development-tajocode>

DISCLAIMER

The Editorial Board, TAJOCODE, CODEPATA, Department of Agricultural Extension and Community Development of SUA and our publishers (referred to as the organs of the journal) make every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "content") contained in our publication. However, the mentioned organs, our agents, and our licensors make no representation or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the content. Any views and opinions expressed in this publication are the opinion and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by the organs of the journal. The accuracy of the contents should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. The organs of the journal should not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, or other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the content. Other details about the journal can be accessed at <https://www.coa.sua.ac.tz/extension/tanzania-journal-of-community-development-tajocode>

The East African Community And The Democratic Republic Of Congo Stability: A Reflection Of The Third Inter-Congolese Nairobi Peace Process

Dr. Philemon Sengati Lugumiliza¹

Abstract

Article history

Received:14/10/23

Revised: 22/11/23

Accepted:23/11/23

Published online:

15/12/23

Keywords: The East African Community, Democratic Republic of Congo & the third inter-Congolese Nairobi Peace Process

This paper analysed the extent to which the East African Community, is effective for the Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C) peace, specifically the 2022 third inter-Congolese Nairobi Peace Process. The data were collected through documentary review and analysed by qualitative thematic descriptive approach. Data revealed, the third Congolese Nairobi Peace Process is unique as it brought together armed groups, civil societies, and victims of sexual violence with the D.R.C government. Auspicious inferences were derived in the negotiation, including prisoners of war with no criminal records of atrocities being released. Armed groups incorporated into the National Force. Citizens of Eastern region be given opportunities in D.R.C.'s territories. Communities residing around national parks be engaged in eco-friendly projects and keep them at the heart of the conservation. The involvement of local Community in benefits from mining, and employment of diplomatic and coercive measures to enforce Peace were approved. The paper recommends, enhanced commitment from Rwanda and Uganda, who are peace spoilers in the region. while, the international community should exert diplomatic and political pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to support Peace Process. At the same time, imperialist powers, the U.S.A. and China refrain from their vested interests in D.R.C.

¹ Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dodoma
P.O Box 259 Dodoma, Tanzania, Contacts: +255 764 936 878, Email: philemonsengati@gmail.com

1.0. Introduction

The E.A.C. is a sub-regional organization founded in Arusha on November 30, 1999, after the signing of the Treaty following the dissolution of the former E.A.C. in 1977 (Kamanga, 2015). The Treaty for establishing the E.A.C. entered into force on July 7, 2000, and a new regional organization, the E.A.C., came into being with three member states: Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Other states that joined the E.A.C. include Rwanda, Burundi, and the Republic of South Sudan. The Community's newest member, the Democratic Republic of Congo, acceded to the E.A.C. Treaty on April 8 2022 and became a full member on July 11 2022. Some benefits that catalysed the D.R.C. to join the E.A.C. include more substantial market access, increased infrastructure development, and enhanced security (E.A.C. Charter, 1999). This is a nexus to the fact that amongst the core objectives of the E.A.C. is to promote Peace, security and stability in region, taking into account that, without security, social, political and economic development remains absurd (E.A.C. Treaty, 1999).

The D.R.C. is in the E.A.C.; its history is replete with tremendous conflicts even before its independence in 1960. The roots of the Democratic Republic of Congo's (D.R.C.) conflict can be traced back to the country's colonial history, this significantly shaped the country's current conflict. Under Belgian rule, the D.R.C. was subjected to brutal exploitation, with its vast natural resources extracted for a small colonial elite (Hochschild, 1996). This led to widespread resentment and a lack of trust in authority that persists to this day. Moreover, the colonial authorities imposed a system of ethnic discrimination that exacerbated existing tensions between different groups (Mamdani, 2004). Besides, in the aftermath of independence in 1960, the D.R.C. became a battleground in the Cold War, as various factions vied for power and aligned themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union (Gautz, 2008). The involvement of foreign powers also led to the proliferation of armed groups, many of which continue to operate today.

Furthermore, ethnic Tensions is another reason for perpetual conflicts, the region is home to a diverse population of over 250 ethnic groups, some of which have long-standing grievances and rivalries (Young, 1998). These ethnic tensions have been exploited by armed groups, who use them to mobilize support and justify their actions. The conflict in eastern part, for instance, has been partly fuelled by ethnic clashes between the Tutsi and Hutu communities (Reyntjens, 2009). While resource exploitation by diverse interests causes conflict, the country is incredibly rich in natural resources, including gold, cobalt, and diamonds. This wealth has attracted armed groups and foreign corporations, leading to conflicts over control of these resources (Global Witness, 2004). The illegal exploitation of these resources has also contributed to environmental degradation and human rights abuses (Perfumo, 2010). Lastly, the Weak and corrupt governance has been a persistent problem in the D.R.C. since independence (de Smet, 2013). This has led to widespread poverty, lack of access to essential services, and a lack of trust in government institutions by citizens and stakeholders.

The D.R.C most recent conflict (2022) is echoed by strained relations between D.R.C. and Rwanda, where Rwanda is condemned for supporting the March 23 2000 rebel group (M23), which brought the two countries close to open conflict. Increasing confrontations between the two countries lead to a new violent escalation. Surprisingly, Kigali has not ruled out the prospect of its troops intervening in Congolese territory in the name of preventing the Hutu who fled to D.R.C. after the 1994 genocide from overthrowing Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Wathrill, 2023).

President Paul Kagame has been for a long time pessimistic that the ultimate intent of the Rwandan Hutu leaders residing in D.R.C. is to take over power from the Rwandese Patriotic Front and regain control of Rwanda (Adelmen, 1997). The hostilities between the two countries have

negatively affected international relations between other E.A.C. member states currently involved in joint military operations against the M23, which is an indirect pushback against Rwandan interests. This was demonstrated by the poor relations between Tanzania and Rwanda in 2013 when Kikwete, the then President of the United Republic of Tanzania, advised President Kagame to sit down with D.R.C. rebels and resolve their differences. Kagame could not welcome the proposal, culminating in a fracture in the E.A.C. and a new relation that segregated Tanzania was initiated between Kenya and Rwanda and later on Uganda, named Coalition of the Willing (the New African Report, 2019).

The conflict has resulted in the widespread displacement of millions of people, both internally and externally. In 2002, it was estimated that there were over 3.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country and over 400,000 refugees in neighbouring countries (U.N.H.C.R., 2002). Widespread human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, rape, and torture, have characterized the conflict. The United Nations has documented numerous human rights violations committed by all parties to the conflict (U.N. Human Rights Office, 2002). Furthermore; the conflict has severely impacted the D.R.C.'s economy, leading to widespread poverty and underdevelopment whereby in 2002, the country's G.D.P. per capita was just \$170 (World Bank, 2002).

There are several efforts to mitigate the conflicts, and records indicate that the United Nations' involvement in the D.R.C. conflict management has been remarkable but insignificant in terms of outcome. The first U.N. mission involved 15,000 peacekeepers sent after the newly independent country had asked for help to resist the Belgian troops that had colluded with Moise Tshombe, the then Katanga province governor, who had established a secessionist government in the Katanga province (Knaup, 2008). The U.N. troops helped calm the tension, and it was the first U.N. mission witnessed within the country. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (M.O.N.U.C.) is another U.N. mission in the D.R.C. which started operating in 2001. It was when Joseph Kabila signed a peace agreement with Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw from D.R.C. The resultant United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279 established M.O.N.U.C., under which the U.N. force deployed 17,000 personnel in the country. This was a plan to observe the ceasefire, disengagement of forces and maintenance of liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. Later, in a series of resolutions, the Council expanded the mandate of M.O.N.U.C. to the supervision of the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and assigned multiple related additional tasks. In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1925 of May 28 2010, M.O.N.U.C. was renamed as of July 1 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (M.O.N.U.S.C.O.) to reflect the new phase of operations reached in the country (Stephen, 2008).

The First Nairobi Peace Process was launched in 1999, a response to the first Congolese war, by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (I.C.G.L.R.). It had the participation of several African countries, including Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania. The process aimed to unite the conflicting parties and address the underlying political, economic, and social issues that fuelled the conflict while promoting Peace and stability in D.R.C Region (Nyamwange & Muhereza, 2017). It was characterized by several stages, including establishing a Joint Military Commission (J.M.C.) to monitor the ceasefire and disarmament, a political committee to facilitate political negotiations, and a Humanitarian Working Group to address the humanitarian crisis in the conflict-affected areas. The process also involved facilitating dialogue and negotiations between the conflicting parties, which led to the signing of several agreements, including the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed on July 10, 1999, in Lusaka, Zambia and involved key stakeholders, including the government of the D.R.C., rebel groups, neighbouring countries, and international organizations. The agreement emphasized the need for

an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the D.R.C., where its primary responsibility was to monitor compliance with the ceasefire, investigate violations, and facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (D.D.R.) of armed groups (Johnson, 2005).

The second E.A.C. effort was anchored to facilitate the negotiations between the D.R.C. and Rwanda, which led to the normalization of relations between the two countries and resulted in the signing of the Nairobi Declaration in 2007. This (2007) Nairobi Declaration marked the establishment of a joint verification mechanism to monitor the common border, which helped to reduce tensions and promote stability in the region (Nyamwange & Muhereza, 2017). The Humanitarian Working Group, part of the Nairobi Process, helped coordinate relief efforts, assist affected communities, reduce suffering, and promote regional stability (Kabemba, 2015). It also facilitated the withdrawal of foreign troops from the D.R.C., the disarmament of rebel groups, and the integration of former combatants into the national army. These steps helped to reduce violence and promote stability in the region (Lacher & Vlassenroot, 2011).

The third inter-Congolese dialogue held under the EAC-led Nairobi process on restoring Peace and security in the eastern D.R.C. was convened in Nairobi, Kenya, from November 28 to December 6 2022, in a warm and cordial atmosphere. President (Rtd) Uhuru Kenyatta, the facilitator of the EAC-led Nairobi process, held consultative meetings with the armed groups, civil society groups, and victims of sexual violence, resulting in the following agreements; a committee comprising representatives of the affected communities, E.A.C., and the D.R.C. government be constituted, to facilitate the release of prisoners with no criminal records of atrocities and criminal convictions, a fully funded P-DDRCS (The national strategy for the implementation of the Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration, Community Recovery and Stabilization Program for ex-combatants) to ensure a successful outcome of the EAC-led Nairobi process, to appeal to the international Community to support the government of D.R.C. in the implementation of the roadmap arising out of the EAC-led Nairobi process, including support to P-DDRCS as well as the continued cessation of hostilities and the release of child soldiers and access to humanitarian aid (The East African, 2023, June 13).

The third Inter-Congolese Peace Process, has brought a degree of stability to the country despite its significant challenges in achieving lasting Peace and prosperity. While the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has decreased significantly since the signing of the accord, there are still an estimated 2.2 million IDPs in the D.R.C. (U.N.H.C.R., 2023). Human rights abuses continue to be a significant problem in the D.R.C., although their frequency has decreased somewhat since the end of the large-scale conflict. The United Nations has continued to document instances of human rights violations, particularly in eastern D.R.C. (U.N. Human Rights Office, 2023). The D.R.C.'s economy has shown some signs of recovery since the cease of the conflict, but it remains potential to conflict and one of the poorest countries in the world. 2023, the country's G.D.P. per capita is estimated to be \$520 (World Bank, 2023). It is perplexing that a lot is done. However, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has continued to be a ground for armed contestation and has remained in a vicious cycle of conflict (Clark, 2022). This paper assessed the third inter-Congolese EAC-led Nairobi peace process as the most recent effort to determine its potential for the D.R.C. peace and stability.

2.0. Methodology

The study was conducted as desk-based research, which involved reviewing and assessing various documentary sources containing secondary information related to the role of East Africa in mitigating the D.R.C. conflict, a reflection of the Nairobi Peace Accord. These included, amongst other things, journal articles, periodicals, proceedings, magazines, newsletters,

websites, newspapers, working papers, books, election Acts, thesis, and reports from various stakeholders concerning the subject investigated. The study employed the qualitative analysis technique because it provided an in-depth understanding of a social phenomenon from 2013 to date. Data was analysed through content analysis. The major substance of content analysis is communications (Babbie, 1992). Despite drawbacks of content analysis, such as being limited to the examination of recorded communications and the possibility of the problem of validity and reliability. Although it also has some merits in terms of validity and reliability., The advantages of it, which outweigh its demerits, emphasized its use in this study. Such advantages include its being economical in terms of time, money, and resources such as staff; safety, i.e., it is easier for partial or complete replicability; allows one to study processes occurring over long periods; and it is unobtrusive, i.e., seldom has any effect on the subject being studied.

2.1. Theoretical and Empirical Explanation

2.1.1. Theoretical Perspective

The theoretical perspective guiding an assessment of the East African Community in the stability of the D.R.C., specifically the Nairobi Peace Process, can be approached from multiple angles. This paper employed a regional integration theory. According to this theory, regional organizations such as the E.A.C. promote stability and Peace within their member states. Regional integration can foster peaceful relations and resolve conflict through economic cooperation, political dialogue, shared norms and security arrangements (Piccito, 2007). In the case of the D.R.C., the E.A.C.'s involvement in the Nairobi Peace Process can be seen as an attempt to address the root causes of instability and promote a regional approach to conflict resolution. Again, through this theory, one can argue that the E.A.C.'s efforts to integrate the D.R.C. into regional economic and political structures, as exemplified by the Nairobi Peace Process, may have positive implications for D.R.C. stability and Peace because the E.A.C.'s principles necessitate regional Peace for the social and economic development of which D.R.C. is part. Besides, the increased economic interdependence and political cooperation facilitated by the E.A.C. can contribute to Peace and stability in the D.R.C.

Literature indicates that the E.A.C. has been involved in peacebuilding efforts in the D.R.C. for many years, both the first (1999) International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the second (2007) Nairobi Peace processes anchored to facilitate the negotiations between the D.R.C. and Rwanda had favourable implication to the D.R.C. peace and stability (United Nations General Assembly, 2013). Through SADC in 2013, Tanzania, as a member of E.A.C., was involved in the D.R.C. Sengati (2017) argued that the potential for success of the Security Council Resolution number 2098 (2013) that mandated a few SADC countries, including Tanzania to intervene the D.R.C. conflict is totally dependent on the U.N. Security Council members' commitment specifically the U.S.A.

The 2022 Nairobi Peace Process brought together all the major stakeholders in the D.R.C. conflict, including the government, armed groups, and civil society. The process resulted in several important agreements, including a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the D.R.C., and the deployment of an E.A.C. peacekeeping force (Clark, 2022). Such an operation ought to be sensitive given that Rwanda, accused of stimulating the conflict, is an E.A.C. member state. Uganda, which is also in the bloc, has also been accused by D.R.C. of backing the rebels A.D.F. "Edgar Mateso, a civil society leader from North Kivu province and the epicentre of conflict in eastern Congo, " is sceptical of the E.A.C. intervention. "They are executioners who want to come as saviours," he said. "They will not have the support of the people." "If Rwanda, which is attacking us through the M23, and Uganda through the Allied Democratic Force (A.D.F.), contribute to this force, it will not be trustworthy, it will not be of any use," added Jean-Pierre Kasereka Maghetsi, an activist (The East Africa Analysis November 25, 2022).

However, the combination of military and diplomatic action facilitated by neutral state Kenya is a positive feature of the E.A.C.- Nairobi 2022 initiative, as pessimism and disagreement on implementation modality, can be charted out and rectified cordially by Kenya, a neutral player, after each annual assessment toward re-engagement (International Crisis, Group, 2022). However, there are several challenges that the E.A.C. will need to overcome in order to ensure that the peace process is successful. One challenge is the lack of trust between the government and armed groups. The behaviour of actors reflects this, as some could not participate in the peace negotiations table in 2022, claiming amnesty, the release of prisoners of war and integration into the government (The E.A.C. Report, 2022). Another challenge is the presence of foreign troops in the D.R.C., some believe, fuelling the conflict. This entails the SADC and M.O.N.U.S.C.O. troops (Knaup, 2008 & McKinley, 2020). Also, the active and illegal foreign armed groups operating on the soil of the DR Congo, including the following: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (F.D.L.R.), The Allied Democratic Forces (A.D.F.), The Lord's Resistance Army (L.R.A.) and the National Liberation Forces (Gates, 2002 & Kālu, 2019).

The presence of powerful external actors, such as Rwanda and Uganda, indirectly engaged in the D.R.C. has significantly impacted the country (Gachuruzi, 1999; Hayner, 2009 & Assefa, 1996). First, it has contributed to the destabilization of the D.R.C. by supporting rebel groups fighting against the government. This has prompted the eviction of millions of people, deaths, and the destruction of property. Second, grabbing the D.R.C.'s natural assets has deprived the country of much-needed revenue, which could have been used to develop the country and its citizens. Third, their involvement has undermined the D.R.C.'s sovereignty and contributed to the erosion of state institutions (Callamard, 1999). Notwithstanding the challenges, others (The E.A.C. Report, 2022; I.S.S., 2022 & International Crisis Group, 2022) argue that the third Nairobi Peace Process represents a significant step forward in bringing Peace to the D.R.C. The E.A.C. has shown that it is willing and able to play a leading role in peace-making in the region.

3.0. Results and Discussions

The third (2022) inter-Congolese Nairobi-led Peace Process is a continuation of the first (1999) and Second (2007) Nairobi Peace process. The negotiation was unique as it was facilitated by Uhuru Kenyatta, who then was Kenyan President and Chairman of the E.A.C. At the same time, essential actors were involved in the negotiation-peace process. Conceptually, it brought together armed groups, civil societies, victims of sexual violence, affected citizens and the government of the D.R.C. at the negotiation table. This implied positivity, as the inclusion of civil society, victims of sexual violence, and citizens never comprehensively featured in previous negotiations like the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and in the second E.A.C. peace process, which brought to the table only the government of D.R.C., rebel groups, neighbouring countries and International Organizations (Johnson, 2005).

However, the leadership of Kenya in the capacity of a facilitator is healthy, too, because historically, it has been a peacemaker and bilateral partner in terms of vested interest in the D.R.C. affairs. The Democratic Republic of Congo–Kenya relations are bilateral relations, and the D.R.C. is a strategic partner of Kenya in many areas, particularly trade and security. Kenya maintains an embassy in Kinshasa and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Nairobi. This brings hope and positive perceptions amongst D.R.C. citizens for Peace in the region (Amnesty International, 2022). The commitment of Kenya to Peace in D.R.C. was glimpsed in the opening remarks by Former President of Kenya Uhuru Kenyatta, speaking at the third inter-Congolese dialogue, who called on all parties to the conflict to open their minds to Peace and said foreign armed groups must be disbanded. "We are here as part of the East African Community to find a way and work with you to find Peace. A peace that the Congolese have not seen for more than 20 years,"

Kenyatta said in Swahili. "Some children have never set foot in a classroom because of the conflict, and some men never got the opportunity to farm their land to bring themselves out of poverty because of conflict" (The E.A.C. Report, 2023).

In the negotiations, it was concluded that prisoners of war with no criminal records of atrocities and criminal convictions should be released. Armed groups and their leaders should be incorporated into the National Force. This decision has released hostility and tension among citizens and armed groups. It has built solidarity, nationalism and patriotism for D.R.C. as a state, consequently mitigating the possibility of further escalations of conflicts. The integration of rebel groups into FARD (the Congolese National Force) has minimized a feeling of isolationism and exclusivity in the D.R.C. affairs, building a national team to contribute to D.R.C. prosperity, thus potentially to the sustainability of Peace in D.R.C.

It was also decided that citizens of the eastern D.R.C. be given opportunities in all the DRCs'145 territories. The citizen of Eastern D.R.C. is conceived to be an excluded war-prone territory and stereotyped as an unworthy citizen of the D.R.C. Equal treatment in terms of availing opportunity in the entire D.R.C. for citizens of eastern D.R.C. will mitigate a sense of dissatisfaction and ultimately create equal ground for each citizen in the country. This concurs with Mpangala (2004), who argues that stigma and exclusion are one of the sources of conflict.

Other decisions made are that communities residing around national parks should be engaged in eco-friendly projects and keep them at the heart of the conservation and involvement of the local Community in benefits from the mining industry in the region. This observation concurs with the view by Cyril (2014), who argues that forestry and mineral extraction by foreigners, which leave the natives poor, aggravate rivalry between citizens and government, ultimately fuelling the D.R.C. conflict. Such engagements will also moderate bad feelings amongst citizens against Rwanda and Uganda who are alleged to interfere in internal affairs and support rebel groups, the M23 and A.D.F., to spoil Peace in the D.R.C. for political and economic motives, particularly mineral extraction (Assefa, 1996; Gahuruzi, 1999 & Hayner, 2009).

Another important decision in the third Nairobi Peace process was to ensure the cession of hostility, as well as the release of child soldiers and access to humanitarian aid and to urge the international community to support the roadmap to Nairobi Led Peace Process (The East African Times, 2023). These are positive signals as the release of child soldiers would mitigate a web of continued breeds of rebels. At the same time, support from the U.S.A. and China, who have invested in D.R.C., would ensure adequate resources to implement the accords. Lastly, it was decided that the peace talks, under the guidance of Kenya, would be backed up by a threat of force against those who did not surrender. This is a unique blended strategy under Kenyatta's guidance. Kenya is leading the diplomatic and military efforts, and it is the first time the E.A.C. is sending troops to a member state. These initiatives have significantly promoted stability in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (I.S.S. Africa, 2022).

Comparatively, the third Nairobi Peace Process differ from what has been done previously; for example, The Nairobi Peace Process was more inclusive than previous peace processes. It involved all the major parties to the conflict and representatives from civil society and the international community (African Union, 2003). This inclusivity helped ensure that all stakeholders' interests were considered in the negotiations. The Nairobi Peace Process benefited from strong international support, with the African Union, the United Nations, and the East African Community playing central roles in facilitating the negotiations (East African Community, 2003). This international backing lent legitimacy to the process and provided crucial resources to ensure its effective implementation. Furthermore, The Nairobi Peace Process represented a significant shift

in the D.R.C.'s approach to peacebuilding, focusing on inclusivity, addressing root causes, and strong international support. The process achieved notable progress, laying the groundwork for further efforts towards lasting Peace and prosperity in the country.

Finally, it was decided that, the E.A.C. must ensure it has the financial, human and material resources necessary to implement the agreements reached in the Nairobi peace process. Otherwise, there were conceived challenges like lack of trust between the government and armed groups, the presence of foreign troops and external actors, and several other factors detected could affect the success of the Nairobi Peace Process. These include the willingness of the government and armed groups to implement the agreements that were reached in Nairobi. The ability of the E.A.C. to provide the necessary security and logistical support to the peacekeeping force and the level of international support for the peace process, particularly the United States of America. If these factors are addressed, the Nairobi Peace Process has a good chance of succeeding in bringing Peace to the D.R.C. (New Africa Report, 2019).

4.0. Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1. Conclusion

The paper infers that the East African Community's engagement in the third Nairobi Peace Process has significantly promoted stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo, thus demonstrating that regional cooperation and dialogue are crucial in addressing conflicts and encouraging long-term Peace and stability, including in the D.R.C. For instance, it has enhanced the prospect for Peace by being more inclusive and bringing the D.R.C. conflicting parties to the negotiating table. In the sense that, it involved all the major parties to the conflict and representatives from civil society and the international community. But also, the representatives of some M23 of the eastern D.R.C.'s and the countless armed rebel groups who concluded five days of negotiations with the government, civil society and citizens in Nairobi.

Furthermore, in the negotiations, it was concluded that prisoners of war with no criminal records of atrocities and criminal convictions be released. Armed groups and their leaders should be incorporated into the National Force. Citizens of the Eastern D.R.C. should be given opportunities in all the DRCs'145 territories. Communities residing around national parks should be engaged in Eco-friendly projects and keep them at the heart of the conservation. Other critical decision arrived at entails the involvement of the local Community in benefits from the mining industry in the region and the Cession of hostility as well as the release of child soldiers. At the same time, access to humanitarian aid and the urge to the international community to support the roadmap to the Nairobi-led peace process were categorical. Lastly, the employment of diplomatic and coercive measures to enforce Peace is unique as they could not feature in the First and Second Nairobi Peace negotiations but rather in the third. These initiatives have significantly promoted stability in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

The combination of military and diplomatic action is a positive feature of the E.A.C.- Nairobi initiative. The peace talks, under the aegis of Kenya, were backed up by a threat of force against those who did not surrender. This is a unique blended strategy, and under Kenyatta's guidance, Kenya is leading the diplomatic and military efforts, and it is the first time the E.A.C. is sending troops to a member state. At an E.A.C. summit days before, the presidents of Kenya, the D.R.C., Burundi and Uganda, plus Rwanda's foreign minister, committed and resolved to form an E.A.C. intervention force to go after those groups who continued fighting. The regional force (comprising contingents from Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan) will help the D.R.C.'s armed forces contain, defeat and eradicate "negative forces" in the east. The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (F.A.R.D.C.), with overall command of the operations, is an opportunity to demonstrate patriotism and enforce Peace where necessary.

The E.A.C., through the Nairobi Peace Process, has the potential to bring Peace to eastern D.R.C. because the process has the international Community's support. The E.A.C. has made a significant commitment to bring Peace to the D.R.C. to support the principles of its establishment, one of which is the maintenance of Peace and security within the region and the D.R.C. being one of its members. The United States of America has significantly supported the different phases of the E.A.C. efforts to bring Peace in the D.R.C. since the 1999 E.A.C. peace initiatives. Thus, this mission may be a make or break for the E.A.C.: collaboration between its member states and a lasting solution to the conflict in eastern Congo, which permits the D.R.C. to integrate into the regional bloc fully, would be a game changer of continental significance. However, there is also the risk that squabbling over their individual interests could doom the mission and undermine the progress the E.A.C. has made in recent years.

The E.A.C. force has a six-month renewable mandate subject to bi-monthly strategic reviews. This would also help change strategies and improve for real Peace in the D.R.C. This is healthy for Peace in eastern D.R.C. because it sets the ground for meditation and changing approach strategies ranging from continuing negotiations to employing force since both are allowed by the international Community (Chapters VI & VII) of the United Nations Charter. Article 2 (4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force and calls on all Members to respect other States' sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. In contrast, Article 51 states that nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations and defence of mandate until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international Peace and security (UN Charter, 1945).

If the Nairobi-EAC-led process is successful, it will be a significant victory for African Peace. The D.R.C. has had a continued history of conflicts since its independence (I.S.S. Africa, 2022, November 22). The success will send a message to the international community that Africa, particularly East Africa, can settle its problems internally without jeopardizing its sovereignty by allowing external intervention. However, even if the process is successful, the country needs more proactive strategies to build Peace (enhanced democracy and governance) because of a long history of conflict and instability in the region and to prevent violent relapse. Theoretically, this article shows the coherence within the actors as concerned with the conflict situation in the Eastern D.R.C. It infers that Peace and conflict in the D.R.C. are possible situations. The existence of Peace, thus a ruined conflict and vice versa, is dependent on the commitment of the East African Community currently to the Nairobi Peace Process and the support of other actors, Rwanda, the United States of America, and the Southern Africa Development Committees in the implementation process. Respectively, the lack of commitment from these critical actors, particularly the E.A.C., which D.R.C. has recently joined, can potentially jeopardize Peace, thus escalating more conflict in the region.

4.2. Recommendations

Most regional, global or sub-regional integration is rendered ineffective because of a lack of financial and human resources. Much work remains undone by the E.A.C. in addressing the underlying causes of conflict in the D.R.C. and ensuring ever-lasting Peace and stability in the region. Therefore, rather than depending on external resources, more independent financial and human resources are needed by East African Members involved in the peace-making and building process to fast-track and maintain Peace in the D.R.C. Therefore, continued support for fully implementing the Nairobi Peace Process agreements remains paramount for achieving lasting Peace and stability in the D.R.C. The international community should continue to provide financial and technical assistance to the D.R.C. government and civil society organizations to support this implementation process (U.N. Security Council, 2023).

The international community should continue putting pressure on Rwanda by employing diplomatic and political means to end its support for armed groups in the D.R.C. and promote ever-lasting Peace, security and stability, leaving D.R.C. sovereignty. This will eliminate the lamentations such as those made recently by the President of D.R.C., his Excellency Felix Tshisekedi, that "the East African Peacekeeping missions are ineffective in addressing the ongoing conflict. Hence, they are required to depart in June 2022. Furthermore, as coined by Pope Francis (a Roman Catholic Leader) during his visit in early February 2023, D.R.C., all imperialist powers must refrain from their vested interest in D.R.C. and leave the country with its sovereignty.

Economic inequality is another significant driver of conflict in the D.R.C. Addressing this issue necessitates promoting inclusive economic growth, providing opportunities for the poor and marginalized, and ensuring transparent and accountable management of the country's natural resources (Lordon & Mirza, 2022). Likewise, Peacebuilding is imperative for the sustainability of Peace in the D.R.C. The E.A.C. and the International Community will need to continue to work together to support the peace process and to build more sustainable Peace in the D.R.C. as post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives. This can be possible through promoting Reconciliation and healing, which requires addressing past human rights abuses, fostering tolerance and understanding between different groups, and supporting community-based peacebuilding initiatives (Sambamo et al., 2023). This should go with strengthening Democratic Institutions, as weak and corrupt democratic institutions have contributed to the D.R.C.'s instability. Strengthening these institutions requires a comprehensive approach that includes reforms to the judiciary, the police, and the electoral system (Verweij et al., 2022).

Lastly, Peace is vital for the D.R.C., E.A.C. region and global development and this call for cordiality of principle and behaviours amongst actors nationally, sub regionally and globally. Both D.R.C. internal actors', the East African Community currently in the Nairobi Peace Process and regional and international players like Rwanda, the United States of America, and the Southern Africa Development Committees need undoubtedly commitment in implementing the Nairobi peace process. Respectively, a lack of commitment from these critical actors, particularly the E.A.C., which D.R.C. has recently joined, has the potential to jeopardize Peace and thus escalate more conflict in the region. Moreover, addressing this conflict requires a regional approach that involves all countries in the Great Lakes region (International Crisis Group, 2023).

5.0. References

- Adelman, H (1997). A framework for Conflict Resolution: Peacebuilding and National Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: Toronto Centre for International and Society Studies, York University.
- Amnesty International (2022). North-Kivu: no end to war on women and children. <http://www.amnesty.org>
- Assefa, H. (1996). Peace and Reconciliation as a paradigm; A Philosophy of Peace and its implication for the conflict, Governance and Economic Growth. Kampala- East African Publishers.
- Babbie E (1992), The Practices of Social Research, 6th edition, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- B.B.C. News (2013), the President Obama Visit to Tanzania. A speech Delivered on April 17 2013. Dar es Salaam-Tanzania.
- Callamard, A. (1999). "French Policy in Africa". In the Path of the Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. Nordic Africa Institute.
- Clark, J. (April 28, 2022). Few optimistic about D.R.C. peace talks in Kenya. D.W. <https://www.dw.com/en/few-optimistic-about-drc-peace-talks-in-kenya/a-61620879>

- Cyril, M (2014). The D.R.C. and its Neighborhood: The Political Economy of Peace. South Africa Policy Brief 109.
- Davis, L. (2006), *Difficulty Peace, Limited Justice: Ten years of peacekeeping in the D.R.C.*, Intaa'l Centre for Justice, 5 Honover Squire, New York.
- De Smet, S. (2013). *Patronage politics and state fragility in Africa: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Routledge.
- Gachuruzi (1999). *The Role of Zaire in the Rwandise Conflict* in Adelman H and A. Suhrke (eds): New Brunswick; Transactional Publishers.
- Gates, S. S. (2002). *Uganda's role in the Congo conflict: A report to the human rights and civic education resource centre*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/uganda/>
- Gatz, J. A. (2008). *General Mobutu and the fall of Zaire: A political biography*. University of Rochester Press.
- Global Witness (2004). *Rape for profit: The exploitation of women in eastern Congo's war*. Global Witness.
- Hayner, P. (2009). *Small Steps Large Hurdles: The E.U.s' Role Promoting Justice and Peace Making in D.R.C*. International Centre for Transnational Justice.
- Hochschild, A. C. (1996). *King Leopold's ghost: A story of greed, human folly, and the remaking of a continent*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Holst, L. (1994). *Early Warning and Conflict Management in Joint evaluation in emerging assistance to Rwanda. Lessons from the Rwandise experience*, Copenhagen: Danida.
- Human Rights Watch. (2001). *Uganda in the Congo: Fueling political and military conflicts*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/africa/congo-bck1031.htm>
- Human Rights Watch. (2020). *Democratic Republic of Congo*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/africa/democratic-republic-congo>
- International Crisis Group (2023). *The Democratic Republic of Congo: The Persisting Crisis in Eastern D.R.C*. Africa Report No. 342.
- International Crisis Group. (2001). *The DR Congo and Uganda: A flawed peace process*. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-and-uganda-flawed-peace-process>
- International Crisis Group. (2022). *Congo-Uganda Relations: A Steady Slide Towards Crisis*. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/310-congo-uganda-relations-steady-slide-towards-crisis>
- I.S.S. Africa. (2022, November 22). *Eastern D.R.C. peace processes miss the mark*. I.S.S. Today. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eastern-drc-peace-processes-miss-the-mark>
- Johnson, A. (2005). *The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement: A Path to Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 32(4), 567-589.
- Johnson, A. (2007). *The Global and Inclusive Agreement of 2002: A Pathway to Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 32(4), 567-589.
- Kabemba, C. (2015). *From conflict to dialogue: The I.C.G.L.R.'s initiatives in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9(3), 472-488.
- Kalu, O. (2019). *Regional organizations and conflict management in Africa: the case of SADC in the D.R.C*. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 54(1), 33-47.
- Kamanga K (2015). *"General Principles Governing E.A.C. Integration"*, E & D Ltd., Dar Es Salaam
- King, A. (1997). *Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo; The Ruzizi Plain*. African Report N 206, July 2013.
- Knaup, H. (2008), *Chaos in Congo UN Peacekeepers Credibility is Damaged*, November 3, 2008, Security Council Congo.
- Lacher, W., & Vlassenroot, K. (2011). *The politics of identifying (with) the Other: Rethinking the peacebuilding agenda in the African Great Lakes*. *African Affairs*, 110(438), 563-582.
- London, M., & Mirza, S. (2022). *The political economy of Peace and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. *Journal of International Relations*, 54(2), 449-483.

- Mamdani, M. (2004). When victims become perpetrators: Northern Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army. James Currey Publishers.
- Mbazira, C., & Murison, J. (2004). The global and inclusive agreement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A critical analysis. *Journal of African Law*, 48(1), 1-25. doi: 10.1017/S0021855304000018
- McKinley, T., & Cohn, S. (2020). The Coltan Conundrum: How Western Demand for Coltan is Driving
- Mpangala, G. (2004), Origin of Political Conflicts and Peace Building in the Great Lakes Region, Tanzania. *A Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.5 No 3, pp 20-23
- Nassali, M. (2000), "The East African Community and the Struggle for Constitutionalism: Challenges and Prospects," in Issa G. Shivji (Ed.), *Constitutional Development in East Africa*, E & D Ltd., Dar Es Salaam.
- New Africa (April 26, 2019). At <https://newafricanmagazine.com/18699>
- Nyamwange, D., & Muhereza, F. (2017). Role of the East African Community in the Democratic Republic of Congo stability: A reflection of the Nairobi peace process. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 11(1), 1-9. doi: 10.5897/AJPSIR2016.0916
- Palmer, J. and Perkins, A. (2002), *International Relations*. A.I.T.B.S Publishers and Distributors, Delhi, India
- Perfumo, A. (2010). *Blood diamonds and the rise of the War Machine: A journey into the heart of Africa's brutal conflict*. Doubleday Canada.
- Piccio, A. (2007), *Conflict Prevention and Development Corporation in Africa: Unpublished Paper on Policy Workshop*. J.I.C.A. November 2007
- Prunier, G (2009). *African World War. Congo, the Rwandan Genocide and the Making of the Continental catastrophe*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Reyntjens, F. (2009). *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A history*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sambamo, M. N., et al. (2023). Promoting Reconciliation and healing in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A review of challenges and opportunities. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 18(1), 1-18.
- Stedman, J. (1997), *Spoilers Problem in Peace Process: A Journal of International Security*, Vol.22, No 2, pp5-53
- Stephen, G. (2008). *Causes of the Congolese civil Wars and their implications for Humanitarian assistance*. Cologne University Press.
- The African Report (16 June, 2015). [Http://www.theafricanreport.com/2895/paul kagame vs jakaya kikwete](http://www.theafricanreport.com/2895/paul%20kagame%20vs%20jakaya%20kikwete)
- The East African Community Treaty (1999).
- The East African Community. (2023, June 13). *Kenyatta: D.R.C. talks to continue under Nairobi, Luanda processes*. <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyatta-says-drc-peace-restoration-talks-to-resume-4185714>
- The East African Report. (2022). [Httpswww.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/11/25/East African. force](https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/11/25/East-African-force)
- The U.N. Report (2011), *The United Nations Security Council Resolution No 1991*. New York-USA
- UN Human Rights Office (2002). *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Retrieved from: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf
- U.N. Human Rights Office (2023). *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2023/call-inputs-preparation-2023-report-united-nations-high-commissioner-human>

- U.N. Security Council (2023). Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. New York: United Nations.
- U.N. Security Council. (2019). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. United Nations.
- U.N.H.C.R. (2002). Democratic Republic of the Congo - Statistics on refugees and internally displaced persons. Retrieved from: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/drc>
- U.N.H.C.R. (2023). Democratic Republic of the Congo - Statistics on refugees and internally displaced persons. Retrieved from: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/99513>
- United Nations General Assembly. (2013). Causes of conflict and the promotion of durable Peace and sustainable development in Africa. New York: United Nations
- Verweij, M., et al. (2022). Strengthening democratic institutions in fragile states: A comparative analysis of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 27(1), 1-22.
- Wathii, J. T. (2023). The African Union, regional economic communities, and peacekeeping in Africa: Time for a rethink. *Journal of African Law*, 57(2), 223-248.
- Wendt, A. (1994), Collective Identity Formation and the International State; *African Political Science Review*, Vol.88, No.2, pp 384-396
- World Bank (2002). World Development Indicators 2002. Retrieved from: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documentsreports/documentdetail/475281468159895302/world-development-indicators-2002>
- World Bank (2023). World Development Indicators 2023. Retrieved from: <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/>
- Young, C. (1998). The politics of cultural pluralism in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *African Studies Review*, 42(2), 1-70.

Policy Brief

The Democratic Republic Congo's Conflict is one of the longest conflict in Africa and presents a shame not only to the East Africa, but for Africa and International Community at large. This study assessed the potentiality of the Third Nairobi Peace process to mitigate this longstanding conflict. Despite the fact that the third Nairobi peace process is new (2022 –To date) but it presents a significant policy, practical and knowledge contribution to handle the respective and comparable conflicts around the world:

Most regional, global or sub-regional integrations are rendered ineffective because of lack of financial, materials and human resources. Much work remains undone by the East African Community (E.A.C). in addressing the underlying causes of conflict in the D.R.C. and ensuring ever-lasting Peace and stability in the region. It is therefore imperative for key player to support implementation of this inter-Congolese Nairobi peace process in terms of supporting it with the necessary financial and human resources which practically calls for political willingness and commitment mostly from leaders and actors within and outside the conflict zone particularly individuals, states, non-governmental organizations and international organizations.

The wide inclusion of prayers in the Nairobi peace process was inevitable for amicable resolution of the conflicts. The third inter-Congolese Nairobi Peace Process was more inclusive than previous peace processes. It involved all the major parties to the conflict and representatives from civil society and the international community. This inclusivity helped ensure that all stakeholders' interests were considered in the negotiations to sustainably ending the DRC inter-state and intra state conflicts. Therefore, inclusive policy as part of good governance are imperative for peace and stability among people within the international system including the DRC.

It is enriching to conceptualize that, Peace spoilers in conflict around the world are either explicit or implicit positioned, there is a need for cooperative effort to identify, condemn and punish them under international legal procedure. The international community should continue putting pressure on Rwanda and Uganda by employing diplomatic and political means to end its support for armed groups in the D.R.C. and promote ever-lasting Peace, security and stability, leaving D.R.C. sovereignty. This will enable the country to diversify development agenda and possibly implement them effectively for the DRC prosperity.

A blended approach in terms of employing both diplomatic and coercive measure to enforce peace is crucial in the world. The inter-Congolese led peace process utilized this strategy and enabled to help facilitate peace and this is the first innovative attempt in the D.R.C region by the EAC. Economic inequality is another significant driver of conflict in the world and Africa this is evident in the D.R.C. Addressing this issue by promoting inclusive economic growth, providing opportunities for the poor and marginalized, and ensuring transparent and accountable management of the country's natural resources is core for sustainable peace in DRC and world at large.

Lastly peace and development are like egg and chick, therefore, this call for collaboration amongst actors nationally, sub regionally and globally on a liberal basis to tackle state, sub regional, regional and global conflicts. Both the D.R.C. internal actors', the E.A.C, currently in the form of the Nairobi Peace Process and regional and international players like Rwanda, Uganda, China, the United States of America, and the Southern Africa Development Committees need undoubtedly commitment in implementing the Nairobi peace process. Respectively, a lack of commitment from these essential actors, particularly members of the E.A.C., which D.R.C. has recently joined, has the potential to jeopardize Peace and thus escalate more conflicts in the region.