A critique of Scheler’s emotional intuitionism

Abstract

Axiology or Theory of Value is a branch of Philosophy which has in its own way, elicited profound interest and polemic This interest in axiology became quite profound in the 19th and 20th centuries However, Risieri Frondizi makes us to understand that Alexius Von Meinong was not the initiator of this branch of Philosophy as held by some authors. Just like any other branch of Philosophy, axiology is polarized into two dominant Philosophical views, namely: the objectivist view, and the subjectivist view. The objectivists hold the cognition of value to be Independent of both object and subject, as well as having empirical provability. The subjectivist on the other hand, holds value to be dependent on both object and the feelings of the subject concerned. This work attempted a detailed exposition of Max Scheler’s axiology. Scheler, it should be noted, is an objectivist; he is of Husserl’s phenomenological persuasion or tradition. Scheler’s input in axiology is epitomized in his Emotional Intuitionism postulation. This work then, featured an analysed critique of Scheler’s position, based on his views as put forward by R. Frondizi in his book What is value: An introduction to axiology.

Keywords: emotional institutionalism, axiology, theory of value, phenomenological disposition