"The nature of morality‟ in Gilbert Harman: As appraisal

Abstract

This study examines Gilbert Harman's submission that moral beliefs are incapable of the sort of empirical confirmation characteristic of scientific beliefs, in his work, "The Nature of Morality.‟ This study argues that the incapability of moral beliefs to be empirically confirmed characteristic of scientific beliefs, as espoused by Harman has not undermined the nature of moral beliefs and the existence of moral universe. Nevertheless, the study concedes that the fact that liar man's grounds are appealing, his claim is insufficient. The study will conclude that moral beliefs cannot be reduced to nothingness: because moral beliefs need not be empirically confirmed; a formal relationship between moral beliefs and empirical confirmation is not a matter of necessity: and, moral beliefs have independent existence from scientific observation. The method of philosophical exposition and analysis will be employed.

Key Words: Morality, Science, Confirmation, Moral universe. Empirical universe