Sartre’s Contingency of Being and Asouzu’s Principle of Causality

Abstract

The position of this work is that all contingent beings have a causal agent. This position is taken as a result of trying to delve into the issue of contingency and causality of being which has been discussed by many philosophers of diverse epochs of philosophy. This work tries to participate in the debate of whether contingent beings are caused by a necessary being or not. It has done this by critically analyzing the thoughts of both Sartre and Asouzu who are on the opposing sides of this debate. The work has discovered that Sartre did not see contingent beings as having a necessary cause but that they are just there. Whereas, Asouzu on the hand opines that contingent beings have a necessary being through which we can explain their existence. He made use of his ideas such as mutual relations, ihedi nwere isi na odu and missing link to substantiate his point. This work therefore concludes that no contingent being can be in existence without a necessary being; and that this necessary being that causes the existence of other beings is God. In this way, one can say that this work affirms creationism which Sartre was against.

Key Words: Being, Contingency, Causality, Missing-link, Necessary being, Nothingness.