Liberal Internationalism, Offensive Realism and Intelligence Liaison: The Case of the Israeli and South African Intelligence Services

Abstract

For better or worse, the study of International Relations continues to be marked by a protracted battle between two competing theories:  offensive realism and liberal internationalism. The study on which this article is based, sought to investigate which theory – offensive  realism or liberal internationalism – offers the most compelling explanation for the alliance formation between the intelligence services  of Israel and those of South Africa. In doing so, the study acknowledged the nuanced and multifaceted nature of intelligence liaison  within the broader framework of statecraft and foreign policy. Although scholars have indeed examined the explanatory merit of  offensive realism and liberal internationalism in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of (liberal) democratic and mixed (democratic  and non-democratic) dyads, attempts at bringing the two theories to bear on the interactions of intelligence services have not been  forthcoming, a shortcoming the current study attempted to address. This article therefore seeks to bridge this gap by presenting an  evaluation of the relative explanatory worth of offensive realism and liberal internationalism in accounting for the alliance formation of  the intelligence services of Israel and those of South Africa. The significance of the study lies in its examination of international politics  and realist thought within the realm of intelligence services. Throughout the article, we use “intelligence services” and “intelligence”  interchangeably. This approach helps bridge a gap in the existing literature by exploring the applicability of offensive realism and liberal  internationalism in explaining alliances between Israel and South Africa's intelligence services.