

RE-ORGANISING THE ACTIVE CITIZEN FORCE

Increasing numbers of Citizen Force personnel are completing their period of service and being discharged into the limbo of a general reserve. This seems a sad waste of trained personnel. A possible system whereby more efficient utilisation of such personnel could be achieved is outlined below:

1. Two years initial military service as a National Serviceman.
2. Service to age thirty with a Citizen Force regiment or commando.
3. Ten years in a regimental replacement unit, receiving limited refresher and conversion training as required, but not subject to camps or initial mobilisation. Subject to call up as required in time of war.
4. Ten years service in an affiliated or integral security unit responsible for rear areas security, VP protection, etc. Still receiving refresher training but also not subject to camps. Subject to mobilisation as required in time of war.
5. Ten years in general reserve for administrative duties. Some personnel could remain with their regiments in this role, others would serve with the territorial commands or local formation headquarters. Not subject to any call up except as required in time of war.

Personnel could, of course, volunteer to remain longer in a given category, up to a final age limit for that category which would depend partly on the position and rank held. Volunteers would be fitted into the system on a case by case basis. Personnel in categories 4. and 5. would, as far as possible, be called up on a part-time or shift basis rather than fulltime, so as to reduce economic disruption to a minimum. Younger personnel not, for reasons of employment or fitness, eligible for normal Citizen Force service as well as women could thus readily be absorbed in these categories.

A system such as that outlined above would provide for:

1. Longer retention and, thus, more effective utilisation of personnel.
2. More efficient utilisation of personnel by means of:
 - a. The regimental replacement units comprising personnel familiar with their regiments' traditions, procedures, habits and quirks as well as with each other.
 - b. Employing less fit and older personnel as well as personnel only available on a part-time basis for rear areas duties, thus freeing other personnel for first line duties.
3. The removal of any remaining stigma attached to rear areas, security and VP duties as the personnel involved would have previous service with the first line elements of their regiments.
4. Further bolstering of regimental traditions and *esprit de corps*.

Economic disruption should not be markedly increased by such a system as:

1. Personnel in categories 3,4 and 5 would only be called up infrequently and briefly.
2. The larger number of personnel available would allow part-time service in the case of many rear areas duties, thus reducing disruption.

Numerically the system could look as follows:ⁱ⁾

Service Category	Personnel
1. Initial	60 000 ^{ii) iii)}
2. First Line Regimental	300 000
3. Regimental Reserve	250 000 ^{iv) vii)}
4. Second Line Regimental	200 000 ^{v)}
5. General Reserve	100 000 ^{vi)}
Total	910 000 ⁱⁱ⁾

i) Based on a constant 30.000 pa call up and assuming sufficient years have passed to allow personnel to reach the final category. In fact by then population growth would have led to a

- higher call up and an increase in the early categories.
- ii) Plus Permanent Force personnel.
 - iii) Given two annual call ups, some 45.000 useable in combat.
 - iv) 2. less those volunteering to stay in category 2. and less those dropping out for medical, employment or other reasons.
 - v) 3. less 'drop-outs'.
 - iv) 4. less 'drop-outs'. A higher drop-out figure can be expected here, but there will in all probability be easily sufficient personnel available to fill those posts available to this category.
 - vii) These personnel could also, of course, be used to help form some additional units in time of war. What proportion are used for that purpose will depend upon available equipment and on whether a short sharp or long drawn out war is expected.

While such a system might at first sight seem to add considerably to administrative problems and costs, this should not, in fact, be the case. What additional workload arises should be readily absorbed by more efficient and streamlined personnel administration in peace time. In time of war, a system of this nature would, apart from its other benefits, serve to ease the administrative load.

Four other related aspects would appear to merit particular mention:

1. As population growth increases the number of personnel available, preference should as a rule be given to the formation of additional units within existing regiments rather than creating totally new entities.
2. There appears to be little reason why regiments should comprise only units of one specialisation within their arm (e.g. in the case of infantry, conventional or Counter Insurgency operations. A combination of differently specialised units of the same arm would not cause any insurmountable problems and could enhance regimental *esprit*, individual interest and morale as well as, not least, collective and individual flexibility of mind.

3. The advantages and benefits of regimental traditions and esprit could be further extended within the army by:
 - a Inducting National Servicemen via their future regiments. Personnel would thus be members of their regiments, wearing the appropriate badges, headgear, etc. and aware of their traditions from the beginning of their service.
 - b Providing for regimental affiliation of Permanent Force staff. In the long run Permanent Force personnel could join regiments in the same way as National Servicemen, only instead of going to the CF, they would remain with the army, serving only rarely with their regiments.
4. Posting Permanent Force and National Service personnel to Citizen Force regiments and units would tie in with 3b. above. Such a policy would also serve to enhance the efficiency of the army as a whole. Suitable posts could include Officer Commanding *or* Second-in-Command, Adjutant *or* Assistant Adjutant, Quartermaster *or* Assistant-Quartermaster, Instructing Officers *or* Instructing Sergeants and instructors. Not all or even the majority of posts would be so filled — only those requiring a permanent presence or where Citizen Force personnel are not available. The latter only until such personnel do become available, the former alternately, for example a Citizen Force, Second-in-Command taking over from a Permanent Force, Commanding Officer and being replaced by a Permanent Force Second-in-Command.

In a relatively small army such as ours it is of particular importance that the available personnel are administered and employed efficiently. It is the writer's hope that the above may serve to stimulate further thought in this direction.

H.R. Heitman.

INFANTERIE VERSUS KORPS VAN PROFESSIONELE OFFISIERS

Dit verbaas my dat *Militaria*, wat andersins 'n goeie standaard handhaaf, 'n artikel soos 'Die Akademies se plek in die SAW' (*Militaria* 8/4/1978) publi-

seer. Dat die Korps van Professionele Offisiere 'n plekkie onder die son en in die SAW verdien, word nie bevestig nie. Dit wil voorkom of die