Understanding the Linguistic Turn and the Quest for Meaning: Historical Perspectives and Systematic Considerations

Abstract

Although the linguistic turn is usually described in historical terms this article aims at combing the significant historical transitions with systematic philosophical considerations. Against the background of earlier rationalistic and empiricist trends particular attention is given to the successive epistemic ideals manifest in the conceptual rationalism of the Enlightenment, followed by the historicism of the 19th century and subsequently by the linguistic turn. An assessment of these transitions will explore systematic issues, in particular the relationship between universality and what is individual, the difference between functional laws and type laws, and regarding the limits of concept formation the distinction between conceptual knowledge and concept-transcending knowledge. This distinction enables the introduction of a new understanding of the difference between rationalism and irrationalism. Apart from Dilthey the linguistic turn penetrated also the thought of thinkers such as Freud, Wittgenstein, Frankl, Heidegger, Habermas, Dooyeweerd and Gadamer, all of them (implicitly or explicitly) elaborated the initial criticism raised by Herder, Jacobi, Hamann, Heidegger and Gadamer against Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason for neglecting language. After briefly referring to the
connection between the linguistic turn and the idea of the meaningful construction of reality, the article ends with a concluding remark  emphasizing the fact that no single concept-transcending usage of modal
(aspectual) terms should be elevated above others or employed at the cost of other equally legitimate idea-statements.