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Causal Co-personality: In defence of the psychological continuity theory
Abstract
The view that an account of personal identity can be provided in terms of
psychological continuity has come under fire from an interesting new angle
in recent years. Critics from a variety of rival positions have argued that it
cannot adequately explain what makes psychological states co-personal (i.e.
the states of a single person). The suggestion is that there will inevitably be
examples of states that it ascribes wrongly using only the causal connections
available to it. In this paper, I describe three distinct attacks on the psychological continuity theory along these lines. While I acknowledge that a number of interesting issues arise, I argue that the theory can withstand all three attacks.
psychological continuity has come under fire from an interesting new angle
in recent years. Critics from a variety of rival positions have argued that it
cannot adequately explain what makes psychological states co-personal (i.e.
the states of a single person). The suggestion is that there will inevitably be
examples of states that it ascribes wrongly using only the causal connections
available to it. In this paper, I describe three distinct attacks on the psychological continuity theory along these lines. While I acknowledge that a number of interesting issues arise, I argue that the theory can withstand all three attacks.
