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Acting on Phantasy and Acting on Desire
Abstract
According to Davidson, an agent S acts for a reason if S has a pro-attitude towards actions of a certain kind, and if S believes that her action is of that
kind. Reasons not only explain actions, but they also justify them. Given this
account of rational action, how do we explain what happens when an agent
acts irrationally? Psychoanalysis seems to explain irrational behaviour by extending the domain of rational explanation into the unconscious, and
Davidson himself admits that many of the reasons and desires that lead to action may not be conscious. But does the appeal to unconscious beliefs and
desires fill in the required explanatory gap? I shall argue that it does not.
Borrowing Richard Wollheim’s distinction between “acting on phantasy”
and “acting on desire” to show how ordinary action differs from deeply irrational activity, I shall argue that irrational activity differs from rational action, not only in terms of the kinds of beliefs and desires involved, but also in terms of the structure of the relationship between mental states and action.
kind. Reasons not only explain actions, but they also justify them. Given this
account of rational action, how do we explain what happens when an agent
acts irrationally? Psychoanalysis seems to explain irrational behaviour by extending the domain of rational explanation into the unconscious, and
Davidson himself admits that many of the reasons and desires that lead to action may not be conscious. But does the appeal to unconscious beliefs and
desires fill in the required explanatory gap? I shall argue that it does not.
Borrowing Richard Wollheim’s distinction between “acting on phantasy”
and “acting on desire” to show how ordinary action differs from deeply irrational activity, I shall argue that irrational activity differs from rational action, not only in terms of the kinds of beliefs and desires involved, but also in terms of the structure of the relationship between mental states and action.
