Need there be a common currency for decision-making?

Abstract

According to various theorists and empirical scholars of behavior and decision,
including economists, utility theorists, behavioral ecologists, behavioral
economists and researchers in the new field of neuroeconomics the value
(typically understood as utility) of competing choices must be represented on
a common scale in order for them to count as competing at all, and in order
for orderly comparison to lead to actual choices. For some neuroeconomists
this means that expected (cardinal) utilities are neurally represented by firing
rates of cells in specific brain regions. In this paper some important statements of the ‘common currency’ argument are reviewed and critically examined. A rational reconstruction of the key argument is then subject to criticism informed by a variety of empirical and theoretical considerations. In a
strong form it does not survive the criticism, and this fact points the way to a
re-examination of the sense in which complex living systems, including
people, are agents in any straightforward sense.