Cognitive Science meets the Design Plan

Abstract

According to Alvin Plantinga, the cornerstone of epistemology is the proper
functioning of our cognitive faculties in accordance with the design plan. In
this paper I will explore two aspects of the design plan that are of central relevance
to the acquisition of warranted true beliefs. In the first place, perceptual
beliefs were supposed to be taken in the basic way and should therefore
constitute highly warranted true beliefs. Scale errors in young children pose
serious problems for this argument, while they show that part of the visual
system may be misguided by perceptual beliefs, as a normal part of the development
of the human design plan. Secondly, the ascription of mental
states to other persons does not depend on deductive or inductive inference
from behaviour. However, the discovery of so-called ‘mirror-neurons' suggests
that motor simulation of observed behaviour plays a crucial role in understanding
the intentions of others. I conclude by arguing for a refinement
of the notion of ‘design plan', guided by recent approaches in cognitive
science that should make Plantinga\'s externalist account at least falsifiable.

South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 (3) 2007: pp. 319-328