In Defense of Classical Foundationalism: A Critical Evaluation of Plantinga\'s Argument that Classical Foundationalism is Self-Refuting

Abstract

In numerous works, Alvin Plantinga argues that classical foundationalism is
a failed theory of knowledge because of its self-referential incoherence. Plantinga\'s
argument, however, fails to demonstrate that classical foundationalism is self-refuting. To bring this to light, I will review the form of Plantinga\'s argument in comparison with other examples of self-refutation. Upon closer inspection, it will be clear that classical foundationalism is not self-refuting, as Plantinga claims. Furthermore, I will expose another flaw in Plantinga\'s argument against classical foundationalism, which shows at best that Plantinga\'s argument cannot be reconstructed to demonstrate that classical foundationalism
is improbable. While Plantinga\'s argument may highlight a challenge for classical foundationalism, his argument does not establish the falsity ofclassical foundationalism, nor does it offer any other overriding reason to reject it. Thus, Plantinga\'s criticisms of classical foundationalism by themselves are not sufficient to rule out the theory\'s viability.

South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 (3) 2007: pp. 245-251