The tacit concept of competence in J.S. Mill's On Liberty

Abstract

Mill is often the object of schizophrenic interpretation: he is either interpreted
as a fierce proponent of negative freedom, i.e. a prototypical liberal
who professes neutrality with regard to different conceptions of the good, or
as a concealed moralist whose ultimate goal is to construct society on the basis
of a particular and thick conception of the good. In this paper I will argue
that Mill employs a tacit concept of competence in On Liberty, which allows
us to account for these different interpretations. I will do so by focussing on
the role of truth and individuality in On Liberty. Competence is a precondition
for individuality, and as such, it is a threshold concept: those above the
threshold are sensitive to rational argument and should be free to pursue happiness
in their own way (because they are guided by the truth), whereas those
who fail to meet this threshold should be educated and paternalistically be
kept out of harm's way until they are able to find the truth for and by themselves.

South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25 (4) 2006: pp. 305-328