Descartes' morals

Abstract

Descartes' morals are often considered a marginal epiphenomenon not only with respect to his metaphysics, but also in regard to the ethical theories that preceded and followed it, that is, broadly Aristotle's eudaimonism, Kantian deontologism and Mill's utilitarianism. I argue in this paper that Descartes' morals do not play a merely subaltern role in his metaphysics, as is often claimed. I first present the specificity and the evolution of his morals by giving an account of his provisory and perfect morals. Second I argue that a close reading of important passages from his correspondence and his treatise on the Passions of the Soul indicates that Descartes develops a third kind of morals based on the virtue-passion of generosity. The last part of the paper discusses Descartes' own treatment of the passions and suggests against the standard view that Descartes' concern is also the veri hominess, and ultimately the generosi hominess.

South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25(2) 2006: 177-188