Do Lawyers need Philosophy?

Abstract

Neo- pragmatists Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish have recently argued that philosophy has no consequences for legal practice (except, in the case of Fish, insofar as it carries rhetorical force). They have asserted not only that philosophy cannot provide absolute metaphysical foundations for legal practice, but also that philosophy cannot be used to criticise law. This essay examines Fish and Rorty\'s reasons for denying the practical force of philosophy. Although I agree with Rorty and Fish\'s non-foundationalism, I argue that in practice lawyers employ discursive categories and concepts that can be described as philosophical. I suggest also that philosophy has a critical function and that the characterization of philosophy offered by these theorists amounts to a conservative assertion of the formal completeness and substantive justice of existing liberal legal systems. Against Fish and Rorty, I argue and selectively demonstrate that lawyers can usefully draw upon \'public ironists\' such as Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida to criticise and improve upon extant legal practices.

S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(1) 2003: 82-97