Sosiaal-etiese verantwoordelikheid in Suid-Afrika: 'n Perspektief vanuit Levinas (Social- ethical responsibility in South Africa: A Levinasian perspective)

Abstract

Social- ethical responsibi ity in South Africa: A Levinasian perspective. On the question regarding the injustice in the South African social reality, two approaches have recurrently been followed: the “individual guilt” approach on the one hand, and the “systemic guilt” approach on the other hand. Drawing on the notion that the subject is on a pre- reflective level “held hostage by the neighbour”, this article elaborates on the significance of Levinas' social ethics to post- apartheid South Africa. The strength of Levinas' phenomenological approach is its confirmation of the primacy of ethics in our time. This makes possible a depth- perspective on the every day ethical discourse that can complement the deficiencies of the approaches mentioned above. I argue that Levinas ought not to be under stood as representative of a “samaritanian” ethics. While Levinas gives emphasis to responsibility in the first person, he also clearly delineates the indispensable importance to ethics of institutions and a good social order. Along these lines, I oppose the apparent quietism of a Derridian approach recently followed in local academic literature. The article concludes with a discussion on the possibility of the concretisation of the Good in Levinas.

S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.20(4) 2001: 85-102