

## Deliberation and citizenship: closing some of the gaps related to the "Values in Education" initiative in South Africa

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I argue that the implementation of the Department of Education's "Values in Education" initiative would be problematic without also invoking procedures of deliberation. Unlike the identified "values" on their own i.e. equity, tolerance, multilingualism, openness, accountability, and honour, as announced by the Department of Education deliberative procedures offer the possibility to deepen a sense of citizenship in schools. My contention is that the "Values in Education" initiative has a better chance of cultivating citizenship in schools if enacted commensurate with the notion of deliberative democracy.

### What constitutes deliberative democracy?

Theoretically defined, deliberative democracy refers to the notion that legitimate political decision making emanates from the public deliberation of citizens. In other words, as a normative account of political decision making, deliberative democracy evokes ideals of rational legislation, participatory politics and civic self governance, that is, "it presents an ideal of political autonomy based on practical reasoning of citizens" (Bohman & Rehg, 1997:ix). The upshot of such a theoretical grounding of democracy based on public deliberation presupposes that citizens or their representatives engage in reasoning together about the laws and policies that they ought to pursue as a political community, that is to say, to bring about the "use of public reason" (Bohman & Rehg, 1997:x). The theoretical critiques of liberal democratic models such as democratic elitism, democratic egalitarianism and demarchism and the revival of participatory politics developed during the 1970s. Only in the 1980s did the concept of deliberative democracy begin to assume some form of theoretical identity with the ideas of Joseph Beckett, who first used the concept as a critique against elitist interpretations of the American Constitution (Bohman & Rehg, 1987:xiii). Since then, several deliberative theorists have endeavoured to develop plausible conceptions of deliberative democracy. For the purposes of this article I shall explain two salient theoretical statements of the concept, with reference to the ideas of Habermas and Benhabib.

First, Habermas (1997) offers an account of democracy which places practical reasoning amongst citizens at the core of political discourse. For Habermas, practical reasoning guides an understanding of political practice in terms of self determination or self realisation and rational discourse (Habermas, 1997:39). This practice of practical reasoning for Habermas empowers citizens to decide upon the rules and manner of their living together in a self determined way, thereby producing co operative life practices "centred in conscious (and rational) political will formation" (Habermas, 1997:41). In short, Habermas contends that a politics radically situated in this world should be justifiable on the basis of reason (Habermas, 1997:41). Moreover, for Habermas a democratic legislature decides by consensus at the level of inter subjective deliberation guided by argumentation, which in turn dismisses programmed decisions in the public sphere (Habermas, 1997:57). In the event that consensus seems unrealisable and political deadlock imminent, Habermas proposes majority decision making as "a conditional consensus" based on conditional rational discussion and argumentation (Habermas, 1997:47). But such a conditional consensus does not require minorities to abandon their aims; rather, they are required to forego the practical application of their convictions, until they succeed in better establishing their reasons and procuring the necessary number of affirmative votes (Habermas, 1997:47).

Second, for Benhabib the deliberative model insists upon the openness of the agenda of public debate. In other words, she argues that legitimacy in complex democratic societies must result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all citizens about matters of common concern, and not just about a specific subject matter involving constitutional issues and questions of basic justice (Benhabib,

1996:68). For Benhabib reason is always situated in a context that can never render transparent all the cultural and social conditions that give rise to it. Hence, for Benhabib deliberative democracy does not restrict the agenda of public conversation, but rather encourages discourse which integrates the public and the private, as well as being more interested in the ways in which political processes interact with cultural and social contexts.

Hence, deliberative democracy involves open, uncoerced deliberation on the educational (political) issues at stake with the aim of arriving at rationally agreed upon judgments. Combining the ideas of Habermas and Benhabib, one finds that notions of rationality, consensus, persuasion through the "better argument" and culturally or socially embedded deliberation constitute the discourse of deliberative democracy. In this article I want to show how such an understanding of deliberative democracy, which considers deliberative arguments grounded in consensus, persuasion, reasonableness and "fair minded" judgements, can be used to cultivate a sense of citizenship in learners a situation which the "Values in Education" project of the DoE can not accomplish on its own. This brings me to a cursory account of the "Values in Education" initiative of the DoE.

### The Department of Education's *Tirisano* project: "Values in Education" initiative and its limitations

The Department of Education (DoE) advocates nine priorities for its *Tirisano* ("Working together") programme: making provincial systems work by making co operative governance work; breaking the back of illiteracy among adults and youths within five years; schools must become centres of community and cultural life; physical degradation in schools has to be ended; the professional quality of the teaching force has to be developed; the success of active learning has to be ensured through outcomes based education; a vibrant further education and training system should be created to equip youths and adults to meet the next century's social and economic needs; a rational, seamless higher education system has to be implemented; and the HIV/AIDS emergency has to be dealt with urgently and purposefully in and through the education and training system (DoE, 1999:13). These priorities (it is hoped) will contribute to the broader process of social and economic development through focusing on two central goals: (1) developing people for citizenship; and (2) developing skills for employment (DoE, 1999:14). My focus in this article is to find out whether "Values in Education" as propounded through the *Tirisano* educational campaign can in fact be cultivated without procedures of deliberation which can in turn lead to a heightened form of citizenship.

In October 2000 a school based research project was conducted by a consortium of research organisations led by the Witwatersrand University Education Policy Unit to explore the way that educators, learners and parents think and talk about "Values in Education". Ninety seven schools across five provinces were chosen by provincial officials to represent the range of schools in their province. Questionnaires were administered to all the educators and principals. Three hour participatory workshops were conducted separately with

learners, educators and parents in 13 schools (DoE, 2000b:4). After a process of research and debate, this working group presented a report on its findings and recommendations entitled "Values, Education and Democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in Education" in April 2000. According to the Report of the Working Group, the democratic Constitution and Bill of Rights accepted in 1996 provide the frame of reference for a democratic educational philosophy. The key elements of such an educational philosophy include: to develop the intellectual abilities and critical faculties among all children and young adults; to emphasise inclusiveness. All learners, irrespective of their backgrounds, should be actively included in school life; and to provide learners with the tools to solve the many problems encountered in life. In this Report they advocated the promotion of equity, tolerance, multilingualism, openness, accountability and social honour in our schools, and suggested a range of ways in which schools could begin to promote these values (DoE, 2000b:4).

I shall now briefly tease out the meanings of these "values" as explained in the Interim Research Report and simultaneously identify some of the gaps related to implementation. This is necessary because I shall later explore the reasons why the implementation of these six "Values in Education" cannot be realised without procedures of deliberation; they will therefore not necessarily contribute towards cultivating citizenship in schools.

### Equity

According to the Interim Research Report, the educational policy from the previous apartheid regime left the majority of South Africans, mostly blacks, with serious inequalities in education. They were subjected to an education which prepared them only for unskilled labour. Mathematics and science were offered in exceptional instances. The teachers were mostly unqualified and financial assistance from the state was minimal compared to that for whites. The consequence of this unequal system was a desperately under educated black African population. What equity means is that, in order to redress the inequalities of the past, all sectors of society, business, government and civil society need to support the learning environment in the way that they allocate resources, set priorities and define an ethos. They need to invest in the infrastructure and quality of teaching in schools situated in the most disadvantaged areas of our country (DoE, 2000b:4-10). My contention is that having various sectors of society "support the learning environment" in terms of allocating resources, setting priorities and defining an ethos is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to cultivate the intellectual, critical, problem solving and co operative capacities of learners, that is to say, developing their sense of citizenship.

For instance, government through the Ministry of Education can "support the learning environment" in terms of allocating resources, setting priorities and defining an ethos through policy formulation and promulgation. However, this does not necessarily mean that such a policy would be implemented or enacted by those teachers, learners and communities whose legitimate interests might be advanced through policy. This implies that the value of equity by itself does not seem to be an enabling condition to redress the inequalities of the past, as well as cultivating a sense of citizenship in learners. The point I am making is that equity *per se* does not seem to be a value that can actually motivate people to cultivate a sense of citizenship, i.e. developing the intellectual, critical, problem solving and co operative capacities of, in this instance, learners. In the first place, people have to be willing and co operative in order to ensure that equitable strategies to redress past inequalities are implemented; people need to engage deliberatively with one another about the reasons and merits of equitable or just practices. They first need to possess a sense of citizenship which can spark in them a willingness to achieve equity or to enact equitable education policies. In this regard Young (2001) states that the mere existence of equitable policies does not guarantee democratic change. I shall argue later that in order to cultivate a sense of citizenship in learners, which can ensure that they become intellectual, criti-

cal and co operative problem solvers, we require of them to engage with others in deliberative practices. In turn, a sense of citizenship can lead to people becoming more intent on implementing equitable education policies; the process does not work the other way round, as propagated by the "Values in Education" initiative.

### Tolerance

The Interim Research Report announces that tolerance does not simply mean putting up with people who are different. Tolerance is explained as entailing mutual understanding, reciprocal altruism and the active appreciation of the value of human difference (DoE, 2000a:22). The working group contends that the value of tolerance is essential in managing and supporting the linguistic, religious, cultural and national diversity of the South African community of learners and teachers. For the working group the value of tolerance could also be promoted outside of the classroom, in extra mural activities such as the performing arts and sport (DoE, 2000a:22-26). I agree with the working group that mutual understanding, reciprocal altruism and the recognition of human difference are crucial to cultivating a sense of citizenship in learners. However, learners can mutually understand one another's diverse perspectives, demonstrate altruism and recognise one another's differences, without this necessarily meaning that they would actually become intellectual, critical and co operative problem solvers. My contention is that critical and co operative learners also challenge one another, that is, question, interrogate, threaten and provoke one another in terms of ideas, perspectives and points of view. In this way critical and co operative learners develop respect for one another. The point I am making is that the working group seems to espouse a notion of tolerance whereby diverse learners have to mutually agree on matters in an altruistic way. I challenge this conception as such a notion of tolerance would instil in learners attitudes of compliance and uncritical co operation. Therefore, tolerance as articulated by the working group does not seem to hold the potential to engender a sense of citizenship in learners whereby they become intellectual, critical and co operative problem solvers. My contention is that learners also need to be familiar with (and practise) deliberation in the quest to become potential democratic citizens. Put differently, they need to become deliberative democrats.

### Multilingualism

The Constitution of 1996 granted equality of status to 11 official languages: Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, isiNdebele, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Afrikaans, and English. English has become the national language of politics and record in the new South Africa. It remains the language of diplomacy and international commerce. The language in education policy of the Department of Education recommended in 1997 that learners should study through the medium of either their home language, or through English and their home language. Two values are promoted in the area of language: firstly, the importance of studying in the language one knows best, or as this is popularly referred to, mother tongue education; and secondly, the fostering of multilingualism. South Africa is a multilingual country. In order to be a good South African citizen, one needs to be at least bilingual, but preferably trilingual (DoE, 2000a:30-33). The question arises as to whether multilingualism holds the possibility for learners to become intellectual, critical and co operative problem solvers to become good citizens. Of course, mastery of the language(s) is one way of establishing conditions for learners to communicate more effectively. But then, merely having a conversation in one's mother tongue with another person does not necessarily guarantee constructive engagement. People can talk to one another, yet they might still be talking past one another, despite having multilingual skills. However, what is required for people to engage meaningfully in conversation is not that they be multilingual, but rather that conversation adheres to procedures of rational deliberation (irrespective of language). I shall argue later that learners need to be familiar with (and practise) procedures of deliberation in order to become critical and potentially co operative citizens.

### Openness

The Interim Research Report announces that South Africa's schooling system has the responsibility of refining the intellectual development of every learner in an environment that is stimulating and emotionally supportive. It also has the responsibility to provide an approach to solving problems that will be useful throughout the life cycle. The report also stresses that most South Africans have been bereft of a strong debating culture as a result of an over emphasis on rote learning and the slavish repetition of information, both of which practices were rewarded by a bureaucratic examination system, where asking questions was discouraged and where an authoritarian attitude to learning and social conduct was expected of teachers. The Report posits that the ability to ask penetrating questions is a skill that has to be encouraged and developed, and that the ability to debate adds value to the quality of public understanding and the public discourse. It is in this context that the Report principally associates openness with the value of being open and receptive to new ideas; the ability to ask good and penetrating questions; and being willing to debate so as to arrive at quality decisions (DoE, 2000a:36-39).

I agree with such an understanding of openness since a questioning and reflective attitude on the part of learners and citizens is what this country is definitely in need of. What concerns me, however, is that the Report does not clearly articulate how learners (citizens) can achieve "quality decisions". Is a quality decision anything people agree with/on? Does a quality decision mean that the decision in point has the support of the majority of learners? I contend that a quality decision does not necessarily mean that anything goes, because that would be tantamount to relativistic chaos. Yet I am not entirely convinced that majority decision making always produces the better decision. The majority of learners can vote in favour of democratic decision making to be abandoned in favour of totalitarian decision making, which does not necessarily make the majoritarian decision a good one. Consequently the Department of Education's value of "openness" does not sufficiently clarify how quality decisions in classroom practice can be achieved. I contend that this can best be achieved through procedures of deliberation, which in turn can cultivate citizenship (more than the value of openness) in South African classrooms.

### Accountability

The Interim Research Report justifies the "value" of accountability in terms of teaching being a vocation – a mission in life and not just another job. And exercising that responsibility requires a strong sense of commitment on the part of teachers and learners. Thus, according to the Report, "every role player should be accountable". The Report states that children and young adults are the responsibility of parents and teachers, who are in turn accountable to school governing bodies and the educational authorities, which are in turn accountable to the citizens of a democratic society (DoE, 2000a:42-45). Notably absent from the Department of Education's understanding of accountability is the idea that accountability does not only mean that teachers and learners need to have a strong sense of commitment, but also that teachers and learners need to provide a justification for what they are doing. This accountability can only be expressed according to justifiable reasons as to why teachers and learners say or do certain things or not. By implication, accountability is linked to justifications associated with providing reasonable arguments for enacting certain educational practices. The point I am making is that one can only be accountable if one's sense of commitment is linked to articulating a justifiable defence of what one is doing. This makes accountability a kind of deliberative practice which cannot be attained without articulating justifiable reasons for one's actions. It is such an understanding of accountability which I shall explore in more detail about procedures of deliberation later on.

### Honour

The primary purpose of a school is undeniably to provide an environment where teaching and learning take place. The Interim Research

Report posits that part of the learning experience involves an anticipation of the responsibilities of adulthood, including those of citizenship in a democracy. Before 1994 there was by definition no common loyalty to the state or to national symbols. The state and its symbols were biased in favour of a White minority. The Constitution and Bill of Rights of the new democratic South Africa envisages a citizenry with a sense of honour and identity as South Africans. Schools are expected to teach learners the national anthem, the significance of the flag and the recently unveiled coat of arms. Also recommended in the Report is the learning of a pledge of allegiance which should be declaimed at school assemblies so that we can be reminded of the fundamental values to which South Africans in a democracy aspire to achieve. The following text illustrates what the working group feels ought to be conveyed, and it invites responses from the public:

I promise to be loyal to my country, South Africa, and to do my best to promote its welfare and the well being of all its citizens. I promise to show self respect in all that I do and to respect all of my fellow citizens and all of our various traditions. Let us work for peace, friendship and reconciliation and heal the scars left by past conflicts, and let us build a common destiny together (DoE, 2000a:48-50).

Ideals of this envisaged pledge of allegiance would be difficult to contest and I would go along with most of what has been expressed in it. Yet to "build a common destiny together" as one of the main objectives of showing a sense of honour would be somewhat difficult to achieve without also invoking procedures of deliberation. It is therefore to a discussion of procedures of deliberation that I now return, because it would be difficult to realise any of the above mentioned six "values" in schools if they do not also encourage deliberative practices.

### Closing the gaps: moving towards procedures of deliberation

I explained above what constitutes deliberative democracy. Despite their different views on deliberative practices, Rawls and Benhabib generally agree on one specific issue: political (and educational) processes involve more than self interested competition governed by bargaining and aggregative mechanisms. In short, deliberation involves open, uncoerced deliberative procedures in relation to the political and educational issues at stake, with the aim of arriving at rationally agreed upon judgments. I shall now examine these procedures of deliberation and their implications for education.

My argument that procedures of deliberation with specific reference to the seminal ideas of Taylor (1985) about rationality, which best elucidate the ideal of better and reasonable argumentation which can lead to a heightened form of citizenship have four main normative elements: (a) the view that rational articulation of arguments is a valuable part of human agency, (b) the view that political formulations have to be consistent and without contradiction, (c) the view that everyone should in principle be attuned to "the order of things", and (d) the view that relevant arguments need to be advanced in intersubjective processes of rational deliberation. I shall now elucidate these normative conceptions of better and reasonable argumentation.

### Rational articulation

By "rational articulation" I mean the individual's readiness to express and provide reasons in support of his or her self interpretations and judgments in a lucid, coherent and logical manner. Support for such a view of rational articulation can be found in Taylor's (1985:137) idea of rationality:

(Rational articulation) seems to involve being able to *say* clearly what the matter in question is ... (in such a way that) we have a rational grasp of something when we can *articulate* it, that means, distinguish and lay out the different features of the matter in perspicuous order.

In short, citizens engaged in public deliberation along the lines of democratic decision making should articulate their preferences, i.e.

supply well ordered reasons in support of their subjectively held views and judgments to others. In doing so, they open up their subjectively held educational views and judgments to rational challenge by others. In other words, individuals do not impose their "private reasons" on the democratic process without justifying and subjecting them to any form of public critical scrutiny. Bohman (1996:5) emphasises the importance of subjecting the rational articulation of deliberative democracy to public scrutiny for by arguing that it is crucial for citizens and their representatives to test their interests and reason in a public forum before they come to a decision. This implies that the deliberative process demands that citizens (teachers and students) justify their decisions and opinions by appealing to common interests or by arguing in terms of reasons that "all could accept" in public debate. The point is that the ensuing collective decision should in some sense be justified by public reasons, that is, persuasive reasons acceptable to everyone participating in the process of deliberation.

What follows from the above is that, unless majority decision makers can provide well ordered reasons and sufficient justification for their particular evaluations, which must be open to public scrutiny by others, rejecting minority views on the grounds of quantification only seems to be antecedent to, and forever removed from, the process of deliberation.

### Consistent political formulations

My discussion of deliberation also aims to show why consistent educational formulations constitute part of a convincing defence for better and reasonable argumentation. It makes no sense for individuals in educational processes to articulate their self interpretations and judgments with ambivalence and contradictions. The beneficial effects of rational articulation can accrue only if the individuals concerned articulate their educational preferences with consistency in deliberative practices. Taylor (1985:137) makes the point that to strive for rationality in deliberative practices is to be engaged in articulation, in finding the appropriate formulations. Yet he also invokes the understanding that a standard intrinsic to the activity of formulating is that the formulations be consistent. Put differently, nothing is clearly articulated if it contains contradictory formulations which makes "consistency plainly a necessary condition of rationality" (Taylor, 1985:137).

Once again the argument for majoritarian preference in educational deliberation becomes insufficient because, in defence of the better argument, majority views might not always be consistent and unambiguous formulations. Absolute majority preference provides no criterion for assessing the quality of arguments; rather, consistent educational formulations provide such a criterion. Rational argumentation in this sense means that everyone is deemed capable of making informed and consistent judgments on educational matters, or more precisely, that no one's consistent and reasonably articulated arguments should be discounted on grounds of majority or minority preferences. The point is, every citizen's contribution in deliberative practices, if consistently articulated, must be seen to be worthy of consideration. Bohman (1996:7) states that deliberative democracy accords with the beliefs and actions of a rational character insofar as they can be supported publicly by good reasons. Furthermore, the exchange of reasons takes place in "a discourse in which participants strive to reach agreement solely on the basis of the better argument, free of coercion and open to all competent speakers".

### Attunement with the "order of things"

By being deliberative, individuals also have to be attuned with the "order of things", in this instance, educational decisions, procedures and issues of public policy. In other words, individuals intent on producing the better argument have to be engaged in an informed (i.e. proceeding with understanding and impartiality) and perceptive way with his or her socio political context, and with other persons for the common good of this context. Taylor (1985:142) establishes a connection between the idea of achieving the better argument and being attuned to the "order of things":

We do not understand (articulate the better argument) without understanding our place in it, because we are part of this order. And we cannot understand the order and our place in it without loving it, without seeing its goodness, which is what I want to call being in attunement with it.

However, does being part of the "order of things" necessarily mean that every individual should directly participate in deliberative practices? I do not think that being part of the "order of things" on the basis of political participation implies obtaining the direct consent of every individual on every issue. Being attuned to educational issues does not mean that every learner must be directly involved in the affairs of education. Certainly in South African classrooms direct participation on the part of every learner would be unfeasible, since the emphasis on direct democracy would be more on getting the mass of students involved in educational decision making rather than reflecting on the reasonableness of the decisions themselves. Representative educational structures dedicated solely to the debate on educational matters of public concern can counteract the difficulties associated with direct participatory democracy. To say that every learner should participate directly in educational deliberation is to assume (a) that individuals only have subjective beliefs, aspirations, and educational values, which ought to shape democratic practices; and (b) that there are no inter-subjective (common) meanings about educational discourse which individuals might collectively share. I agree with Taylor (1985:36) when he claims that people in any society have all sorts of beliefs and attitudes which may be thought of as their individual beliefs and attitudes, even if others share them. But what they do not own are the meanings constitutive of educational discourse. For example, public debate on educational matters is not just an arena where the pre-formed interests or views of people are fought out, culminating in a majority vote. The point is that public debate is constituted by the exchange of the inter-subjective meanings or a set of common terms of reference such as for people to reasonably reflect on their views during the process of deliberation, and for them to reach an agreement on what educational decision should be made on the issues in question. These inter-subjective meanings are rooted in the practice of public debate and could not be the single property of individuals. Taylor (1985:36) explains inter-subjective meanings as follows:

It is not just that the people in our society all or mostly have a given set of ideas in their heads and subscribe to a given set of goals. The meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not just in the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves, practices which cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are essentially modes of social relation, of mutual action.

However, for teachers and learners to reach agreement among themselves thus attuning themselves to the "order of things" does not mean that educational decision making should be subjected to solely to a majority vote. Why not? Reaching agreement entails disclosing a sincere and rational way of securing "mutually respectful social co-operation" (Callan, 1998:62). Mutual social co-operation implies that teachers and learners have to respect each other and be sincere about meeting each other half way, to compromise. Compromise, in the words of Bohman (1996:89), "is all about coming to an accommodation or making concessions. It involves tradeoffs and balances of interests making concessions of one's own for equal ones by others". The question can legitimately be asked how such a compromise could be established and ensured. My argument is that teachers and learners could temporarily come to an agreement based on majoritarian decision making, but should also procedurally build into the deliberative process a reflexivity principle which allows for the public re-examination of majoritarian decisions what Benhabib (1996:72) refers to as that reflexivity condition which allows abuses and misapplications at the first level to be challenged at a second meta level of discourse. Also, Gutman and Thompson (1996:43) argue that deliberative processes help distinguish true moral disagreements from agreements that could be resolved by "bargaining, negotiation or

compromise" or by rational clarification.

When teachers and learners in a public debate compromise, they do not merely advance the position of their individual or group interests, but rather develop a shared willingness to make minimal use of controversial empirical premises. For Bohman (1996:91), in a compromise parties do not modify the framework to achieve unanimity, but rather modify their conflicting interpretations of the framework so that each can recognise the other's moral values and standards as part of it. In other words, the framework is then common enough for each party to continue to cooperate and deliberate uncontroversially with the other. Habermas (1996a:324) posits that reaching mutual understanding (compromise) through deliberative discourse guarantees that issues, reasons and information are handled reasonably. Thus, to avoid perpetual conflict, which may bring us nowhere, we need to develop what Callan (1998:76) refers to as "a shared group interest in compromise", a kind of shared loyalty that can push hard in the direction of temporary agreement between teachers and learners who need to respect each other, until educational decisions are again subjected to reflexive re-examination at another "meta level".

In the context of pursuing respectfully and non-arbitrarily a deliberative discourse in a diverse South African classroom, we have to develop "a shared group interest in compromise" which can prevent us pushing toward convergent interpretations of education. Rather, we (teachers and learners) need to develop compromising understandings of education that can advance our shared interests in a diverse political community. For this reason Habermas (1996a:331) makes the point that in a deliberative democracy "all politically relevant collective actors enjoy roughly equal opportunities to influence the decision making processes that concern them; that the members of the organisations determine the politics of pressure groups and parties (teachers and learners); and that the latter in turn are pushed by multiple memberships into a readiness for compromise and the integration of interests".

In essence, deliberation involves what Habermas (1996a:322) refers to as procedures of argumentation in which those taking part justify their reasons with consistent and unambiguous political formulations. When a person is rational, he or she is in principle attuned to "the order of things" in unconstrained intersubjective processes of deliberation. In a Habermasian way, deliberation as "the centerpiece of deliberative politics consists in a network of discourses and bargaining (compromising) that is supposed to facilitate the rational solution of pragmatic, moral, and ethical questions" (Habermas, 1996b:320).

Thus far I have expounded upon procedures of deliberation with respect to four main points: (a) the view that the rational articulation of arguments is a valuable part of human agency, (b) the view that educational formulations have to be consistent and without contradiction, (c) the view that everyone should in principle be attuned to "the order of things", and (d) the view that relevant arguments need to be advanced in unconstrained intersubjective processes of rational deliberation. I shall now explore why these procedures of deliberation can also bring about caring, conversational justice and political reasoning. In this way, I hope to show that deliberative procedures can cultivate a sense of citizenship.

First, the rational articulation of arguments in a Taylorian sense brings into question the notion of justification. Teachers and learners not only have to explain and justify their points of view, decisions or choices, that is, possess an ability to logically construct and understand arguments and their appropriateness to different educational contexts (Raz, 1999:68-70), but should also *care* about making educational arguments reasonable to other citizens. In other words, deliberation should also have the effect whereby people develop the capacity to reach their own justifiable conclusions or inferences to which they are to be held accountable. And when people develop a deep sense of accountability in this way, they can be said to have assumed a profound sense of citizenship, because the articulation and exchange of educational arguments involving caring can be linked to citizenship

a matter of cultivating in others the care to justify their actions and to which they are to be held accountable for those actions. In this way the rational articulation of arguments in the domain of the educational sphere makes the idea of a citizenship possible.

Second, if deliberation involves the capacity of people to articulate unambiguous educational arguments, then it has to invoke the idea of conversational justice, which demands that they (teachers and learners) produce coherent arguments to justify their points. Rawls's (1993:220) idea of public reason, within which deliberation is embedded, is inextricably linked to "standards of correctness and criteria of justification". In a Rawlsian sense "criteria of justification" not only refer to an articulation of arguments without contradiction, but also "a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made" (Rawls, 1993:217) a matter of engaging in conversational justice as citizens. By implication deliberation can engender conversational justice through which citizens willingly justify their articulations to one another. In short, deliberation has the potential to cultivate a sense of citizenship.

Third, if deliberation involves the capacity of people to be attuned to "the order of things", then it means that teachers and learners have to be engaged in an informed, perceptive and reflexive way with their socio-political context, and with other persons for the common good of this context. Thus, the idea of "attunement with" one socio-political context invokes the idea of political reasoning, which holds that each individual has to contribute "to the shared deliberations of the community in his or her own voice" (MacIntyre, 1999:140). Rawls (1993:252) explains deliberative democracy in this same vein on the basis that citizens in a society share in the political power they exercise over one another, "when they engage in political advocacy in the public forum, in political campaigns, for example, when they vote on those fundamental questions". In other words, they are attuned to their socio-political context. What follows from this is that deliberation can bring about political reasoning through which citizens share in intersubjective (rational) deliberations with their socio-political contexts. In essence, deliberation can enact goods of citizenship (caring conversational justice and political reasoning).

Finally, the question arises: can deliberation in schools live up to the demands of citizenship? One way is to persuade teachers and learners to accept that the activities associated with participation and deliberation are intrinsically rewarding. This Aristotelian view holds that participation and deliberation are superior to private life involving the family, work, religion and leisure, which most people often find burdensome and sacrificial (Kymlicka, 2002:297). Most people, certainly in South Africa, do not necessarily accept the intrinsic value of participation and deliberation as rewarding, since they will find their greatest joys and projects in other areas of life, including the family, work, the arts or religion. If this were to be the case, and one has good reason to believe it is, the least people could do to cultivate citizenship would be to learn the social virtue of "civility" or "decency", since it applies not only to educational activity, but primarily to our non-discriminatory actions in everyday life, on the street, in neighbourhood shops, and in diverse institutions and forums of civil society such as stores, corporations, churches, charities, support groups, unions and families. Walzer (in Kymlicka, 2000:305) posits that the civility that makes deliberation possible can only be learned in associational networks of civil society. According to Glendon (1991:109) it is in voluntary organisations of civil society, such as those mentioned above, that human character, competence and the capacity for citizenship are formed, for it is here that people internalise the idea of personal responsibility and mutual obligation, and learn the voluntary self-restraint which is essential to responsible citizenship. However, Okin (1992:65) posits that these associational networks of civil society can also teach deference to authority and intolerance towards other faiths, prejudice against other races, and male dominance over women, which do not make these networks defensible "seedbeds of civic virtue" (Glendon, 1991:109).

It seems clear that no single institution can be relied upon as the exclusive "seedbed of civic virtue". Therefore I agree with Kymlicka (2002:307), who argues that the virtues of citizenship can "best" be learned in schools. In his words, "schools must teach children how to engage in the kind of critical reasoning and moral perspective that defines public reasonableness ... (and) promoting these sorts of virtues is one of the fundamental justifications for mandatory education (Kymlicka, 2002:307). Of course, historically, schools have often been used to promote deference, chauvinism, xenophobia, and other illiberal and undemocratic practices, but this does not detract from the fact that schools can be reorganised, particularly in South Africa, to be effective "seedbeds of civic virtues". According to Gutman (1987:30), education for citizenship should inevitably involve equipping children with the intellectual skills necessary for civility.

### Conclusion

The point about citizenship is that people (citizens) are required to act responsibly. Citizens should not merely become involved in deliberation and decision making, but they should also try to promote the common good. For Miller (2000:83) promoting the common good involves securing a set of equal rights for all citizens, to encourage people to respect the rule of law, and to take active steps to defend the rights of others, particular the least privileged. As I have argued, procedures of deliberation seem to be an appropriate discourse within which to cultivate such a notion of the common good. In short, procedures of deliberation can frame a notion of citizenship which can imbue in citizens (teachers and learners) the virtue of practising a rational, consensus oriented deliberative discourse in a reasonable and reflexive way. In this way, teachers and learners could enhance their capacities as practical reasoners who deeply care about building a just, equal and deliberative society, which in turn could make the successful implementation of the DoE's "Values in Education" initiative highly possible.

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