

A CLIENT TRUSTED SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR DEPENDABLE CLOUD COMPUTING

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ABSTRACT

Cloud computing is a relatively new technology that is in wide use because of the benefits it offers, but is still confronted with security issues. The residence of the client's sensitive or proprietary data in the cloud service provider's server and premises expose the data to the possibility of manipulation, modification, inspection, deletion or theft. This possibility creates fear in the mind of the data owner and reduces the user's trust level in cloud computing. We propose a client trusted security framework to increase users trust level in cloud computing to make it more dependable. The proposed framework includes a user focused software process model for cloud computing security. A formal analysis of the proposed framework shows that it is capable of increasing the trust level of cloud computing by about 67 % when implemented by cloud service providers.

Key words: cloud computing, users trust, framework, model, cloud

INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing is relatively new and has no long history. In general it originates from the late nineties and has been further developed in the next millennium; the name was created because the data sent could not be tracked by anymore when moving towards its destination. The term cloud was created because one could not determine the path a certain data package followed.

Cloud computing is stated into different definitions. In some definitions, cloud computing was described as an updated version of utility computing (Buyya et al., 2009). The other, and broader, side states that anything you can access outside the firewall is cloud computing, including outsourcing (Knorr, 2008). In this paper, we

adopt the accepted definition of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Cloud Security Alliance. They define cloud computing as a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction (ISACA, 2009). In general, cloud computing provides hardware and software services that are in the cloud and can be accessed by client as they pay for it. Despite the various benefits of cloud computing, such as economies of scale, reuse and standardization (Van-Antwerp et al., 2011), many users are not comfortable with using the cloud resources because of

the various risks and challenges that it portends. Cloud computing services includes Software as a Service (SaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Component as a Service (CaaS) (Rahaman and Farhatullah, 2012). Examples of IaaS cloud computing applications are: a cloud web server, a cloud datacenter, and a corporate virtual desktop. A cloud datacenter is a network of virtual servers that allows a company to move all of its corporate data assets into the cloud.

There are no existing formal definitions of dependable cloud computing. However, for the purpose of this document, we provide a working description for clarity. A dependable cloud computing can be viewed as cloud computing which users (mainly consumers or information owners) can rely on to do what they want or need with all the security concerns adequately addressed and with uncompromised data integrity. Security concerns of cloud computing has been one of the drawbacks affecting the full adoption of cloud computing by many organisations.

Background of Study

Data and application in the cloud reside in systems the user doesn't own and likely has limited control over (Van-Antwerp et al., 2011). This is responsible for the security issues associated with cloud computing. Some of the security concerns of prospective cloud service users include: possible harm to their organization for public and wide distributed access, the cost of such harm and the risk associated with possible cloud service failure (Cadregari and Cutaia, 2011). These concerns generate questions in the mind of prospective cloud users and when these questions are left unanswered, they feel insecure in adopting

cloud computing despite all the possible gains that cloud computing provides.

Adopting Cloud Computing

Cloud Computing is also about how Information Technology (IT) is provisioned and used and not only about technological improvements of data centers (Creeger, 2009). Enterprises must consider the benefits, drawbacks, usage practices and other effects of Cloud Computing before adopting and using it (Khajeh-Hosseini et al., 2010b). The adoption of Cloud Computing in enterprises is much dependent on the maturity of organizational and cultural processes as the technology per se (Fellowes, 2008). Some predict that adoption of Cloud Computing is not going to happen overnight, rather it could take 10 to 15 years before a typical enterprise makes this shift (Sullivan, 2009). Hence, we are currently at the start of a transition period during which many decisions need to be made with respect to adoption of Cloud Computing in the enterprise.

In adopting Cloud Computing, enterprises will typically consider organizational clouds based on heterogeneous computing environment managed by more than one public cloud provider. The adoption of Cloud Computing does not depend only on technical issues but also on the risk management policy of the organization and the consideration of trade-offs between the benefits and risks (Khajeh-Hosseini et al., 2010a).

Many of the risks and security concerns of cloud computing can be safely handled by organizations through planned risk management business processes and activities. Examples of such risks that

enterprise must properly manage include: the right choice of service provider, the legal responsibility that must be accepted by service provided, the threat of access to intellectual properties and the content of disaster recovery documentation (ISACA, 2009).

Data Security in Cloud

Lack of control on the physical infrastructure is responsible for most of the security issues which arise in Cloud Computing. Furthermore, enterprises are ignorant of the physical location of their stored data in the distributed environment and the type of security mechanisms put in place by the cloud provider (Babu and Srivatsa, 2014). Other technical security issues in Cloud Computing relate to the problems of web services and web browser and not of Cloud Computing. The common use of web browsers and web services to access the services offered by the cloud make these issues still current and relevant. to access the services offered by the cloud The common attacks on web services include the XML Signature Element Wrapping, where XML signature is used for authentication (Jensen et al., 2009).

Security controls in Cloud Computing are similar to security controls in any IT environment. However, Cloud Computing may present, different risks to an organization because of service models, operation models and the technologies associated with it. In cloud computing, security controls models can be applied to applications using firewalls, to information using database activity monitoring, to management using configuration management and monitoring, to network using firewalls and to computing/storage using encryption. Apart from using

traditional security controls such as access controls and encryption, unapproved data movement to cloud services can be managed through the monitoring of large internal data migrations with Database Activity Monitoring and File Activity Monitoring; and monitoring of data moving to the cloud with URL filters and Data Loss Prevention (Van-Antwerp et al., 2011). Other levels of encryption, to protect data moving to and within the cloud, are client/application encryption, Link/Network encryption and proxy-based-encryption and IaaS storage encryption, PaaS and SaaS encryption.

Virtualization and Trusted Computing

Virtualization is the process of decoupling hardware from the operating system on a physical machine (Campbell and Jeronimo, 2006). Cloud computing provides to users multiple isolated users environments known as virtual machines (VMs) on a single host (Rongyu et al., 2013). A Virtual Machine (VM) is the virtualized representation of a physical machine that is run and maintained on a host by a software virtual machine monitor or hypervisor. An example of a Type 1 hypervisor is Xen (Barham et al., 2003). Xen provides full virtualization to partition the host machine into multiple VMs.

Trusted computing is a mechanism that allows organizations to verify their security posture in the cloud through hardware and software controls. One of the key components of trusted computing is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which is a cryptographic component that provides a root of trust for building a trusted computing base. The goal of virtual TPM (replacing TPM) or any trusted component is to move cryptographic computations into a locked virtual area, which is not under

control of entities on the host platform (Smith, 2005). However, TPM works only in non-virtualized environments. Therefore, a Virtual Trusted Platform Module (VTPM) is usually provided according to standard specification by creating an instance of TPM for each VM on a trusted platform (Scarlata et al., 2008; Krautheim, 2009).

Related Works

Various study groups and research efforts have proffered remedies to the perceived flaws that come with cloud computing and there are other ongoing research work on this same subject matter of making cloud computing dependable.

Krautheim (2009) proposed a Private Virtual Infrastructure model that shares the responsibility of security in cloud computing between the service provider and client together with "Locator Bot". The Locator Bot pre-measures situational awareness through continuous monitoring of the cloud security. Jrad et al. (2013) proposed a broker-based framework for running workflows in a federated environment that involves multiple Clouds. The framework is based on workflow management for the cloud. Anisetti et al. (2016) proposed a certification framework that implements a security certification process for the cloud. The framework is a test-based security certification framework, in contrast to cloud security certification assurance technique, to support cloud providers in the design and development services and applications ready to be certified. Alqahtani et al. (2014) proposed a context-based security framework for cloud services using aspect orientation to separate between business logic and security code. The framework focused on front end web

services security to the cloud service. Considering security concerns, privacy and other business and technical risks associated with migration into cloud, Islam et al. (2014) proposed a decision framework model for migration into cloud. The framework is a process model that considers the requirements and the risk of migration without providing a solution to cloud security issue. Rongyu et al. (2013) proposed a user-specific virtual Trusted Platform Module and a trust chain model for virtual machines. Sharma et al. (2016). proposed a framework for implementing trust in cloud computing by integrating trust at the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) level. The framework employs an algorithm based on fuzzy logic to find trust. Rahaman and Farhatullah (2012) proposed a three layered framework for preserving cloud computing privacy with an algorithm to generate unique user cloud identity. The objective of this framework is to to preserve sensitive information entered by cloud users as they interact with the cloud to gain access to cloud services. Trabelsi et al. (2015) proposed a privacy and security framework for mobile and cloud platforms. The framework is a symmetric architecture to address the problem of isolation of security and privacy requirements in the two platforms. Poh et al. (2013) proposed an authentication framework for peer-to-peer cloud network, the objective of which is to provide solution to authentication challenges in peer-to-peer cloud network in contrast to centralized cloud model. Youssef and Alageel (2012) proposed a framework for the identification of security and privacy challenges in cloud computing. The same work also proposed a generic model to satisfy security and privacy requirements in

clouds to advise users and protect against vulnerabilities.

In this paper, we propose a client trusted security framework for dependable cloud computing using an integrated client trusted software process model. Our approach is distinct from previous efforts because the security framework employs a novel client trusted process model. Our proposed framework defines the association and relationship between the provider, the client, the client trusted process model and cloud service models.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Studies on cloud computing requires various computer hardware and software at the client side and the server side. Furthermore, the peculiarity of cloud computing makes a virtual machine an essential requirement for experimental studies on cloud computing framework. The materials employed for this study and the methodology adopted are covered in this section. The materials include the client computer and the server computer.

Client Computer

At the client side, a laptop with Intel Core i3-2330M 2.20 GHz processor was employed. The client laptop was installed with 300 GB hard disk and 2.0 GB random access memory (RAM). The free hard disk space available was 80 GB. Windows 7 Home Premium 16 bits operating system

was installed on the client system with 3G technology internet facilities. A shortcut to the virtual machine remote desktop protocol was installed on the client computer.

Server Computer

The sever computer consists of Commercial Network Services (US) server installed with Windows 2003 (x86) Enterprise Edition R2 operating system, classified as Traders Virtual Private Server (VPS). Access to this server was made possible through monthly subscription. The virtual private server was provided with 1 GB of RAM and 640 MB RAM by Commercial Network Services, a US based cloud service provider. Instances of MetaTrader applications with proprietary expert adviser codes, owned by the user, were installed on the remote desktop of the VPS.

Methodology

Systems analysis and design methodology was used for this study. Various cloud security frameworks and methods were studied to identify their strengths and drawbacks through literature survey to propose a new framework to enhance the strength of existing frameworks and to overcome some of their weakness. A client trusted security framework is proposed to make cloud computing more dependable.

Figure 1 shows the conceptual security framework proposed for cloud computing dependability.




Figure 1. The Conceptual Security Framework for Client Trusted Cloud

Proposed Client Trusted Security Framework

The proposed framework consists of four major interacting and associated units. These are: Provider, Client Trusted Model, Cloud Service Models and Client.

The Provider represents the cloud service providers. Examples of Providers are: Amazon, Google, Salesforce, IBM, Microsoft and Sun Microsystems who possess established data centers for hosting Cloud computing applications. The Client represents the cloud users. The Client includes enterprise service consumers with global operations, and all the consumers that pay service providers based on their usage of these utility services. Cloud Service models include Software as a Service (SaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS) consisting of virtual machines, physical machines, resource allocator, other infrastructure and datacenters which are maintained continually by service providers. Figure 2 shows the Client Trusted Process Model. It

consists of two levels: the Provider's level and the Client's level which are linked together with a feedback. The provider's level consists of five basic operations with their deliverables. The Client's level consists of two operations with client's feedback as its deliverable. Client Trusted Process Model is described in the next section.

In Figure 1, the interaction and relationship among the four units of the framework are shown. The provider implements and integrates Client Trusted Process Model. For IaaS, this integration of Client Trusted Process Model into the Cloud Service Models is done under the Data Configuration policies of IaaS data layer life cycle. The life cycle process of IaaS data layer includes the following phases: Data Configuration policies, provision of easy access to data, policy monitoring, calculation of Trust Factor Index and its implementation (Sharma and Banati, 2016). The Cloud Service Models are deployed to the Client's as services. The Client gives his

perception of trust to the Providers for Providers information and action.




Figure 2 Client Trusted Process Model

Client Trusted Process Model

The Client Trusted Process Model is shown in Figure 2. It consists of two levels: the Provider's level and the Client's level which are linked together with a feedback. The provider's level consists of four basic operations.

The first operation of Client Trusted Process Model at Provider's level is "Search for Security Controls/Models". This operation requires the domain knowledge of provider's software architect in cloud computing domain. Some of the available security controls and models have been discussed under background of study. The security controls must be classified into

user-configurable and non-user configurable. The deliverable of this first phase and its exit criteria is the "List of Controls/Models". This list is the input into the next phase and operation.

The second operation is "Identify User Configurable Security Controls/Models". Security controls which the providers deliberately make available to the users for the purpose of building the users confidence are here referred to user configurable security controls. For example, a user may be allowed to configure two factor authentications but may not be allowed to gain access to database activity monitoring. The deliverable of this phase is the "List of

User Configurable Security Controls/Models”.

The third operation is “Update Data Configuration Policy with List of User Configurable Security Controls”. This phase involves writing the data policy configuration algorithm and providing the configuration module with optional security features for the client’s use. The exit criteria of this phase is data configuration algorithm and the operational module.

The fourth operation of the Client Trusted Process Model is “Publish Security Controls to Client with documentation”. In this phase, the client is exposed to the various security features that he can apply to prevent the client’s data from illegal access, theft, unauthorized migration etc. in the cloud. The exit criteria of this phase is the provision of labeled documentation D_1 to D_n . A documentation D_n is attached to each security control feature exposed to the client. Each major security control feature will increase the level of trust of the user by a unit factor.

The fifth and the last operation of Client Trusted Process Model at Provider’s level is “Provide Interface for Client’s Feedback”. In this phase the user is presented with the opportunity to send a feedback to the Provider on his level of trust and confidence.

The Client’s level of Client Trusted Process Model captures the user’s security responsibilities. The Client’s level consists of two operations with client’s feedback as its deliverable. The two operations are “Set Security Controls” and “Send Feedback to Provider”. The user sets security control options and based on his experience and

assessment of level of trust, the user sends a feedback to the Provider. The content of the user’s feedback determines the next operation at the Provider’s level. The operations of the process model terminate at a high level of user’s trust rating.

Implementation of the Framework with CloudSim

The proposed framework was implemented with CloudSim, a state of art object oriented simulation tool for the modelling of cloud computing systems, infrastructures and processes, based on Java. The architecture and the design of CloudSim have been explained by Goyal et al. (2012). CloudSim version 3.0.3 was used with Eclipse IDE for Java Developers chosen as the Integrated Development Environment (IDE). Java version 8 Update 131 was installed on the operating system for the IDE.

In implementing the Client Trusted Security Framework with CloudSim, standard Java class models of CloudSim were employed. A new Java class *ClientTrustedSecurity* was created. In this class, the Provider is represented by the Broker, which can be created by using the *createBroker* method. This Java class model also contains elements of Client Trusted Process Models such as *Security Control Documentation Labels*. The Cloud Service Models are represented by the Virtual Machine (Vm) class. The Client is captured by the *UserId* of CloudSim Vm class.

The high level algorithm for the ClientTrustedSecurity Java class created for the framework simulation with CloudSim is stated in the next section.

Client Trusted Security Simulation Algorithm

The algorithm of the high level structures of *ClientTrustedSecurity* Java model, used for simulation, is as follows:

```

import the basic text and util Java classes.
import the basic CloudSim classes such as
Cloudlet, Datacenter, DatacenterBroker,
DatacenterCharacteristics, Host,
// Indicate the number of users
num_user ← 10
Initialize the common variables and create
the Cloud Information Service (CIS)

// Create the Datacenter
Datacenter createDatacenter(name)
Create an array to list to store one or more
machines in the Datacenter

Create an array to specify the processing
elements (PE) and the capacity of the
datacenter

Create the datacenter characteristics such
as type of vm, cost per sec., ram
provisioning, Security Control
Documentation Labels, etc.

// Create datacenter broker and the instance
DatacenterBroker createBroker()
//Create the virtual machine and its
characteristics, and set the vm list in the
main method
List<Vm> createVM()
vmList ← createVM(brokerId, 10)
// Submit the Vm list to the Broker
broker.submitVmList(vmList);
//Create the Cloudlet and its characteristics,
and set the list in the main method
List<Cloudlet> createCloudlet()

```

```

core.Cloudsim, Vm,
VmAllocationPolicySimple , etc.

// delclare the main simulation class
public class ClientTrustedSecurity
//write the main method
public static void main(String[] args)
// Set the number of cloud users in the main
method. This corresponds to broker
cloudletList
← createCloudlet(brokerId, 8);
// Submit the Cloudlet to the Broker
broker.submitCloudletList(cloudletList)
// Start simulation
CloudSim.startSimulation
// Print the status of the simulation for the
Cloudlet and the Vm

printCloudletList(newList);
printVmList(vmList);
// Stop simulation
CloudSim.stopSimulation

```

Comparison of the simulation with a live and currently running scenario of a cloud provider and a user was carried out. The user subscribed for IaaS to Commercial Network Services, a cloud service provider for the purpose of installing some proprietary applications.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1 shows the options available in the existing live cloud system with the product details and the values set by the cloud provider. Table 2 shows the documentation provided in the live and running cloud scenario, as required by the fourth operation of the Client Trusted Process Model.

Table 1 Cloud Provider's Product Options for the Existing Cloud System

Product Details	Options set
Product/Service:	Online Traders - Trader's VPS Value Edition
CNS Subscription ID:	118223
VM:	VM118223.tradersvps.net
IPv4 Address:	173.228.134.65
CPU Cores:	2
RAM (MB):	640
DISK (GB):	20
Two-factor Authentication:	No
OS:	Traders VPS Windows 2003 (x86) Enterprise Edition R2
Datacenter:	NYC

The location of the datacenter, the description of the Virtual Machine, security control provided by the provider and other product information are shown in Table 1. It

can be seen from Table 2 that the only security control provided by the provider is "Two-factor Authentication".

Table 2 Security Control with Documentation for the Existing Cloud System

Security Control Name	Documentation Label	Documentation
Two-factor Authentication	D1	Anytime you login from a device that you haven't verified in the last 12 hours, you will be asked to enter a token from the Google Authenticator app on your mobile device. You will be prompted to re-verify again after 12 hours or after you actively log out by clicking "Logout" in the control pane. You can also request a token be sent to you via SMS if you do not have a Smartphone that supports Google Authenticator. Simply enter the token displayed and your device will be verified for 12 hours, or until you log out.

The result of the successful simulation for the cloudlets and the virtual machine is shown in Figure 3. The cloudlet ID, the status of simulation, resource Id, data center Id, Vm Id, cost per second, CPU time, start time of simulation and finish time are

shown in Figure 3 for the cloudlets. The Vm Id, Vm user Id, number of processing elements, the RAM size, Vm name and Security control documentation labels for the virtual machines are also shown in Figure 3.

===== OUTPUT =====

Cloudelet Lists

Cloudlet ID	STATUS	Resource Id	Data center ID	VM ID	Cost Per Sec	CPU Time	Start Time	Finish Time
0	SUCCESS	2	0	3.0	0.0	1	0.2	1.2
1	SUCCESS	2	1	3.0	0.0	1	0.2	1.2
2	SUCCESS	2	2	3.0	0.0	1	0.2	1.2
3	SUCCESS	2	3	3.0	0.0	1	0.2	1.2
4	SUCCESS	2	4	3.0	0.0	1	0.2	1.2
5	SUCCESS	3	5	3.0	0.0	1	0.2	1.2
6	SUCCESS	3	6	3.0	0.0	1	0.2	1.2
7	SUCCESS	3	7	3.0	0.0	1	0.2	1.2

VMs List

VM ID	VM User ID	Mips	No of PEs	RAM	Bandwidth	Size	VM Name	SCDL 1	SCDL 2	SCDL 3
0	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3
1	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3
2	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3
3	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3
4	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3
5	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3
6	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3
7	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3
8	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3
9	12	1000.0	1	640	1000	20000	Xen	D1	D2	D3

ClientTrustedSecurity simulation finished!

Figure 3 Simulation Output for Cloudlets and Virtual Machines

Figure 3 shows the three security controls integrated into the system, identified by *Security Control Documentation Labels (SCDL) D1, D2 and D3*. Table 3 shows the

documentation of the security controls in the simulated system, as required by the fourth operation of the Client Trusted Process Model.

Table 3: Security Control with Documentation for the Proposed Cloud System

Security Control Name	Documentation Label	Documentation
Two-factor Authentication	D1	Anytime you login from a device that you haven't verified in the last 12 hours, you will be asked to enter a token from the Google Authenticator app on your mobile device. You will be prompted to re-verify again after 12 hours or after you actively log out by clicking "Logout" in the control pane. You can also request a token be sent to you via SMS if you do not have a Smartphone that supports Google Authenticator. Simply enter the token displayed and your device will be verified for 12 hours, or until you log out.
Use secure provisioning and Secure Migration Protocols	D2	These protocols prevent information from ever being sent to malicious hypervisor, virtual machines and host whenever a new virtual server is requested in the cloud. It puts a verification mechanism in place to ensure that attacks against the virtual environment of your stored application or data will not be performed by an unapproved Operating System.
Virtual Trusted Platform Module	D3	Virtual TPM protects its internal data from being accessed by the host environment, hypervisor, and all other virtual environments on the platform and puts a protection in place to prevent itself from being cloned and it is maintained in a secure location under your full physical control

As shown in Table 3, the instance of the proposed framework uses three security control systems while the existing live cloud system uses one security control system as shown in Table 2. Increase in user's trust level can be calculated as the gradient i of graph $n = it$, where n is the number of documented security controls made

available and t is the number of possible documented security controls, each associated with its developmental cost. The relationship between the increase in user trust level for the existing live system and the client trusted security framework system is shown in Fig. 4.




Figure 4 Increase in User Trust Level

The user trust level increases with the number of operational and well documented security controls. Comparing Table 2 with Table 3, the proposed framework is capable of increasing the trust level of the client by about 67% when compared to the existing cloud system. The users trust can increase above this value as more appropriate security controls are put in place to clear the user's doubt and enhance the trust level.

This work represents a new paradigm of information protection and security in cloud computing using a client trusted process model. We examined and defined a new client trusted security framework for cloud computing. The proposed framework defines association and relationship between the cloud provider, the client, the client trusted process model and cloud service models. Formal analysis shows that the proposed framework is capable of increasing the user's trust level by about 67%. Cloud computing will gain a wider global acceptance if a client trusted security framework is employed and the user is made to participate in the configuration of well documented security controls accompanied with the provision of feedback

to the cloud provider until absolute confidence of the user is gained.

Future Work

Future work shall focus on full scale implementation of this framework and how to protect the cloud from intentional malicious acts by the cloud provider.

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