

A socio economic analysis of the nature of rural-urban migration dynamics in Rwanda 1960 to 2010

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Abstract

In this paper we argue that in the last 5 decades Rwanda has had a unique migration system which defies the conventional and received wisdom of the rural to urban unidirectional movement. Firstly rural to urban migration has been a residue of the rural to rural movement either regulated by the government or as an automatic relief of population pressure in Rwanda. Secondly the rural to urban movement of population in Rwanda after 1990s has been shaped by the recent events and the legacy of conflict. Thirdly despite the anomalous nature of migration in Rwanda its socio economic implications to urbanization and development have not been analyzed. There has been a lack of clear and detailed policy on urbanization that can mitigate negative consequences of rural to urban migration. Urbanization has been regarded as a desirable development process for development in Rwanda. While analysis should generally show that to be true, the social justice and inequality implications of the process in Rwanda have not been empirically estimated.

The paper will address the following issues; How has process of rural urban migration in Rwanda in the last 50 years? What has population pressure and land scarcity affected the rural to urban migration and urbanization in Rwanda? How has a legacy of conflict and events of the late 1990s influenced the rural to urban migration process and what lessons can be learned for post conflict transitions? What are the magnitudes of resources allocation and use between rural and urban areas? Are Rwanda's towns parasitic on the socio economic benefits and social services delivery in Rwanda? How is the nature of equity consequences of Rwandan urbanization process? What are the policy implications of the Rwandan analysis? It is anticipated that the paper will flesh out areas that need more data and policy investigations and offer lessons to other countries especially those in post conflict transitions. Rwanda's analysis will offer lessons to economies and societies that have been experiencing population pressure and resources scarcity. Methodologically the paper will offer an approach to rural-urban migration that is multidisciplinary and more comprehensive than the conventional Todaro type models.

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1. Introduction

The paper lies within the rural to urban migration discourse and the role of urbanization. The thrust of our argument is that Rwanda presents a unique case of rural to urban migration and an approach to urbanization that can offer some lessons to planners. We argue that in the last 5 decades Rwanda has had a unique migration system which defies the conventional and ‘received wisdom’ of the rural to urban unidirectional movement. Firstly rural to urban migration has been a residue of the rural to rural movement either regulated by the government or as an automatic relief of population pressure in Rwanda. Indeed in periods prior to 1960s the most notable movement was that to neighboring countries.

Secondly the rural to urban movement of population in Rwanda after 1990s has been shaped by socio economic events and the legacy of conflict in the recent past. Thirdly despite the anomalous nature of migration in Rwanda its socio economic implications to urbanization and development have not been analyzed. There has been a lack of clear and detailed policy on urbanization that can mitigate negative consequences of rural to urban migration. Urbanization has been regarded as a desirable development process in Rwanda. While analysis should generally show that to be true, the social justice and inequality implications of the process in Rwanda have not been empirically estimated.

Although the configuration of Rwanda geographically and the physical link between rural and urban population can mediate the extent of the rural to urban divide, it is still plausible to argue that Kigali and other urban areas in Rwanda are parasitic to the rest of the country. However to look into this possibility the paper also interrogates why the rising levels of inequality in Rwanda do not seem to be related, by formal accounts, to the rural –urban divide.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows; in section 2 is a review of theory and concepts on rural to urban migration. Section 3 describes the methodology while section 4 reports the findings on Rwanda. Section 5 concludes the paper including an outline of issues that need to be pursued further. The penultimate page has references.

2. Methodology

Data for the paper are both primary and secondary. There is a scarcity of studies on rural to urban migration in Rwanda. However since this is a well-studied area in other parts of the world a major methodological approach has been a review of existing theories and concepts. To cover the evidence gap a short questionnaire of 25 questions were administered to 226 different types of respondents in Rwanda as a way of testing the hypothesis that the rural to urban migration in Rwanda is unique. The data analyzed using SPSS provides initial insights into how people perceive towns and rural areas and should stimulate the desire for larger inquiries. The information complements household survey reports on migration reported by government. Lack of detailed time series data on migration has not allowed more rigorous analysis for the period between 1960 and 2010. Indeed as argued, the movements of people in Rwanda have been complicated and in all sorts of directions. It is the latter phenomenon that has encouraged us to use a multidisciplinary approach to our analysis. Rural to urban migration first looks like a geographical phenomenon related to resource utilization pressures. Todaro has come out with a model that looks at it as an essentially developmental economic issue while the question of social justice and inequality links it to public economics. For centuries however urban poverty, challenges of modernization and the development of the inner city culture makes the issue sociological. We posit that the Rwandan case is perhaps a typical case where the need of a multidisciplinary approach becomes banal.

3. Theoretical context of rural to urban migration

The conventional theory on rural to urban migration derives from studies in geography that explains movements of people as a result of interwoven 'pull' and 'push' factors between the urban and rural areas (Diagram1). The pull factors are associated with better living conditions and services that urban areas have compared to rural areas. The push factors are associated with vulnerable conditions that are found more often in rural areas such as effects of vagaries of weather, food insecurity, problems in the agricultural sector and conflict. As shown in the diagram the movement of people from rural

areas to cities has been the villain of urban poverty and the correspondent development of shanty towns.

On the flip side of the theory is a look at migration from an economic vantage point. The latter is summarized in Diagram 2. The decision to migrate is a result of complex factors dictated by the differences between rural and urban incomes. The first strand of the economic explanation is consistent with the Lewis Theory of Two sectors. By the theory economic development is associated with movement of labour from rural to urban areas. Most developing economies have surplus labour in the rural areas whose marginal cost is zero. The movement of people out of the rural areas may not affect productivity in the sector and makes labour readily available to industries located in urban areas. The model has been the harbinger of sociological studies based on the modernization theory. In latter case rural areas are represented by the agricultural sector which is 'backward' while urban areas are represented by industrialization which is an epitome of 'modernization'. While it would be an unnecessary digression to indulge in the debates on modernization, a general critique of the theorem is that the marginal product of the rural labour may not after all in all cases be zero. The idea that what is modern is good and agricultural sector being backward is not desirable has also been challenged.

The more rigorous treatment of migration from rural to urban areas as an economic phenomenon has been championed by Todaro and Harris. The model presented in Diagram 3 has been appropriately called the Harris Todaro model. Todaro sought to explain why there was growing migration in a situation where there was unemployment in urban areas. He argues that the economic rationale of the movements is the expected income embedded in the rural-urban differences. Consistent with Diagram 2 the person moving to urban areas somewhat discounts the present value of migration basing on the expected benefits and income by residing in urban areas even if at the material moment he or she would be faced with unavailability of jobs.

Diagram 1: The classical rural to urban dynamics as it relates to urbanization




Diagram 2: Migration as an economic decision





Diagram 3. Harris Todaro Model of migration



Source: Derek Byerlee(1974) Rural urban migration in Africa: Theory, policy and research implications. International Migration Review adopted from Todaro 9th Edition pg 341

The explanation of the model is given in Diagram 3. In brief the Todaro model argues that

- a. Migration is stimulated by rational economic considerations of benefits and costs
- b. Expected income rather than rural-urban gap explains the movement
- c. Probability of obtaining urban job is inversely related to urban unemployment
- d. Migration is a result of serious imbalances in economic opportunity

Todaro has used the model to prescribe policy paths to developing countries including the following;

- a. Reducing the rural-urban imbalances
- b. Urban job creation is not a sufficient cure of urban unemployment. Indeed it may stimulate higher movements as one job opportunity created in town may stimulate three or fourfold migrants
- c. Indiscriminate education expenditures will lead to further migration and unemployment
- d. There is a need for integrated rural development initiatives

In the diagram AA1 depicts demand for labour in the agricultural sector. MM1 depicts demand for labour in manufacturing. OAOM is the horizontal axis representing total labour force. In the traditional neoclassical sense equilibrium wage would be where W_a equals W_m or where the two demand curves cross with OAL_a workers in agriculture and $OM L_m$ in urban manufacturing. According to Todaro this is only an ideal situation. In reality urban wages are institutionally determined at W_m^* . The urban wage W_m^* is clearly higher than the rural wage at W_a .

If there is no unemployment, OML_m^* would get urban jobs and OAL_m would settle for rural jobs at OAW_a^{**} wage below the free market level of wage at OAW_a . The urban –rural wage gap is thus $W_m^* - W_a^{**}$ because W_m^* is institutionally fixed. The rural workers will most likely join the job lottery to see if they can be part of the OML_m^* jobs available. The probability of getting the job is given by the ratio OML_m^* to the total labour pool in the urban sector which is OML_a^* times the determined urban wage ($L_m/OML_a^* \cdot W_m^*$). The

locus qq shows indifference of a migrant to job locations. The probability of urban job success necessary to equate agriculture income W_a^* with urban expected income given by the probability $(L_m/OML_a^* \cdot W_m^*)$. At point Z is the new unemployment equilibrium where the urban – rural wage gap is actually $W_m^* - W_a^*$. In the latter case OAL_a^* are in the agricultural sector while OML_m^* are employed in the urban sector with W_m^* wages. The rest $OML_a^* - OML_m^*$ are either unemployed or engaged in the informal sector explaining why despite unemployment migration to urban areas still may continue.

While these generic theories have coherent explanation of why people move from rural to urban area, the rest of the paper is premised on an argument that they do not take into consideration the context of a particular country over time such as Rwanda. We argue that over the decades Rwandan migration has been militated by the physioeconomic conditions related to availability of land for agriculture and a legacy of conflict especially after the 1960s. This is what constitutes the next section.

4. The Rwanda Migration Dynamics

4.1. Changing nature of rural – urban migration in Rwanda over the decades

The nature of rural to urban migration has been a complicated movement from rural to rural, rural to urban and rural to foreign countries at different times in the recent past of Rwanda. For many decades Rwandans moved to East Africa and DRC in search of jobs in mines and plantations not to Kigali. The latter was a small one street capital that was not as attractive as the job opportunities in neighbouring countries. In Table 1 are the figures of such movements from late 1940s to 1960.

Table 1. The flow of migrants from Rwanda to East Africa and Congo

Year	Number of people to East Africa	Number of People to Congo
1949	11,053	10,992
1950	12,759	6,693
1951	15,087	7,849
1952	19,200	14,018
1953	16,181	3,851
1954	17,548	3,020
1955	15,995	2,715
1956	16,703	2,505
1957	14,844	1,353
1958	16,101	1,013
1959	18,953	747
1960	19,638	140

Source: Baker 1970:145.

The real reasons may have been economic or otherwise. Pottier (2002) talks of a movement of about 100,000 Rwandans into Congo and Uganda in the 1920s due to famine. By 1950s it is related that a third of Buganda was of Rwandan origin. But it can be said generally that the movements after 1960 were more related to political upheavals than economic forces. Table 2 summarizes major movements of Rwandans associated with the legacy of conflict.

Table 2. Movement of Rwandan based on a checkered history of conflict

Date	Movement
1959-61	First major wave of Rwandan refugees, mainly Tutsi, flee to neighbouring Uganda, Congo and Burundi following the killings of Tutsi that accompanied the Hutu “revolution”, the end of Tutsi monarchical rule and transfer of power to the Hutu majority.
1963-64	Some exiled refugees organize armed raids into Rwanda, each raid provoking more violence against

	Tutsi and further exodus, mainly to South Kivu in Congo. By 1964, UNCHR estimated that more than 150,000 Rwandans (mainly Tutsi) were living as refugees in neighbouring countries and a few (probably less than 2000) fled to Europe (Belgium).
1967	Renewed killings, more Tutsi flee to neighbouring countries.
1973	Purge of Tutsi from public posts by the Kayibanda regime in February and March 1973. Several hundred Tutsi were killed and a few thousand fled over the border
1970s/80s	An unknown number of Rwandans leave to work in Uganda's coffee plantations.
Late 1980s	UNHCR makes little progress on solving the lingering problem of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi refugees living outside the country. After several years of relative quiet, the Rwandan government initiates anti-Tutsi propaganda.
1990	October 1st, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) of exiled Tutsis from Uganda invades Rwanda and the civil war begins, accompanied by increasing persecution, imprisonment and violence against Tutsis and leading more to flee, several to join the ranks of the RPF
1994	Almost three million Rwandans flee to neighbouring countries of Congo and Tanzania
1994-95	After the RPF took power in July 1994, an estimated 700,000 Tutsi refugees from as far back as 1959 returned to Rwanda, mainly from the neighbouring countries of Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire, but also a few also from Europe and North America
1996	In August, the RPF attacks the camps in Eastern Zaire, aiming to break up the camps and stop them being used as a base to attack Rwanda. Several thousand refugees were killed and mass repatriation started voluntarily and by force.
1996-1999	Several hundred thousand refugees repatriated from 1996 to 1999 (most in early 1997). Several thousands

	others head west further into Zaire instead and there is evidence that they were pursued by RPF soldiers and speculation that thousands of these refugees perished in the forests – one estimate says up to 200,000 “missing refugees” have not been accounted
2002	UNHCR reports that almost 1.5 million Rwandan refugees have been repatriated from DRC (Zaire) to Rwanda since the start of their operations there in 1994 and around 20,000 refugees remain
2004 onwards	Ex combatants of FDLR who want to return to Rwanda are continuously repatriated by aid of mobilization and Reintegration Commission
2008	A large number of Rwandans residing in Tanzania are repatriated following agreement between Tanzania and Rwanda
2010	Arrangements are made between Rwanda, Uganda and UNHCR to repatriate

The data in the previous paragraphs indicate that the most prominent movements of Rwandans were those to neighbouring countries. The arguments for these were both political and economic. Nonetheless there has also been attempt to explain the movements as demographic pressure resulting from scarcity of land that has been growing over the decades. The argument does not suggest that there were no internal movements as well. There is evidence of internal migration from land scarce areas to those, which had some surplus (Clay and Ngenzi 1990; Olson, Clay and Kayitsinga 1990). The province-to-province movements can be put into four phases corresponding to the evolution of the land problem nationally².

The first phase was between 1945 and 1961. Heavy migrations were from Ruhengeri to Byumba Province and from Gikongoro to Butare. Moderate movements were those from Kigali to Gitarama and modest movements were from Gikongoro to Cyangugu and from

²A very heavy movement is that involving about 1000 to 1500 net migrants per year. A heavy movement is that between 250 and 999 migrants per year, a moderate movement between 100 and 249 per year and modest movement 50 to 99 per year. Kigali province was then including the capital city.

Kibuye to Gitarama. Another phase in rural migration was from 1962 to 1971. Very heavy movements were from Butare to Kigali. Heavy movements were from Gikongoro to Butare and from Byumba to Kigali. Moderate movements were from Ruhengeri to Byumba. Modest movements were from Gikongoro to Kigali and Gikongoro to Gitarama. Another modest movement was from Byumba to Kibungo. A third phase was that from 1972 to 1976. It was dominated by a massive movement from different provinces to the capital Kigali. The heaviest movements were from Butare to Kigali. Other moderate movements were from Butare to Kibungo, Gisenyi to Kigali Rural Ruhengeri to Kigali and from Ruhengeri to Byumba. There were modest movements from Gikongoro to Kigali and from Byumba to Kigali (Clay and Ngenzi 1990).

The last recorded phase was intensive movement from many provinces to those to the East of Rwanda although it is also classified as not being quite heavy. This was a period where land scarcity was acute and movement was to places where there was still ample space. There were modest movements from Butare, Gikongoro, Kibuye, Gitarama, Gisenyi and Byumba all to Kibungo Province. But there were also modest movements from Gikongoro to Kigali Rural and to Butare. There were movements from Butare to Kigali, from Gitarama to Kigali, Ruhengeri to Kigali, from Byumba to Kigali and from Gitarama to Kigali³.

In the immediate past of Rwanda, movement to Kigali or other urban areas was perhaps not the most primordial direction. The obvious reasons were that for geographical and economic reasons rural to rural movements in Rwanda have been relatively more important due perhaps to pressure on land by rising physical densities especially in the Northern and Southern provinces. But does the argument mean Rwanda is completely unique in the discourse on rural to urban migration? While the arguments are sensible in the period after 1960s it is also notable that Kigali has developed into a primate city with growing problems that are consistent with Todaro analysis in the previous section. In the period after 1994 Kigali alone has

³ See Olson, Clay and Kayitsinga (1990:10) for diagrammatic representation of movements

developed from a small urban area of 300,000 to over 600,000 inhabitants⁴ almost 5 times larger than the next urban area. The majority of the population expansion in Kigali is however not necessarily rural to urban. There are many Rwandans who returned from Diaspora who chose to reside in Kigali. There are also several people who reside in Kigali as an escape from rural areas attached to bad memories of genocide. But above all there are people who move to Kigali due to pull and push forces that were outlined in section 3 of the paper. Table 3 provides data on movements of population as monitored in the major households surveys that took place after 1994.

It is stated forthrightly that migration follows job creation in Rwanda. However supportive of our hypothesis the greatest job creation has been in the Eastern province essentially a rural area. The Todaro model may still be valid in the sense that migration is said to be higher where population growth has not been matched with job creation. Out of 550,000 adult migrants 500,000 are internal. From Table 3 based on household survey of living conditions the previous five years meaning after 2000; the largest group of migrants comprised of farmers, of whom over 40% migrated to Eastern Province. The next is the service sector involving 90,000 adults in Kigali City most of whom (63,000) are maids, cleaners of similar workers. Seventeen thousand professional workers migrated over the five year period, with less than half destined for Kigali. Professional migrants include 3,500 medical staff and 4,300 teachers.

⁴ The estimate is for population at night as that during the day is in excess of a million there is a heavy inward and outward movement of people into Kigali during the day

Table 3. Migration

	Kigali City	Southern	Western	Northern	Eastern	National
Professionals	6500	3200	2000	700	4200	17,000
Senior officials and managers	800	400	200	0	0	1400
Office clerks	3600	500	160	300	200	4700
Commercial and sales	15900	5000	2100	1100	6800	31000
Service sector	55600	13500	7600	3300	9800	89800
Agriculture and fishery	13400	59200	39900	26300	102,300	241,000
Semi skilled workers	12900	4200	3700	1700	3900	26300
Drivers and machine operators	2700	900	300	200	200	4300
Unskilled labour	1900	600	1000	400	1600	5500
Total	113300	87500	57000	34000	129000	421,000

Diagram 1. Internal migration by provinces





Diagram 2. Internal migration by type



According to Poverty Update of Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) (NISR2007) migration in the last 5 years was 10.3% for 15 years old and above. Movements were domi-

nantly from the City of Kigali, Kigali Ngali and Gitarama: 38.3% of people who have migrated within the last five years come from these former provinces. It was found out that most movements were to areas close to home. Little movement was observed between the Western and Eastern Province but was substantial from Northern Province to the Eastern. The update states that ‘a very high proportion of migrants from Ruhengeri and Byumba have moved to Eastern Province (58.2% of the former and 72.3% of the latter); similarly, a large proportion of migrants from Cyangugu and Kibuye have remained in Western Province. However, Eastern Province is the most common destination for migrants overall, receiving 28.8% of migrants aged 15 and over in the last five years, slightly more even than the province of the City of Kigali’. Migrants from Rwanda's neighbouring countries, too, tend to be concentrated in the provinces that are adjacent to their countries of previous residence, or in Kigali, resulting in a fairly even spread throughout Rwanda. The exception is the Northern Province, which has received just 8% of international migrants in the last five years. The most common reason for migration is economic: 41.3% of migrants aged 15 and above cited economic reasons as the principal cause, of whom about half moved for agricultural employment reasons, 11.3 per cent were looking for employment and 8.9 moved due to lack of land. Some 26.4 per cent moved for various family reasons while 32.3 per cent moved because of several other reasons.

4.2. Analysis of findings on present dynamics from a survey

The argument in the previous section was based on secondary data and existing records. In this section is an analysis of 226 returns based on a questionnaire administered to individuals on behalf of their households in Kigali, the Southern province and a few from the Eastern province. While the majority of the questionnaires (49.1 per cent) were administered in the Southern province there was no concern about statistical representation of the whole country. The aim was to purposively elicit information on the character of migration in Rwanda particularly Kigali and Butare but also to get perspectives at random on perceptions about the most dominant features from general knowledge of the respondents. In this regard 30 (13.3) respondents were randomly selected from rural areas while the

rest 179 (79.2 per cent) were urban residents with 16 (7.1 per cent) not responding to the questions. In urban area respondents 88 (38.9 per cent) were from Kigali City while 113 (50 per cent) were from other Rwandan town and 21(9.3 per cent) were from other rural areas. Out of the random selection of respondents 141(62.4 per cent) were male while 84(37. 2 per cent) were female. In the sample 78 (34.5 per cent) were classified as adults above 18 and youth between 18 and 30 were 89(39.4 per cent). In the sample farmers constituted 19 respondents (8.4 per cent), traders 47(20.8 per cent) and small business 95(42.0 per cent).There were 5 (2.2. per cent) and 15(6.6. per cent) respondents were unemployed.

The returns greatly support our hypothesis that movement in Rwanda has been influenced by a recent history of Rwanda. In the random sample it is noteworthy that the majority about 63 per cent settled in Kigali or Butare and the other areas after 1994. Of the 63 per cent about 40 per cent settled or in other words moved to the area they are located between 2001 and 2010. On the question of direction of movement there is evidence as suggested in our hypothesis that in Rwanda there has been rural to rural movements (4.9 per cent) alongside the traditional rural to urban movement but perhaps not to as a large extent and anticipation as in the hypothesis. An interesting finding in the study is the response to knowledge of urban to rural movement in Rwanda is higher (5.3 per cent) than our rural to rural thesis. Of course the data supports the conventional wisdom that the movement is rural to urban (72.6 per cent) and out of this rural to Kigali is (16. 4 per cent). Indeed in a separate question on knowledge of urban to rural movements in Rwanda registered 167 (73.9 per cent of complete responses) in the affirmative. The principal factors for urban to rural movement out of 166 complete responses were given as going to claim family land (46.9 per cent), business (29.5 per cent), and almost 1 per cent or 15 people citing expulsion from urban areas. For movements as a whole the factors cited were looking for more productive areas (73.5 per cent), land plots 15.5 per cent (isambu in vernacular) following family members (3.5 per cent) and displacement by genocide (5.8 per cent) and population pressure (1.3 per cent).What is interesting is that very few believe they have

moved to where they are because of population pressure which is the most attractive push factor advocated for Rwanda.

In Table 4 are responses on the question on motivation for moving to urban areas other than Kigali. The response with the seeking job opportunity constituting more than 50 per cent is consistent with the conventional wisdom of rural to urban migration. The same argument is supported by the reasons for moving from rural areas to Kigali where a majority of 78.8 per cent again cite employment as the major pull factor in Table 5.

Table 4. Motivation of movement to town other than Kigali

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Job opportunity	120	53.1
	Business prospects	84	37.2
	Invited by family member	6	2.7
	Proximity to services and school	7	3.1
	Pressure from home	3	1.3
	Total	221	97.8
Total		226	100.0

The response on Kigali somewhat makes us look at our hypothesis carefully. Modernity to Kigali is also a conventional Lewisian argument. However it is interesting to note that displacement by conflict and attachment to genocide has very insignificant returns of 0.4 and 0.9 per cent response. Instead cultural pull factors account for about 4.4 per cent. While our hypothesis was that a good amount of movement may be attached to genocide and conflict, this may be with regard to movement to foreign countries. Moving to Kigali may be more due to the traditional pull factors than push from rural or conflict situations.

Table 5. Reasons for moving to Kigali

	Frequency	Percent
Valid Modernity of Kigali business	34	15.0
Expected employment	178	78.8
No attachment to genocide	2	.9
Cultural attractions	10	4.4
Displacement by conflict and genocide	1	.4
Total	225	99.6
Total	226	100.0

One issue pursued on Kigali and Rwanda was that of daytime movements. Due to the geographical configuration of Rwanda it is possible to spend time in Kigali or another town and travel home in rural areas. From Table 6 the phenomenon is evenly distributed between very frequent (32.3 per cent) frequent (36.3) and not frequent (30.1 per cent). Combining frequent and very frequent supports affirmatively our argument that given the geographical configuration of Rwanda some rural to urban movement is mediated by the proximity of Rwanda urban areas from rural areas.

Table 6. Day time movement

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Not frequent	68	30.1
	Frequent	82	36.3
	Very frequent	73	32.3
	Total	223	98.7
Missing	System	3	1.3
Total		226	100.0

Table 7 represents a question that was constructed to look into the attraction to other urban areas of Rwanda. Kigali is still the most attractive (58.8 per cent) as would be expected and the most

important factor is the pull factor of opportunities (52.2 per cent) in Table 8.

Table 7. Attractiveness of other urban areas in Rwanda

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Kigali	133	58.8
	Kibuye	31	13.7
	Butare	44	19.5
	Rusizi	5	2.2
	Muhanga	1	.4
	Ruhengeri	5	2.2
	Total	223	98.7
Missing	System	3	1.3
Total		226	100.0

Table 8. Major reasons for movement to other urban areas of Rwanda

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Bigness and services	19	8.4
	Home town	44	19.5
	Beauty and fame	41	18.1
	Opportunities	118	52.2
	Total	223	98.7
Total		226	100.0

Most of arguments on the parasitic nature of towns are usually based on computed secondary data. The capital of a country is parasitic if for example its population is several times larger than the second largest a phenomenon common in capitals in Sub Saharan Africa. In the survey there was a question on whether the respondent regarded urban areas as parasites to rural areas and why. A majority of 207 (1.7 per cent) out of 223 complete returns support the argument that towns are parasites and the dominant reason is that rural people are

becoming poorer relative to urban people who are becoming richer (47.3 per cent) most education and health services (12.4 per cent), more attention and money is given to towns (10.6 per cent) or some other reason (24.3 per cent). On why urbanization may be desirable 53.1 per cent of complete responses (223) cite market and business opportunities 53.1 per cent availability of modern facilities 27.4 per cent and services like water and electricity 18.1 per cent. Negative things on towns are noise and violence (45.1 per cent) and poverty and street children (11.9 per cent) and finally prostitutes and loss of culture (17.7 per cent).

From records there may have been low rates of movements to Kigali compared to the period after 1994 because of government regulation. Indeed even moving from one commune to another was sort of restricted during Habyarimana regime. A majority of responses (82.3 per cent) from complete questions show that they do not know of any restrictions. Those responding in affirmative constituting 15 per cent may have been in Rwanda when the regulations were some of the factors that regulated movement.

From the data sets in SPSS it is possible to dissect response by gender, by location or some other categories. They provide a modest set of perceptible data base. However for the sake of the paper the secondary data and the findings offer some tentative conclusions on which policy may be based but also on which further research may be conducted. These are outlined in the next section.

5. Rural urban divide and equity argument

One argument posed by this paper was that urban areas are parasitic to rural areas. The underlying hypothesis is obviously that the urban rural divide is the primary explaining factor for growing inequality. In this section we support the observation of growing socio-inequality but revisit our assumption of the proximate cause of the socio economic problem. We provide a number of caveats that support our earlier argument that the Rwandan context may not after all be consistent to all types of received wisdom on rural to urban divide. It is hoped the latter analysis can shape the framework of policy formulation.

The first observation with regard to the social justice inquiry has been related to how pro poor has been the growth and transformation that Rwanda has been undergoing. In the last 5 years Rwanda has registered an average growth of GDP of more than 6 per cent. Per capita GDP has grown from 280 to US \$520 (NISR 2009) yet the level of poverty reduction between 2001 and 2006 has been slightly more than 3 per cent only from 60.2% to 56.9% from 2001 to 2006. It is officially documented that there are 600 000 more Rwandans living in poverty currently than there were five years ago. In the context of a less than pro poor growth is the obvious inequality argument.

While the average income of the top 20% of the population has almost doubled since 1996, the income of the bottom 20% has remained stagnant in the past 10 years (UNDP 2007). If income distribution had remained constant since the genocide, then the average annual income would have been more than double what it is today among the bottom 20% of the population. Thus, despite rapid economic growth, poverty has been increasing due to rising inequality, and it is estimated that further growth could increase the gap between rich and poor without decreasing poverty at current inequality rates (UNDP 2007). The Gini coefficient as an indicator of inequality has grown from less than 0.3 to 0.5 in the last twenty years and places Rwanda among the top 15% of the most unequal countries in the world (UNDP, 2007). From the returns of our survey presented in the last section and from the theory and empirics of the discourse the villain of inequality is the rural urban divide. Further data to the patterns of migration seem to question to some extent this stylised wisdom. Table 8 shows select indicators on health while Table 9 shows the number of primary school pupils and number of secondary schools by area.

For comparative purposes Kigali population estimate in the last Household Survey (EICV 2) was 663,000 while other urban areas had 618,000 and the rural areas 6,683,000. Recalling that there are more than 10 other urban areas the fact that Kigali is a primate city is sensible to geographers and non geographers. The combined population of Kigali and other urban areas is 16.5 per cent while it is noted that other urban rises have been growing faster than Kigali by 11 per cent the fact remains that Kigali is perhaps the most truly

metropolitan area of Rwanda with most features you find in other cities in the developing world.

Table 9. Major health indicators by provinces 2008

	1	2	3
East	264796	978206748	112
West	311810	1220761187	107
North	236287	1021163638	113
South	370728	1151183199	126
Kigali City	16092	526859767	39

1 - Number of people covered by one doctor 2 - funds in Rwf Performance Based funds 3 number of health facilities

Table 10. Major education indicators

	1	2
East	497918	137
West	505693	139
North	501899	154
South	534810	159
Kigali City	149950	67

1 Number of primary school children 2 Number of secondary schools
 Table 8 is consistent with the expected findings that Kigali City has superior services in that it has the fewest number of people covered by a doctor. In fact the number of people per doctor in South and North is almost or more than double that of Kigali City. It is however noteworthy that the disbursement of funds for health does not show any expected lion's share of Kigali City compared to other areas of Rwanda. Likewise the number of health facilities is in fact lowest for Kigali City compared to other areas. Kigali City has also the lowest number of primary school children and the lowest number of secondary (Table 9). Table 10 as expected shows that a majority of hotels are located in Kigali City. While Kigali City by 2008 data had 31 hotels the West had 20, North 13 and South 9.

Table 11. Number of Hotels

	Number of hotels
East	5
West	20
North	13
South	9
Kigali City	31

These figures by no means show adequately the levels of differences between the rural and urban areas. A few more indicators show that definitely Kigali City and other urban areas are better endowed with public and private services and as a result the urban areas are more attractive and would be a good destination of migrants. Although Kigali City has the lowest number of secondary schools the gross attendance ratio of urban areas is 20.7 per cent while rural areas have 4.5 per cent only(DHS2005). While in the previous table Kigali had the lowest number of health facilities it is noteworthy that 4 out of 5 referral hospitals are located in Kigali City. Kigali City has 25 per cent while other provinces have less than 10 per cent each. The respondents having electricity were 25.1 per cent of the respondents while the rural areas were 1.3 per cent only. The rate of possessing a TV in urban areas was 14 per cent while it was only 0.3 per cent in rural areas.

Indeed the argument is supported by the most recent poverty profile and related indicators. In the DHS 2005 cited above the rural areas were more dominant in the lowest wealth quintile with 24.2 per cent compared with 6.1 per cent for urban areas. In the highest quintile urban areas had 59.7 per cent while rural areas had 11.7 per cent. A comparison of the head count index across two of the most recent survey is presented in Table 11. The poverty levels fell very slightly in Kigali City and Western Province but in fact rose in the Southern Province. The Eastern Province which was also shown to be the destination of most internal migration had most substantial fall in poverty. The Poverty update (NISR 2007) note that 68 per cent of all poverty reduction between 2001 and 2006 was derived from the Eastern Province. Inequality rose in Southern and Western provinces. But what is again consistent with our argument is the inequality question. Consistent with the findings that the Eastern Province

created more jobs and was thus the most attractive destination is that the major difference in inequality is not between Kigali and the rest of the country but between the Eastern and the rest of the country. It is thus not strange to find returns in our survey showing more rural to rural movements and even some urban to rural movement, a phenomenon we are arguing is contextual to Rwanda

Table 12. Head Count poverty index across provinces

Province	EICV 1(2001)	EICV 2 (2006)
City of Kigali	24.4	20.2
Southern	65.4	67.3
Western Province	63.1	62.0
Northern Province	66.9	62.7
Eastern Province	61.8	50.4
National	60.4	56.3

NISR (2007).Poverty update for EDPRS 2007

In the shadow of the general scenario should be a number of observations that sharpen the Rwandan context. Rwanda's configuration needs to be taken into account. In our survey we noted people who know day time urban dwellers who sleep in rural areas because Rwanda is not a large country. This has a meaning also that anybody with minimum capacity can have access to facilities that are tenable in Kigali or other urban areas. The urban rural divide in Rwanda is not sharpened by geographical distances.

Another caveat is the issue of which an urban area is and which is not. In Rwanda the administrative definition of Kigali City include quite semi rural areas of Gasabo and Kicukiro. Huye town includes semi urban areas of Rango and Tumba. Although the factor is said to have been taken care of in the EICV survey results we note that there is a weak distinction between the two. Previously we note figures from surveys showing that the rest of other urban areas has a population which is still less than that of Kigali. Indeed we have also noted that Kigali by the night is smaller than that by the day as many Rwandans can do business in Kigali and get home in any other part of Rwanda. Huye more Butare the second largest urban area would qualify for a trading centre in most East Africa urban areas.

In the study we saw that historical factors including a recent experience of genocide shapes the discourse of population movements. However the most recent surveys do not show any more international out migrations. The latter should not suggest that it would not be important. The joining of Rwanda in the East African Community makes the perspectives of urbanization take a new outlook. While this may not be part of the most recent protocols the possibility of skilled labour movement can bring new patterns in future different from the ones of the 1950s.

A missing dimension in this paper is the gender dimension of movement and its possible implications to inequity. Its clear that referring to anybody above 15 years is the criteria but for a study that would follow up the post migration activities gender would be interesting. There are cases where a number of under employed people in cities are house maids. These could possibly be the reasons for a number of people showing urban to rural migration we noted. Other papers in the series may have investigated this more closely but it is a possible future area of research.

Finally the question of the rural urban divide is mediated by the fact that it based on low thresholds. While the indicators show high levels of inequality that have risen in the recent past it is important to note a substantial part of it is between rural provinces themselves.

6. Conclusions

The paper was hinged on two sets of theories. The traditional theory of migration based on the pull and push factors and an economic modeling by Harris and Todaro that indicate existence of other reasons for movement. The findings suggest that the policy implications of both hold. However the unique characteristics that were found with regard to the Rwandan context suggest an extra care to define policies that can suitably answer the question of rural to urban migration in light of the need for improved livelihood robust to all parts of the economy. The following areas though definitely exhaustive deserve further policy analysis and formulation;

- a. An integrated rural development strategy is appropriate and focus on poverty reduction is essential the central focus. The issue of job creation and employment is crucial to the

strategy. Umurenge Vision 2020 seems a Rwandan answer to the Todaro recommendations. It should however give appropriate attention to the anomalies that the finding on Rwanda depict particularly differences that are between rural areas

- b. Land and access seem to be behind historical and recent movements of the people. Land Policy and Law of 2004 and 2005 are important instruments available in Rwanda. It would be expected that implementation of the policy need to be cognizant of the contextual nature of the Rwandan case
- c. A legacy of conflict has shaped the movement of people inside and outside Rwanda. Durable peace building policies are important post conflict management of all types of movements in Rwanda
- d. Social policies are required to answer the inequality and poverty conditions that are behind the migration in Rwanda. A clear link between patterns of migration, poverty and inequality were consistently noted in all types of data and findings
- e. Urbanization policy need to consider the great difference between Kigali and the rest of the urban areas
- f. In the backdrop of the discussion looms the population growth and growing land scarcity in some parts of the country especially the North and the South

Finally it should not be outrageous to look at Rwanda as a holistic unit where rural to urban migration is not the central issue but the urban areas other than Kigali are planned to grow as part and parcel of a larger conurbation. The central issue would be a balanced growth spatially planned to be evenly distributed over the otherwise densely populated country.

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