The Thesis of Vague Objects and Unger's Problem of the Many

Abstract

Peter Unger argues that his puzzle of the problem of the many leaves us with having to accept either countless embedded objects of the same kind or a Parmenidean rejection of distinct entities. This dilemma can be avoided if objects truly have vague boundaries. It is metaphysically impossible for an entity with a vague boundary to be embedded within an entity of the same kind. A cloud's parts (that is, cloud stuff) cannot be clearly embedded within the vague boundary region of another cloud, for the latter region is defined as possessing neither cloud-stuff nor non-cloud-stuff. Likewise, there cannot be a cloud with a vague boundary embedded in the middle of another cloud because there would then have to be a population of water droplets dense enough to compose part of the larger cloud which was nevertheless insufficient in density to compose part of the embedded cloud.