

Influencing public policy in Tanzania: Trials and tribulations of the Tanzania Horticultural Association

*David Irwin
Irwin Grayson Associates
United Kingdom
david@irwin.org*

Abstract: *Interest groups aim to influence public policy and, therefore, interest groups representing business advocate improvements to the business enabling environment. Researchers claim that it is difficult to assess the extent to which interest groups influence public policy. Most research in this area focuses on the US and EU and little explores the factors that may determine whether business membership organisations (BMOs) are likely to be successful. This paper addresses those gaps. It explores the attempts by a BMO in Tanzania, the Tanzania Horticultural Association, to influence reform of public policy. It offers evidence that the association was successful, though mostly on issues that might be regarded as technical rather than contentious or political. The paper reviews the factors that have contributed to its success, which include providing good evidence, preparing a persuasive argument, using champions amongst public officials and engaging in dialogue, without confrontation, across government and concludes that this approach makes a difference in whether BMOs are successful.*

Keywords: Public-private dialogue, public sector advocacy, interest groups, business membership organisations

Introduction

Most prior studies in the rapidly growing literature on interest groups focus on activities in the US or EU, with very little research examining their activities in developing countries, despite considerable efforts by donors to encourage and support dialogue and advocacy. As a result, we do not know whether interest groups in developing countries work in the same way as their counterparts in developed countries, whether they form similar relationships with public sector target audiences or even whether the political environments in which they work are similar. And nor do we ever really know the extent to which interest groups are successful, even in developed countries. This paper aims to address that gap by examining the work of a single business association in Tanzania.

Unlike cause groups, business associations have more objectives than solely the influence of public policy. Nevertheless, business associations, effectively interest groups for the private sector, see one of their primary roles being to influence public policy. Business associations seek to improve the environment for business and thus have a similar overall objective to

many governments which see the private sector as the engine of growth (see, for example, International Labour Organisation (ILO) 2007, United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2010). Improving the investment climate and reducing the regulatory burden is encouraged by the World Bank through its Doing Business scorecard (see for example World Bank 2018). Examining the efforts of interest groups to influence policy leads to debate, *inter alia*, about whether interest groups gain attention (Page 1999) and whether they are successful in influencing policy (Grossman 2012).

This paper describes the work of a single business association, the Tanzania Horticultural Association (TAHA), based in Arusha in northern Tanzania. As explained in more detail below, this case has been selected because horticulture is an important contributor to the economy of Tanzania and because TAHA is held up as an exemplary business association (Kelsall 2013; TPSF2016). During this time, TAHA was supported financially by a donor-funded support programme known as Business Environment Strengthening Tanzania (BEST) Advocacy Component (AC), now renamed BEST-Dialogue.

The findings make two important contributions. Firstly, I offer evidence that at least sometimes, business associations are capable of putting an issue on the political agenda and pursuing it all the way through to reform of policy and sometimes reform of legislation as well. Achieving the occasional success may be regarded as luck rather than design, so it is important to understand what it is about the business association – its characteristics and actions – that lead to repeated success. Secondly, therefore, I contribute to the debate about the nature and characteristics of what it means for a business association to be professional.

This paper is structured as follows. A brief review of the interest group literature on access, influence, success and what it means to be competent is followed by the case study, which draws out case specific lessons, and then concludes with an assessment of the key attributes that led to TAHA's success.

Access, influence, success

Whilst some researchers question whether interest group and their lobbying activities contribute to the democratic process, others argue that interest group participation in policy-making can improve the quality of both the policy and the decision making (see, for example, Dür and de Briève 2007). Participatory democracy requires widespread participation in policy formulation and interest groups broaden citizen involvement (Saurugger 2008). Furthermore, involving the private sector in the process of formulating public policy builds legitimacy and secures private sector buy-in (Bettcher 2011: 2; Dür and Mateo 2012). In principle, the Government of Tanzania is keen on this approach since it joined the Open Government Partnership in 2011 and is committed to “transparency, accountability and public participation in the governance of Tanzania” (URT 2012: 1).¹

Associations engaging in dialogue and advocacy tend to choose between two strategies: working “inside” government – seeking directly to influence officials and politicians – or “outside” government – essentially through mobilising public opinion (Walker 1991: 103). In countries such as Tanzania, where there are comparatively few business associations compared to a developed country, and where public officials need help to acquire good research evidence, it makes sense to follow the insider approach. Start and Hovland argue

¹In 2017, it withdrew again, arguing that it was already subject to other review mechanisms and that it was not necessary to be part of OGP (Buguzi 2017) though it is not yet clear what, if any, difference this will make in practice.

that "two important dimensions to consider [...] include the balance between confrontation and co-operation and rational evidence versus values or interest-based argument" (2005: 5). Collaboration, and working with public officials, rather than being confrontational, resonates with the consensual culture of Tanzania (Chazan *et al.* 1999).

Public sector policymakers need information, knowledge and opinions, and many researchers argue that there is a resource exchange mechanism at work – and thus a theory to explain policy maker and interest group interaction – in that public agencies need policy goods – technical expertise, research information, implementation support, political support, legitimacy, even support in implementing government policy – and interest groups need access to policymakers (Poppelaars 2007; Braun 2012; Dür and Mateo 2012; Beyers and Braun 2014.) Indeed, Braun (2012) argues that the main predictor of access is the level of policy goods offered to policymakers. The need to provide information, expertise and opinion hints at several competencies required of the BMO, including the ability to collate evidence and prepare a persuasive argument.

However, whilst many associations have access, access is not the same as influence (Bouwen 2002; Eising 2007), leading commentators to lament the lack of knowledge of "which groups are influential and to what extent" (Pedersen 2013: 28) and that "we look for [influence], but rarely find evidence of it" (Lowery 2013: 1). Page (1999) suggests that interest groups that pursue an insider strategy are likely to have better access, are more likely to be consulted and so are more likely to be able to influence policy than outsider groups. Braun (2012) observes that consultation provides an opportunity for interest groups to exert influence; she reports that business interests have a higher degree of success in influencing rules and regulations than other interest groups.

Mahoney (2007) notes that success does not prove that a business association has influence: simply being on a 'winning' side is not a success. A trade association may see a change in public policy that accords with their wishes but which they did not bring about. Woll (2007) suggests that often what appears to be a lobbying success is not an indication of victory in a business-government conflict, but rather of the convergence of business and government objectives. It does seem, however, that focusing on issues that might be considered 'technical' rather than politically contentious makes them easier to address (Michalowitz 2007) and gives an increased chance of success (Dür 2008).

If business associations are successful, that poses a question about the factors that lead to success. Mahoney (2008) argues that the characteristics of an advocate affect their chances of lobbying success – and suggests key characteristics are financial resources, membership size and organisational structure. Success, at least in Tanzania, does not derive from the size of a business association (or its members) or its ability to threaten the economy. It might, however, derive from its credibility and professionalism.

Broadly speaking, there are four ways in which interest groups may seek reform of public policy. Firstly, they may propose a change in the administrative arrangements through which a policy is implemented. This does not change the policy but may reduce the burden imposed on business. Secondly, they may argue for a changed interpretation of the existing regulation. This may change the policy at the margin, but the underlying policy imperative is retained. Thirdly, they may seek a change in policy which does not require a change in legislation. Lastly, they may seek a change in policy which does require legislation. In general, persuading governments to introduce or reform legislation is the most challenging way of bringing about policy reform.

Often the choice comes down to one of how the BMO frames the issue. Careful framing is the start of effective argumentation and justification for a different approach to solve or address a particular issue. Baumgartner *et al.* (2009), only partly in jest, say that ‘framing’ is the political science word for spin. Entman (1993) explains that framing involves selection and salience, that is, the selection of some aspects of an issue and then making them more salient through appropriate communication which promotes a problem definition, a causal interpretation, a moral evaluation and a recommendation to solve the issue (1993: 52). Framing an issue in a clear and simple way can make a difference in the way in which it is then perceived by the government (Mahoney 2008; Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008; Klüver *et al.* 2015).

Jones and Villar (2008), despite their observation that it is politics that matters most, go on to suggest that there are two requirements to influence policy: the political context and quality evidence. They suggest that careful framing provides a shared definition of an issue and quote Keck and Sikkink (1998) who suggest that framing problems carefully can make their solution come to appear inevitable.

Interest groups will not be successful every time, so there is an argument that it makes sense to aim to build long-term relationships with public officials: indeed, such may be one of the key features that lead to effectiveness. If interest groups are particularly helpful, it is easy to see that public servants will develop a positive relationship with them and then be proactive in consulting them. Policymakers have limited time both to gather the information that they require and to meet with interest groups. So, Braun (2012) argues that public officials will work with selected interest groups based on the quality of their policy information.

This aspect raises a question about what will happen when the interest group does not provide information of sufficient quality and, indeed, Braun (2012) observes that this scenario ought to lead to interest groups being dropped. However, she argues that this reaction is often overridden by two logics: of “habitual” behaviour (ie, because they have always had a relationship) and of “anticipatory” behaviour (ie, in case they are useful in the future). If these logics are always evident, it might suggest that becoming one of the select few is difficult but that once a group has broken through it is relatively easy to maintain a relationship.

Thus, Klüver (2012) argues, interest groups need to organise themselves in such a way that they are abreast, even ahead, of public sector thinking and can respond quickly to a need for information, though Klüver *et al.* (2015) argue that interest group activities are shaped by policy-related factors, viz. complexity, policy type, status quo, salience and degree of conflict characterizing legislative proposals and associated issues.

Sometimes BMOs seek to form alliances, either with other BMOs or, on occasion, with a government agency which shares the same goal: Baumgartner *et al.* (2009) found government officials who, far from being neutral, were acting as advocates, often collaborating with others regarded as sharing similar views, and actively lobbying others to adopt a particular position. Some BMOs seek to cultivate champions – people from both the public and private sectors who invest in the process and drive it forward – and they can make a real difference (Public Private Dialogue 2006). As Baumgartner *et al.* (2009) observe, this approach may need to be nurtured over a long period and through a variety of interactions in order to build mutual respect, trustworthiness and credibility.

The literature thus appears to suggest that effective business associations need to be competent in their approach, with objective research and evidence that will inform policymakers and with compelling policy positions that will persuade politicians and officials. They need to develop and sustain relationships with ministries, departments and agencies so that they can adopt an insider approach.

Methodology and methods

This paper is based on a single case study, though is one of several case studies of business associations in Tanzania. This case follows TAHA over a period of around six years. The starting point was a decision by the UK Government's Department for International Development to commission a five-year longitudinal impact assessment (LIA) of the work of BEST-Dialogue. For that assessment, seven cases were selected on the basis of four entry criteria (features that all case studies should have) and six portfolio criteria (features that needed to be exhibited by at least one of the selected cases). The methods included interviews with the BMOs and others, the undertaking annually of an advocacy competence diagnostic assessment and a survey of around 50 of their members. The Agricultural Council of Tanzania was chosen for the group of seven but because they are primarily an apex for the agricultural sector, suggested that we survey members of TAHA. As a result, we interviewed TAHA each year as well and it effectively became an eighth case study. Single case studies are justified if the study is longitudinal (Yin 2009).

This case has been chosen for this paper for two reasons. Firstly, horticulture, whilst not as important as gold or tourism is still an important sector in Tanzania. Kelsall (2013) sees horticulture as a small sector but with big potential. In Tanzania, agriculture accounts for around 25 per cent of GDP (with its main crops including coffee, sisal, tea, cotton, pyrethrum, cashew and cloves) and 75 per cent of employment (World Bank 2015). Agriculture accounts for 50 per cent of exports, including two of Tanzania's top three exports of gold, coffee and cashew. Zanzibar's biggest export is cloves (just over one per cent of total exports). In 2004 total horticultural exports were just \$64m; by 2015 they had risen to \$500m (Citizen 2016) – 38 per cent of agricultural exports (Ihucha 2015) – and growing at the rate of around 11 per cent per annum. TAHA has a vision at least to double horticultural exports by 2019. Tanzania's main agricultural sectors have, to a large extent, been captured by "patronage, cronyism and rent-seeking" (Cooksey 2011: s59) but horticulture has largely escaped this, avoiding state institutions seeking control (TPSF 2016). Thus, it is becoming an important contributor to the economy and, given its ability to earn foreign exchange and its tax contribution, one might expect the government to listen to its representatives. Secondly, at least outwardly, TAHA appears very successful. It has good relations with the Ministry of Agriculture. It is represented on several government committees. It appears to be successful in its advocacy. Its subsidiary, TAHA Fresh, supports its members and makes a profit. It raises significant funds from donors. As a result, it is held up by other Business Membership Organisations (BMOs), donors and BEST-Dialogue as an exemplary (TPSF 2016; Kelsall 2013).

I met with TAHA at least annually to quiz them about their issues, activities, progress and successes. The case study does not include all of their dialogue and advocacy activities but it does include a representative sample and all those considered by TAHA to be significant. I also interviewed people in the public sector who might be expected to know the BMO, particularly in the Ministry of Agriculture and in the Prime Minister's Office. The interviewees are listed in the appendices for the period 2010 to 2016. In general, access was not a problem, and on most occasions, I interviewed the chief executive, though I

occasionally interviewed other staff, usually in addition rather than instead. It was always easy to follow up interviews with correspondence or calls.

The case takes a process tracing approach using interviews, histories, government documents etc, as far as possible, to trace and describe links (and triangulate and, as far as possible confirm the evidence) between causes and observed outcomes (George and Bennett 2005: 6). Being able to revisit regularly turned out to be extremely beneficial as there is a tendency in countries such as Tanzania for interviewees to tell you what they think you want to hear, rather than giving an accurate answer to the question. Being able to go back and reassess events, timings and outcomes, and to triangulate through interviews with the public sector, made it much easier to pin down what actually happened.

An introduction to the Tanzania Horticultural Association

This case study highlights the work of the Tanzania Horticultural Association (TAHA) during the period 2010 to 2016. TAHA is one of several agricultural business associations.²TAHA, like every other business association in Tanzania, works in an environment that is not wholly supportive of the private sector. Following colonialism, and then a period as a one-party state and a failed experiment with African socialism, Tanzania is now nominally a multi-party state with free elections – although the Party of the Revolution (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, CCM) has never lost an election. Furthermore, the boundaries of the state, the bureaucracy, the military and the party are blurred (Temu 2013). The country went through a period when voluntary organisations were constrained though now anyone can start an interest group and can seek to influence public policy. Access to policymakers is not always easy and building a positive relationship takes time and effort. The civil service is prone to corruption and fails “to articulate and implement private-sector friendly policies” (Temu and Due 2000: 704). Representatives of business are often regarded as suspect, though the business elite and political elite are intertwined and yet, as noted earlier, the government sees the private sector as the engine of growth (URT 2010).

TAHA was founded in 2004, largely by Dutch ex-patriate horticulturalists who dominated the flower sector and with funding from the Government of the Netherlands (Cooksey 2011) and became operational in 2005. Chamanga (personal correspondence 2017) explains that TAHA has three categories of members – commercial large-scale horticulturalists (producers, exporters, processors), associates (mainly small farmers and farmer co-operatives) and allied members (service providers such as suppliers of fertiliser or pesticide etc). Its focus initially was on helping companies locally, with issues like land ownership, registration of inputs (that is agri-chemicals for use as fertiliser and pesticide) and fiscal regimes – it secured representation on the Arumeru District Development Council in 2009 (Cooksey 2011) – and providing services to help its members – it created TAHA Fresh Handling in 2007 (Cooksey and Kelsall 2011). The sector suffered following the global credit crisis in 2008 with many small flower and seed companies becoming bankrupt and a 15 per cent decline in flower sales. TAHA responded by trying to help firms overcome difficult economic conditions including, for example, persuading the Tanzania Investment Board to reschedule loan repayments (Cooksey 2011). Its advocacy at this time focused on activities such as attempting to reduce the costs of freight and eliminating multiple testing of chemicals.

² The other associations prominent in the agricultural sector are the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT), which is the apex body, and the Agricultural Non-State Actors' Forum (ANSAF), but there are many commodity associations as well.

The current CEO, Jacqueline Mkindi, was appointed in 2005 and found an association that she described as "weak and without credibility" with either the government or the sector and that "the relationship with the government was at rock bottom" (int. 2011a). As a result, she had to work hard to rebuild it. By 2010, however, she perceived that "TAHA has an excellent relationship with government" (int. 2011a) as will be described further below. This narrative makes Mkindi look good. It may be, however, that until Mkindi started to make an effort, there simply was not a relationship, because TAHA's focus was elsewhere.

By 2011, it had six staff but still had just 26 members. By 2016, it had grown to 727 members (including some groups of farmers), representing about 25 per cent of the horticultural sector by value, with Mkindi trying hard to diversify the membership. It now has 70 directly employed staff – including an advocacy manager (originally funded by BEST-AC) and a policy officer and it now has the funding to recruit a policy analyst as well – and utilises a further 90 indirectly employed staff. It touched more than 40,000 farmers in the four years to 2016. With the support of the Government of Tanzania, through the Small Industries Development Organisation, which gives \$1m a year, and development partners, especially USAID, currently also giving \$1m per annum, it has grown from one office in Arusha to having offices also in Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Morogoro, Iringa and Zanzibar.

Mkindi (int. 2011b) explained that "advocacy and lobbying is the number one reason for TAHA's existence", though she draws a distinction between them in which 'advocacy' describes all activities associated with influencing policymakers and 'lobbying' refers to the actual act of influencing, usually face to face. TAHA advocates both on its own and in alliance with ACT and other associations depending on the issue and whether it cuts across more than one agricultural association. Dig deeper, however, and it seems that most of TAHA's advocacy efforts are focussed on relatively technical issues and indeed it does appear to have been successful in securing reforms on these issues. It has not, on the whole, secured reform where the issue has been rather more contentious, such as biological control agents. On taxation, it has had mixed results.

In addition to its advocacy activities, TAHA provides services to members. This includes TAHA Fresh Handling, a logistics and transport business, which now turns over \$3m per annum and, in 2014, made a profit of \$100,000. This perhaps begs a question of whether TAHA is still seeking to make a real difference to the enabling environment to support all its members or whether too much energy is going into securing its existence by developing services and undertaking work for donors. Many BMOs attempt to offer services as a way of supplementing their income and encouraging businesses to become members. However, few are as successful as TAHA has been with TAHA Fresh.

Policy novice 2010-2012

In 2009, the Board decided to do more to lobby government nationally, when TAHA successfully argued that there was no need for the Tropical Pesticides Research Institute to test and register chemicals that had already been registered for agricultural use by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (Cooksey 2011).

By 2011, Mkindi thought that TAHA had "built a relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture and had created a feeling of mutual trust" (int. 2011b). She explained that she developed relationships with people in all the appropriate Ministries, but especially focussed on the Ministry of Agriculture from the Minister down to desk officers, reflecting the assertion of Baumgartner *et al.* (2009) that developing a relationship with a named individual can make a difference. She knew the Permanent Secretary well enough to secure a meeting

whenever she needed one – but recognised the importance of working with desk officers as well, rather than always going straight to the top. Indeed, Mkindi and her team worked to develop and maintain relationships with people whom they could regard as champions within the Ministries and in the Prime Minister's office. TAHA kept these champions informed – through sending them the monthly newsletter, letting them know when they were seeking to achieve particular objectives and through occasional face to face meetings – and involved – for example by inviting them to events. They also asked for their advice when doing research or formulating policy.

TAHA does not have a formal bilateral dialogue mechanism with the Ministry of Agriculture, though the champions meant that it was largely unnecessary; and the Ministry of Agriculture had set up the Horticultural Development Council of Tanzania (HODECT) in 2008 to provide a forum for a more formal but wider dialogue. Cooksey reports that about this time TAHA requested "the government should come up with initiatives to support this infant industry and to ensure that it is competitively positioned in the global markets" (2011: 19). HODECT subsequently was instrumental in pulling together the sector to agree a horticultural development strategy (HODECT 2010) and TPSF (2016) implies that this was at least in part in response to TAHA's lobbying. Mkindi, however, suggests that HODECT was ineffective because it lacked the revenue promised by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry and Trade (int. Mkindi 2012) and it no longer exists. Importantly for TAHA, all along it worked with the Ministry of Agriculture. Indeed, the Ministry reported that it worked closely with TAHA, especially on tax issues (int. Mibavu 2011) and that frequently the Ministry agreed with TAHA's (and ACT's) positions and then together lobbied other parts of government (int. Mibavu 2011).

In addition to developing and maintaining direct relationships with key staff in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mkindi explained that she sat on several government committees – largely dealing with technical issues such as the way in which regulation is implemented or reformed rather than political committees determining the policy in the first place – and was thus able to convey a sector view, including

The National Technical Committee of the Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Committee;

The National Technical Committee of the Tanzania Trade Integration Strategy;

Ministry of Home Affairs Doing Business Road Map Task Force on Trade Across Borders

Technical Committee to review the Plant Protection Act

Northern Zone Technical Committee on Agriculture and Livestock Research and Development (which she chairs)

TAHA has been good at framing issues as public problems and could be regarded as one of Knaggård's(2015) problem brokers, in that they have put issues on the agenda, despite a belief by researchers that this can be hard (Kimball *et al.* 2012). Often, they have then been able to influence the government to address the issue as well. Indeed, for many of their issues, their careful framing has implied an obvious solution. In 2010, for example, the government suddenly and unexpectedly imposed value-added tax (VAT) on air freight, making all goods sent by air immediately less competitive. Most exporters are supposedly able to recover the VAT, but Kelsall (2013) described it as a long and futile task and suggested that bureaucracy such as this added 20 per cent to the cost of doing business. The Tanzania Revenue Authority confirmed that VAT rebates to most businesses were delayed

because of their cash flow problems (int. Maganga 2014). The argument, then, is not really about competitiveness, but about bureaucracy and the need to charge VAT and then secure a rebate at a later date, meaning that the government actually gains no revenue. TAHA, working in alliance with ACT, within three months, persuaded the government to waive it again (int. Mkindi 2011a). It was too late, however, to save the air freight service from Kilimanjaro International Airport which had been withdrawn when the farmers switched to road transport to Nairobi and air freight from there.

TAHA worked again with ACT when the government also imposed VAT on 'deemed capital goods'. The position was that if a capital good (such as a greenhouse) or a deemed capital good (such as the plastic sheeting to make a greenhouse) was imported there was an exemption from VAT. The government changed this arrangement to impose VAT on deemed capital goods. Again, for VAT registered businesses, this would not be a problem, except that securing rebates took too long. The Government agreed once again to exempt deemed capital goods from VAT as a result of the action by TAHA and ACT (int. Mkindi 2011a).

An issue related to zoosanitary and phytosanitary standards arose when members started complaining about the government inspectors. Their role was to uphold the standards at the farm level – and that was important to the farmers because they need to meet the standards to export – but the farmers described the inspectors' approach as one of looking at fields, giving the impression of not knowing what they were doing and wasting the farmers' time. TAHA discovered *inter alia* that the inspectors did not have an operations' manual, discussed this with the Ministry of Agriculture, drafted a manual, then persuaded the Ministry that farm produce should be inspected only once, rather than several times, and then persuaded them to endorse and implement the manual (int. Mkindi 2011a). This shows how TAHA was able to influence the Ministry to ensure that it performed its inspection role professionally.

An issue of phytosanitary certification arose in 2011. Farmers complained that the UK had suddenly stopped the import of flowers but seemingly did not know why. To understand the issue, Mkindi had to telephone the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and discovered that Tanzania's phytosanitary certification did not comply with international requirements. There were several problems, but the main one seemed to be that the system was not secure and that certificates were too easy to forge. TAHA worked with the Ministry of Agriculture, reviewed the requirements, identified some areas where the certification was inadequate and proposed revised certification in line with international standards. This was adopted by the government and exports to the UK resumed (int. Mkindi 2011b). An issue such as this is unlikely to be contentious and indeed the government is likely to be as keen as the BMO to resolve it since they would also have been losing revenue. But, nevertheless, it is an example of TAHA both working closely with the Ministry and being able to influence their approach to regulation.

It is notable that these issues are all fairly technical. On occasion, TAHA has also influenced other governments, though again on narrow, technical issues. For example, in May 2011, the Government of Kenya (GoK) banned the import of cut flowers, supposedly to protect Kenya from pests and diseases. Many Kenya traders mix cut flowers from Tanzania with cut flowers from Kenya in order to deliver the specific requirements of their European buyers. So, the effect of the ban was that some farmers lost good contracts. TAHA persuaded GoK to implement its own farm inspection regime in Tanzania which resulted in the ban being lifted (int. Mkindi 2011b).

There is one area that has seemingly been contentious, though the Government claimed that it saw it as technical. Starting in 2010, TAHA has tried to influence government policy in relation to the use of biological control agents. Essentially these provide a substitute for pesticides, using insects to control insects, resulting in less harmful residues. It is easy to see how this could be regarded as a contentious issue since some people might object to the idea of introducing new insects into the environment. The government had clearly been working on this having set up the National Biological Control Programme in 1990 (NBCP 2016). NBCP (2016) explained that the import of biological control agents was guided by the Plant Protection Act 1997 and Regulations, 1998 and that importers needed to present a dossier to the Secretary of the Biological Control Agents' Subcommittee. It was however rather more complicated than that, with the need then to go to another committee and then to the Registrar of Pesticides and Biological Control Agents which is appointed by the Minister but based at TPRI. NBCP claimed to have approved 20 agents since 1988, though they only listed 8 in their brief, and TAHA claimed that they were not approved for commercial distribution (int. Chamanga 2016). Minutes of meetings in 2012 and 2013 suggested that TAHA was making progress, albeit slowly. It is worth noting that the NBCP brief was only published in 2016, possibly in response to TAHA's lobbying.

TAHA tried to frame the issue, not as one of accepting the principle of use, which they argued had been settled, but as being a simple one of putting in place a system to register these agents. Mkindi (int. 2013) explained, however, it took more than five years of discussions before the Government admitted that a registration system was required. TAHA and the Ministry of Agriculture then worked together, and involved academic and other experts, to design a registration system. The Government then did not convene a meeting of the committee until 2016, though has now done so, and it has approved the first three agents for commercial use.

Mkindi described the secret of her success at this time as "leadership and management, networking widely and being a go-getter" (int. 2011a). All she meant was that TAHA was proactive. Being proactive, and being seen to be proactive, is almost certainly helpful when it comes to persuading donors to support TAHA's activities. However, TAHA also put a lot of effort into gathering data and, as Mkindi puts it, "doing hardcore research", in line with Berry's dictum that "only the facts count" (1997: 99) and the assertion of Nownes and Newmark (2016) that lobbying is about information. She stressed that it is "important to have a clear understanding of the issue" and a mastery of the details but also noted the importance of seeing the bigger picture (int. Mkindi 2011b). She explained that if she went to the government without having done her homework, she would not have the facts and figures to back up her position and thus weaker argumentation. Generally, it appears that TAHA has been able to do this well. It seems that on the issue of biological control agents, they may have been less well informed, and that may explain why they struggled. So TAHA collects detail, drafts policy positions, sends them back to their members to ensure that everything is accurate and reflects their concerns, finalises policy positions. They then build a good story and then seek validation from the members before going to the government. They send a copy of the final position to members for reference, so that, if they are quizzed by someone from the Ministry, they will all communicate the same message – and the Ministry does send staff out to talk to farmers.

Mkindi explained that she also networks widely, aiming to create strategic alliances and partnerships (int. 2011b). As well as ACT, with whom TAHA works closely, they collaborate with the Agricultural Non-State Actors' Forum (ANSAF), Tanzania Seed Trades'

Association (TASTA), Tanzania Association of Tour Operators (TATO) and Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF). Often TAHA will take the lead on lobbying, but sometimes they follow others such as ACT or TPSF, particularly where the issue is wider than simply horticulture.

Mkindi claimed that the staff in the Ministry appreciated the evidence that TAHA could provide but noted that it was “essential to master the details” (int. 2011). Originally, explains Mkindi, the Ministry thought that TAHA was simply “making a lot of noise for big guys” which, given Tanzania’s history, is not always effective, but they understood that TAHA was “working on behalf of whole sector” (int. 2014) – and most of the sector is small indigenous farmers. This is confirmed by the Ministry of Agriculture (int. Mibavu 2011, int. Msambachi et al. 2013). Indeed, Mibavu (int. 2011) explained that the Ministry often agrees with TAHA and that they then lobby together. He cited occasions when, for example, they had lobbied together on road tax for tractors not used on public roads and on crop cess.

When it comes to lobbying, Mkindi stressed that it is necessary “to engage with the whole system and not just with one or two people; to pressurise the government at all levels” (int. 2011b). The point here is that whilst they may have developed champions who can take up their cause, they also recognise that they need themselves to influence people across Agencies and Ministries. Mkindi is both personable and articulate, so well able to do this.

A good tactic in dialogue and advocacy is to raise awareness and understanding amongst stakeholders. Berry (1997) makes the point that interest groups have a role to educate and TAHA does this well. For example, each year they do a programme with the Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture, including taking them on a field trip. TAHA works closely with the media and has worked hard to build good relationships with key journalists who have now become ‘good friends’ of TAHA. It organises field visits for them too, so journalists can go to farms and see them for real. They also offer training (awareness raising) courses for journalists. They never pay ‘facilitation’ fees – but still get good coverage (int. Mkindi 2011b).

This combination of providing good research evidence, success in policy reform, even on technical issues, being seen to be active not least through the media, and raising awareness raised TAHA’s credibility – which Berry (1997) notes as a priority – and which then makes it easier to continue to secure access (and reflecting Braun’s (2012) logic of habitual behaviour).

Whilst TAHA appeared to be adept at communicating with its members it was not always so. Indeed, the Ministry of Agriculture said that it would like to see more business people and more farmers involved in dialogue (Mibavu 2011, int.). The implication seemed to be that associations in general, and TAHA in particular, did not consult enough with their own members, so did not know what was happening on the ground and sometimes that their members do not even understand the issues.

Until December 2011, Mkindi was responsible for all TAHA's advocacy. However, with financial support from BEST-AC, TAHA was able to appoint Anthony Chamanga as its first policy officer and thus have someone focused full time on policy and advocacy as well as freeing up Mkindi to manage all TAHA's other activities and to seek sponsorship. He has a background in agricultural economics and the international trade. He worked at the Ministry of Agriculture and is still well networked, to the extent that he could request meetings with the Minister, but also ensured that he received good intelligence, including draft legislation,

often before it went to other stakeholders. Mkindi says that recruiting a former official made an enormous difference to TAHA's effectiveness, though she also says that she had to work hard to keep reminding Chamanga that he now worked for the private sector. She wonders "why other BMOs do not also recruit people with inside knowledge" (int. Mkindi 2012).

Early in 2012, Mkindi was invited to join the National Permanent Secretaries Committee (driving the so-called Doing Business roadmap) alongside TPSF and CTI and thus giving a greater chance to influence policy and the implementation of policy (int. Mkindi 2012). Until this point, TAHA was represented on committees that were largely focused on narrow technical issues. The Doing Business roadmap was the Government of Tanzania's attempt to improve the country's ranking in the World Bank's annual Doing Business league table. This provided an opportunity for much greater dialogue between public and private sectors and to propose reforms on a wide range of policies and regulations, some of which would certainly have been regarded as contentious (such as land reform) – and thus an opportunity to break out from influencing solely technical issues.

Policy entrepreneur 2013 - 2015

Several changes occurred around mid-2012. A number of mundane but important issues that had been pending for a long time were resolved. TAHA started to seek reform on more contentious issues, such as reducing the level of produce cess (local tax) and persuading the government to set up bonded warehouses (int. Mkindi 2012). This appears to be about the time that TAHA reflected on its approach to advocacy, recognising that it was delivering reform on narrow technical issues, but aiming to address broader issues as well, often by carefully reframing issues to have two steps. Perhaps not surprisingly, these changes coincided with Chamanga having worked out his role and started to make a difference. TAHA appointed an advocacy manager and gave him a 'to do' list of outstanding issues and anticipated issues (int. Chamanga 2016). Chamanga notes that whilst government was 'attentive' at this time, it was often also inactive. Chamanga had the luxury of being able to analyse the issues and then to work out ways to resolve them. His background in the Ministry helped him to understand the issues and to identify the key people to lobby. Two issues, albeit still technical, on cut flowers and on packaging, for example, were each resolved in just one meeting.

TAHA also became more proactive in areas where once they might have taken their time, such as with finding new champions in the Ministry of Agriculture after staff changes. Mkindi and Chamanga stressed that TAHA does not "expect the government to create an enabling environment if the private sector is sleeping" (int. 2013). And, away from advocacy, TAHA aimed to expand its services to members, with funding from USAID, the EU and the Aga Khan Foundation.

TAHA also responded to the question of whether it was involving members effectively by being demonstrably more business oriented and by ensuring that all the issues that they took to government reflected the needs of the business community, which they did through improving their consultation with members and by ensuring that they were all briefed on the policy positions adopted by TAHA (int. Mkindi 2014).

Although TAHA did not spot it at the time, the Fertilisers' Act of 2009 made it difficult for farmers who wanted to use specialist fertiliser, often specified by European buyers, with the threat of the loss of their contract if they did not comply. Nothing happened with the passing of the Act (int. Chamanga 2016) but the Government approved the Fertiliser Regulations in 2011 (URT 2011) and then created the Tanzania Fertiliser Regulatory Authority in 2012.

Before the law changed, many of these specialist fertilisers were easily available but the Act required that all fertilisers had to be registered (or re-registered) and the process was slow. Whilst the fee was a modest \$50, there was a requirement for three seasons of trials at a rough cost of \$10,000 per season. So, it was simply not economic for the input suppliers to register many of these fertilisers as the demand for each was low. In this case, TAHA aimed for a two-track approach. Firstly, it started lobbying the Government. Early in 2013, Mkindi wrote to the Ministry of Agriculture and thought that the best outcome might be that the Permanent Secretary would invite them to Dar to discuss the issue – but instead, the Permanent Secretary went to TAHA in Arusha with a team of four officials (int. Mkindi 2013). In October 2013, the government agreed on a fast track registration process whereby some 75 fertilisers that had been tested and proven elsewhere could be registered without further trials. This was expected to have a considerable impact – not just the 75 x \$30,000 but the increase in yield or quality and thus in incomes from using the different fertiliser. Secondly, the Government agreed to review the legislation – and, in 2016, finally agreed to amend the Regulations, which will reduce though not eliminate the cost of registration (int. Chamanga 2016). The amendments were finally published in Feb 2017 as the Fertiliser (Amendments) Regulations 2017 (URT 2017).

TAHA has now adopted this two-pronged approach for much of its advocacy: look for an immediate solution through a waiver or derogation, which could be argued is a technical solution, and then look for a longer-term review, perhaps more likely to require a political solution.

TAHA's success in Tanzania has made it more confident to work across borders as well. An example, though again on a narrow issue, was when in 2012 the Government of Kenya introduced a levy of KES4 per kilo on all fruit and vegetables imported into Kenya, irrespective of whether Kenya was the final destination. An agreement between traders and farmers resulted in this being split equally – though in reality, the farmer bears the cost because the price goes down. TAHA has worked with GoT and GoK which has resulted in GoK agreeing to abolish this levy with effect from February 2013. More than 80 per cent of fruit and vegetable exports go via Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (in Nairobi) so this is important. TAHA estimated this at about 25 tonnes per day. Assuming a six-day week and KES2/kg, this saved about \$200,000 which went back into farmers' incomes (int. Mkindi and Chamanga 2013).

When asked in 2013 to pinpoint reasons for TAHA's success, Mkindi characterised it all in terms of what TAHA does. She explained, again, that they "do their homework" and "ensure that we have sound evidence" saying that if they "have a weak case or poor evidence, it will backfire" (int. 2013). When they go to the government, they always take members, that is, farmers, as well as staff so that they can describe their experiences at first hand. Mkindi argued that they had built a good brand as evidenced by the fact that they are trusted and consulted by the government. The Ministry of Agriculture confirmed this view and reported not only that they perceived TAHA to be a "strong organisation" but also that they had worked together on a review of taxes and submitted joint proposals to the Cabinet Secretary (int. Msambachiet *al.* 2013).

Mkindi also explained that whilst financial resources were not the whole picture, clearly, they made a difference (for example, to bring together a group of experts to talk about biological control mechanisms or a group of MPs). And she repeated her point that TAHA does not just engage with one body but engaged "across the system", that is, they aimed to bring on board

the civil servants in any Ministry that might have a view and the Parliamentary Committees as well as the Ministers (int. 2013).

When it seems appropriate, TAHA will work with others. It does take care, even when it is working alone, not to alienate other business associations though it does sometimes find itself, even with a generally collaborative approach, arguing head-on with government agencies. Chamanga (correspondence 2017) confirms that TAHA has not experienced objections from other interest groups but have had cases where a government institution objected. Indeed, he cites the case of fertiliser registration, where the Tanzania Fertiliser Regulatory Authority (TFRA) objected to their position, while the Prime Minister's Office supported their position.

Evidence of TAHA's ability to build relationships, but also of their luck, came in early 2014. Staff changes at the Ministry of Agriculture including the departure/retirement of the Permanent Secretary Mr Mohamed Muya and of Geoffrey Kirenga, a director who had been helpful to several BMOs, as well as of two other key directors, left a void and caused a short interruption. Chamanga explained that the new people did not understand so well what TAHA was trying to do (int. Chamanga 2014). TAHA had to work hard to rebuild the relationship and encouraged two new directors to visit. This resulted, in April 2014, in the new director for Crop Development, TwahirNzalawahe, and the new director for Policy and Planning, NkurulilwaSimkanga, coming to TAHA. The luck came about in that Simkanga had been Chamanga's first supervisor when he joined the Ministry of Agriculture. Chamanga reported that both seemed impressed by TAHA. To some extent, however, TAHA creates its own luck. It was not simply a coincidence that TAHA appointed as its first advocacy manager someone who had worked in the Ministry. And TAHA deliberately seeks out junior members of staff to become champions so that as they rise through the ranks, they can become more influential on TAHA's behalf. A consequence of impressing the two directors, according to Chamanga, was that the new Permanent Secretary seemed also to be increasingly on side. He suggested that "the relationship has resumed" (int 2014).

Cooksey (personal correspondence 2016) notes, however, that TAHA sticks to cultivating champions amongst the bureaucracy and not amongst politicians, since the opposition party, Chadema, holds many of the constituency seats where horticulture flourishes. Remen explains this differently, noting that MPs come and go rather faster than officials and so they deliberately target officials. Furthermore, he explains, "when you have not fed the government with enough information [parliamentary] committees are not interested. In some meetings, the central government officers present to committees. So we invest a lot in directors in the government and have a list of champions" (int. 2015).

Conclusion

Researchers argue that it is difficult to find clear cases where business associations have influenced government. However, TAHA has clearly put issues on the agenda – often through careful framing – reflecting the dictum of turning problems into issues (Berry 1997). It appears that TAHA has also influenced the way that policy has been implemented but has been less successful in changing policy imperatives. Indeed, TPSF (2016) suggests that TAHA is credited with addressing many co-ordination constraints and that this has resulted in the sector's rapid growth. As TAHA grows and delivers more services and support to farmers, the government can see the association bringing in resources from elsewhere that are intended to develop the sector in line with government policy. The Ministry of Agriculture had, for example, signed a memorandum of understanding to work together on post-harvest

losses (int. Msambachi et al. 2013). Mkindi claimed that the Director of Policy and Planning at the Ministry of Agriculture (appointed in mid-2014) was later asking TAHA for more ideas on what could be done (int. 2014).

Horticulture has many expatriate farmers and a high level of foreign investment. It is possible that this may dominate TAHA and shape its policy. Mkindi explained, however, that the member profile had changed considerably since she joined. It used to be dominated by foreign and expatriate businesses but is now dominated by local businesses. The two groups, however, did not always see eye to eye, said Mkindi, so she often found that she had to strike a balance between the demands of each group. For example, the bigger, and the foreign, businesses want advocacy and the services of TAHA Fresh (smallholders, if they export at all, probably do so alongside a bigger farm). This helped to bring members along. She did recognise, however, that having foreign investors and expatriate farmers had conferred some advantages, in that they were better able to work with TAHA to develop coherent and persuasive positions.

Neither access (Eising 2007) nor success (Mahoney 2007) proves that a business association has influence. A trade association may see a change in public policy that accords with its wishes but which it did not bring about. However, where a trade association puts the issue on the agenda and then seeks to reform the policy, it provides rather more evidence to support the view that it brought about the policy reform. The change to the phytosanitary certification provides a good example, as does the revised regulation on fertilisers.

TAHA tends to focus on quite narrow and often rather technical issues, perhaps unlikely to be highly salient to anyone outside the sector, and which on the whole do not require a change in policy. It also frames issues to focus on outcomes that are important to the government, like export revenue, tax and employment creation, rather than anything related to the performance of their members, such as competitiveness or profitability. Beyers (2008) distinguishes between 'particularistic' issues (issues that are quite technical, usually focused on a narrow sector and do not conflict with the political objective), 'dividing' issues (issues that divide business sectors because of different interests) and 'unifying' issues (issues that are perhaps more political in nature and where the private sector adopts a more cohesive position). Addressing particularistic issues requires what Michalowitz (2007: 136) describes as a technical influence; addressing unifying issues requires directional influence, that is, an influence that changes the direction of the policy (Michalowitz 2007). TAHA has been less good at this. For example, the work on fertiliser aimed to split the issue into two parts: one that was very much a technical issue to be overcome in the short term, and then a longer-term issue that might have been more politically contentious, though TAHA was not arguing against the fundamental principle of registering fertiliser. Now, when they go to the government, they always have two proposals e.g. (a) to review an Act and (b) to adopt short-term measures to ameliorate the worst problems whilst the Act is reviewed (int. Mkindi 2014). Mkindi says that she always tries to convey a sense of urgency in her dealings with government and the likely loss to members (and by implication) to the government if it delays, which possibly explains why the government is willing, at least on occasion, to agree to the short-term solution.

“TAHA has worked hard to build trust with the government and to demonstrate its credibility and, as a result, the government is always willing to listen to its ideas in relation to horticulture policy” (int. Mkindi and Chamanga 2013). However, it is generally unwilling to act on issues that might be considered more political such as tax and cess, as Mkindi admits

(int. Mkindi and Chamanga 2013). Even for these, it seems to be able to secure support from the Ministry of Agriculture.

This suggests that TAHA is more a problem broker than a policy entrepreneur. Knaggård (2015) explains that problem brokers frame issues as public problems, that they are independent of policy entrepreneurs (though there is no reason why that should be) and that they have access, persistence and credibility. It does appear that TAHA is good at doing this, always reminding the government of the contribution that horticulture makes to the economy, not least in terms of jobs and tax revenue.

Knaggård (2015) further suggests that when interest groups communicate with civil servants they need to be 'knowledge heavy' but that when they talk to politicians, or the public, values and emotions become more important. The implication is that both are important. The knowledge provides the evidence that will persuade the civil servants; the narrative will provide the argument that convinces the politicians. TAHA seems to have recognised this to the extent that they avoid dealing with politicians, "because we know that politicians come and go" (int. Remen 2015). TAHA has generally found it more effective to work through officers, and leave them to persuade the politicians: "we invest in a lot in directors in the government and have a list of champions" (int. Remen 2015) reflecting the assertion of Herzberg and Wright (2006) that champions are needed to sustain PPD and that backing the right champions is important. In Tanzania, this is especially important to overcome "hierarchical silos, top-down powerhouses and lines of command along government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) which may impair cross-cutting or inter-ministerial work relations" allied with "weak capacity in the civil service" (Temu 2013: 63).

So, TAHA not only works closely with the government but also aims to ensure that they are recognised for what they do. Kelvin Remen, TAHA's assistant advocacy officer, notes that other BMOs "wonder why we say our first partner is the government" (int. 2015). He explains that TAHA has not only "established a very close relationship with the government but also gives them credit" (int. 2015). He continues: "the government respects us; we don't work like an activist group, criticising the government; we try to address issues diplomatically and credit them for the forums they have given us and the progress" (int. 2015). TAHA is, it claims, "very good at using the network" (int. Mkindi and Chamanga 2013). Chamanga goes on to say that often TAHA has government departments "on our side" (ibid.). For example, if TAHA is going to lobby the Tanzania Bureau of Standards, it ensures that it has first informed its champions at the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Agriculture.

Whilst a high level of resource may not be necessary, Mkindi explained that it is impossible for BMOs to influence government if they do not have enough capacity in terms of people and resources. She talked, for example, of the need to bring together a group of experts to talk about biological control mechanisms or to bring group of MPs on a field trip (int. Mkindi and Chamanga 2013) or to get on plane to Dar or even Washington at a moment's notice (int. Mkindi 2014). Mkindi perceived that the government was changing, was becoming more responsive and was more likely now to listen. However, success, Mkindi explained, requires compelling policy proposal, partnership (especially with the government) and ability to mobilise resources – and "TAHA is good at this" (int. 2014).

TAHA takes care of building relationships. It is careful about who they engage, how they engage and when they engage (int. Mkindi 2014). When the government does agree to reform, TAHA keeps pressing, until an agreement to change is actually implemented (int.

2011), unlike some BMOs who fail to follow up (Lutabingwa and Gray, 1997) and then wonder why nothing has changed.

To summarise, it seems that TAHA is good at putting issues on the agenda, frames issues both so that they appear to be technical rather than political and so that solutions present themselves, seeks access effectively, raises awareness of issues, builds coalitions for reform and is very persuasive. There seems little doubt that TAHA has achieved repeated success. The Citizen reports James Parson, Managing Director of Africado saying: “TAHA has helped a lot in creating an enabling environment for the industry ... the association works round the clock to maintain dialogue and good rapport with the government of Tanzania, development partners and farmers” (Ihucha 2015a). Ihucha (2015b) also reports that Mkindi received the Tanzania Women’s Achievement Award for agriculture in 2015 in recognition of her achievements. TAHA appears to be very professional – which Klüver (2012) argues is a *sine qua non* for success – reflecting the view of Mulder (2014) that being professional requires the competence to act responsibly and effectively. It does this through employing staff who are knowledgeable, competent and well-networked and through its unremitting focus on the use of evidence, good framing, compelling argument, champions and recognition of the need for enough resource to do what it needs to do. It also helps that Mkindi empowers the staff to take the initiative. The consequence of all this is that they make a difference for horticulturists in Tanzania.

References

- Baumgartner, F.R. and Mahoney, C. (2008), The two faces of framing: individual level framing and collective issue definition in the European Union, *European Union Politics*, 9 (3): 435-449.
- Baumgartner, F.R., Berry, J.M., Hojnacki, M. et al (2009), *Lobbying and policy change: who wins, who loses and why*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 341pp.
- Berry, J.M. (1997), *The Interest Group Society*, 3 ed, Longman New York
- Bettcher, K.E. (2011), *Making the most of public-private dialogue: an advocacy approach*, Centre for International Private Enterprise: Washington, DC
- Beyers, J. and Braun, C. (2014), Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakers, *Journal of Public Policy*, 34 (1): 93-121.
- Bouwen, P. (2002), Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9 (3): 365-390.
- Braun, C. (2012), The captive or the broker? Explaining public agency-interest group interactions, *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions*, 25 (2): 291-314.
- Buguzi, S (2017), Tanzania states why it opted out of Open Government Partnership, The Citizen, 30 Sep [<http://iga.fyi/GoTogp1>], Site visited 17 Oct 2017
- Citizen, (2016), TAHA plans to double exports in three years, 29 Jan, [<http://iga.fyi/tahap60b7>], Site visited 10 October 2016)
- Cooksey, B. (2011), The investment and business environment for export horticulture in northern Tanzania, background note
- Cooksey, B. and Kelsall, T. (2011), The political economy of the investment climate in Tanzania, Overseas Development Institute for the Africa Power and Politics Programme London. 98pp.
- Dür, A. (2008), Interest groups in the European Union: how powerful are they? *West European Politics*, 31 (6): 1212-1230.

- Dür, A. and De Bièvre, D. (2007), The question of interest group influence, *Journal of Public Policy*, 27 (1): 1-12.
- Dür, A. and Mateo, G. (2012), Who lobbies the European Union? National interest groups in a multilevel polity, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19 (7): 969-987.
- Eising, R. (2007), The access of business interests to EU institutions: towards elite pluralism, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14 (3): 384-403.
- Entman, R.M. (1993), Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm, *Journal of Communications*, 43 (4): 51-58.
- George, A.L. and Bennett, A. (2005), *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*, MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. 331pp.
- Grossman, M. (2012), Interest group influence on US policy change: an assessment based on policy history, *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 1 (2): 171-192.
- Ihucha, A. (2015a), Making a name in horticulture, *The Citizen*, 15 Jan, [http://iga.fyi/makinf277], Site visited 10 October 2016
- Ihucha, A. (2015b), Prize takes boss of horticulture association to greater heights, *The Citizen*, 19 Mar, [http://iga.fyi/prizef3c5], Site visited 10 October 2016
- ILO, (2007), *The promotion of sustainable enterprises*, International Labour Conference Geneva, 96th session
- Jones, N. and Villar, E. (2008), Situating children in international development policy: challenges involved in successful policy influencing, *Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research Debate and Practice*, 4 (1): 31-51.
- Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K. (1998), *Activists across borders: advocacy networks in international politics*, Cornell University Press: Ithaca. 242pp.
- Kelsall, T. (2013), *Business, politics, and the state in Africa: challenging the orthodoxies on growth and transformation*, Zed Books London. 190pp.
- Kimball, D.C., Baumgartner, F.R., Berry, J.M. et al (2012), Who cares about the lobbying agenda? *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 1 (5): 5-25.
- Klüver, H. (2012), Informational lobbying in the European Union: the effect of organisational characteristics, *West European Politics*, 35 (3): 491-510.
- Klüver, H., Mahoney, C. and Opper, M. (2015), Framing in context: how interest groups employ framing to lobby the European Commission, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22 (4): 481-498.
- Knaggård, A. (2015), The Multiple Streams Framework and the problem broker, *European Journal of Political Research*, 54: 450-465.
- Lowery, D. (2013), Lobbying influence: meaning, measurement and missing, *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 2 (1): 1-27.
- Lutabingwa, J. and Gray, K.R. (1997), NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa: developing critical capacity for policy advocacy, *International Journal on World Peace*, XIV (3): 35-70.
- Mahoney, C. (2007), Networking vs allying: the decision of interest groups to join coalitions in the US and the EU, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14 (3): 366-383.
- Mahoney, C. (2008), *Brussels versus the Beltway: Advocacy in the United States and the European Union*, Georgetown University Press: Washington, DC. 260pp.
- Michalowitz, I. (2007), What determines influence? Assessing conditions for decision-making influence of interest groups in the EU, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14 (1): 132-151.
- NBCP, (2016), *Importation and use of biological control agents in Tanzania*, National Biological Control Programme
- Nownes, A.J. and Newmark, A.J. (2016), It's all relative: perceptions of interest group influence, *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 6 (1): 66-90.

- Page, E.C. (1999), The insider/ outsider distinction: an empirical investigation, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 1 (2): 205-214.
- Pawson, R. and Tilley, N. (1997), *Realistic evaluation*, Sage: London. 254pp.
- Pedersen, H. H. (2013), Is measuring interest group influence a mission impossible? The case of interest group influence in the Danish parliament, *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 2 (1): 27-47.
- Poppelaars, C. (2007), Resource exchange in urban governance: on the means that matter, *Urban Affairs Review*, 43 (1): 3-27.
- PublicPrivateDialogue, (2006), *Charter of Good Practice in using Public Private Dialogue for Private Sector Development*
- Saurugger, S. (2008), Interest groups and democracy in the European Union, *West European Politics*, 31 (6): 274-1291.
- Start, D. and Hovland, I. (2004), *Tools for policy impact: a handbook for researchers*, ODILondon
- Temu, A.E. (2013), *The political economy in which PSOs operate in Tanzania: implications for public private dialogue strategy*, in BEST-AC: annual review and project completion report
- Temu, A.E. and Due, J.M. (2000), The business environment in Tanzania after socialism: challenges of reforming banks, parastatals, taxation and the civil service, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 38 (4): 683-712.
- TPSF (2016), Political Economy Analysis – 2016: How the political economy of Tanzania influences the business enabling environment, Tanzania Private Sector Foundation, Dar es Salaam. 24pp.
- URT, (2010), *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II*, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs: Dar es Salaam
- URT, (2011), *Government Roadmap on the Improvement of the Investment Climate in Tanzania*, Prime Minister's Office, Dar es Salaam
- URT, (2012), *Tanzania Open Government Partnership (OGP) Action Plan 2012-2013*, URTDar es Salaam
- URT, (2017), *The Fertiliser (Amendments) Regulations 2017*, Government PrinterDar es Salaam
- Walker, J.L. (1991), *Mobilizing interest groups in America*, University of Michigan PressAnn Arbor, Mich
- Woll, C. (2007), Leading the dance? power and political resources of business lobbyists, *Journal of Public Policy*, 27 (1): 57-78.
- World Bank (2015), Tanzania Economic Update: Why should Tanzanians pay taxes? The unavoidable need to finance economic development, World Bank. Dar es Salaam.
- World Bank (2018), Doing Business 2018: Reforming to create jobs, International Bank for Reconstruction and World Bank: Washington D.C. 313pp.
- Yin, R.K. (2009), *Case study research: designs and methods*, 4th edition, Sage: London

Interviews

2011

Mibavu, G, Ministry of Agriculture

Mkindi, M, TAHA (13 April)

Mkindi, M, TAHA (25 July)

2012

Mkindi, M, TAHA

2013

Mkindi, M. And Chamanga, A., TAHA

MsambachiA Msambachi, A., Muzava, A.K., Hango, D. and Ohidi, S., Ministry of
Agriculture

2014

Maganga, M., Tanzania Revenue Authority

Chamanga, A., TAHA

Mkindi, M, TAHA

2015

Remen, K., TAHA

2016

Chamanga, A., TAHA