The Question of the Supremacy Clause and Its Resolution Mechanisms under Ethiopia‘s Federal and Constitutional Design and Practice: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen‘?

Abstract

In a federal system, laws made by the federal government and the constituent units usually contradict each other. Thus, which law should supersede would become a pressing issue. Despite variations, virtually all federal systems adopt the federal supremacy clause by stipulating it in their constitutions. However, this does not apply to Ethiopia where the Federal Constitution opts for a blanket silence on the supremacy clause. As a result of the constitutional lacuna on this subject, different approaches, including constitutional, legislative, executive and judicial ones, have been adopted which in turn raised many questions and dubieties. This article aims to critically evaluate the approaches employed by different government organs and its concomitant consequences from constitutional and comparative perspectives in federal dispensations. Methodologically, the study employed a qualitative research method in general and a doctrinal approach in particular. Moreover, it used a comparative analysis which puts the Ethiopian experience in the perspective of other federal systems. Case and document analysis regarding the question of the supremacy clause was also conducted. The study, thus, found out that the approaches adopted as regards the resolution of the question of the supremacy clause under the Ethiopian federal and constitutional design is not only an unconstitutional act and ineffective but also lacks the center of adjudication. Such a misplaced center of resolution mechanism may jeopardize the development of federalism and constitutionalism in Ethiopia.