

3.**NAVIGATING THE TENSION: MARIUS AND THE DELICATE
BALANCE OF STATE AND SELF**

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Abstract

Competing socio-political and economic needs of the last century of the Roman Republic make the interplay between Gaius Marius' political ambition and state interest an intriguing subject. With the understanding of 'state interest' as the consensus between the upper classes and the lower classes on what was the public good, this paper examines the extent to which Marius reconciled state interest with personal ambition that was driven by strong desire for power, influence and recognition. The rational theory, which posits that individuals premise their decisions and actions on a rational evaluation of costs and benefits of each option, and the political culture theory that focuses on societal deep-seated patterns of beliefs, values and attitudes in relation to their influence on political behaviour, provide the perspective to the work. Through interpretive use of Plutarch's "Life of Marius" as major ancient source, the process of Marius' unprecedented political achievements between 134 BCE and 100 BCE is considered vis-à-vis his contributions to the state order. The paper revisits how Marius acted astutely within the framework of the Roman socio-political structures to fulfill his ambition while handling emerging security issues expeditiously. Notably, the statesman brought about desirable political outcomes, albeit severally deviating from the norms and acting in controversial settings to become a model of effective leadership in a crisis situation. Notwithstanding moral concerns that may arise, the paper points to situational premise for the link between state interest and politician's ambition.

Keywords: Marius, Link, State interest, Personal ambition, Political outcome

Introduction

The circumstances of Gaius Marius standing out as a leader during the twilight of the Roman Republic can generate discussion on the interface between personal ambition and state interest in political processes. Marius' unprecedented political appearances at the supreme office of the state as well as his military achievements and innovations remain indelible in the history of Rome. His place in Roman politics as the Republic entered into the last century B.C.E. became especially significant at a time when the invincible Roman forces came under fatal attacks abroad.

As critical threats confronted the state, all eyes seemed solely focused on keeping Rome safe and guaranteeing security at Rome became the primary criterion in determining what effective leadership meant. The events leading to the rise of Marius offer good basis for examining how the politician's burning desire for personal glory well suited the socio-political atmosphere of the state. While other modern scholarly works, such as "Gaius Marius: A Political Biography" (Evans, 1995) and "The History of Rome" (Mommsen, 1958) have been cited, this paper largely used the account of Plutarch, "The Life of Marius"(1920) for the socio-political discussion.

The expression, state interest, here includes the priorities, goals, or concerns of the Roman Republic in relation to its internal affairs or foreign policy. The scope covers economic, security, social, and other public businesses of the period under consideration. Political ambition, on the other hand, represents the desire or aspiration of Marius to gain and exercise power or influence within the Roman political system. The term connotes the politician's personal drive or motivation to achieve his goals of holding high offices and effecting necessary changes. In relating the two key expressions to the present discussion, the perspectives of rational or rational choice and political culture theories have been adopted. Rational choice theory presupposes that rational or purposeful decisions made by individuals are motivated by self-interests (Coleman, 1990, p. 302). While rational theory implies individuals make decisions and act in a way that brings them ultimate benefits (Scott & Marshall, 2009, p. 38), political culture theory in a complementary role -indicates that individuals' political behavior can also be shaped or influenced by the strong beliefs, values and norms of the society (Almond and Verba, 1963). Interplay of the two theories depicts how Marius balanced his political actions and strategic calculations while expanding his influence and consolidating his power with state's best interest.

Contextualising the Rise of a *Homo Novus*

Born in 157 BC in the town of Arpinum in Southern Latium, Marius was new to the Roman political terrain, which was monopolised by membership of the aristocratic patrician class in the Early Republic. However, the Conflict of the Orders that lasted between 500 BC to 287 B.C.E. had paved greater access to political offices for the plebeians who were known as *novi homines* (new men, singular is *homo novus*) as they entered the senate or high public services (Burckhardt, 1990). Marius was allegedly 'born of parents who were altogether obscure -poor people who lived by the labour' (Plutarch, Marius 3:1) and viewed as belonging to this class. However, according to a different scholarly view, Marius was not of so much political obscurity, his 'father had been some sort of local knight or noble and he held the Roman citizenship...Marius was a knight, and though his fortune must originally have been modest by the standards of the Roman aristocracy, it would not have been entirely negligible' (Hildinger, 2002:59) While there is no basis for ascribing any distinguished

political advantage to Marius' ancestry, neither is there a consensus among scholars on a background of grinding poverty.

Roman political schemes were not favourable for someone with indistinct political family since there was "no Government, no political parties advocating distinct policies" (North, 1990: 238). The 'traditional political culture' (Yakobson, 2010) compelled Marius to navigate a political system where exercise of voters' powers was greatly influenced either by patronage or political manipulation of the ruling elite. Plutarch notes what the political culture necessitated, "Marius willingly yielded to the influence of his uncle...publicly professing to admire and follow him, and especially to adopt his political principles" (Plutarch, Marius, 4.7).

Significantly, prevailing circumstances at Rome demanded pragmatic leadership as Marius entered the Roman political stage. On the positive side of history, the Gracchi brothers were arguably good-hearted in their efforts to make Rome's social and political structure favour the lower classes. But the will of the *populares* did not match the political power they needed to pull through with their reforms. The political atmosphere thereafter only got more tense, and the fate of populist political adventurers suffered by the Gracchi raised the bar for anyone hoping to succeed as a Roman leader.

Hence, the political rise of Marius is best contextualised within an urgent socio-political situation at Roman that beckoned on a leader with unassailable power. As the Republic contended with serious security issues, the economic realities at Rome were distressing to the poor whose outcries were getting louder. The Roman senate and the general populace were very inclined towards reaching consensus on the need for a frontrunner who possessed crucial military skills to deliver on a stronger vision. Particularly, though, for the aristocratic class and the common people, safety came first. It meant taking control of the future by leading the Romans bravely against the threatening external dangers. It was this time Marius "began to devote himself with greater energy to political affairs, in the hope and expectation that by this path he would reach the summit of authority" (Plutarch, Marius, 9.4). The reference to Marius' relentlessly seeking political power forbodes the subsequent interplay between Marius' pursuit of his political ambition and the state interest.

Career Progression through Service and Strategic Alliances

Describing Marius as 'driven by the blasts of passion, ill-timed ambition, and insatiable greed' (Plutarch, Marius, 2.3) may make a reader curious about how such a controversial personality got to the apex of Roman politics and, unprecedentedly won consulship seven times in quick succession. However, Scipio Africanus, the great general and military strategist often spoken of in most glowing terms (Liddell, 1992), rather saw the alleged contentious dispositions as great potentials for leadership. Marius' impressive military

performance when he served under Scipio Aemilianus in Numantine war (134-133BCE) could have informed the perspective.

Marius gained a great deal of military experience from the Scipio and the commander was so consistently impressed by Marius' frugality that he found in him a model for other soldiers. Scipio enforced Marius' simple manner on the rest of the soldiers as if he was laying foundation for Marius' career (Plutarch, Marius, 3.2). Contrary to the picture of a young man with inordinate ambition, Marius associates saw in him a promising young man who was full of energy and excellent military prospects. Influenced by their values, Marius soon concentrated on two factors that were crucial to his political rise: possession of excellent military skills and advantageous relationship.

For right political connections, Marius sought the patronage of Caecilius Metellus of a prominent noble family. The support of Metellus' family was crucial in Marius' getting elected as tribune in 119BCE. However, as soon as he became a leader of the people, Marius 'did not, behave like a young man who had just entered political life without any brilliant services behind him, but assumed at once the assurance which his subsequent achievements gave him' (Plutarch, Marius, 4.2). Marius began to take political risks, undeterred by the opposition from his patrons as he sponsored a law that curtailed the influence of the upper class in elections (Duncan 2017, p. 86). At the same time, he proceeded cautiously in taking political positions. Hence, while the political move against the elite gave him some notoriety among the common people, Marius appeared to have considered it too early to permanently flag off his support for the plebs when he vetoed the people-oriented grain-dole bill on the ground of high cost (Duncan 2017, p. 87). Yet, he showed recognition for another significant elements of the political "culture" of the time: bribery.

Bribery a major feature of electoral malpractice, was a common tool for politicians during the middle and late Republic. Marius was accused of bribery (*ambitus*) in an election, although he obtained an acquittal from the charge (Duncan 2017, p. 91). His acquittal could pass more for evidence of his political astuteness than for being free of guilt (Evans, 1995). Use of money continued to be a factor in the rise of Marius when his imperium was extended and he was placed in charge of Further Spain, *Hispania Ulterior* by 114 BCE, the assignment which really meant a significant political fortune for him (Evans 2008, p. 80). As Brigands were undermining the state's economic interest in the region (Duncan 2017, p. 91) Marius, with his military skills gaining more recognition, was considered very suitable to root out the menace. It turned out to be an opportunity for Marius to further establish himself on greater political pedestal by amassing more personal wealth as he returned to Rome in 113 BCE (Duncan 2017, p. 91, Evans 1995, p. 69).

Good military skills, helpful political connections and personal wealth were already factors in Marius' political progression, yet, the politician also thought of the place of marriage alliance. Although there is no 'marked evidence of such practices before the time of Sulla' (Potter, 1934: 663), marriages were contracted

during the Republic for political reasons. Marius knew he was strengthening his political position and respectability when he married Julia, a member of one of the foremost patrician families in the Republic (Duncan 2017, p. 92).

Until 110 BCE and even shortly thereafter, the factors mentioned seemed sufficient to shape Marius' political career. However, more socio-political events unfolded at Rome and it became clearer which of the factors was foremost in setting the stage for Marius' unprecedented political records. The Romans had engaged in constant battles around the Mediterranean, but the circumstances of the Jugurthine War (112-106 BCE) particularly paved way for Marius to move to the next political level. A series of incompetent Roman generals sent to Numidia could not inflict decisive defeat on Jugurtha but rather made the endless war a desperate military situation. By 109 BCE, Quintus Metellus got the command of Africa against Jugurtha with the full backing of the Senate. Things progressed well enough with Metellus as he took the city of Vaga, defeated Jugurtha in the Battle of the Muthul and recorded victory when he stormed several towns (Mommsen, 1958, p. 104). His success stories were celebrated at Rome. However, Jugurtha, a master at guerrilla tactics frustrated all Metellus' brilliant efforts to bring about a decisive victory. As Metellus' lieutenant, Marius took advantage of the exasperating situation engendered by the protraction in executing the war to advance his political career.

Apparently full of ambition, Marius saw addressing a crucial state interest as strategic to further ascending the political ladder. Claiming the wherewithal to speedily end the war, Marius resorted to employing various deliberate manoeuvres to replace Metellus as the commander of the war. In a manner characteristic of a populist, he endeared himself to the troops and gained their respect with the reputation for doing things in common with them (Plutarch, Marius, 7). Interpretable as maligning of reputation, he reportedly cleverly incited the disgruntled African prince, Gauda, and many Roman knights who were soldiers and merchants to write a letter to their friends in authority at Rome to criticise Metellus' approach to the war (Sallust, Jug., 65). The approach was to have these men root for Marius' appointment as general while Marius at the same time corroborated their efforts by 'appealing to the credulity of the Roman mob and ... misleading with the most unfair and absurd misrepresentations of ...Metellus...(Mommsen, 1958, p. 248). As much as he recognised what the well-being of the public meant, Marius was well conversant with all the social factors, dynamics, and structures for securing power, which included smear campaign.

Clearly, strong support for Marius' political schemes came from the fertile soil of populism at Rome. Conditions were most conducive for his consulship campaign to gain momentum as 'It happened that the people too, at this juncture...were eager to raise commoners to office. Hence, everything was favorable to Marius' views' (Sallust, Jug., 65). It is pertinent to recall that Tribunes from the time of Tiberius Gracchus (133 BC) onward had brought the ever-widening influence and power of the senate under constant attacks. The

situation was only made worse by the senate's inability to successfully execute the Jugurthine war. The deficiencies of the ruling class were already public knowledge, and Marius again made no mistake in judging the anti-elite public mood as perfect for his political advancement in 107BCE. Besides the overriding interest of the state that was heightened by military stagnation in the Jugurthine war, perennial socio-economic problems confronting the Romans were real. Crisis had followed the displacement of farmers who previously served on long foreign campaigns at their own expense, making the smallholders bitter. The socio-political tension further increased with the Italian allies, who had loyally supported many Roman military campaigns, persisting in the demand for enfranchisement which they were denied (Appian, *Civ. Wars*, 1.7). Marius was cognizant of how to align his personal ambition with the preponderant state interest. His political scorecard got improved when he decided to ride on the back of men who were looked down on to fulfill his Africa command as Metellus' replacement. He daringly, as if deliberately opting for a political risk, 'contrary to law and custom, ... enlisted many a poor and insignificant man, although former commanders had not accepted such persons, but bestowed arms, just as they would any other honour, only on those whose property assessment made' (Plutarch, *Marius*, 9.4). Without disguising marks of demagoguery and opportunism, he boldly took to all sorts of boastful taunts to annoy the nobles and become loathsome to them. Characteristic of the Roman pattern of political culture, 'such talk was not mere empty boasting, nor was his desire to make himself hated by the nobility without purpose' (Plutarch, *Marius*, 9.4). Marius' behaviour was considered appropriate and advantageous at the time when senate's poor execution of the war was attributed to winking at flagrant cases of bribery. The powerful ruling body was not viewed as representing state interest and, 'indeed the people, who were delighted to have the senate insulted...measured the greatness of a man's spirit by the boastfulness of his speech, encouraged [Marius], and incited him not to spare men of high repute if he wished to please the multitude' (Plutarch, *Marius*, 9.4). Marius' behaviour typically exemplified an aspect of the social basis of power or the "political culture" in the late Republic.

When finally, he secured command of the Jugurthine war, Marius faced the battle that would make or mar his political ambition. Granted, the overall activity of Metellus in Numidia has been described as cheer 'widespread devastation of the country' (Holroyd, 1928, p.18) because it was short of expectation, nevertheless, his military efforts could not be dismissed with a wave of hand. Marius certainly knew he had several records of Metellus to beat and, in no time, displayed all thoughtfulness and brilliant sense of organisation in executing the war. Despite the eagerness of the ambitious Sulla, his upcoming rival, to share the glory of the ultimate victory with him, Marius' war skills were so distinguished that he got the credit for ending the Jugurthine war (Holroyd, 1928, p.18).

Marius grew very popular with the soldiers as a worthy general by the end of the war albeit some aristocrats' opposition that existed back home. His alliance with the common people, who saw him as 'capable alike from his military and political position' (Mommsen, 1958, p. 104), positioned him for pragmatic restructuring of the Roman system of military recruitment. In the unfolding events of more pressing security issues, Marius' prominence in ending the war in Africa never proved to be the apex of his political career.

Emerging as the "Third Founder of Rome"

With the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE, Rome enjoyed respite from any major enemy threat in the Mediterranean region for several decades. However, as Germanic Cimbri and Teutoni tribes began to migrate towards the north-eastern Alps in 120-115, fresh crisis became more threatening. Alarmed by the invading movements, the Taurisci, the Roman allies in the region, requested the Romans to come to their aid. In response, the Roman senate sent one of the consuls for the year 113 BCE, Gnaeus Papirius Carbo, to handle the threat from the marauders. Roman soldiers suffered a shameful defeat near Noreia when Carbo and his army only narrowly escaped total destruction.

However, the Cimbri and Teutones would not press on but chose to cross the Alps and move into Gaul to carry on pillaging. Again, the Roman army under the consul Marcus Junius Silenus suffered defeat by the Cimbri in 109 or 108 BCE (Evans, 2005, p. 41). Although mention of the Cimbri is absent in ancient sources, a few years thereafter, problems and humiliating experiences from them were far from being over for the Romans. In 107 BCE, the Tigurini, the allies of the Cimbri raided southern Gaul and it was another terrible rout for the Romans when one of the consuls for the year, Cassius Longinus, was ambushed and killed (Evans, 2005, p. 41).

The disastrous trend continued for the Romans at Arausio where Rome suffered one of the costliest defeats in her war history. In 105 BCE, Gnaeus Mallius Maximus, the new consul for the year and the proconsul Quintus Servilius Caepio raised a formidable force of over 80,000 men who were joined by thousands of other supportive groups. Tragically, the consuls in command had so much dislike and distrust for each other that they set up separate camps and presented a divided front for the next war against the invaders. With the lack of cooperation between the commanders, 'fear of the Romans turned to contempt' (Evans, 2005, p. 42) and the ignominious defeat that followed could not be averted.

The defeat suffered at Arausio seemed to climax the Romans' ugly war experiences in the hands of the Germanic tribes on the north-western frontiers of their empire. An atmosphere of panic became inevitable in Rome since a huge number of Romans had lost their lives and Italy was practically laid bare to the invaders. There was apparently a dearth of generals who could be relied upon to successfully manage the foreign threats and the insecurity was very dire. From the look of things, the victorious Cimbri, Teutons, Ambrones and their Gallic

allies were determinedly averse to rest unless Rome was brought under their control and Italy devastated. A crucial major leadership decision must be made by the Romans to save the state from further military embarrassments.

It was at this critical time that Gaius Marius, a general with a rich profile of successful campaigns; the victor of the Jugurthine war, got all attention again. The security of the state was so much of concern that the Romans could only look to the man whose military experience and popularity among the soldiers offered hope of protection for the city. Hence, the Romans summoned Marius to the command and, although, it was unlawful to do so, he was reelected consul the second time, even in his absence. The thought was all about expediency; therefore, the 'people would not listen to those who opposed the election. For they considered ... the demands of the general good' (Plutarch, Marius, 12. 1). Striking is the expression, 'general good', which can be substituted here with 'public interest' or 'state interest'.

The assignment suited Marius' desire to enjoy more political prominence and also met another state's interest. Men were very much needed to wage war after great number of Romans perished in the wars against the invaders. Interestingly, confronted with manpower problem, Marius went for a radical solution that addressed, not only the present military problem, but also remarkably handled the socio-economic crisis over which the Gracchi had lost their lives. In another instance of departure from tradition and constitution that met least resistance, Marius began to recruit soldiers from the *proletarii* (propertyless). As anticipated, the action met the yearning of the teeming population of impoverished Romans who were promised pay while in service and land when discharged. In the face of the urgent security need, the senate was eager to compromise traditions and grant Gaius Marius more power to protect the state.

Apart from the circumstances that favoured Marius' revolutionary military action, the general was also known for strong character in his use of authority and for firmness in arbitrating matters involving soldiers serving under him. His popularity increased among his troops who found it easy to obey him as soon as his high sense of discipline was perceived to be in their best interest. Among the soldiers, Marius' stern outlook 'gradually became familiar, as fearful to their enemies rather than to themselves... the uprightness of his judicial decisions ... pleased the soldiers' (Plutarch, Marius, 14. 2,3). Marius strove to conduct himself in harmony with the public good as he propelled his ambition.

Soon, news of Marius' excellent handling of military affairs heightened his political profile at Rome and greatly influenced his getting the third consulship when 'at the same time, too, the Barbarians were expected in the spring, and the Romans were unwilling to risk battle with them under any other general' (Plutarch, Marius, 14. 6). As he combined military intelligence and diplomacy to ward off the invaders' threat, Marius gained acceptance of the Romans so much that his election as consul came in succession from 104 to 100 BCE. The menace of the Germanic tribes had created enough panic and the Romans would

also not take chances with wrangling in the military that could result from transferring command to another person.

The credit for the final defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones went to Marius. While the role of Lucius Cornelius Sulla, Catullus' legate, was indisputable, the overall picture of the ultimate victory won by Marius with his professional and highly organised soldiers stood out. The previous record of victory, still vivid in the minds of the Romans, combined with the success in the Cimbrian war to raise the general to greater political heights. By the present achievement, the long awaited safety had returned to Rome and nothing else could meet the Romans' requirements for effective leadership at the time.

The intense appreciation of the Roman populace is captured by Plutarch as follows: "the people hailed him as the third founder of Rome, that peril which he had averted from the city was not less than that of the Gallic invasion; and all of them, as they made merry at home with their wives and children, would bring ceremonial offerings of food and libations of wine to Marius as well as to the gods...(Plutarch, Marius 27.5.). These expressions of gratitude are reminiscent of the praises bestowed on Marcus Furius Camillus (c.445/446-365 BCE), who similarly came to the rescue in 390 BCE when Rome was under grievous attacks of Gallic invaders. Reflecting over the socio-political structures of the Romans, there were no parameters for good leadership other than what Camillus had met. In addition to his outstanding military feats, he distinguished himself so much in administration and politics that he was chosen as dictator for five times. Hence, he was dubbed 'Second Founder of Rome' (Plutarch, Camillus, 1.1) after his historic defeat of the Gallic army. As the 'third founder of Rome', Marius had similarly lived up to the expectation of his people as a statesman in the course of pursuing his political ambition.

The Irony of Marius' Civilian life

It increasingly became an issue after the Cimbrian war that, while Marius excelled in warding off external threats, his ambition as a politician conflicted with civil life, bringing his ability to demonstrate leadership traits under serious criticism. Plutarch notes: 'confronting a political crisis or the tumultuous throng ... his ambition made him most timorous, and that undaunted firmness which he showed in battle forsook him when he faced the popular assemblies, so that he was disconcerted by the most ordinary praise or blame' (Plutarch, Marius, 28.2). Reference to Marius as someone who had 'no natural aptitude for peace or civil life, but had reached his eminence by arms' (Plutarch, Marius, 32.1) similarly betrays a serious personality deficiency. Evidently, Marius began to show that his love for power came first and he would do everything to retain it, even if it conflicted with the state interest. Driven more by desire for personal glory than by spirit of selfless service to the state, he allegedly 'got his sixth consulship by paying down large sums of money among the tribes' (Plutarch, Marius, 28.5). High sense of discipline and restraint that characterised Marius' conduct of wars seemed to have given way to low level of tolerance since the general had

problem with subjecting himself to the law, especially when his personal interests were threatened. Reportedly, he detested recall of Metellus from exile to the point that, even when a law had been passed to that effect 'and after the people had adopted the measure with alacrity, unable to endure the sight of Metellus returning, he set sail for Cappadocia and Galatia' (Plutarch, Marius, 31.1). Going by Plutarch's portrayal, Marius' civilian life became inimical to the peace of the state he had toiled hard for abroad. It appeared he hurriedly pushed his brilliant military performances and reforms that solved crucial socio-economic problems behind him when he became embroiled in personal conflicts.

If the tendency had always been there, it caught no one's attention during the periods of war as much as it did at the time of relative peace in Rome. It was understandably so since the state was hitherto more eager for a leader who could bring about security or safety at home. In the face of external dangers, this was all that Marius stood for as he pursued his political ambition with more consideration for state interest. It could be reasoned that, 'while in war he had authority and power because his services were needed' (Plutarch Marius, 28.3), Marius became a less ideal leader as he spent more time at home because he could not exercise restraints and make his ambition secondary to state interest.

Suggesting why Marius was not a good politician because he frequently had problem with civil life, Plutarch says: 'it was rather his inferiority to others in the graces of intercourse and in political helpfulness, which caused him to be neglected, like an instrument of war in time of peace' (Plutarch Marius, 32.1). Plutarch here imputes low self-esteem as the problem. Marius desired so much relevance in the Roman political schemes that he would not accept being ignored or neglected 'like an instrument of war in time of peace'. At home, he was imbued with the spirit that warred against whatever seemed like making him a second fiddle. A state of conflict was inevitable since his ambition now came first, and he was in no way prepared to allow anyone to rob him of his glory as the 'third founder of Rome'. Undoubtedly, Gaius Marius's political trajectory is a complex interplay between state interest and personal ambition. While his initial political rise could be seen as driven by a genuine desire to serve Rome, his unyielding drive for power eventually dented his records.

Conclusion

The interplay between state interest and personal ambition in the political career of Marius implies a politician's combining necessary skills and charisma; deviating sometimes from the norms or even acting in controversial settings to bring about the desired political outcomes for the state. In this context, a leader may be evaluated as good when he, in the pursuit of his personal ambition, uses whatever wherewithal he has to bring about desirable political outcomes or meet the state's utmost needs. Such political leaning may give little or no consideration to idiosyncrasies or possible moral deficiencies in a leader, as long as private flaws are not seen as conflicting with overall interest of the state.

To the Romans, Marius was undoubtedly a good leader in the wartime. He got the credit for ending the Jugurthine war and saved Rome from humiliating defeats suffered in the hands of the Cimbri and the Teutones. During these periods, security challenges shifted all attention to distinction in military service as the foremost virtue of a leader. Marius could not have been less popular among the *proletarii* who got a leader with the power to take them more decisively beyond the point reached by the Gracchi. His departure from tradition brought about reforms that prioritised state interests. The power to succeed he got from the Roman political institution because he knew and had what the state desperately needed.

However, the subject of Marius' controversial leadership in peacetime shows a conflict in the interplay between the state interest and a politician's personal ambition. This can be more of the focus in another work. It suffices to conclude the discussion here on the note that Marius' case well illustrates how, more than ethical consideration, prevailing political concerns of a state or the state interest, largely determine the success of a politician's ambition or how a politician is appraised. Hence, Marius political career is a typical case of the interplay between state interest and personal political ambition, which may become complex when interests become conflicting and prioritising long interest of the state becomes difficult.

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