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AVARITAS ET GLORIA: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN POMPEY AND CAESAR FROM A MORAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract
Several writers on the history of the Roman Republic have argued that the causes of the conflict between Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus and Gaius Julius Caesar, Rome's renowned military commanders and politicians, are traceable to the deaths of Crassus and Julia, wife of Pompey. Crassus was the third in the 60 B.C. tripod alliance of Crassus-Pompey-Caesar otherwise called 'First Triumvirate' while Julia was the daughter of Julius Caesar, given in marriage to Pompey to strengthen the alliance. The writers, reasonably, conclude that the deaths of these unifying personages soured the relationship between the last two politicians, resulting ultimately in an open conflict in 49 B.C. These submissions and others, however, have not grounded the roots of the conflict in the moral problems of greed for wealth and power (*avaritas*) and desire for fame, public honour and military triumph (*gloria*). Therefore, this paper concentrates on both Pompey and Caesar and those latent amoral actions that induced the spread of their political and military influence and accumulation of wealth and positions in the dying days of the Roman Republic. The paper explained *avaritas* as an intense and selfish desire for wealth and power beyond what is necessary. By the same token, *gloria* is expressed as intense and selfish desire for fame or public honour, attained through military conquests and political achievements. Using the historical method in interpreting both primary and secondary sources, the paper notes that in the late Roman Republic, men were inspired by straightforward greed for political power and winning military glory; the greatest glory was a triumph, which was a military display of spoils of war to attract the praise of the people. To realize their individualistic objectives, they, in the guise of overcoming oppositions in the senate, formed an informal political alliance with Crassus, the richest Roman in history, who died at the Battle of Carrhae while seeking military glory. By teasing out certain actions and inactions of the last two men before and during the dying days of their alliance, this work concludes that the underlying basis for the breakdown in the

relationship between Pompey and Caesar should be seen in their twin moral vices: *avaritas* for economic gain and acquisition of resources as well as competition for *gloria*, through ambition to outshine each other over control of the Roman Republic.

Keywords: Pompey, Caesar, Roman Republic, *avaritas, gloria*

Introduction

One of the stories of great nations and great men which have swayed the ancient and modern world is, respectively, the story the last century of Roman Republic and its political gladiators, especially Pompey and Caesar. The ancient Roman republic was a type of mixed constitution, which kept elements of three types of government namely: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. In this blend, the consuls could be assumed to have represented monarchy, the senators represented aristocracy (best men) while and the peoples' assemblies represented democracy. The Senate was the most important and most enduring of the organs of Republican government. Between the years 133 and 27 B.C., Rome suffered from great internal tensions, leading to numerous civil wars (Scullard, 1968). Her constant political turmoil forced the Roman Senate and her political gladiators to, from time to time, take decisions that had myriads of impacts on the state, resulting ultimately, in the collapse of the Republic (Goldsworthy, 2009).

The Roman army was a key element in the politics of the late Roman Republic. The military was always tightly keyed to the political system. Right from the monarchy period, the social standing of a person was determined by both his political and military roles. The political system was based upon fierce competitions within the ruling elite, particularly the patrician upper class who held all the important political positions, the most coveted of which was the post of *consul*. Two consuls were elected each year to head the government of the state; they were then assigned a consular army and an area of campaign (Akinboye, 2015).

During the Republic, the consular army became a militia, because the army was raised for specific military campaigns. Once that campaign was finished, the army was normally disbanded and the soldiers returned to civilian life. They returned to civilian life because until the time of Marius, the army was not a professional entity. Rather, soldiers were normally recruited from among civilian population in times of crises. From the time of Marius and Sulla, the control of the army began to be tied to the political ambitions, greed and desire for glory of individual consuls or military commanders. The vices of using the army to achieve personal gains or interests led, among others, to the civil war involving Marius and Sulla and to the formation of the First Triumvirate, which was an alliance of three notable men – Crassus, Pompey and Caesar. These men dominated the political and military space of the late Roman Republic for long (Holland, 2003).

Both Pompey and Julius Caesar were outstanding examples of late century Roman politicians and military commanders, who used the army and the masses to pursue individual careers with unflinching fervour for greed and glory. Both manipulated the political life of Rome for the benefit of themselves and a third member of their 'triumvirate', Crassus. But after the death of Crassus, the last two became bitterest enemies. Several writers (e.g. Brunt, 1988; Bunson, 2002; Holland, 2003; Mackay, 2004; Flower, 2011; Morstein-Max, 2021) have also argued that the death of Julia, wife of Pompey, added to the reasons for the conflict. Julia was the daughter of Julius Caesar given out in marriage to Pompey to seal the alliance between the last two politician-soldiers. The passing of these two unifying personages – Crassus and Julia, bred distrusts that eventually led to the conflict. In what follows, this paper attempts to provide other latent causes for the breakdown in relationship by suggesting two moral vices: greed (*avaritas*) and glory seeking (*gloria*), as primal factors. The paper revolves around the subjects of Roman politics and military. We have paid particular attention to the period between 106 B.C. when Gnaeus Pompey was born and 49 B.C. when Julius Caesar decided to cross the Rubicon to begin an open conflict with Pompey – the so called civil war.

***avaritas et gloria*: A conceptual clarification**

In classical antiquity, greed *(avaritas)* and glory or fame *(gloria)* played significant roles in politics and the two were often intertwined. Glory or fame was closely tied to the pursuit of political power because the Graeco-Romans valued military conquests and triumphs, which brought honour and prestige to the victors. Greed (Greek, *pleonexia*) is avarice, greediness, cupidity or desire for any of these. It refers to 'an excessive desire to acquire or possess more than what one needs or deserves, especially with respect to material wealth' (*The American Heritage Dictionary*). In the context of politics, greed was often seen as a negative trait and perceived as an extreme desire for wealth, political power, and control (Geisthorpe, 2019). Ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle believed that greed could corrupt political leaders and undermine the common good. Plato agreed that human nature has the natural and necessary desires to get more than necessary, yet he emphasized that greed is an excessive form of desire (*Rep*. 558a-559d). Aristotle, on his part, says it is important to cultivate and practise moral virtue (the *mean*) as a prerequisite to individuals' happy life (Aristotle, 1975: 99-101). We will be in a bad position if we allow emotions or desires to regulate our lives. When passions are moderately and rationally delineated by virtues of temperance, courage, integrity, wisdom, generosity, self-respect, justice and friendliness with our public acts, a happy life would be guaranteed (Akinboye, 2016: 202). Both philosophers, therefore, emphasized the importance of moderation and virtue in political life, warning against the detrimental effects of unchecked greed.

The word 'glory' was called *kleos* in Greek; its Latin counterpart was *gloria*. The concept of *gloria* encompassed the pursuit of honour, reputation, pride,

ambition, fame or desire for any of these. In ancient Greece, *kleos* was closely tied to heroic deeds and one's legacy; achieving it was often associated with military prowess, bravery in battle, or other significant contributions to the state. The quest for *gloria (kleos)* among the Graeco-Romans motivated both political leaders and warriors, playing significant roles in shaping political landscapes and public opinion of individuals and states (Langois, K. 2017), hence the modern expression, *'the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome'*. Again, the Greeks and Romans used the word 'fame' (*fama* in Latin) synonymously with 'glory' to denote a person's reputation and renown. *Fama*, like *gloria* above, could be earned through various means, including achievements in politics, warfare, intellectualism, prowess, or artistic excellence. Political leaders in ancient times often sought to establish positive and long-lasting reputation among their contemporaries and future generations. Fame was seen as a way to leave a mark on history and ensure a lasting legacy and in the last century of the Roman Republic.

***avaritas et gloria*: Pompey and rise of the triumvirate**

"The greedy stirs up conflict . . ." Solomon in Proverbs 28:25 (NIV)

Mahatma Gandhi in one of his famous quotes says: 'There is enough for everybody's need and not for everybody's greed'. By this statement, he means that nature has provided resources that are sufficient for everyone but some people, because of their avaricious and self-seeking nature, often try to keep or desire much more than what is required for themselves. Globally, many political leaders, in their quest for more than what is necessary, have wrecked up polities, embezzled commonwealth's patrimony and created innumerable conflicts which have generated hatred among people.

Pompey was born in 106 B.C. into the privileged class of *optimates*. His father was Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo, who was a soldier of some ability, but was killed in a plot by his own officers in 88 B.C. As a soldier as early as age 17, he showed all the old Roman virtues for he was authoritative and hardy, reliable, temperate, and brave (Collins, 1953: 98; Smith, 1865: 200). In 87 B.C., Pompey was prosecuted on various improbable charges, and only owed his life to Publius Antistius, the *praetor* whose daughter he married. In the days of the Roman civil war between Sulla and Marius, Pompey pitted his tent with the victorious general Sulla for whom he had earlier raised three legions in the stirring times of the war (Collins, 1953: 99; Smith, 1865: 200/1). At Rome, Sulla crushed his enemies, the Marians, got himself proclaimed *Dictator* and carried out a systematic reorganization of the state and the constitution, which gave over the benefits of government and the law courts wholly to the *optimates*. Then, Pompey was sent to mop up oppositions in Sicily. While there, he captured and put to death the Marian *populares'* consul, Carbo. Then, crossing to Africa, he speedily defeated another Marian and Cinna's son-in-law, Domitius Ahenobarbus and his native hordes and restored the dethroned Hiempsal to the throne of Numidia (Collins, 1953:100; Smith, 1865: 201).

Pompey's military achievements against the Marians procured him the greatest renown, and he returned to Rome famously covered with glory (80 B.C.). A lot of Romans in their numbers flocked out of the city to meet him; and Sulla himself, who formed one of the crowd, greeted him with the surname of *Magnus* (the Great). Pompey then asked for a triumph (*triumphus*). During the Republic, politics and arms were all one career under the Roman system. The idea of *triumphus* encapsulated glory (*gloria, fama*) which was attained through military conquests and political achievements. Originally, triumph was a ritual rite, highest honour and civil ceremony, held to publicly honour a military commander who had led Roman forces to victory in a foreign war. It was the pinnacle of a Roman politician or general's career. When Sulla told the young Pompey that only a senior magistrate who had held some post such as *dictator, consul,* or *praetor* could be paid that honour, Pompey was said to have replied Sulla, 'More men worship the rising than the setting sun'. When Sulla saw his firmness, he kept quiet for a moment, he then remarked, 'Let him triumph'. Thus, the young general entered Rome in triumph as a simple *eques* at just the age of 25 years. This was the first clear incident of Pompey's *avaritas et gloria* (Collins, 1953: 100; Smith, 1865:201).

Not long after his triumph, Rome was involved in three wars simultaneously: in Rome, Lepidus had risen in arms against the Senate; in Asia, Roman legions were struggling to keep Mithridates and his ally, Tigranes of Armenia, at bay; and in Spain, Sertorius, the last helmsman of the Marian cause, was giving the Romans a great trouble (Collins, 1953: 100). When he had successfully defeated Lepidus at Modena, Pompey was given the pro-consular command to go Spain. It took Pompey nearly four years of campaigning to subdue Sertorius' Spain in 72 B.C. Although a Roman general, Metellus, had in no small measure taken part in the final defeat of Sertorius and his ally, Perperna, Pompey stole the show by obtaining the credit for bringing the Spanish war to a conclusion (Collins, 1953:101; Smith, 1865: 201/2). After all these victories, there was yet in Italy another trouble: Spartacus and his horde of gladiators were in possession of a great part of the Italian peninsula. In fact, Rome had been badly shaken by the revolt of these gladiators and some consuls who tried to tame the revolt had been defeated. Crassus, better remembered for his wealth than his generalship, had broken up the insurrection in 71 B.C. and Pompey, on his homeward march from Spain, was asked to rout the scattered survivors. He did, saying afterwards that 'Crassus had won the battle, but Pompey had torn up the rebellion by the roots' (Collins, 1953: 101/102; Smith, 1865: 202). On his return to Rome, he, again, demanded another triumph. The senate could not refuse; he was granted a colourful triumph. Expectedly, his fame highly soared.

Pompey contested and elected as consul for the year 70 B.C. This was a defiance of all laws related to the *cursus honorum* (the order of holding public offices) because he had never been a *quaestor* or even served in the Senate. His co-consul for the year was Crassus, the Rome's business mogul. In order to inflate his fame among the masses, Pompey proceeded to modify the laws of his late

commander, Sulla, many of which had favoured the patrician *optimates*. By his reforms, Pompey sacrificed past friendship, broke with the aristocratic class, and became the hero of the mass *populares*. In carrying these measures, he was strongly supported by a new man who was just sliding into politics and military, Julius Caesar, a rapidly rising star in *populares'* favour. (Collins, 1953:102; Smith, 1865:202-204).

In the interim, Rome's preoccupations stated above had left the Mediterranean pirates unchecked. Piracy had now infested the whole inland sea so much that there was danger of famine. By a special decree, the *Lex Gabinia*, Pompey was again put in command of all Rome's maritime regions. In forty days, the seas east of Sicily were freed, and in another forty-nine days the marauders had been swept from their strongholds in the western Mediterranean. Again, by this feat, his fame kept soaring high (Collins, 1953:102).

Now at the age of 40, it was clear that Pompey was gradually being consumed by self-consciousness for unending fame; he yearned to be the sole Roman central figure and the patron of men. By the reason of *Lex Manilia*, and we can assume that with his request, he, once again, received the supreme command in the East to deal with Lucullus. He sailed for Asia with some 50,000 men. His campaign in the East was a long one. During the period, he made an alliance with Phraates of Parthia, succeeded in keeping Tigranes neutral, and inflicted a heavy defeat on Mithridates' army. By 66 B.C. Pompey's forces had penetrated the Euphrates, occupied Syria, and reduced Jerusalem. He spent most of 62 B.C. in organizing a lot of places in Asia Minor and brought more than 20,000 talents to the Roman treasury. In 61 B.C., he returned to Rome, to a great triumph for the third time. Not only did he become the most famous man in Rome, his fame also spread all over the Mediterranean world like a wild fire. His renown was unprecedented and clearly showed that he loved the growing fame!

After the glow and glamour of the triumph, Pompey next demanded land and eastern settlements for his veterans. The idea was a logical one since no state would want to keep restless unemployed veterans in the city; resettling them in the east to farm would certainly reduce tensions. However, it turned out that the Senate was never willing to approve this demand of Pompey; no thanks to the displeased Marcus Porcius, better known as Cato the Younger, leader of the *optimates*, who were the conservative members of the Senate. The refusal of Pompey's demands was to readily drive him into the waiting hands of Senate's enemies – the rising Caesar and the desperate Crassus (Collins, 1953:103; Smith, 1865:202, 20-23).

As seen above, Crassus had been a colleague, a co-consul with Pompey in 70 B.C. In 60 B.C., he was the leader of the *publican*, the rich tax farmers and businessmen, who collected taxes from Roman provinces and colonies for repatriation to Rome. The practice then was that an agreed amount of money was initially deposited into Rome treasury by a *publicanus*; he in turn returned to his assigned colony to farm out taxes and recoup his initial deposit. In that year 60 B.C., Crassus had inaccurately made a handsome bid for the lucrative

Eastern Asia. When he realized that the amount he tendered was too high and that he would not be able to re-coup himself of the deposit, he, like others in his category, appealed to the Senate for renegotiation to reduce the amount. But the Senate bluntly refused, thereby offending another very prominent citizen (Akinboye, 2015: 146). The third prominent personality who, as shall be seen below, desperately wanted the support of Pompey and Crassus was Julius Caesar. Thus, in 60 B.C., these incompatible characters were driven into the arms of one another by forming an unofficial political friendship or alliance which has been popularly referred to as the First Triumvirate (Akinboye, 2015: 147).

***avaritas et gloria*: Caesar and rise of the triumvirate**

Gaius Julius Caesar's rise into prominence was gradual yet very fast (Drogula, 2015, 119). He lived for just 55 years! He was born to the patrician Julian family in the year 100 B.C. But his old family had become politically obscured by the time he was rising into prominence. His early political relevance only came with his connection to the Marian family because his aunt was married to the great Marius. He began his military career after his pardon by Sulla when served at the Siege of Mytilene. During that battle, he saved the life of a fellow citizen and by so doing won a civic crown which came with the privileges of having the Senate stand on a holder's entrance; holders were also permitted to wear the crown at public occasions. This was the spark inflamed Caesar's desire for honours and glory seeking. In 73 BC, Caesar, in absentia from Rome, coveted the office of a pontiff in place of his deceased relative Gaius Aurelius Cotta. His well-acceptance into that aristocratic circle further whetted his appetite for greater future prospects in his political career. By 71 BC, he became one of the military tribunes and a *quaestor* in 69 BC (Plutarch, *Life of Julius Caesar*, 5. 1). In 65 BC, Caesar further moved up the *cursus honorum* following his emergence as one of the *curule aedile*, and for obtaining this position, he threw a very lavish party and organized games that won him great fame and masses support (Plutarch, *Life of Julius Caesar*, 6. 1-4). By 63 BC, Caesar had speedily become one highest ranking state religious official and politician, having stood for and won the praetorship and the post of *pontifex maximus* (Morstein-Marx, 2021: 64). The latter was the head of the *collegium pontificium* (College of Pontiffs). His defeat of other influential contestants for the pontifical office is alleged to have been facilitated with huge bribes and gratifications (Plutarch, Life of Julius Caesar, 7.1-4; Morstein-Marx, 2021: 64-66).

The last 16 years of Caesar's life were the most momentous. In these years, he became Rome's most powerful commander and politician, having become a *consul* in Spain for the years 60/59, *proconsul* of Illyricum, Gaul from 58-49 B.C, *consul* of Rome for the years 48, 46 to 44 B.C. and *dictator perpertuo* from 49 till 15 March, 44 B.C. In fact, in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, Cassius speaking to Brutus, describes Caesar:

> Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world
> Like a Colossus, and we petty men
> Walk under his huge legs and peep about
> To find ourselves dishonorable graves.
> Men at some time are masters of their fates.
> (Act I), Scene ii)

Given the above narratives, Caesar, no doubts, was a man whose military attainment threatened to quickly overshadow the fame and glory of Pompey, at least, by 60 B.C. when he ended his governorship in Spain. It was no surprise that he became the third factor in the first triumvirate.

***avaritas et gloria*: Pompey and Caesar and fall of the triumvirate**

As seen above, Pompey the Great had, in 60/59 B.C., had entered into a political alliance with both Julius Caesar and Marcus Licinius Crassus. It was an alliance which the threesome planned to use to further their different greed and ambitions in spite of strong oppositions from majority of people in the Senate. At the beginning, the alliance was clearly successful in winning some advantages for its members during the Caesar's consulship of 59 B.C. (Gruen, 1995: 91). However, over the following years, it gradually broke down not necessarily because of the death of Crassus, but, as this paper emphasizes, because of the amoral issues of greed for more political power and uncontrolled desire for military glory (Russell, 2015).

To start with, the formation of the alliance (triumvirate) has been seen as a momentous milestone in the crippling of republican institutions since ancient times. Even among the Romans of the late Republic, it was known that the alliance kickstarted with inordinate greed and self-seeking intentions. Among modern historians, Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg, for example, in his *Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic* (2014:91), wrote:

> "Their friendship (*amicitia*) could have been a traditional alliance within the framework of what was usual in Roman political life. Yet their agreement that nothing should be done in Rome that was displeasing to any of the three... changed the rules of the game. There had never been a time when three men had conceived of the notion that their private arrangements should regulate what would happen in Rome. For there had never before been three men with the necessary resources and power to impose their vision on the state."

The purpose of the alliance was to secure something that none of the three men (Caesar, Pompey and Crassus) could secure in person. While each had attained

personal success, yet, each wanted more *gloria* (glory) and personal avaricious gains. Both Pompey and Caesar knew that they would not likely be able to force the senate to assent to their individual demands if they did not align together (Gruen 1995:89; Drogba 2019: 126.).

It is trite, here, to first consider some specific *avaritas* and *gloria* of Pompey in the dying days of the alliance and breakdown of relationship with Caesar. Pompey, as seen above, had already established himself as the most famous and powerful man in the Roman Republic before Caesar shone forth. He had had a successful military career. It can be argued that Pompey had the nature of a man who lavishly inclined towards public display and who only felt at peace if the masses would shout his name, *Pompeius Magnus*! As shown above, right from his early life, he forced Sulla to approve a triumph for him when he returned to Rome from his mop up campaign against the oppositions in Sicily and Marians who were defeated in Africa. Pompey had defied the norm and insisted on a triumph. Clearly, he loved to be celebrated through military triumphs, and he got three in his hey days. That was something unprecedented in the Roman republic until his time. He loved to be in the eyes of the public; he was thoroughly shocked when he once found out that his popularity had fallen following the victories of Caesar in Gaul. So, a major trait of Pompey that impacted his disposition in the days of the alliance was his hunger for *gloria*, the public confirmation of his status.

Pompey was also induced by unbridled desires for power. As he won political and military success, he demanded more and more recognitions, power and positions. Three times, he occupied the highest position of *consul* (70, 55 and 52 B.C.) even though he had little political experience at his early stage. His success as a young general enabled his direct aim for consulship without following the traditional *cursus honorum.* He was commander, as shown above, in the Roman wars against Spartacus, Sertorius and Mithridates. His obsession with power, esteem and power 'caused him to use almost everyone he met for political gain …an obsession that ultimately led to his demise.' (Grigsby: 2022).

It is known that after each successful campaign and in the fainting days of the tripod alliance, Pompey was accustomed to giving the plebeians presents in form of booties, money, financed feats and festivals. These 'bread and circuses' kept the people temporarily satisfied, despite their lack of political power or rights. These Pompeian concerns and strategy of holding on to fame only proved that the Roman masses' applause or support could be secured by bread. Pompey knew this and thus furthered his mass oriented programme.

In 60 B.C. when Caesar allied Pompey and Crassus, Caesar was the least powerful of the three, but his stint as a governor and the fame and wealth he had acquired in Spain helped in bolstering his influence (Gruen, 1995: 87–88). In spite of the wealth and fame he amassed in Spain, Caesar was still desirous of both a triumph and becoming a *consul* in Rome. In addition, he was also keen in gaining a pro-consulship and military command in Gaul yet without letting go of his army, which had now become the tool for gaining power and military glory

since the days of Sulla and Marius. In fact, when he returned from Spain in June of that 60 B.C., he was forced to choose between entering the city without his army to declare candidacy for the consulship (a situation that would have made him ineligible for a triumph) and forgoing the consulship by staying with his army outside of the city to await a triumph from the senate (Drogula, 2019: 119-20). Again, it took Cato the Younger, leader of the conservative members of the Senate and Caesar's obstinate opponent, to thwart the general's request for both greed and desire for glory in form of both a triumph (*gloria*) and consulship candidacy (power).

At any rate, Caesar, shockingly, gave up his eligibility for Rome's highest military honour (a triumph) to declare his consulship candidacy (Drogula, 2019, 120). Although he was the most popular candidate for the consulship of 59, yet Cato and his allies tried to counter-balance power by ensuring that Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, a personal enemy of Caesar's became Caesar's co-consul and that the consuls received a command with no opportunities for glory or excessive material wealth (Drogula, 2019, 121). These outcomes were certainly incompatible with Caesar's greed and ambition. Like modern politician, his ambition was not simply for service alone, but also for personal gains. Caesar won his election conveniently, but for him to turn it into anything useful for his need and desires, he needed to do something drastic. This ardent need to secure political gains, glory and wealth led him into the hands of Pompey, the most celebrated general. So, we can aver that the alliance between the two, which later included Crassus (the First triumvirate) was founded on greediness for power and glory (Drogula 2019: 125).

Again, we can see Caesar's greed for absolute power in the ruthless way he treated his co-consul, Calpurnius Bibulus, so he could remain the sole consul for the year 59B.C. By law, a consul had the inalienable right to veto a proposal made by his fellow consul if the proposal was unfavourable to him, and that was exactly what Bibulus did on a couple of occasions. On one last occasion, Caesar took his proposal to the popular assembly. As he stood to present the proposal to the assembly, Bibulus attempted to interfere. But he was thrown down the steps of the temple of Castor and showered with garbage by Caesar's 'boys', ostensibly on the instruction of their patron. Bibulus returned to his home where he remained out of public life while Caesar ruled as consul alone.

The craving for more riches and political and military glory, induced also by the same mischief of the alliance, impelled Caesar to push for the governorship of Gaul, an area that included what is now France and Belgium. His Roman troops conquered Gallic tribes by exploiting tribal rivalries. In eight years, he increased his military power and, more importantly, acquired plunder from Gaul. In actual fact, Caesar was a man who loved flamboyancy and the fame of military triumph; he did not stop at anything to get it. He did his utmost to get the better of his rival, Pompey, by celebrating four incredible and extravagant triumphs following his victories in Gaul, Egypt, against Pharnaces of Pontus and King Juba of Numidia. So, Caesar's fame grew

in leaps and bounds and, unfortunately, attracted the envy and jealousy of Pompey, who would never wish to be outshined. This situation laid the bed for the conflict between the two ambitious generals.

We have mentioned briefly that Caesar, to bolster his relationship with Pompey, had him marry his daughter, Julia. And after the untimely demise of Julia, Caesar also offered other family members as brides (Plutarch, *Life of Julius Caesar*. 'The death of Julia'. 23. 5-7). Cato had protested this marriage publicly, advocating that it was morally wrong to have a government littered by marriage alliances and to have men gain political standing from the use of women (Plutarch, *Life of Julius Caesar*. 'Caesar's methods as consul,' 14. 1-13). These political strategies, notwithstanding Cato' objections, showed that Caesar had great desire for glory and glory determination to retain political power by any means necessary.

With the deaths of Julia and Crassus (the third tripod, who was the unifying factor in the triumvirate) in 54 and 53 B.C respectively, tensions between both Pompey and Caesar became inevitable. These deaths put the two men in competition for political dominance and glory. With Caesar's remarkable military success in Gaul, Pompey, who had hitherto no command, had to search for new allies to counter-balance Caesar. These new allies he readily found in the senate, especially among Caesar's enemies. Unfortunately, this action, inevitably, was to lead him into deeper and irreconcilable conflict with Caesar.

As Caesar' campaign in Gaul was set to expire, he was faced with a critical choice. We assumed that he had asked himself two critical questions: should he disband his army and return to Rome at the end of his consulship as a private citizen, of course at the cost of his political glory and military career? Or should he continue, illegally, in Gaul to save his political glory and military career, and certainly at the cost of being prosecuted for breaching the law?

Again, it is known that Pompey ultimately severed his relationship with Caesar when he joined the senate in opposing and clamouring for the recall of Caesar from Gaul. In fact, according to Appian, Pompey perhaps planned to deal with Caesar if he returned to Rome, but he feared Caesar's loyal troops and the great influence Caesar had if he were to order the troops to act (Appian, *Civil Wars*, 'A second consulship for Caesar? 2.25.9). Pompey's act of aligning with the senate was certainly something that arose out of greed for political power and desire for sole dominance; his actions should be interpreted as arising from a desire to regain his dwindling fame, of course, at the cost of ruining old relationship.

It can be deduced that Caesar's success made him a threat to Pompey and other powerful men in Rome, who feared that he would use his army and material influence to seize control of the city, as others like Marius and Sulla had attempted in the past. Thus, when the senate finally ordered the recall of Caesar from Gaul as a private citizen in 50 BC, and asked Pompey to ensure the disbanding of his rival's army, Caesar knew that this would not only leave him vulnerable to his enemies, but also would drown his much cherished glory and

material acquisitions. Of course, he was not ready to sink all he had acquired in a swoop at just the age of 50. So, when Pompey, in the guise of obeying the senate, asked Caesar to step down, Caesar's response (*the die is cast*) marked the first step to a conflict that was to become fatal to the republic. The two men's greed is displayed by the fact that they both craved more power than what was necessary or divided among them. In a quest to get rid of this division of power and have it all for themselves, both men's separate aspirations eventually led to tensions. The overt greed of the two politicians for power, wealth, fame and military glory, even before start of their alliance, can be seen as the reason for their conflict and Rome's civil war in 49B.C.

Conclusion

When the story of the conflict between Pompey and Caesar is reviewed, one can submit that factors, both complementary and complex, were responsible for the collapse of their alliance; in fact, the collapse of the bond ultimately led to the collapse of Republican institutions. Although it is difficult to be categorical about the extent or degree to which each factor was responsible, it can be said that these issues were more socio-psychological in nature and spanning many decades (Akinboye, 2015: 164). From the middle to the last period of the Republic, Rome's victorious wars had brought about the successful development of a money-based economy, with wealth concentrated in the hands of a few powerful individuals. This development altered the old aristocratic system based on land ownership and introduced greediness into politics. All aspects of the Romans' life, characterized in earlier times by traditional aversion for luxury and love for moral values, were affected by a drift towards lavishness, indulgence and modernity (Akinboye, 2015: 165-166). According to Ackah, moral vices are a major reason for the tensions of the late republic because: 'they are cleverly revealed in the various conflicts between the Senate and the People, the entry of the generals into equation, the age of Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar was an age of individualists who were restricted only by their personal vision or ambition.' (Ackah, 2010: 112).

As shown above in the context of Roman military and politics, the Romans valued military conquests and triumphs, which brought honour and prestige to the victors and aided their political popularity. To attain these, instances of greed or selfishness often comes into play. In fact, many ancient writers believed that greed corrupted the political leaders and military commanders of the last century of the Roman Republic. As it has been seen above, the first instance of Pompey's greed is seen in his demands from Sulla for political and military recognitions after his successful campaigns against pirates in the Mediterranean. This included the demand for a triumph, even though his victories against the pirates were not considered on the same scale as a traditional military triumph. Fast forward, Caesar was a gem in the public's eye. His conquests of new territories in Gaul not only expanded the Roman Empire to its greatest extent, bringing wealth and prestige to Rome but also the victories were used to bolster his

political career, gaining a large following of supporters. His sprawling glory drew the envy of Pompey who had the desire to maintain his influence and control over the Roman state. Pompey's willingness to abandon his alliance with Caesar and side with the Senate demonstrated his prioritization of personal power and his inclination to exploit political situations to his advantage. Caesar equally exhibited great greed and desire for glory by his desperate interest in perpetuating his consulship in Gaul, Spain, and other territories for a number of reasons which included amassing of fame, wealth and power.

The Pompey-Caesar's story is the story of men who saw other men and weak situations as an opportunity to gain *gloria* and *avaritas*. Both Pompey and Caesar viewed the army and the masses as a tool of political advancement and used their supporters and friends to better their own positions. They were so obsessed with recognition, power and fortune that they were willing to break principles, laws and tradition, and friendships to get what they wanted. Desires for wealth, fame or glory itself is not a bad thing. However, desires that fly beyond what is necessary easily turns to vice. In contemporary times, it is pathetic to find that personal ambition, greed for wealth and desire for fame continue to feature in African politics. These vices also continue to corrupt individuals' moral conduct, influence political behaviours, truncate democratic processes, motivate politicians to loot the commonwealth and induce public officials to amass illicit. It is unfortunate that the modern man has defiantly failed to learn from history.

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