

Court's Reluctance to Safeguard Rights of the Accused in the Ethiopian Counter-terrorism Prosecutions and its Broader Implication

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Wondwossen Demissie Kassa *

Abstract

Ethiopia's former and current anti-terrorism laws recognize information obtained through court authorized interception as evidence in counterterrorism prosecutions. This comment briefly examines Federal High Court rulings in two counterterrorism prosecutions where the accused challenged the admissibility of intercepted materials into evidence for not being obtained with court warrant. Though the objections in both cases could have been easily addressed by verifying whether a court warrant was in fact issued prior to intercepting the material in question, the court did not take this course of action. In one of the cases, the court *presumed* that a court warrant was issued; in the other it ignored the objection altogether and admitted the contested material into evidence. The comment can serve as a basis to undertake further research on whether the courts are doing justice in enforcing rights of the accused the safeguarding of which do not require constitutional interpretation. It might also invite investigation into its broader implication on whether the courts have the readiness to meet public and legal professionals' expectation in safeguarding human rights were they empowered in the realm of constitutional interpretation.

Key terms

Counter terrorism · Intercepted evidence · Right to privacy · Court's reluctance to listen to the accused. Constitutional interpretation

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* Wondwossen Demissie Kassa (PhD), Associate Professor, Addis Ababa University School of Law
Email: wondwossend@yahoo.com
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0494-6835>

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1. Introduction

Ethiopia's first anti-terrorism law (Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009, commonly referred to as the ATP) was repealed and replaced by the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation No. 1176/2020. Both laws recognize information obtained through court authorized interception as evidence in counterterrorism prosecutions.¹

This Comment mainly draws on Federal High Court rulings in two counterterrorism prosecutions where the accused challenged the admissibility of intercepted materials into evidence for not being obtained with court warrant.² In *Federal Public Prosecutor v. Getachew Shiferaw Andarge*, the court 'presumed' that a court warrant was issued based on problematic reasoning; in *FPP v Mohamed Sulieman*, it simply ignored the objection and admitted the challenged material into evidence.

Frequently used acronyms:

ATP Anti-Terrorism Proclamation

NISS National Intelligence and Security Agency

¹ Article 14 (1) (a) of the ATP authorizes "the National Intelligence and Security Service, *up on getting court warrant*, [to] intercept or conduct surveillance on the telephone, fax, radio, internet, electronic, postal and similar communications of a person suspected of terrorism" (emphasis added. Article 23 of the ATP gives evidentiary value to "intelligence report prepared in relation to terrorism." Article 42 (1) (a) of the Terrorism Prevention and Control Proclamation No. 1176/2020 authorizes the police to intercept or conduct surveillance on postal, letter, telephone, fax, radio, internet and other electronic devices exchange or communications of a person suspected of terrorism. Article 42 (2) provides for the requirement of court warrant to undertake the interception.

² In the cases, information said to have been obtained through interception were presented to the court as intelligence report. As the repealed law explicitly authorizes the prosecution to use intelligence report the defence simply based their objection on the non-fulfilment of the law that regulates interception.

This comment also makes reference to three cases where the court subjected the prosecution's evidence to different levels of scrutiny. In *Federal Attorney General v. Ato Dejene Serbesa Terfusa and Ato Lelesa Gadisa Regassa*, where the court displayed its proper judicial role, the prosecution's evidence was dismissed on the ground that it was not obtained through court warrant as required by law. In *FPP v. Deputy Inspector Abebe Yehuala et al* and *FPP V Ato Wagari Bedassa Shiro et al*, the court, without confirming issuance of warrant prior to interception, used its own method³ to check if what was obtained through interception was related to the accused at all. By applying this method, the court learned that in 7 of the 9 defendants the material presented as having been obtained through interception was not related to them making it disregard the material and acquit the accused. These three cases are presented for comparison purposes. These are meant to demonstrate the practical difference the court's approach –in dealing with objections of the accused– would make in the outcome of the prosecution's case and its vital importance to the fate of the accused.

2. The Court's Approach to Dealing with Objection of the Defence

This Section is presented in two sub-sections. The first relates to two prosecutions where the court unreasonably disregarded the objection of the defence. The second discusses other three cases where prosecution's evidence were scrutinized.

2.1 Cases where the court ignored the law requiring court warrant

*Federal Public Prosecutor v. Getachew Shiferaw Andarge*⁴

Getachew Shiferaw was charged under Article 7(1) of the ATP for having a connection with and providing information to *Ginbot 7*.⁵ The charge indicated

³ This method cannot be seen as a proper alternative to verifying whether interception was conducted with prior court warrant. Such verification is to be done prior to considering the relevance of the information seized through the interception. To see the weakness of the method the court employed, see *FPP v. Deputy Inspector Abebe Yehuala et al* where one of the accused was convicted simply because the court found the evidence obtained through interception relevant without ascertaining that the interception was conducted with court warrant.

⁴ *Federal Public Prosecutor v Getachew Shiferaw Andarge*, Federal High Court, File No. 178771.

⁵ *Ginbot 7* was one of the political organizations which were proscribed as terrorist organization under the repealed ATP. Parliament voted to lift that label following the 2018 change of government in Ethiopia. The Party dissolved itself to form a new

that he contacted members, leaders, and supporters of Ginbot 7 through telephone and Facebook. Prosecution's evidence to prove these details constituted letters from the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISS). The letters were prepared based on information said to have been obtained through interception.

Getachew's defence lawyer raised several objections against this evidence.⁶ One relates to the procedure through which NISS conducted the interception. According to the defence, there is no evidence to show that the interception was conducted with court warrant as required under Article 14 of the ATP. Collecting evidence through interception without a court warrant, the defence asserted, would amount to violation of right to privacy recognized under Article 26 of the FDRE Constitution. The defence argued that this would make the interception unconstitutional and the intercepted communication void, not admissible into evidence.

The court agreed that Article 14 of the ATP requires the information to be used for the intelligence report to be gathered with court warrant.⁷ However, instead of verifying whether or not court warrant was issued, the court reasoned "because the security agency sent the intelligence report to the police citing Article 14 of the ATP [which requires court warrant], the court

political party — the *Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice* —together with other political parties. Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban, 'Ethiopia's Ginbot 7 dissolves, transforms into new 'united' party' *Africanews* 10 April 2019, available at: <https://www.africanews.com/2019/05/10/ethiopia-s-ginbot-7-dissolves-transforms-into-new-united-party/>

⁶ One of the objections relates to what should be the content of the report. The defense argued that though the evidence obtained through interception under Article 14 of the ATP should have been directly reduced into writing, the NISS has interpreted what it has intercepted. To the extent the NISS engages in interpreting the seized material (instead of producing the material without its own interpretation) it is not consistent with what Article 14 provides. The court did not accept this objection. As per the court, the term "report" under Article 23 of the ATP does not connote "the literal words of the accused." *Federal Public Prosecutor v Getachew Shiferaw Andarge*, File No. 178771, ruling, p. 5, Tahisas 13, 2009 E.C (translation mine). According to the court, intelligence report need not be the literal words of the accused. It involves interpretation of the conduct of the accused by the intelligence agency. By allowing "intelligence report to be used as evidence", the court reasoned "Article 23(1) of Proc. 652/2009 envisions possible interpretations and analysis of the suspect's conduct and words by the Security Agency." *Federal Public Prosecutor v Getachew Shiferaw Andarge*, File No. 178771, ruling, p. 5, Tahisas 13, 2009 E.C.; *Federal Public Prosecutor v Getachew Shiferaw Andarge*, File No. 178771, Ginbot 16, 2009 E.C, Judgment, p. 6

⁷ *Federal Public Prosecutor v Getachew Shiferaw Andarge*, File No. 178771, Ginbot 16, 2009 E.C, Judgment, pp. 6-7

presumed that the agency has got court authorization prior to interception.”⁸ The court noted that it is better to “*trust*” NISS to have collected the information with court warrant than to adjourn the case to verify whether or not it was conducted with court warrant which might take considerable time.⁹ The ruling of the court in this regard reads:

በሌላ በኩል ይህ ችሎትም ቢሆን የብሔራዊ የመረጃና ደህንነት አገልገሎት የተጠርጣሪን የፌስቡክ/የስልክ ግንኙነት ከመጥለፉ በፊት በጸረ ሽብር አዋጅ ቁጥር 652/2001 አንቀጽ 14(1) መሠረት የፍርድ ቤትን ፈቃድ መያዝ አንዳለበት የሚያምን ሲሆን መረጃውን አጠናቅቶ ለፌዴራል ፖሊስ ወንጀል ምርመራ ዘርፍ የላከው የብሔራዊ የመረጃና ደህንነት አገልገሎት የተጠርጣሪን የፌስቡክ/የስልክ ግንኙነት የጠለፈው ወይም መረጃውን ያሰባሰበው በጸረ ሽብር አዋጅ ቁጥር 652/2001 አንቀጽ 14(1) መሠረት መሆኑን በማመን እና የሕጉን ክፍል በመጥቀስ ነው። ስለሆነም ይህ ችሎት መዘገቡም በዚህ ምክንያት ላልተወሰነ ጊዜ ተደጋጋሚ ቀጠሮ ከሚይዝ ያለው ማስረጃ ተመርምሮ ብይን ቢሰጥበት የተሻለ መሆኑን በማመን እና የብሔራዊ የመረጃና ደህንነት አገልገሎት የተከሰሰን የፌስቡክ/የስልክ ግንኙነት የጠለፈው ወይም መረጃውን ያሰባሰበው በጸረ ሽብር አዋጅ ቁጥር 652/2001 አንቀጽ 14 (1) መሠረት መሆኑን ግምት ወስዷል።¹⁰

Because the court did not give due weight to their objection, the defence raised lack of court warrant for the second time in their concluding statement. This time the court dismissed their point citing its own previous ruling. Apparently referring to its *presumption of legality* and *trust* in NISS, the court dismissed argument of the defence noting that a “*reasoned*” decision has already been given and there is no procedure that allows it to reverse its ruling given earlier in the proceeding.¹¹ The court held:

ከመረጃ አቀራረብ ጋር በተያያዘ ችሎቱ ብይን በሚሰጥበት ጊዜም ቢሆን በዚህ ረገድ የቀረበውን ክርክር በምክንያት ያለፈው ሲሆን ይህ ተመልሶ መቅረብ የሚገባ ካለመሆኑም በላይ ይህ ችሎት የራሱን ብይን በራሱ ጊዜ በፍርድ ወቅት የሚቀይርበት አሠራር የለም።

While the court puts so much faith in one of the parties –the government agency– and presumed facts in their favour, it did not accord similar weight to statements of the accused. It outrightly rejected evidence and argument of the accused (under Articles 132, 142 (3) and 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code) where the accused consistently denied his involvement in the alleged offence. The court rejected the latter stating that if not supported by other

⁸ Id., p. 7 (emphasis mine).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ *Federal Public Prosecutor v Getachew Shiferaw* Andarge, File No. 178771, ruling, pp. 5-6, Tahisas 13, 2009 E.C; *Federal Public Prosecutor v Getachew Shiferaw* Andarge, File No. 178771, Ginbot 16, 2009 E.C, Judgment, p. 7.

¹¹ *Federal Public Prosecutor v Getachew Shiferaw* Andarge, File No. 178771, Ginbot 16, 2009 E.C, Judgment, p. 11 (emphasis mine).

evidence, it is just a mere denial that cannot be given much value.¹² By so doing the court applied double standard in assessing the admissibility of evidence of the two parties.

*FPP v Mohamed Sulieman Adem*¹³

Mohamed Sulieman was charged under Article 7(1) of the ATP for being a member of a terrorist organization, International State of Syria, and Iraq (ISIS), with a desire to impose Islam as the only religion in Ethiopia. The charge stated that the accused travelled from Chagni, Benishangul Gumuz Regional State, to Addis Ababa and met two individuals who were facilitating his contact with members of the ISIS in Somalia. It provided details as to what he allegedly discussed with the two individuals, his agreement to take terrorism related training, and that the accused was arrested in Addis Ababa on his way to Somalia to join the terrorist group.

Prosecution's evidence to support these allegations consisted of documents from NISS which are prepared based on interception of the communications the accused was said to have made.¹⁴ The defence lawyer challenged the admissibility of the documents into evidence¹⁵ (on similar grounds the defence challenged the prosecution's evidence in Getachew Shiferaw's case) stating that the documents were not prepared based on information collected through court authorized interception as required under Article 14 of the ATP.

While the challenge against the admissibility of the evidence was clearly based on the fact that the interception was not conducted with court warrant, evasively the court attempted to justify the constitutionality of Articles 14 and 23 of the ATP. The court analysed both provisions in the light of Article 26 of the FDRE Constitution and concluded that collecting evidence in accordance to these provisions is constitutional. Furthermore, still avoiding the objection to *admissibility*, the court ruled on the weight of the evidence. It

¹² *Federal Public Prosecutor v Getachew Shiferaw* Andarge, File No. 178771, Ginbot 16, 2009 E.C, Judgment, pp. 10-11.

¹³ *FPP v. Mohamed Sulieman Adem* Federal High Court 1st Anti-terrorism and Constitutional Bench, File No. 254907

¹⁴ The prosecution presented the documents characterizing one fall under Article 14 and the other under Article 23 of the ATP as if the two are different. So was in other prosecutions such as *FPP v. Mohammed Sulieman* (cr. F. No. 254907). In *FPP v. Getachew Shiferaw*, the court noted that the evidence envisioned under Article 23 is the one Article 14 relates to. Statement of the accused was also presented though challenged for not being given voluntarily.

¹⁵ *FPP v. Mohamed Sulieman Adem* Federal High Court 1st Anti-terrorism and Constitutional Bench, File No. 254907, Hidar 24, 2013 E.C.

noted that the intelligence report, which provides the detailed steps the accused took to become member of the ISIS, as stated on the charge, *proved* the prosecution's claim as to the membership of the accused.¹⁶

The court's ruling fell short of addressing the objection of the defence – that the interception was not conducted with court warrant. Instead, the court admitted the evidence simply asserting that Articles 14 and 23 of the ATP are special laws which are envisioned under Article 26 of the Constitution and accorded to it a probative value.¹⁷

2.2 Case where the court subjected prosecutions' evidence to scrutiny

Below are three cases where the court's effort to verify the veracity of the prosecution's evidence led the court to discover its problematic nature. In the first case, the court took lack of court warrant seriously and rejected the prosecution's evidence on this ground. In the other two, though the court did not try to verify whether warrant was issued, its inquiry into the relevance of the prosecution's evidence disclosed its problematic nature. In all the three cases the court rejected the evidence in question which, in turn, brought about acquittal of the accused against whom such evidence was produced.

*Federal Attorney General v. Ato Dejene Serbesa Terfusa and Ato Lelesa Gadisa Regassa*¹⁸

In this case the court displayed what is expected of it. The charge provided details of what the accused are alleged to have done in preparation to commit a terrorist act. The prosecution's main evidence are documents relating to alleged communications of the accused intercepted from their phone conversations or obtained from their Facebook pages. In examining whether the prosecution has proved its case to an extent that justifies ordering the

¹⁶ *FPP v. Mohamed Sulieman Adem*, Federal High Court 1st Anti-terrorism and Constitutional Bench, File No. 254907, ruling, Hidar 24, 2013; judgment Tir 27, 2013, pp. 4 ff

¹⁷ Similarly, despite the objection of the accused that what is presented as statement of the accused was obtained through coercion, the court simply cited Article 27 of the Cr. Pro. C. to support its conclusion that the accused is found guilty of violating Article 7 (1) of the ATP.

¹⁸ *Federal Attorney General v. Ato Dejene Serbesa Terfusa and Ato Lelesa Gadisa Regassa*, (Fed. H. Ct. Cr. F. No. 255296), ruling, Yekatit 30, 2013 E.C. It is a case where the accused were charged under Article 6(2) of the Terrorism Prevention and Control Proclamation No. 1176/2020 for preparation to commit a terrorist act. However, this proclamation does not have any difference from the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation regarding the requirement of court warrant to intercept communications to use them as evidence.

accused to enter their defence, the court noted that the information used to prepare the documents was supposed to be collected based on court warrant.

Furthermore, the court cited Article 24 of Proclamation No. 804/2013, NISS's enabling legislation, in support of the requirement that the Agency should have collected the information with permission from the court. Because there is no evidence to show that the agency was in possession of a court warrant at the time of interception, the court inferred that the interceptions and other restriction of privacy of the accused were made not in accordance with the law making it infringement of their right under Article 26 of the FDRE Constitution. The court acquitted the accused without a need to enter their defence for lack of evidence against them.

*FPP v. Deputy Inspector Abebe Yehuala et al*¹⁹

In this case five individuals, three of whom were members of the Amhara Regional Police at the time, were prosecuted under Article 7(1) of the ATP for communicating with representatives of *Ginbot 7*. Materials collected through interception and confession of the accused were the prosecution's main evidence. Based on these items of evidence, the court ordered the accused to enter their defence. Denying any contact with *Ginbot 7*, the accused challenged the prosecution's evidence. Upon application of the defendants, the court ordered Ethio Telecom, the national Telecommunication Company, to let it know: (i) if the phone numbers –the defendants were said to have used to communicate with *Ginbot 7*– belong to them, and (ii) if they had made the alleged communication.

Ethio Telecom advised the court that the phone numbers referred in the charge to have been used by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants are not registered in their names. However, the phone number stated in the charge to have been used by the 5th defendant was in his name. Regarding the second question, the Telecom Company advised the court that it does not have the capacity to trace phone conversations. Following receipt of the Telecom Company's report, the court noted that unless the prosecution establishes that the accused had access to these phone numbers (though not registered in their names), it could not assume that they used these phone numbers simply because NISS stated so. Thus, the court concluded that three of the defendants have rebutted the prosecution's evidence and acquitted them.²⁰

¹⁹ *FPP v. Inspector Abebe Yehuala*, Fed. H. Ct., Cr. F. No. 171222.

²⁰ The Attorney General appealed against this decision requesting for the judgment to be suspended. Later it withdrew its appeal. The accused who were acquitted had to stay in prison pending the withdrawal.

Noting that the 5th defendant failed to rebut the prosecution's evidence, the court convicted him simply because Ethio Telecom advised the court that the phone number he allegedly used to make the intercepted communication is registered in his name. It is because whether the alleged communication was made between the accused and Ginbot 7 was contentious that the court initially requested the Telecom Company to confirm. However, when the court knew that the Telecom Company is unable to confirm what was alleged by the prosecution, the court retreated from its initial position and presumed that the 5th defendant did what the prosecution has alleged –communication with Ginbot 7– simply because the phone number he allegedly used is registered in his name.²¹

*FPP v. Ato Wagari Bedassa Shiro et al*²²

In this case, four individuals were charged under Article 4 of the ATP for preparation to commit a terrorist act.²³ The details of the charge indicate that the accused discussed with Shene's leadership about killing government officials and members of the National Defence Force. The prosecution's evidence included documents that NISS prepared based on alleged communications of the accused obtained through interception.²⁴ Despite the objection from the accused that there was no court warrant authorizing the NISS to collect the information claimed to be used as source to prepare the document, the court did not take steps to verify whether warrant was issued. Instead, the court ordered the accused to enter their defence noting that the prosecution's documentary evidence proved what has been alleged on the charge.²⁵

²¹ In view of that the technical evidence in the other four cases had been found to be unreliable and the requirement that the prosecution must prove its allegations beyond reasonable doubt, it would have been more justified to reject the prosecution's allegation even against the fifth defendant.

²² *FPP v. Ato Wagari Bedassa Shiro et al*, Federal High Court, Cr. File No. 252993

²³ The details of the charge and the intelligence report indicated that the first accused was involved in the killing of government officials and members of the national Defence Forces. It is not clear why the accused was charged for preparation instead of committing a terrorist act.

²⁴ Two documents were presented –a 23-page document described as a document 'prepared in accordance to Article 14' and another 8 pages document referred to as a document 'prepared in accordance with Article 23' of the ATP. The documents have consecutive reference numbers (Reference numbers *ለመ*42/60/2012 (Art. 23 doc) and *ለመ*42/59/2012 (Art. 14 doc)). Though its relevance is unclear, the prosecution introduced Nokia mobile phone from the third accused referring to it as exhibit.

²⁵ *FPP V Ato Wagari Bedassa Shiro et al* (cr. File No. 252993), Federal High Court, ruling, Hamle 28, 2012 E.C.

After the case was adjourned to hear evidence and arguments of the defence, the judges of the bench were changed. Noting that the prosecution did not produce the actual record of the phone conversation the accused were alleged to have made, the newly assigned judges requested the Ethio Telecom to provide information about the contents of the communication the accused were alleged to have made. As it did in *FPP v. Deputy Inspector Abebe Yehuala et al*, Ethio Telecom wrote a letter stating that it does not record and keep contents of phone conversations.²⁶ However, the court learned the phone numbers –that the accused were said to have used to do the ‘intercepted’ communication– are not registered in their names.

Absence of evidence to show that interception was conducted with prior authorization from the court coupled with the fact that the phone numbers were not registered in their names led the court to acquit them. Essentially the court, constituting newly appointed judges, rejected the evidence based on which the accused were ordered to enter their defence. The court used Ethio Telecom’s report that the phone numbers were not registered in the name of the accused as a ground to ‘reconsider’ and reject the prosecution’s evidence which had already been admitted and given a weight good enough to order the accused to enter their defence.²⁷

3. Conclusion: Implications of the Rulings

This Comment is not a comprehensive assessment of the court’s approach in treating allegedly intercepted communications of the accused –the prosecution presents as evidence– in counterterrorism. It is meant to draw on some court rulings to illustrate instances where the court was reluctant to enforce the rights of the accused while what was required was to simply verify if the collection of evidence was conducted in strict compliance with the specific provision of the ATP. Though these rulings were given based on the repealed anti-terrorism law, these are still relevant in many ways and at different levels. First, as noted, the current anti-terrorism law retains court sanctioned interception as proper means of collecting evidence. Second, the rulings are relevant to other criminal prosecutions in general as the problem

²⁶ *Federal Attorney General v. Ato Wagari and others*, File No. 252993, Yekatit 24, 2013 E.C, judgement, p. 8.

²⁷ Apparently, these defendants would have been convicted had it not been for the change of judges who were critical of the prosecution’s allegation and evidence. The court’s approach might be questioned in terms of procedure as it reverses its own ruling. However, the court’s approach does not have any problem in terms of substance. In addition to the change of judges, the court’s being critical of the prosecution might be attributable to the environment created in the wake of change of government in 2018.

of reluctance of the court to safeguard rights of the accused is not necessarily confined to counter-terrorism prosecutions.

Third, the cases could also have a broader implication on whether Ethiopian courts can be trusted guardians of human rights. One of the often-debated features of the Ethiopian constitution is its allocation of constitutional interpretation power to a political, as opposed to judicial, institution.²⁸ Some have argued that this feature of the Constitution has diminished the Ethiopian courts' ability to safeguard human rights.²⁹ This argument is premised on the assumption that courts would safeguard human rights if they have the power to interpret the Constitution.

This Comment, without taking position on the validity of this claim, has presented court cases where the Federal High Court unreasonably deferred to the executive thereby failing to safeguard rights of the accused. The court's failure to protect rights of the accused in these cases does not have much to do with its lack of power to interpret the Constitution. As demonstrated in *Federal Attorney General v. Ato Dejene Serbesa Terfusa and Ato Lelesa Gadisa Regassa*, the cases required simple application of a specific law. The court's unsubstantiated presumption in favour of the prosecution and unfounded "trust" in the security agency's lawful conduct would make one to question if the courts have been reliable guardians of human rights.

While the Comment is based on a small number of cases, it could serve as a basis to undertake a broader and deeper research on whether the courts are doing justice in enforcing rights of the accused the safeguarding of which do not require constitutional interpretation. Where the courts do not provide protection to the rights of the accused that they could under the existing constitutional framework, it is questionable if they have the readiness to meet public and legal professionals' expectation in safeguarding human rights were they empowered in the realm of constitutional interpretation. _____■

²⁸ Yonatan Tesfaye Fesha (2008), 'Whose Power is it anyway: The Courts and Constitutional Interpretation in Ethiopia', 22 *Journal of Ethiopian Law*: 128-144; Assefa Fiseha (2011), 'Separation of Powers and its implications for the judiciary in Ethiopia', 5 *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4: 702-715.

²⁹ See for example: Adem Kassie Abebe (2011), 'Human Rights under the Ethiopian Constitution: A Descriptive Overview' 5 *Mizan Law Review* 1: 41, 65-69; Chi Mgbako et al, (2008) 'Silencing the Ethiopian Courts: Non-Judicial Constitutional Review and its Impact on Human Rights', 32 *Fordham International Law Journal* 1: 258, 284-293; K.I. Vibhute, (2012), 'Right to Access to Justice in Ethiopia: an Illusory Fundamental Right?', 54 *Journal of the Indian Law Institute* 1: 67-83; Mizanie A. Tadesse, (2020), 'Constitutional Rights Without Effective and Enforceable Constitutional Remedies: the case of Ethiopia', 19 *North Western Journal of Human Rights*: 80-89.

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