

## CHANGE OF POWER-BLOCKS AND YOUTHS' POWER: EVIDENCE FROM ZIMBABWE

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### **Abstract**

*The study sought to establish the power dynamics in political youth from a factional view point. It explored why political youth factions fluctuate and swing in terms of strengths and how the same factions use power at their disposal. It was inspired by the continued shifts in power within ZANU PF political factions where most youth have remained the worst affected; with some taking advantage of the power to create anarchy. The qualitative desk analysis drew its data from media reports and selected scholarly publications. It was guided by the concept of democracy viewing factionalism as an ideal element of democratisation. The study established that the prevailing faction has more power and influence. It also found out that the youth's power is rooted in the political elites who control the reigns. Therefore, most youth would want to align with factions whose leaders are financially sound and whose prospects for victory are high. However, this alignment is not permanent.*

**Keywords: Power-block, Political power, Political dynamics, Political factions, Youth, Democracy**

### **Introduction**

The politics in Zimbabwe has always been characterised by factionalism growing from the membership's desire to take control of the political parties and institutions. Often times, the centre identifies and chooses to align with particular individuals who over time, begin to control and call the shots on behalf of their anointing leaders. The other members who feel isolated may then mobilise around their noted 'discrimination' and form a competing faction.

In most cases, politics in Zimbabwe is largely driven by the power and numbers in the youth constituency. The youths are usually influenced by ideology, material resources and prospects for security and identity among others. Therefore, over time, most youths tend to side with the governing faction so much so that if there is a sudden shift of power, they may find themselves exposed and isolated. It is therefore, the intention of this study to explore the implications of power block shifts on the supporting youths. The study derives its evidence from the Zimbabwean case where power shifted from the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) Joice Mujuru faction to G40 faction before landing in the Team Lacoste faction following the military coup of 14 November 2017. The study also sought to establish the attitudes of the youths; those whose faction would have lost power and those who would have prevailed and the subsequent effects on effective politics in Zimbabwe.

The qualitative desk analysis derived all its data from archival material; selected media reports on the activities as they unfolded on the political arena and selected credible

scholarly publications around the study area. Media reports were helpful especially in identifying critical political activities that defined contemporary Zimbabwean politics. Most of the media reports had never been published from a scholarly perspective. The study is expected to help understand why youth factions exist, why they also fluctuate in terms of strengths and how the same factions use power at their disposal in political stand-offs.

### **Background to factionalism**

Factionalism in the Zimbabwean politics is an old phenomenon which dates to the pre-colonial era when sub-chiefs, Headmen and Kraal-heads would form clusters competing for recognition and preference from the centres of power. The phenomenon also rocked the liberation movements; Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe Peoples' Liberation Army (ZIPRA); seriously hampering their efficiency and effectiveness in the execution of the war. In the former, factionalism grew along ethnic lines between the Manyikas and the rest of the ethnic groups (Bhila 1982) while in the latter, it pitted the Ndebele against the Shona ethnic groups (Moyana 1984; Bhebe 1999). It was actually some form of factionalism which led to the break-up of Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) culminating to the formation of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

Post-independence, factionalism was also recorded especially in ZANU (Patriotic front) when the then vice President Simon Muzenda and a cabinet minister Edison Zvobgo led rival factions in Masvingo province. At national level, factionalism reared its ugly head along ethnic lines pitting the Karangas against the Zezurus (Dodo 2014: 97). In the 2000s, factionalism in ZANU PF transformed its nature and structure bringing in factional leaders of the likes of cabinet ministers Joice Mujuru a Korekore but sponsored by her husband Solomon, a Zezuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa a Karanga. This had a deep ethnic flavour though. The Mujuru-led faction was in 2014 at the time of its ouster, described as 'weevils', destroying the party from within (Muzulu 2015; Pindula 2017a). According to Mugabe, the 'weevils' required '*gamatox*' for fumigation. Apparently, *gamatox* is a pesticide that kills maize weevils. It was during the ouster of Mujuru faction that Grace Mugabe entered into active politics securing the top-most women's post in the party, ZANU PF.

Beginning 8 October 2014, Grace Mugabe as head of the women in ZANU PF embarked on massive nation-wide rallies where she consolidated her position by attacking all perceived contenders (Pindula 2017b). Her first rally was held in Harare at City Sports Centre on 8<sup>th</sup> October, 2014. In Manicaland, the rally was convened on 10<sup>th</sup> October in Sakubva stadium before having another in Matebeleland South in Gwanda on 13<sup>th</sup> October, 2014. The 15<sup>th</sup> October rally at Amazulu Sports Club in Bulawayo showed her the strength of the other faction when she was booed with the attendance walking out (Ndlovu 2014). On 16<sup>th</sup> October, 2014, Grace Mugabe addressed Mashonaland Central in Chipadze stadium, Bindura before facing another embarrassment in Rudhaka stadium, Marondera in Mashonaland East province on 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2014.

Factionalism or power block in politics is generally created by political elites in need of leadership power and influence. It also starts from the top roping the youths as foot soldiers; otherwise, the youths alone cannot create factions when the rest of the structures are intact. However, to effectively drive it on the ground, the youths take charge. As the youths assume the responsibility to direct activities and define operational parameters, they become so powerful that they almost create their own territories to rule. Such scenarios were experienced during the Pupurai Togarepi-led youth executive who was aligned to Team Lacoste faction before it was replaced by the G40 aligned executive (Pindula 2017a). Following this, Togarepi and the entire faction went into hiding with all their influence and power. Similarly, there was a repeat during the Kudzai Chipanga-led executive era which literally directed governance systems in all sectors of the economy including the military

institutions. Chipanga was the ZANU PF youth leader who was inclined to the G40 faction that collapsed following the military coup in November 2017 and some of his allies were Mtehlabayo Malunga, Xavier Kazizi and Innocent Hamandishe. After the collapse, all the members were replaced with some getting arrested for crimes allegedly committed while in power. These developments literally saw the entire executive and the faction dying naturally. However, some of the faction members who did not hold influential positions simply shifted their allegiance to the prevailing faction of the Team Lacoste albeit with no power or influence.

### **Conceptual explanation**

Democracy is the guiding concept for the study. The study specifically touches on factionalism as an emerging sign of democratisation. While factionalism is seen as destructive and retrogressive, in this study, and according to various scholars cited in the discussion, it is a concept that allows political scientists to look at aspects like sovereignty, human rights, conflict resolution and development among others. Underpinning all these cited aspects is the element of power by the involved factions.

Democracy, by which the different forms of political freedoms appear, is the basic and crucial part of politics. Furthermore, democracy is the most important aspect for the establishment, identification, continued existence, and development of a political institution (Haugaard & Ryan 2012). Therefore, from a democratic perspective, factionalism is an ideal element, which is progressive and helps to identify competent leaders. It also allows robust political debates which bring out new ideas and potentially important persons in society. Factionalism, viewed from a democratic stand-point also helps apportion power and influence in the youth.

### **Factionalism and the youth**

Youth factionalism is a sign of budding political consciousness building towards political power. Power is in the people's actions, social interactions and ideologies (Shokri 2017: 269). Power can also threaten the existence and identity of some groups and individuals. It gives security to the political community or an organization to flourish and develop over others (Hearn 2014: 175). It is therefore this guaranteed security that individuals seek through collectivism which in political terms is referred as factionalism.

Factionalism from a political view-point is understood as a sign of a developing democracy with some members exercising their rights to opposition and abandoning the traditional habits of cultism and hero-worshipping within political institutions. These factions are sub-groups within the main institutions, basically seeking to propagate a particular system within a defined era, which maybe already in the institution but suffering serious suppression (Boucek 2009: 455). It is, by other scholars seen as a group within another or a group competing for power and influence within the larger group of which it is a part. Dal Bo et al (2009: 115) describe factionalism as hierarchical networks of party officials while Bettcher (2005: 339) calls it clientele on account of the existence of a patron-client relationship. In the Zimbabwean politics, unlike in Europe (Heidar 2006), youth factions are an direct appendage of the main political party primarily serving as the vanguard of political processes (Dodo 2013)

According to some scholars (Kollner & Basedau 2005; Boucek 2009: 445), factionalism exists in two basic forms; collaborative and antagonistic. Collaborative is whereby different factions differ in their beliefs but choose to mobilise their different view-points towards the achievement of a particular goal. On the other end, antagonistic factionalism is whereby different groups are separated simply because they see, think and

believe differently and with no hope of ever compromising. In most instances, such groups are hostile to each other and may be sworn enemies. Factions within political institutions which in other circles may be seen as power blocks on account of their ability to sway decisions, are modelled along ethnic, religious, gender, sex, age, literacy level, ideology and sometimes peoples' grievances. However, some of the factors like age, gender, and sex and literacy level maybe too minute to impact on the entire political institution (Boucek 2009: 445).

Political parties are not homogenous institutions which are certain of their goals and which follow some unitary will. Instead, they are coalitions of political actors who pursue their individual interests and goals. Some of the coalitions derive from an exchange of resources, support and expertise (Haugaard & Ryan 2012; Keen & Apostolova 2017). Indeed, the relationship between political parties in Zimbabwe and the youth is premised on the exchange of resources and support with the youth expecting resources while parties hoping to get support. It is therefore some of these expectations that keep youth/political parties sustained for some time till either party fails to fulfil its end of the contract.

### **Effects of Political Factionalism**

Factionalism as a phenomenon as alluded to above is as old as humanity. It has over the years helped to regulate society and all the systems within political institutions. However, it has its share of challenges within the same political institutions. Various studies (Kollner & Basedau 2005; Sloam 2013: 4) concur that, though factionalism breeds conflicts, it also helps resolve and prevent political conflicts. Factions work as a communication belt for conflict resolution, bargaining processes and consensus building within political institutions. The emergence of factions can also have mobilising and participation-broadening effects on party members and supporters (Keen & Apostolova 2017). It can also encourage party unity through articulation and channelling of different interests within the party. Factionalism also helps to bring about essential competition between ideas and people, which is good for development. This is what Mugabe was good at. He always ensured that factions existed as a way of dividing the party and justify his continued presence in office. While there were instances when he tried to neutralise the factions, he would create new ones based on different demands (Kunambura 2017)

However, studies have established that the challenge with factionalism is the pre-eminence of expedience over goodness, logic and principle (Keen & Apostolova 2017). Usually, there is no proper reasoning when factional members put forward their sectarian causes, often motivated by vacuous desires (Kollner & Basedau 2005; Sloam 2013: 4). According to Wafawarova (2016) and Pindula (2017b), ZANU PF campaign strategy of 2008 was marred by '*Bhora Musango*' slogan, allegedly by a faction that was pro-Joice Mujuru. The slogan sought to ensure that supporters did not vote Robert Mugabe for Presidency. According to the pro-Mujuru faction, the strategy would have seen the ouster of Mugabe from Presidency while maintaining the rest of the party grassroots support and legislative members. The strategy was driven by the youth.

Factionalism generally is seen as a phenomenon belonging to the 'pathologies of politics' (Friedrich 1972). This undoubtedly shows the thinking of the centre and surrounding officials for whom the existence of factions presents an overt challenge to the political party. Undeniably, factions can weaken the unity and the efficacy of political institutions (Sloam 2013: 4). Open opposition within a party and consequent subjugation can lead political institutions to the verge of breakup. Factions can have serious influence on changes in the identity, organization, and in-house decision-making processes of parties (Mycock & Tonge 2012: 138). This is because only one dominant political ideology will be calling the shots while other views, no matter how impressive and progressive they may be, will be ignored.

Similarly, factionalism can result in increasing scepticism on the part of voters. In 2017 according to Chitagu (2017), ZANU PF was heavily characterised by in-fighting so much so that both factions; Team Lacoste and G40 ended up fighting over the control of the President's Youth Interface rallies (Chitagu 2017). They both believed the rallies could spruce up their images and support ahead of the special congress that was held in December 2017.

Political factionalism also adversely affects the economic side of a country. With personnel appointed without considering merit and decisions made based on factional basis, productivity and economic growth tend to take a downward flow worsening economic woes and subsequently impacting on service delivery (Schwarzer & Connor 2013: 253). Similarly, it also leads to policy paralysis, which has long term implications on the performance of an economy. Factionalism can also result in the misuse of public funds, which ends up fuelling public despondency thus leading to civic protests. Such cases of the economic challenges have been a common experience in Zimbabwe where a series of public protests were noted following reports of misappropriation of public resources and a collapse in social service delivery (Masaka 2017).

Factionalism creates inequality and undemocratic practices, like the abuse of the 'vote of no confidence' facility towards perceived enemies and competitors. According to Masaka (2017), most rallies and political gatherings by ZANU PF from 2014 up till 2017 were factional, where speakers took an opportunity to attack perceived rivals before building and strengthening their factions. Resultantly, the practice led to the demise of the G40 faction which had considerably laid some foundation towards taking over power from Robert Mugabe (Muronzi 2009). The nature of factionalism in ZANU PF was that it took a few leaders to go on the open; the rest supported their factions clandestinely for fear of reprisals. Resultantly, it was difficult to clearly tell in terms of the numbers, the strengths of respective factions.

It has been observed that factionalism has the capacity to sow disgruntlement and despondency among the people especially if they realise that participation and contributions by non-faction members are not considered in decision making and other planning activities. When one faction becomes so enormous that it dominates all the structures of the party, there is practically no reason of involvement by anyone who is not a member of that faction. Isolation of members based on factionalism renders party membership worthless, and it defeats the thought of objective debate and the contesting of ideas (Wafawarova 2016).

Political factions can have an effect on the stability of political parties and party systems. Resultantly, that can impinge upon the legality and effectiveness of democratic political systems. Similarly, factionalism can also result in intra-party decisions on personnel that are not based on value and aptitude of the people concerned but on their factional connection (Keen & Apostolova 2017). In 2017, 12 of the 40 Bulawayo youth executives resigned in protest to the factional initiatives by Chipanga (Staff Reporter 2017). Over the years, ZANU PF has had to appoint incompetent and unqualified people to positions of authority solely because of their connection to particular factions. With the shift in power in November 2017, some of the appointments are being either reversed or nullified.

### **Youths' Status Post-power Shift**

Whenever there is a change of power from one faction or block to another, there are too changes that also register on the ground. Because youths would have accustomed themselves to some lifestyle and governance system, acknowledging change breeds conflict (Dean 2012: 101). In some cases, some youths will be trying to protect their newly created empires hence the resistance (Bhebhe 2014). All these revolve around power which Max Weber defines as;

“The probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which that probability rests” (Dean 2012: 101). Therefore, after a shift in power dynamics, power is the last thing political youths maybe prepared to let go. In some cases, conflicts maybe experienced due to resistance while in others, there may be out-right repression of the rights of the ousted youth faction.

According to Grimm (2015), whenever a faction of youth is removed from the centre, it suffers serious repercussions. Most notably, its approach to politics becomes weak so much so that they often fail to achieve any planned objectives. In the case of Zimbabwean youths who were ousted from power during the 2014 expulsion of Joice Mujuru (Bhebhe 2014), the Tsenengamu-led group continued to access air space where they sent their propaganda messages. However, the messages lacked authority hence remained ineffective. It therefore took a few courageous youths from the ousted faction to go public expressing their views and grievances otherwise the rest went underground for fear of embarrassment and reprisals by the faction that had assumed power. Similarly, following the reinstatement of all the 12 youths in Bulawayo who had resigned in March 2017, the youths who were suspended following the 2017 coup have since lost their credibility and respect in the eyes of the masses (Staff Reporter 2017).

Closely akin to the above argument is that when the Tsenengamu and the Chipanga-led youth factions were removed from the centre, they suffered a discredited standing in the eyes of the entire youth constituency. They were depicted through the national media as dishonesty, corrupt and fake such that their defence and any other arguments were taken with a pinch of salt. A similar scenario was also experienced in Bulawayo province in 2014 when the Bulawayo ZANU PF provincial youth chairperson Khumbulani Mpofu read riot act to the ousted faction with a view to instil discipline. Mpofu also wanted to show the outside community that all the ousted members alleged to be aligned to Joice Mujuru could be called to order (Bhebhe 2014; Gagare 2017). Similarly, all the arguments raised by the ousted faction are never accorded the attention that they deserve. In 2016 and 2017, Tsenengamu and Ace Lumumba of the Mujuru faction appealed through various channels trying to deliver their arguments but to no avail. Even the generality of the masses did not take their arguments seriously arguing that they had been part of the same system for years before they were ejected.

Any political faction that is pushed away from the centre of power is naturally embarrassed. Embarrassment leads to loss of confidence and often eventual resignation or dismissal. Haugaard & Ryan (2012) argues that often times, lack of confidence by some political establishments results from embarrassing situations like electoral defeat and ousting of factions from the core of power and authority. Like it has been mentioned above, a shift in power may result in the new faction seeking revenge by targeting all known and perceived enemies before they are prosecuted and harassed. In July 2007, the reigning Mujuru-led youth faction amended the age limit for the youth to 30 years as a way of removing the then leaders of the wing, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao (Chimakure 2007). Similarly, in 2017, Manicaland ZANU PF youth league led by Mubuso Chinguno, described Mnangagwa as a cancer eating the party from within and requiring dismissal and replacement by Grace Mugabe (Machamire 2017). However, hardly a year down the line, the Mnangagwa faction (Team Lacoste) assumed power and have since started purging members of the Grace Mugabe faction (G40). In 2017, 40 ZANU PF Bulawayo provincial youth members who had been suspended by the G40 faction were reinstated in a move that showed strength and control of the political institution (Tshili 2017).

There are some youths who out-rightly boycott political programmes for as long as they are organised by their rival faction. This approach to politics is meant to weaken the

rival's efforts. This was experienced during the 2008 March election when the Mujuru faction allegedly employed what was termed '*Bhora Musango*' where voters were required to vote for their ZANU PF Legislative candidate and vote against ZANU PF Presidential candidate who was Robert Mugabe (Wafawarova 2016; Pindula 2017b). Closely akin to complete avoidance to partake in political activities is the aspect of migration. Some youths who feel weakened and exposed to various politicised abuses may decide to leave the country and seek refuge in countries where they feel secure. In 2015, Ace Lumumba who then belonged to Mujuru faction once sought refuge in South Africa after the ouster of his faction (Gagare 2017).

There are also some youths who simply choose to go on retirement once they realise that their faction has been removed from the centre of power. Besides fearing retribution and discrimination, the choice for retirement at least keeps the youths away from political embarrassment, persecution and continued condemnation (Tshili 2017). Mukarati (2017) reports that 14 youth executives in Bulawayo ZANU PF committee had resigned citing excessive interference by some leaders in the G40 pushing factional agenda. This move seriously affected the effectiveness of the party as it had sent a signal of lack of democracy and freedoms for the youth concerned.

Rebellion and calculated resistance are some of the effects of any shift in political power from one faction to the other. In 2017, former vice President Phelekezela Mphoko was embarrassed when he attempted to address a ZANU PF gathering in Bulawayo. Youths aligned to Team Lacoste interrupted the meeting that was organised by the mainly G40 faction (Gagare 2017). Apparently, while power was largely in the G40's control on account of Grace Mugabe the faction leader being wife to Robert Mugabe; it was gradually tilting towards Team Lacoste, which enjoyed support from the majority of the youths and the former liberation war participants.

Whenever there is political power shift from one faction to the other as argued by Shokri (2017: 269), there is fear, distrust, panic and uneasiness on the part of the ousted youths culminating in their retreat. Often times, because of the nature of Zimbabwean politics that believes in vengeance, it becomes safer for the youths in the faction that would have been ousted to lie low for some time before they draw their course of action. It is during the retreat that the youths re-strategised with the hope of re-launching a swift and sustainable come back. In most cases, all these efforts are done by the main wings of the political parties who wield real power. The youth executive in Bulawayo, Manicaland and Mashonaland Central that had been removed from office in 2014, returned in 2017 when their faction had wrestled power back (Chimakure 2007; Bhebhe 2014; Mukarati 2017). Pupurai Togarepi who was the politburo secretary for youths was relieved of his duties and decided to lie low till 2017 (Ncube 2017). This simply shows the desire to remain in power on the part of politicised youths.

Usually, an ousted youth from the centre of power is desperate and uncertain. Therefore, to regain strength and hope, the youths find solace in what they hear from the main wings of their political factions. Besides, they also resort to excessive hero-worshipping as a way of winning the hearts of the leadership in either their factions for identity or in the rival factions for survival and relevance. Often times as established in a study by Dodo, Nsenduluka and Kasanda in Chiweshe and Shamva districts of Zimbabwe, it is such desperate youths who need identity and survival that are exposed to abuse. They are accepted into the structures but are immediately assigned to some immoral and illegal tasks, which they find hard to refuse because of their predicament (Dodo et al 2016: 208). According to Gagare (2017) and Staff Reporter (2017), some of the youths who had been accepted from rival factions in Harare, Mashonaland Central and Bulawayo had been pushed at the forefront in illegal activities as a way of proving their sincerity in joining the faction in power.

## **Discussion**

Factionalism can play a considerable function in terms of determining how political parties carry out their society and state-oriented responsibilities which are fundamental for the running of democratic systems. However, in as far as the influence and power of the youths are concerned, there is a serious compromise which is both positive and negative. It is positive in that it curtails and regulates the excesses of the youths politically and legally in their communities of operation. On the negative side, factionalism, it allows them unfettered freedoms that unfortunately infringe on the privacy and rights of others.

Factionalism in ZANU-PF was a clear signal of the democratisation process in Zimbabwe as postulated by Kollner & Basedau (2005) and Keen & Apostolova (2017). However, the democratisation process unfortunately created serious challenges on the part of the youths involved; with the previously privileged having to be weeded out and left in the cold while those who were playing second fiddle found themselves around the centre of power. Effectively, it meant that all the power previously in the hands of the prevailing faction was transferred to the incoming faction thus worsening the feud. Normally, when there is a shift in power block, there follows some vengeance conspiracy especially over past discrimination and inequalities. Even in the eyes of the voters and the generality of the population, the youth whose faction would have been ousted from the centre tend to lose respect. They become subjects of ridicule and abuse.

From the study, it was difficult to clearly tell the strengths of competing factions. However, what is glaring is that the power of influence lies in the degree of proximity of the youths to the centre. Once that centre is changed, the power correspondingly shifts. The study has also established that every faction that is pushed away from the centre of power is naturally embarrassed, often leading to loss of confidence and eventual resignation or dismissal. A shift in power may result in the new faction seeking revenge by targeting all known and perceived enemies before they are prosecuted and harassed. This has been the trend in Zimbabwe. In 2014, following the ouster of the Mujuru faction; Ray Kaukonde, Tsenengamu, Godwin Gomwe, Lumumba and others were persecuted. Similarly, following the ouster of the Grace Mugabe faction, Kasukuwere, Zhuwao, Chipanga, Innocent Hamandishe and others are facing various criminal charges. All these point to the effects of a shift in power from one faction to the other especially in the Zimbabwean politics. It is politics of power and revenge.

The study shows that when the youths collaborate, they widen their chances of gaining more political support and yet weaken them in terms of power of influence. It is only during factional antagonism that either party wield more power and is able to use it against the other parties including the general populace. Therefore, power is the last thing political youths maybe prepared to let go. In some cases, conflicts maybe experienced due to resistance leading to migration, retirement, persecution and revenge and boycott among others. Political youths gain more power if their faction is prevailing while those outside of the centre of power expend their power on fighting for the removal of the faction in power. The study shows that most youths would want to remain in power even if they have no direct material benefits. In some cases, they respond to ignorance, illiteracy, desperation and pure coercion among others.

Getting over-powered in any political contestation is normal. However, with regards to the youths' situation, they must be empowered enough psychologically, educationally and economically to understand their capabilities and strengths. They have to know that they can exist independent of the others thus remove the element of abuse and worshipping political elites. The youth must understand that political power is slippery; it can unexpectedly run out of one's control but that should not lead to despair but patience and perseverance.



## Summary

The study looked at the concept of factionalism from a political youth's perspective. It sought to explore how the power of the youths is maintained especially in a highly polarised situation factionally. The study looked at the situation in Zimbabwe deriving examples from ZANU PF party. It also looked at how factionalism has defined the political path in Zimbabwe and how power has been shifted from one faction to the other. In the same vein, it has also touched on the effects of such trends in power distribution and faction architecture.

The study noted that factionalism in politics is a healthy sign of the development of democracy where people jostle for power and influence. It was also established that politically, youths wield a lot of power and influence such that they are indispensable. However, as they take up their roles, they tend to get abused and often along the way assume artificial power, which they may also misuse against ordinary citizens and their rivals. It was also established in the study that political youth's power is not in the individuals; rather, it is in the leaders of the faction whose demise also marks the end of power. Any desire to reclaim that power requires either the youths to re-join the rival faction or fight for the reclamation of power by the faction leaders.

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