Globalisation, Faith and Terrorism: Religious Opposition to Modern Statism

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ABSTRACT

Conflicts and wars are not new to the world. Man has been fighting amongst themselves for centuries now. However, many reasons have been adduced for wars, but the wars of this modern age has moved beyond the conventional conflicts between two opposing nations or tribes to a different form of struggle which has acquired the character of religious movements and very much clandestine in nature. The world is now moving from secular wars to religious motivated wars, from conventional wars to unconventional wars, that is, terrorism. This new phenomenon has been fuelled by globalisation and the drive to turn the world into a single global village. At the local level, Nigeria has had its own share of religious motivated terrorism which is anti-globalisation.

INTRODUCTION

Since the past decade, the world has been experiencing a spate of international terrorism in which religion and religious movements and organisations have played prominent roles. Terrorism, killings, assassinations and other various acts of violence have been perpetrated by people and groups in the name of religion. Religious beliefs therefore provide the basis for such violent acts and terrorism thereby introducing the term 'religious terrorism' into the lexicon of international policymakers. This term has also acquired an additional meaning; it has become a euphemism for political violence committed by religious fundamentalists such as Muslims or Christians. To a large extent, this has made political scientists and analysts to lose sight of the fact that acts of violence and terrorism are not the exclusive preserve of these two religious fundamentalists alone. The modern state has had equal experience of terrorism from virtually every form of religious traditions. History and past experience has recorded the actions of Timothy McVeigh, a Christian terrorist who bombed the Oklahoma City Federal

Building on April 19, 1995; Yigal Amir, a Jewish activist who assassinated Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; and Shoko Asahara, a Buddhist follower who was responsible for the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subways near the Japanese parliament buildings (Juergensmeyer, 2004:34-38).

In spite of all these, religious terrorism has been used as synonymous with Muslim fundamentalists basically because of all the religious traditions, Muslim fundamentalists have adopted the method of terrorism as a predominant way of expressing grievances more than any other religious tradition in the past decade. However, not all acts of political violence perpetrated by members of a particular religious group qualified to be labelled religious violence. This is because issues of race and ethnic differences can lead to violent acts that can, and most often are, coloured by religious differences. This, therefore, makes the relationship between religion and political violence a complex issue. The basic reality of the past and present decade have actually shown that religious terrorists have employed violence as a means of achieving political, economic and social objectives. In this respect, religion is seen and used as a means rather than an end in itself thereby making religion ideological. As an ideology, religion and religious beliefs have displaced other ideologies as a rallying call for collective actions. Where other ideologies have failed, religion seems to have succeeded. As an ideology, religion therefore justifies behaviour based on its system of beliefs.

As an ideology, religion therefore serves similar functions as political ideologies and these are (1) polarise and mobilise populations toward common objectives; (2) create a sense of security and belongingness by providing a system of norms and values to which all members could identify, and (3) provide the basis for the justification and rationalisation of human or members' behaviour. While there is nothing intrinsically violent in ideologies, they, however, provide the basis for differentiation and polarity among populations and organising political dissents which inevitably could lead to violence against those perceived as non-members. Thus, while religion may not be the sole cause of political violence, it provides an effective basis for organising political dissents and polarising the population. In this respect, religious violence seems to be directed against the secular state and its government. This consideration raises two questions which this paper seek to investigate. These are (1) why is religion the basis for opposition to the state? Could there be a reason why religious fundamentalists are against the secular state? (2) although instances of religious differences have existed since the ages, why has it become an issue now or why has it escalated to the proportion of terrorism now? In order to provide answer to these two questions and the related ones, the paper is structured into five sections. The first part is the introductory section; the second section looks at the concept of terrorism, the third section looks at the impact of globalisation and modernisation to changing nature of violence and the escalation of religious violence; the fourth section attempts to recast the Nigerian experience of religious conflicts while the conclusion looks at the implication of religious terrorism on the development modern state systems.

THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM

Conceptualising terrorism is an essential step in understanding it. In spite of volumes of literature and opinions about it, there is still the problem of a general acceptance of its definition and meaning by both scholars and policymakers. As an instrument designed to carry a message, to force radical social and political changes or as an instrument to prevent such changes, terrorism is not a modern phenomenon but actually an 'ancient enemy' with roots in many cultures and followers in virtually all creeds and religions. It is basically not a political weapon and crime alone, but also carries within it legal and military connotations and so any acceptable definition must reflect this. This is what makes an acceptable definition of terrorism problematic. However, Laqueur's (2003) had warned against trying to categorise or define terrorism because there are "many terrorisms".

However, it is generally agreed that terrorism involves three basic components: the perpetrator(s), the victim(s) and the target(s) of the violence (Badely, 2007:1). The perpetrators are seen as fanatics, disaffected groups or minorities who employed terrorism as a tool to oppose the rule and the oppression of an established and militarily superior power (Nicholson, 2003). The victims are seen as innocent people who have no part or are directly involved in the struggle and the struggle or target is political. With this perspective in mind, Nicholson (2003) had defined terrorism as "the deliberate killing of non-military personnel in order to pursue a claimed political goal through exertion of pressure on a society". Hoffman (1998) has also included "political change" as the desired end result of terrorist acts in his definition. Of course, this is not to say that all terrorist acts have specific political goals. Most terrorists' political goals are so sweeping as to be delusional and their acts should be seen as purely nihilistic and pointless. Even with certain political goals or concessions as their end, terrorist movements have rarely succeeded militarily. It would seem that they are actually not interested in coming to the negotiation table. As the National Commission on Terrorism (2000:2) has noted, "Today's terrorists don't want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it".

Combs (2003, 8-13) has suggested a number of definitions. In particular, she defines terrorism as "a synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatisation of the most proscribed kind of violence – that which is perpetrated on innocent victims – played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes". Deriving from this definition, it is clear that terrorism involves specific acts of violence, an audience, the creation of a specific mood; that of fear, the presence of innocent victims and political motives and goals. However, to further our understanding of this phenomenon, we shall attempt to look at certain elements or concepts that make up this definition. A glaring thing about terrorism is that it involves acts of violence. Violence or the threat of violence is endemic to terrorism. The violent acts need not be perpetrated before it qualifies as terrorism. Once the threat is backed with the

capacity and willingness to use force or violence then the act qualifies as terrorism. Of course, there are many types of violence including domestic violence. So it is through the perception of an audience that acts or capacity for violence becomes terrorism.

Terrorist actions would be useless if not directed to attract attention, the attention of a specific audience in which a particular mood of fear is sought to be created. The violence of terrorism is not an end in itself. Rather violence is employed precisely to create a sense of fear, terror and uncertainty in the people, the audience of terrorism. The fear or terror thus created or caused by terrorism is linked to the nature of the victims of terrorist attacks. The victims are not specifically defined. Even the terrorists seem not to be able to determine or define who their victims or the numbers will be. The fact that they are only interested in maximising the impact of their attacks without regards to the victims further served to intensify the mood of fear and uncertainty precisely because anyone could be a victim. As Howe (1976:14) had stated;

> To qualify as a victim of a terrorist today, we need not be tyrants or their sympathisers; we need not be connected in any way with the evils the terrorist perceives; we need not belong to any particular group. *We need only to be in the wrong place at the wrong time* (Emphasis Mine).

At this stage, another definition of terrorism can be proffered if we limit ourselves to the elements discussed above. In that case, terrorism can be seen as acts of violence deliberately perpetrated on innocent victims (third parties) in an effort to or with an intention to coerce or force the opposition or persons to act in a desired way. Victims are not chosen because of their involvement or guilt but because their death or injuries are determined to create not only fear but also to shock the sensibilities of normal people such that pressure can be made to bear on the opposition or in most cases on the government to concede to the demands or make some concessions to the terrorists. If this is the case, then it means that terrorist violence is merely a means to an end. Violence, mass deaths and injuries caused by terrorists' attacks are basically geared towards achieving an end. Within a state system, the end can only be a political goal. However, much controversy attends the admission of a political goal for terrorists' attacks.

Under international law, it has been argued that while political goal and motive may be deemed as necessary for an act of violence to qualify as politically motivated, nevertheless, it is not sufficient to earn for an action the label of a 'political offence' under the same law. As Kittrie (1981:300) had suggested, for an act of violence to qualify as being a "pure political offence", it must "challenge the state but affect no private rights of innocent parties". For this clause to be achievable, it implies that perpetrators must take serious and extreme cautions as to the recipients of their attacks. Since terrorists are not wont or known to take these precautions, then a definition of terrorism

need not include the consideration of a political aim or goal. This, therefore, limits the major qualifying elements of terrorist violence to attacks on innocent victims and leads us to proffer another definition of terrorism which excludes political aim. In this respect, terrorism could be considered as an act of violence perpetrated on innocent persons or people in order to evoke fear in them. Viewed this way, terrorism is different from other types of violent actions primarily because of the illegality accorded it as a result of its deliberate choice of victims who are innocent. Thus, in essence then, and by its very nature, terrorism involves the deliberate disruption of norms, the violation of generally accepted standards of decency, including the laws of war as they apply to innocent and helpless victims (Friedlander, 1979:286).

From secular conflicts to holy wars

In general and broad terms, conflicts and violent occurrences in the world can be divided into two broad epochs. The first epoch started with events preceding and ending with the Cold War. Within this epoch, four variants of conflicts and violence can be identified. The first variant results from the ambitions of the reigning world powers at geo-politically dividing the rest of the world into spheres of interests and control. The clash of interests that resulted from this purely imperialistic drives led to the first and second World Wars. The second variant is the various anti-colonial conflicts and wars of national liberation which took the form of the local indigenous peoples fighting against being subjugated by the colonial powers. Most notable of this were the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya and the various wars of national liberation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The third variant was the anti-apartheid wars in South Africa, Namibia and the racist regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). These were basically wars waged against foreign interests in coalition with some white minority elements within the state desirous of subjecting the majority black population to inhuman treatment and segregation. These wars were waged through the 1970s and in the case of Namibia, all through the 1980s till independence in 1990. The fourth variant was the major conflicts of the 1970s that were Cold War related but in which African nations acted as proxies and were used as the extension of the battle grounds of conflicts that were basically the Eastern and Western nations represented by Soviet Union and America respectively. A good example of this was the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia (1976-83) and the Angolan civil war (1975-88) in which the East took side with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against the West-backed National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA).

The second epoch took its root from the post-Cold War 1990s period. The nature of conflict in this epoch is quite and radically different. Ibeanu (2003) has identified three types of conflicts specifically in Africa during this period and these are; (1) conflicts that arise as a result of struggle for political participation or over political space, (2) conflicts caused by the contest for access to resources, and (3) conflicts caused by the struggle over identity. To

this, Kahler (2002:1) has added a fourth one; conflict caused "by persistent attachment to territory". The political conflicts in Rwanda, Uganda, Chad, Sudan and Somalia give us concrete examples of conflicts that ensue as a result of the struggle for political participation, relevance and inclusion. Groups or parties that feel marginalized from having access to political power or that feel excluded because of the another group's or party's hegemonic monopoly over the political machinery usually have no other option than to resort to armed conflicts either to drive home their point of political inclusion or to wrest power from the other party's hands. This is very common in Africa where politics has become or assumes a zero-sum game.

Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Niger delta area of Nigeria posit examples of conflict over access to resources or distribution of resources. The crux of the problem in Nigeria's Niger delta area is the general feeling of alienation of the populace in that area coupled with the fact that oil exploration has led to massive environmental degradation resulting in the loss of the people's primary occupation which is farming and fishing. This is further compounded by the fact that the people have nothing to show for the rape which their environment is subjected to in terms of infrastructures and government's presence. Conflicts emanating from struggle for identity and citizenship are typified by the many ethnic/tribe related genocidal wars in countries such as Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and the Darfur area of Sudan. The salience of this factor as a source of conflict is further made prominent by the plural nature of many of the African states and the fact that massive mobilization of identities serve as a veritable basis for contesting and sometimes retaining a hegemonic hold over political power. Ethnic sentiments become a political resource which the politicians are not slack to whip up in their bid to control state machinery and by this, embers of negative ethnicity are ignited leading to violent conflicts, sometimes of a genocidal proportion as in Darfur (Sudan), Rwanda and Burundi.

Ethnic related conflicts also ensued as a result of disagreement over communities' boundaries. As a matter of fact, many intra-state conflicts assume this character. As Nnoli (2003:3) has noted, this type of communal conflict over territories assume the proportion it does basically because;

> …a communal group is one in which primary identity prevails.
> Membership of the group is not attained but ascribed. Within
> the communal group, the individual self is defined holistically.
> The totality of the individual's involvement in life is defined by
> the group. Examples of communal groups include family, ethnic,
> religious or regional groups.

A fifth variant is religious related violence in Africa. This is not to argue that Africa had never experienced religious related violence before this period but that this type of violence has attained a proportion that was never

experienced before in Africa. Not only this, the proliferation, escalation and terrorist dimension of religious violence are very recent. Religious violence and terrorism of this epoch has acquired both internal and external characteristics, that is, it is not only outwardly directed to other nations but internally directed against other races and tribes occupying the same nation-state as the perpetrators. While this may seem like an anomaly, the fact is that terrorism now found expression as both an international and local incidents of political violence. A good example is the bombing of a Shi'a shrine in Iraq on August 29, 2003 by Al Qaeda terrorists which killed 80 people including a venerated Muslim leader; Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al Hakim.

     The world is experiencing a new type of violent activities perpetrated by religious extremists and terrorists which are, although, both political and economic in character, but primarily religious. The religious dimension has to do with the religious authority accorded them by their followers and the ability of these terrorists' leaders to refer to religious beliefs and authority which their religion accorded them as the sole basis for their moral justification and legitimacy to employ violence in assaulting nations and peoples deemed as against them. This is the basis of the continued relevance, authority and hold that leaders such as Osama Bin Laden has over his followers and which also ensured the existence of such organisations as the Al Qaeda. Religion therefore provides the terrorists with the mental picture of a cosmic war against infidels, an image of a spiritual struggle between good and bad, truth and evil. At best, it is a perverted view that sees the terrorists as agents of good and standing for truth against the others who are evil and bad. It is also in this sense that the attacks against the World Trade Centre and the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, the various burning of Churches and killings of Christians in northern Nigeria and other parts of Africa and the world in general is seen as good and truth by the perpetrators but in reality cannot be any other thing other than religious terrorism.

     Analysts must recognise that religious terrorism is different from other types or forms of struggles basically because (1) other types of struggles attempts to find conclusions within the life times of the perpetrators but religious struggles can outlives their participants. This is predicated on the belief that the rewards of those involved in this cause are trans-temporal and the time limit of their struggle is eternity. (2) its targets are not chosen for their military values but rather they are chosen for the sole purpose of making an impact on public consciousness both by its brutality and suddenness. The constant recourse to a 'god' to justify their action has the power of 'satanising' the enemies while making the perpetrators of religious terrorism 'godly'. As Juergensmeyer (2004: 34-38) had noted, this is a kind of "perverse performance of power meant to ennoble the perpetrators' views of the world while drawing viewers into their notions of cosmic war". The effect of this as he had also noted is "not so much that religion has become politicised but that politics has become religionised. Through enduring absolutism, worldly struggles have been lifted into the high proscenium of sacred battles". (3) the targets of religious terrorism and violence also have

the tendency to assume and acquire a similar religious mien, explanation and perspective. Following the 9/11 attacks, the US public and its leaders became more religious and God-minded by adopting the song, "God bless America" as the country's unofficial national anthem. The then US President, George Bush whipped up national sentiments when he invoked the image of America's "righteous cause" as combating and bringing to an end the "absolute evil" of its enemies. (4) the 'divine' nature of religious terrorism, the notion that the battle is between good and bad, truth and evil, the expectation of heavenly rewards for the terrorists all rule out the possibility of a compromise or a peaceful negotiated truce. (5) the spiritual dimension of the war makes it to go beyond the confines of human law and ideal of morality. Society's law are subordinated and in extreme cases are deemed non-existence or inapplicable because of the recourse to a higher authority. In this case, there is no need to contend with society's laws and limitations when one is obeying a higher authority. (6) finally, the end result of religious terrorism is that it impacts a sense of redemption and dignity on the perpetrators. It is at this level that religious terrorism acquires a personal willingness on the part of the perpetrators who often times are men who feel alienated and marginalised from public life. Their efforts become conscious attempts at ennoblement and empowerment. Such efforts would have been poignant if they were not so destructive.

THE ROLE OF GLOBALISATION AND MODERNISATION

The transition from worldly struggles to sacred battles has been greatly influenced and perhaps accelerated by globalisation and modernisation. To be able to understand the role played by globalisation and modernisation in fomenting religious terrorism, we may have to visit the "ghosts of our past" (Armstrong, 2007; 2-5). Throughout the Muslim world there is widespread bitterness not only against America but against believers of other religions especially Christianity. This bitterness has bred an atmosphere that is highly conducive to extremism. The present crisis of religious terrorism must be understood within the rubric of the process of modernisation. It is a historical fact that Islam had been a religion of success. Within the first hundred years after the death of Prophet Muhammed in 632 AD, the Muslims had conquered and had control over a territory that extended from the Himalayas to the Pyrenees. By the 15th century, Islam had become the greatest world power, not dissimilar to the US today. However, the expansionist programme of the Western powers which coincided with the great Western transformation started a competition with Islam everywhere they went, from the Middle East, to India, Persia, Southeast Asia, China and Japan. In the 16th century, when Europe was in the early stages of its transformation into world power, the Ottoman Empire which ruled Turkey, virtually the whole of the

Middle East and North Africa was probably the most powerful state in the world, perhaps more powerful than any single state in Europe.

With the reformation of the military, economic and political structures of the European powers, the Islamic nations were not able to withstand their incursion into territories once controlled by Islam. In 1798 Napoleon defeated the reigning Muslim Mamelukes of Egypt, a stronghold of Islam in Northern Africa. Other Muslim strongholds soon fell to the military supremacy of the Western nations such that between 1830 and 1915, the European powers have effectively ousted Muslim occupation but not the Islamic religion and imposed Western rule in occupied Algeria, Aden, Tunisia, Sudan, Libya and Morocco. Like all Western colonies, these states were exploited as sources for raw materials which fed European industries. Perhaps the most tragic was Egypt which was saddled with the responsibility of providing the funding, materials, labour and 200 square miles of its territory for the building of the Suez Canal. The profits and shares of this project were held and appropriated exclusively by Europeans. This cost outlay of this project eventually bankrupted Egypt and this gave Britain an excuse to set up a military occupation there in 1882.

While the evil effects of colonialism were not exclusive to the Muslim nations alone, the nations of the Middle East had always have autocratic rulers which had not provided them with the conditions to fully develop a democracy and modernise along the lines of their closest neighbours in Europe. Thus, in the Muslim nations, modernity did not bring freedom and independence rather; it came in a context of political subjection. The baton of power shifted after World War II with the relegation of Britain and France to secondary powers and the emergence of America as the leader of the Western world. As Armstrong (2007:4) had noted;

> Even though the Islamic countries were no longer colonies but were nominally independent, America still controlled their destines. During the Cold War, the United States sought allies in the region by supporting unsavoury governments and unpopular leaders, largely to protect its oil interests.

Many Muslims resented America for its support of unpopular rulers such as President Hosni Mubarak of the Egypt, the Saudi royal family and the State of Israel. In their frustration, many have abandoned Westernisation and adopted religious fundamentalism as an acceptable alternative. Fundamentalism therefore represents their rejection of western secularism and modernism. Every fundamentalist movement and this is not peculiar to Islam alone, is convinced that the modern, secular society is anti the true faith and religious values. Fundamentalists therefore tend to downplay the compassionate teachings of their faith and overemphasise the more belligerent passages in their article of faith. However, fundamentalism in every religion tends to be localised initially; that is, their fiery passion is

usually turned against co-believers whom they viewed as not being pious enough or as having watered down the religious values. Initial confrontation is therefore intra-religion. It is only at a later stage that fundamentalists export their religious fervency and confronts foreign enemies that are seen as behind the evil and non-acceptance of the faith by their people.

The change in the nature and character of these recent religious crises, violence and terrorism from the earlier holy wars fought by Mohammed and later by his generals can only be accounted for as responses to contemporary theme in the world's political and social life: globalisation. Modern day religious acts of terrorism, whether local or international, in a sense, are statements of resentment against modernity and globalisation. The clerics and leaders resent the western-style modernity that secular globalisation is imposing on them. At the local level, believers in other faiths and religious values are seen as the impostors while at the international level, western nations and in particular America, are seen as the main culprits. The US role in creating a 'new world order' of globalisation and forcing it on other nations especially the Third World has created a sinister image of the United States. In certain respect, this distrust of globalisation is justified for the great imbalance and distortions which it has engendered in the political, social, cultural and economic lives of the nations. Contentions are rife as to whether the rapid increase in cross-border economic, social, technological and cultural exchange engendered by globalisation is civilizing, destructive or feeble (Guillen, 2004; Hirschman, 1982). Levitt (1983) and Ohmae (1990) have contested that globalization offers promise of boundless prosperity and consumer joy, while in contrast, Kennedy (1993), Rodrik (1997), Gilpin (2000) and Mittelman (2000) have raised alarm concerning the increasingly free international economic and financial flows which, of course, is a one way traffic; that is, from the developing countries to the developed countries.

Equally contentious are the different perspectives of globalisation. Three opposing theoretical paradigms can be identified. The first view is that of the conservatives who outrightly deny the globalisation trend by down-playing on its significance. Conservative traditionalists would want to argue that social relations are still organized in terms of territorial units with only limited interdependence between sovereign national states but definitely no global fusion. Within this conservative circle are the proponents of the realist school of international relations who still hold tenaciously to the fact that the world system is reducible to competition for power. They dismiss any claim to globalisation by arguing that power politics still carry the same salience as during the cold war era. They, therefore see globalisation as a ruse whose attempt is to detract from focusing on the management of power relations at the international level and the reality of the division of the world into uni-polar or multi-polar (Layne, 1993; Waltz, 1993; and Krasner, 1994). The realist arrogance and ideological denial of globalisation can be understood as it challenge their fundamental belief by negating power politics and instead preach a cooperative effort and shared destinies among nations hence the notion of a global village (Agnew, 1994). Conservative denial merely has a

salutary effect of checking unrestrained attempts and claims by proponents of globalisation to globalise virtually everything, but in reality, cannot hinder the world-wide move of globalisation. Their continued and insistent denial therefore, seems baffling and bizarre in the face of this reality (Ruggie, 1993).

A second perspective is the Liberal school. Proponents of this school accept the reality of globalisation but view it as progressive, necessary and benign. This school has within it those who basically have some advantage to derive from globalising the world such as advertisers, management consultants, large sections of governing elites and academia. From the Liberal perspective, the current trend of globalisation is God sent and long overdue. It is seen as an extension, if not the logical culmination, of interdependence among states in the international scene. Thus, it is no wonder that in Liberal discourse, the terms 'internationalization' and 'globalisation' are used as if they are synonyms. Thus, seen basically from the capitalist Liberal perspective, globalisation offers the prospects of modernity in the sense that it frees market forces, electoral practices of the democratic form, technological transference, international cooperation, thereby implying global peace and absence of war and national self-determination from the shackles of traditionalism and communism (Huntington, 1991; Ohmae, 1990; Mueller, 1989). Deriving from this broad Liberal perspective are two strains of the same view. The Neo-liberal preached that globalisation will usher in the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992) while in contrast to this extreme view, the reformist liberal cautioned that globalisation should be used to correct the present imperfection of the free world. The extent to which the liberals accept the ideology of globalisation can be seen from their claim that globalisation has heralded an end to history, geography and even sovereignty by their argument for rapid de-territorialisation (O'Brien, 1992; Camilleri and Falk, 1992). Also implicit in the liberal view is a lack of critical examination of the trend and an unabashed declaration that globalisation as a process is inherently beneficial to all. The claim that globalisation will automatically yield a universal, homogeneous, egalitarian, prosperous and communitarian world society is a demonstration of naive optimism that is prevalent with adherent of this perspective. Conveniently, the liberal denies that in practice, globalisation has often led to poverty, violence, ecological degradation, and exploitation of some part of the world society. In this respect, liberalism presents itself as an ideology whose purpose is to sustain the status-quo of exploitation and degradation of a major portion of the world system with false utopian promises.

In contrast to the two views enumerated above are theorists who belong to the Critical school. Theorists of this perspective view the notion of globalisation from the perspective of exploitation and unequal development among the world society. Their approach is that even before the advent of globalisation, the world capitalist system had engendered violence and deprivation of certain section of the world, specifically the Third world of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Critical discourse theorists, therefore, argued

that with the claim of globalisation to de-territorialisation and supra-territoriality, the likelihood of exploitation and underdevelopment of the Third world countries will receive a new lease of life. Globalisation will enhance, extend and reinvigorate new forms of cultural and economic imperialism, exploitation, underdevelopment, military threats and incursion, including all other predicaments that have been factors in the move towards modernity. Within this Critical Perspective, two trends are discernible. The first is the historical-materialist trend which argued that globalisation is a particular phase in the development of world capitalism. Theorists of this particular perspective focus on the effect and implication of globalisation on accumulation forms of state and regulation, dynamics of class relations and exploitation (Lipietz, 1987). The second strain of the critical perspective is the post-modernist or poststructuralist school which focuses on the psychological and cultural implications of globalization. Theorists of this school have been able to link fragmentations of identity, language and culture, crises of community and religious riots and intolerance with globalization (Featherstone, 1990; Robertson and Garrett, 1991; Omoniyi, 2003).

In reality, among the many effects of globalisation is the crippling of secular nationalism and the concept of the nation-state. Globalisation has eroded the basic sense of national identity and unity through the expansion of media and communication technology, importing western secularity and popular culture in competition with and to the detriment of the local indigenous ones. That is why some of the intense movements, struggles and genocidal wars associated with ethnic and religious nationalism are presently been experienced in Africa and other parts of the Third World. Although globalisation through the emergence of multicultural societies formed through global diasporas of peoples and cultures and the emergent idea of a global military and political control may have created a 'new world order', it also, perhaps, inadvertently, created fear; a fear of domination by a single world power of the United States.

The Nigerian experience

Nigeria has had, perhaps, more than it's equal share of ethno-religious conflicts bordering on terrorism in the sense that the targets of these attacks live in their country but in constant terror of being attacked unannounced. The attacks are labelled ethno-religious because in most cases it is difficult to actually distinguish whether these attacks were ethnic motivated or directed against members of a different religious group. This categorical confusion stemmed from many facts such as (1) in most cases these attacks or riots originated from the predominantly Muslim enclaves or states of Kano and Kaduna, (2) that the targets of these attacks are always members of other ethnic groups residing in these two states majority of who incidentally are non-Muslims, (3) even where the events that triggered off the attacks have nothing to do with other ethnic groups but can be located as differences

180

between fundamentalist and orthodox Muslims (intra-religious) as the cases of the Maitatsine riot of 1980, the Shiite attacks of 1996 and 1997 have exemplified, the focused targets have also included other ethnic and especially non–Muslim people living in these two Northern and predominantly Muslim states. Thus, in Nigeria, religious riots are of two types; intra-religious violence which limits to between fundamentalist and orthodox Muslims alone and inter-religious violence which is between Muslims and Christians.

However, since our intention in this section is not to chronicle all cases of religious riots and conflicts in Nigeria, we shall focus only on the intra-religious conflicts because these better provide us with insights to certain significant facts that most scholars of religious terrorism and conflicts either are not aware of or overlook in their discussion of religious terrorism. Muslim fundamentalists are obsessed with following the teachings, laws and precepts of their religion as set down in the Quaran and the Hadiths. They, therefore, regard other Muslims who do not strictly adhere to these principles as "apostates who have abrogated the Holy Law and adopted foreign and infidel laws and customs" (Lewis, 2003:24). The only solution for these apostates is to return to the authentic Muslim way of life or face the wrath of Allah through his messengers. Thus, while the fundamentalists are anti-western because they regard the West as the source of the evil that is corroding Muslim society, their first step in their crusade for restoration of the authentic faith is internal cleansing, that is, the removal of the apostate governments becomes an essential first step and so their primary attack is directed against their own rulers and leaders. This provided the reason for the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the murder of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt two years later. Closely related to this is that the rules of war against apostates are quite different and rather stricter than those of wars against unbelievers (infidels). The apostates are far worse than the unbeliever because the unbeliever has not seen the light and so there is always hope that he may eventually see it. The apostates, on the other hand, are those who have known the faith but abandoned it and for this offense there is no human forgiveness. The renegade must be put to death if male and if female, flogging and imprisonment will suffice.

Now this distinction is important because when religious militants declare a jihad against their own members deemed as apostates and renegades, it is always without mercy, a prerogative no human has authority to extend to the renegade except Allah. This accounts for the brutality of the attacks against perceived enemies of the faith. In Nigeria, intra-religious violence has also acquired this element of brutality. The Maitatsine Riot of 1980 led by Mohammed Marwa, a Cameroonian who migrated to Kano, was a first in a series of such intra-religious violence in Kano. Kano was a breeding place for different Muslim sects and Quranic teachers who found the city a haven for such activities and the large number of homeless and unemployed a ready source of adherents. His teachings and rituals were considered heretic by the orthodox Muslims in Kano especially when he

started challenging some contents of the Quran, and preached against modernisation and the wearing of wrist watches, use of motor cars, bicycles and so on. When asked to demolish some illegal structures which he used to house his homeless followers, Marwa reacted by declaring a jihad against the infidel government of Alhaji Abubakar Rimi. The targets of his attack were the police and the orthodox Muslims. Over 500 people including Marwa himself lost their lives. The followers that fled in the ensuing state reprisals carried the riots and violence to other states such as Bulunkutu, Jimeta, Yola, Gombe and Funtua between 1982 and 1987 (Albert, 2004:286).

Within the Northern parts of Nigeria which is predominantly Muslim populated, the Shiites formed another fundamentalist Islamic group. This sect is headquartered in Zaria under the leadership of Mallam Ibrahim El Zak-Zaky. The Shiite fundamentalists were believed to be supported by the governments of Sudan and Libya and membership was predominantly made up of youths. The Shiites basically had anti-establishment views with a pathological hatred for the police and the secular judicial system which was viewed as satanic. This is inspite of the fact that membership of the Shiites consisted of well educated young men and even lecturers from Universities are known members of this group. The peace of the city of Kano was threatened several times by this group and two of these moments are important for us to discuss here. The first was the clash between the Shiites and the Yan tauri (meaning the invulnerable in Hausa because members were thought to possess some juju that makes it impossible to be stabbed by knife) in August 1996. Earlier, the Shiites had made their intention to marked the Id-El Maulud (Prophet Mohammed's birthday) at Adakawa quarters and this worried the other Muslims sects which led to a notice being given to the Shiites not to come. However, in spite of the warning by both the community and the Police, the Shiites held their prayers and this was disrupted by the Yan tauri and led to a free for all fight in which various weapons were used. The fight and subsequent destruction of lives and properties were, however, not limited to between the Muslims alone and the area as it quickly escalated and spread into surrounding neighbourhoods.

On the 7th February, 1997, the Shiites once again attacked Kofan Mata quarters during the EId-el-Fitr prayers. The reason behind this attack was to punish the community and other orthodox Muslims in Kano for their lukewarm attitude to the practice of Islam. The Shiites saw the failure of the orthodox Muslims to revolt against the Abacha's (who was also a Muslim) government for its perceived political injustices and corruption as implying that they accepted and this made them accomplishes. The Shiites felt that a true Muslim should be more involved in the political development of his country more than what the orthodox Muslims are showing. They were therefore convinced that Allah would compensate true Muslims who got involved in putting right the gross injustices of the Abacha's regime. They blocked all the entrances leading to the prayer ground and the arrival of the Police led to outright violence in which many lives and properties were destroyed.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATION FOR THE MODERN STATE

The modern state is heterogeneous, offering political, economic and religious accommodation for all of its citizens. This implies that the modern state must be secular if it is to be able to do this. Even religious states, that is, states with acclaimed particular religious bias must also cater for and accommodate elements within it that belong to other religious movements, even if they are in the minority. No religious movement can claim an exclusive preserve of a state and no state can claim to belong exclusively to a particular religious movement. The implication of this is that religious clashes may characterise the existence of the modern state for some time.

Merari (2007:12) had attempted to see terrorism as a strategy of insurgent and by so doing had come up with four classifications or four types of terrorism. these are states against states, states against citizens, citizens against citizens and citizens against the states. In justifying this classification, Merari had argued that acts of terrorism by citizens against the state may take any of the several forms available; one of which is terrorism. However, deriving from the above, it follows that the modern state which is secular must be ready

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