Lapai Journal of Economics; Volume 8, No.1; 2024
Print ISSN: 2659-028X
Online ISSN: 2659-0271
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/lje.v8i1.12
Published by Department of Economics, IBB University Lapai, Niger State, Nigeria

An Evaluation of Public Sector Corruption and Organized Crimes as Impediments to Nigeria's Economic Growth

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Abstract

This research work on the evaluation of public sector corruption and organized crime as an impediment to Nigeria's economic growth attempts to examine the link between crime and growth based on the theory of rational choice and empirical data.the major objective of this research is to evaluate the extent to which public sector corruption and organized crime impacted on economic growth in Nigeria. The Dynamic Endogenous Growth model is adopted to analyse the data collected as the study sought to cast further light on the macroeconomic implications of organized crime and its interaction with corruption. The study concludes that to eradicate organized crime and corruption in Nigeria, effort should be geared towards a fool-proof, digitized intelligence gathering on identifying the roots causes and a way to nip them in the bud. All leakages in the public sector also need to be blocked to curtail loopholes for corruption to thrive It is recommended that prosecution be forcefully pursued through the enactment of an accountability legislation for public office holders and the enhancement of police and court system skills through sufficient funding.Furthermore, the government ought to take action to promote a more productive economy, which would lower unemployment and serve as a deterrent to crime.

Keywords: Corruption, Organized Crime, Economic Growth
JEL Classification: J45

1. Introduction

Nigeria is arguably, a country under distress. The country's woes are most evident in the torrential spate of armed violence and criminality in various parts of the country. Nothing explains this awry nation better than the apocalyptic. volatile security ambience in the wider northern Nigeria. The northeastern Nigeria is still patently under the Boko Haram scourge, amidst the precarious counter-insurgency endeavors of the government (Okoli 2017a; Zenn 2018). The north-central area has been afflicted by herdsmen militancy, which has plunged the region into dire humanitarian crisis (Okoli and Ogayi 2018). The northwestern region has recently been enmeshed in the rapid upsurge of rural banditry along its international frontiers as well as the forested interior. Research on the prevailing precarious security situation of northern Nigeria has been perennial, albeit with disproportionate emphasis on

the phenomena of Boko Haram insurgency and herdsmen-farmers' disturbances (Olayoku 2014; Okoli and Iortyer 2014; Otewu 2015; Bagu and Smith 2017). Incidentally, while scholarship on Boko Haram and farmers-herder crises has come to a full cycle, organized research on rural banditry is still at an inchoate stage of nascence. Although there exist some important scholarly works on aspects of the subject matter (Ladan 2014; Kuna and Jibrin 2016; Okoli and Ochim 2016; Olaniyan and Yahaya 2016; Olaniyan 2018), none of these extant works could systematically and aptly account for the northwestern scenario where rural banditry has assumed the scale of a complex emergency.

Nigeria's oil revenue has totaled $340 billion in export since the 1970s and it is the sixth largest producer in the world. Shehu, (2011) Nigeria has the potentials for growth, as it has a rich reserve in oil and several other mineral and non-mineral resources e.g, Tin, Bauxite, Coal, Gold, etc. it also has abundant vast expanse of arable land for agriculture across several geographical regions with different crop specialties, e.g. Cocoa, coffee, in the Southwest, palm trees in the southeast and tomatoes, maize, groundnut, cotton and animal rearing in the Northern part of the country, Shehu, (2011).

However, the increasing incidence of corruption and insecurity in Nigeria, which pose great challenges to governance have thus, become issues of public concern. Successive administrations in Nigeria have made concerted efforts to reform the security sector (Fayeye,2007; National Planning Commission, 2004; Zebadi, 2007). In recent years, the sector has also been receiving a lion-share of the national budget. Laws have also been enacted and institutions established to fight corruption. These include the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) established through the ICPC Act, 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) vide the EFCC Act, 2004. Others are the Fiscal Responsibility Commission established vide Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007, the Bureau for Public Procurement established through the Public Procurement Act, 2007 and the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) through the NEITI Act, 2007.

In spite of all these efforts, corruption is still manifesting in different sectors of governance in Nigeria. For instance, prior to the establishment of the above mentioned anti-corruption agencies and return to democratic governance to Nigeria, Costa (2008), the United Nations Executive Director for Drugs, Narcotics and Money Laundering estimates that corrupt leaders have embezzled close to $400 billion within 1966 – 1999. With the return to democratic governance to Nigeria in 1999 and establishment of many anti-corruption agencies. Nigeria lost between US$4 billion and US$8 billion annually to corruption. Between2005 and 2007 alone, state Governors and politicians, allegedly embezzled US$250 billion hidden in Western banks and other offshore financial centres (Shehu, 2011). Others include the Siemens 1.3 billion euro and Wilbrow International's 10 million Euro bribery scandals involving some Federal Public servants and Foreign Firms between 2006 and 2007 (Akinrijomu, 2009; Financial Standard, 2007). Transparency International Corruption

Perceptions Index (CPI) for Nigeria varies from the lowest of 1.0 in 2001 to the highest of 2.7 out of10.0 in 2008. This was neither maintained nor improved upon as the CPI slipped back to 2.5 in 2009 and further to 2.4 in 2010.

There are different forms of insecurity in Nigeria. For example, in the South-West geo-political zone, armed robbery is prevalent especially in cities like Lagos, Ibadan, Akure and Abeokuta; in the South-South and South-East which is the oil base of the nation, kidnapping is rampant and the activities cover every part of the zone with victims from all ages and all walks of life; in the North, robbery across the border, banditry coupled with Boko Haram insurgence are the security challengies. The menace of the Boko Haram for some time now has constituted a thorn in the flesh of Nigerians; from the first time they struck in Borno State of Nigeria in 2009, over 4000 people including Nigerian citizens as well as expatriates have been killed in violent deadly attacks targeting Christian churches, police, mosques, military installations, Western-type educational institutions with innocent students and even children (Edukugho, 2012). They have also carried out a series of deadly and costly bombing campaigns in the country - the Independence anniversary bombing, the bombing of the United Nations office in Abuja, the bombing of the Police Headquarters in Abuja, the bombing of the military base in Kaduna (cited in Egbewole, 2013).

According to Akpata (2019) "the results of a study conducted shows that corruption in Nigeria could cost up to 37% of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) by 2030 if it's not dealt with immediately. This cost is equated to around $1,000 per person in 2014 and nearly $2,000 per person by 2030. The boost in average income that was estimated, given the current per capita income, can significantly improve the lives of many in Nigeria".

Nigeria has dropped on Transparency International's yearly corruption perception ranking, moving two places down to rank the world's 34th most corrupt nation. In the 2019 Transparency International's corruption perception index released, Nigeria scored 26 out of 100 points, falling by one point compared to 2018. In the country comparison, Nigeria ranks this year 146 out of 180 countries – two places down compared to 2018 results. The broad objective of this study is to examine the impact of organized crime, corruption and their interactions on economic growth of Nigeria. Specifically, the study examines the extent to which organized crime impact on economic growth in Nigeria, and the extent to which public sector corruption damaged economic growth in Nigeria.

2. Literature Review

There is a lot of evidence in the literature on this subject to suggest that crime both influences and distorts economic growth (Mauro, Carmeci, 2007). In their analysis of the relationship between the rate of violent and property crimes and income growth, Burnham, Feinberg, and Husted (2004) found little evidence linking violence to growth. More often than not, research finds that more has to be done to fully comprehend this connection. The

study results of Enamorado, López-Calva, and Rodríguez-Castelán (2014) have been impacted by a lack of data.Panel data or time series methods are used to analyze the given data (Burnham et al., 2004; Mauro, Carmeci, 2007; Pan, Widner, Enomoto, 2012; Kumar, 2013; Goulas, Zervoyianni, 2013; Enamorado et al., 2014). The relationship between crime and economic growth in Nigeria is the subject of this analysis, which is based on time series data and is essential to addressing both of these issues (Mauro, Carmeci, 2007; Pan et al., 2012; Kumar, 2013; Goulas, Zervoyianni, 2013; Enamorado et al., 2014). Becker (1968) postulated that people's behavior whether engaging in legal or illicit business is best understood as an effort to meet basic requirements in an effort to reduce crime.

If gains from illicit behavior are greater than those from legal activity, then one should anticipate to participate in illegal conduct, and vice versa. A potential criminal may also think about engaging in illegal behavior depending on the surroundings, degree of protection, and possibility of causing harm to members of society. In order to lower the danger of participating in the crime, the offender must have information regarding probable results and future odds. Becker (1968) asserted that the costs of crime to both people and society are the disturbance of economic activity and the divergence of monies intended for growth.

In addition, the public's response to a rise in crime is a desire for more policing, which raises the costs to society in terms of damages and the government's costs of arrests and convictions. Therefore, the theory of rational choice (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; Bourguignon, 1999) confirms that a rise in crime will result in an increase in social loss. Similarly, Mauro and Carmeci (2007) verified that the illicit actions of organized crime necessitate businesses to monitor their operations, which raises their expenses in a dynamic approach to the economics of crime. This results in a de facto tax being imposed on business, which lowers earnings, lowers the return on capital and salaries, and directs tax revenue away from development and into the production of security. As a result, criminal behavior would cause economic output to decrease.

Corruption' has long been considered one of the defining characteristics of 'organised crime'. As comprehensive reviews of organised crime definitions illustrate, the great majority of them – but not all – include corruption as a defining element (Finckenauer 2005; Hagan 2006). Maltz (1994) suggests that only public sector corruption should be considered an element of organised crime. Finckenauer (2005) provides various examples of different types of complex frauds (e.g. health insurance fraud) with a high degree of organisation that does not resort to corruption or violence. Nevertheless, for some academcs like Finckenauer, corruption is one of the key defining characteristics that sets apart 'organised crime' from crime marked solely by a complex organisation. In the United States (Goldstock *et al*. 1990; Beare 1997) and Latin America, the corrupting influence of organised crime has received much attention. In Europe, with the exception of Italy (e.g. Della Porta & Vannucci 1999, Paoli 2003, Calderoni & Caneppele 2009) and Bulgaria (CSD 2008, Be-zlov *et al*. 2007), little empirical research has been conducted in a similar vein. Various authors have decried

the absence of such empirical studies in other European countries (European Commission 2008, Beare 1997). Europol's (2007, 2008, 2009) reports are amongst the few attempts to suggest an empirically grounded theoretical typology of organised crime's use of corruption.

Empirical Literature

An influential empirical study of the impacts of corruption is Mauro (1995). Mauro aims to 'identify the channels through which corruption and other institutional factors affect economic growth, and to quantify the magnitude of these effects'. He uses various indexes provided by Business International for the period 1980-83, (BI) published indices on 56 'risk factors' for a sample of 68 countries. The respondents (i.e., BI correspondents and country analysts) were asked to rate the risk factors on a scale from 1 to 10. One of the 56 factors is corruption, defined as: "The degree to which business transactions involve corruption or questionable payment." According to Mauro, a more precise indicator of corruption is the simple average of three of the indicators, i.e., the judiciary system, bureaucratic red tape and corruption. These three indicators correlated well, and by aggregating them the risk of measurement errors were expected to be reduced. Mauro calls the composite index "bureaucratic efficiency". Mauro (1995) finds that corruption has a negative impact on the ratio of investments to GDP, its investment rate. For example, if Bangladesh improved the integrity of its bureaucracy to the level of that in Uruguay, its investment rate would increase by almost five per cent. An empirical study by Keefer and Knack (1995) supports Mauro's findings, using a different corruption indicator with observations from Political Risk Services (PRS).The authors include "corruption in government" among other explanatory variables into one single index of "institutional quality" to explain economic performance. Thus, the corruption variable is not tested in isolation.

Other empirical studies support Mauro's results: Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997), using a corruption index developed by the World Bank and the University of Basel (WB/UB-index) for a sample of 41 countries, find that corruption significantly reduces the ratio of investment to GDP. This is also the conclusion of Brunetti and Weder (1998), in a larger sample of 60 countries and by making use of corruption data by PRS. Mauro (1997a) uses the same source and shows that corruption reduces the ratio of investments to GDP in a sample of 94 countries. Elliot (1997) using Transparency International's 1996 CPI, presents similar results. Wedeman (1997) questions the generality of Mauro's findings. According to Wedeman,(1997) the correlation between corruption and investment might be strong for countries with little corruption, but it loses power for countries with higher levels of corruption.47 Thus, the assumption that corruption systematically lowers growth through the investment rate is not entirely justified. Wedeman's (1997) major critique is that Mauro treats corruption as an"undifferentiated phenomenon", and argues that the impacts of corruption depends not only on its amount, but also on its form: In cases where government elites are engaged in looting, corruption is likely to undermine growth and development

(e.g., Zaire under the late president Mobutu). Furthermore, in cases where governmental power is used to distort the economy in order to create rents that the elites then can siphon off, it is likely that corruption results in structural inefficiencies and irrationalities that will undermine development in the long run (e.g., the Philippines under the late President Marcos and Indonesia under Suharto). However, in countries where corruption is linked to a political strategy that seeks to stimulate growth, the contradiction between high growth rates and corruption need not be antagonistic (e.g., South Korea in the period 1963-93).

Prevalence of crimes and Corruption in Nigeria

Nigeria had a murder rate of 9.85 per 100,000 population in 2015.(U.N, 2018). In 2012, it was estimated that Nigeria had lost over $400 billion to political corruption since independence (Rita, 2012). Organized Crime in Nigeria includes a number of fraudsters, Northern Nigeria Banditry (looting, kidnappings on major highways, claims to be connect to Fulani Bandit Gangs) spread across Western Africa. Drug traffickers and racketeers of various sorts originating from Nigeria. Nigerian criminal gangs rose to prominence in the 1980s, owing much to the globalization of the world's economies and the high level of lawlessness already in the country with corrupt military rulers looting & laundering loots overseas. Crime organisations in Nigeria, typically do not follow the mafia-type model followed by other groups. They appear to be less formal and more organized along familial and ethnic lines, thus making them less susceptible by infiltration from law enforcement. Police investigations are further hampered by the fact that there are at least 250 distinct ethnic languages in Nigeria. Other criminal gangs from Nigeria appear to be smaller-scale freelance operations. Mike, (2006) Groups from Benin City are especially notorious for human trafficking. Aljazeerah, English, 2014.

The intensity of crime in Nigeria has been described by, Adekoya and Abdul Razak (2016). They noted that the government have made several efforts to reduce it, including the Police reform in 2006, establishing the Economic and Financial Corruption Commission, Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, and recognition given to the Nigeria Civil Services and Defense Corps in the early 2000 s. The number of personnel in the Nigeria Police Force increased by 19.03% between 2003 to 2007, and 16.32% between 2007 to 2010, respectively (Network on Police Reform in Nigeria, 2010 and Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Funds allocated to the Economic and Financial Corruption Commission were decreased 23% in 2012 from the ₦13.8 billion Naira allocated in 2011, but of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission were increased 11.1% in 2012, from a 2011 baseline of ₦3.6 billion Naira (Omoniyi, 2014). The government also provided the military with modern equipment and arms to combat the insurgency, which engages in criminal behaviors and, more generally, increased the annual expenditure on internal security as a percentage of total expenditures from 5.47% in 2005 to 6.96% and 9.13% in 2008 and 2012, respectively (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2012). Prison maintenance and imprisonment in the country accounted for 0.97% and 1.20% of the total

expenditure in 2011 and 2012 in Nigeria (The Prison Services of 2012). Highly organised Nigerian confraternities/campus gangs operate worldwide. For example, the Neo Black Movement of Africa. In its own words, the Neo Black Movement of Africa is a "registered non-partisan, non-religious and non-tribal organisation that sincerely seek to revive, retain and modify where necessary those aspects of African culture that would provide vehicles of progress for Africa and her peoples". (NBM, 2020). Nonetheless, law enforcement officials who have investigated members in recent years, for example in Canada, the UK and Italy are convinced that the movement has strayed far from its original path.(Faz.net, 2020).

Behind the welfare facade of the Neo Black Movement (11) hides indeed the most dreaded Nigerian campus cult, the Black Axe confraternity. (UNHCR, 2014). NBM usually state that they are not identical with Black Axe for propaganda purposes. While the atrocities committed by campus cult members are well-know Area boys (also known as Agberos) Chris, (2004) are loosely organized gangs of street children and teenagers, composed mostly of males, who roam the streets of Lagos, Lagos State in Nigeria. (Heap, 2004) They extort money from passers-by, public transporters and traders, sell illegal drugs, act as informal security guards, and perform other "odd jobs" in return for compensation. Momoh, (2000). One of the methods Area Boys use for extortion is to surround pedestrians, drivers, and passengers in vehicles, which are stuck in traffic, and force them to pay for some actual or fictitious service before letting them go. To aid in collecting money during traffic jams, the area boys place nails in the road and dig up the streets. Among the area boys are both sellers and users of illegal drugs. A study states "most of them use drugs (cocaine, heroin, marijuana, etc.) either as occasional users or addicts, or as peddlers." Of 77 respondents to a survey, 12.2% dealt drugs, while 60.3% were addicts themselves. Sale of drugs takes place both in Nigeria and abroad, and sales abroad have earned a small percentage of the sellers' significant amounts of money. Momoh, (2000).

An advance-fee scam is a form of fraud and one of the most common types of confidence tricks. The scam typically involves promising the victim a significant share of a large sum of money, in return for a small up-front payment, which the fraudster requires in order to obtain the large sum. If a victim makes the payment, the fraudster either invents a series of further fees for the victim or simply disappears. NDIC, (2010). Nigerian criminal groups are heavily involved in drug trafficking, shipping heroin from Asian countries to Europe and America; and cocaine from South America to Europe and South Africa. The large numbers of ethnic Nigerians in countries like India and Thailand give their gangs ready access to around 90% of the world's heroin (FBI, 2010). In the United States, Nigerian drug traffickers are important distributors of heroin, from importing it into the country to distribution level and selling it to lower-level street gangs, (NDIC, 2010). These criminal groups are also known to launder drug money through domestic football clubs in the Nigeria Premier League, and are rumored to make additional money through match fixing activity within football matches.

Nigeria is a source, transit, and destination country for women and children subjected to trafficking in persons including forced labor and forced prostitution. There is a huge menace of Kidnappings on Northern Highways as well as allover Nigeria, claims to be from Fulani Bandits. Trafficked Nigerian women and children are recruited from rural areas within Nigeria - women and girls for involuntary domestic servitude and sexual exploitation, and boys for forced labor in street vending, domestic servitude, mining, and begging. U.S. Dept of state. 2010. Nigerian women and children are taken from Nigeria to other West and Central African countries, primarily Gabon, Cameroon, Ghana, Chad, Benin, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, and the Gambia, for the same purposes. Children from West African states like Benin, Togo, and Ghana – where Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) rules allow for easy entry – are also forced to work in Nigeria, and some are subjected to hazardous jobs in Nigeria's granite mines. Nigerian women and girls are taken to Europe, especially to Italy and Russia, and to the Middle East and North Africa, for forced prostitution (Dept of state, 2010). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nigerian criminal enterprises are the most notable of all African criminal enterprises. They are considered to be among the most aggressive and expansionist international criminal groups, operating in more than 80 countries of the world and are established on all populated continents of the world. Their most profitable activity is drug trafficking, though they are more famous for their financial fraud which costs the US alone approximately US$1 to 2 billion annually (FBI, 2015). In Nigeria, crime manifest in the convulsive upsurge of both violent and non-violent crimes. Incidents of armed robbery, assassination and ransom-driven kidnapping are now ravaging the polity like a tsunami and spreading a climate of fears and anxieties about public safety (Okechukwu, 2011). The upsurge of crime has been ongoing as Nigeria has been on the global crime map since 1980s. Martin, (2003) These throes of crime for decades are traceable to poverty, poor parental upbringing, and greed amongst the youth; get rich quick mentality, inadequate crime control model of national security among others. According to Osawe (2015), crime portrays the inability of government to provide a secure and safe environment for lives, properties and the conduct of economic activities considering the alarming increase in criminal activities in Nigeria such as armed robbery, terrorism and other related crimes. Several causes of crime have been identified by scholars and social analysts. Notable among them is the availability of arms in the hands of illegal users, particularly civilians motivates criminality in Nigeria. For instance, Hull *et al.* (2006) argued that the proliferation of arms contributes to conflict in two main ways namely: 'increasingly lethal firepower is likely to cause higher levels of destruction; and that augmentation of sophisticated weaponry creates a vicious cycle whereby competing militias engage in an arms race to gain dominance in capability. Hull, *et al.* (2006). Such competitions often result in violence. No zone in Nigeria is immune to crime.

However, the frequency and fatality rate varies. According to Nigeria Watch Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2011), not only acknowledged that the second main cause of

violence in Nigeria is crime but reported its heavy presence in the South and the North-east. Therefore, it remains imperative to look at violent and non-violent crimes in Nigeria with the objective of establishing its trends and patterns. Nigeria has dropped on Transparency International's yearly corruption perception ranking, moving two places down to rank the world's 34th most corrupt nation. In the 2019 Transparency International's corruption perception index released, Nigeria scored 26 out of 100 points, falling by one point compared to 2018. In the country comparison, Nigeria ranks this year 146 out of 180 countries – two places down compared to 2018 results.

3. Methodology

On this note, the key determinant of growth is the number of capital-producing firms, which now depends on factors related to both organized crime and corruption. That is, the growth rate of the economy is derived by the Dynamic, Endogenous Growth model, given as:

$$Y_t = k_{t-1} + k_t^{-1} + \sum_{i=1}^{p} y_{t-i} + \mu_t \quad \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots 1$$

Where y is the economic growth which is a function of changes in the capital market equilibrium k_{t-1}/k_t, Σy_{t-1} represents the steady state of the growth. Any reduction in k_t reduces y_t, caused by increase in extortion and bribe-taking. Thus, growth in a badly governed economy is lower than growth in a well-governed economy. The key point of the above framework is that economic growth is enhanced in an economy that is free from all organized crime and corruption than when it is saddled with either or both these (Blackburn et al, 2017). However, the question whether an economy is damaged by more or less if organized crime occurs alone than if it co-exists with corruption remains unresolved in theory. Since the main point of the framework that the organized criminals extort capital producers, raises the question of which economic phase bears the most damaging effect is still unknown. This renders comparative statics ambiguous on the equilibrium of economic growth model with organized crime versus the growth with both crime and corruption. These clearly shows that the consequences of organized crime may be conditional on the presence of corruption, and the direction of causality could go either way -organized crime may be more or less damaging if it co-exists with corruption. The models specified below are built to empirically examine the ambiguity of the underlying interactions established in Blackburn et al Dynamic, Endogenous growth framework.

By doing this, one could examine the economic growth effect of organized crime both in isolation and in conjunction with corruption. But this may be ambiguous in ideal scenario, thus, the present study employed a mathematical specification of growth equation that controls for both organized crime and corruption amongst other growth factors in the following functional form:

$$y_t = f\left(ORC, COR, (ORC * COR) + \sum X\right) \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots 2$$

Where y represents the growth rate of real GDP per capita, indexed by time period, t; ORC represents organized crime; COR represents corruption perception index; and summation of X represents a set of standard growth control variables. Equation 3.2 function can be represented in a classical linear econometric function in the following format:

$$y_t = \lambda_1 ORC_t + \lambda_2 COR_t + \lambda_3 (ORC * COR)_t + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \rho_i X_{i,t} + \alpha + \mu_t \quad \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots 3$$

Where y represents the growth rate of per capita GDP; ORC is a measure of organized crime; COR represents a measure of corruption perception index; very important variable is (ORC*COR) - it represents the interaction term between organized crime and corruption perception index; X represents a set of standard control variables, comprising a set of implicated variables included in growth regression (e.g. Sachs & Warner, 1997). These are the log of initial growth rate of per capita GDP (y_{t-1}), human capital index (HK) - a measure of the rate of returns to education, domestic investment (INV), inflation rate (INF) – measured by the Implicit Price Deflator, % gross Secondary School enrollment (SE) ; α represents the intercept; μ represent a time-varying idiosyncratic error term; and ρ represents the parameters associated to the standard control variables of the model. In addition to these baseline control variables, the study includes a number of instrumental variables, composed of the population growth rate (PGR), ratio of Trade to GDP (TRD), share of government expenditure (GXP), financial development (FD) – measured by financial deepening, and foreign direct investment (FDI). λ_1 to λ_3 are the parameters that associates with the core variables of the model (ORC, COR and their interactions); All variables are indexed by time period t.

The major element of the above growth regression equations is an interaction term between ORC and COR, which represents the conditional effects of organized crime and corruption on the economic growth process. A positive (negative) coefficient of λ_3 would support the argument that organized crime has a less (more) severe effect on growth process when it is accompanied by corruption (Blackburn *et al*, 2017). In this subsection, the study specifies rigorous econometric models to critically examine the level of interaction among organized crime, public sector corruption and economic growth prospects, based on the above described theoretical framework. Due to the ambiguous description in the Blackburn et al model that requires, first, specifying an economic growth performance in the absence of both organized crime and corruption, and then simultaneously introducing each of these factors in turn until both are represented in the equation. By doing this, one could examine the economic growth effect of organized crime both in isolation and in conjunction with corruption. But this may be ambiguous in an ideal scenario, thus, the present study employed a mathematical specification of growth equation that controls both organized crime and corruption amongst other growth factors in the following functional form:

$$y_t = f\left(ORC, COR, (ORC * COR) + \sum X\right) \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots.... 4$$

Where y represents the growth rate of real GDP per capita, indexed by time period, t; ORC represents organized crime; COR represents corruption perception index; and summation of X represents a set of standard growth control variables. Equation 3.2 function can be represented in a classical linear econometric function in the following format:

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Where y represents the growth rate of per capita GDP; ORC is a measure of organized crime; COR represents a measure of corruption perception index; very important variable is (ORC*COR) - which represent the interaction term between organized crime and corruption perception index; X represents a set of standard control variables, comprising a set of implicated variables included in growth regression (e.g. Sachs & Warner, 1997). These are the log of initial growth rate of per capita GDP (y_{t-1}), human capital index (HK) - a measure of the rate of returns to education, domestic investment (INV), inflation rate (INF) – measured by the Implicit Price Deflator, % gross Secondary School enrollment (SE) ; α represents the intercept; μ represent a time-varying idiosyncratic error term; and ρ represents the parameters associated to the standard control variables of the model. In addition to these baseline control variables, the study includes a number of instrumental variables, composed of the population growth rate (PGR), ratio of Trade to GDP (TRD), share of government expenditure (GXP), financial development (FD) – measured by financial deepening, and foreign direct investment (FDI). λ_1 to λ_3 are the parameters that associates with the core variables of the model (ORC, COR and their interactions); All variables are indexed by time period t.

The major element of the above growth regression equations is an interaction term between ORC and COR, which represents the conditional effects of organized crime and corruption on the economic growth process. A positive (negative) coefficient of λ_3 would support the argument that organized crime has a less (more) severe effect on growth process when it is accompanied by corruption (Blackburn et al, 2017).

4. Result

The results of the descriptive statistics revealed that the analysis were conducted using a balance observation of 21 periods, which is sufficient for achieving the objectives of the study. The measure of central tendency also revealed that the variables are significantly normally distributed showing very negligible differences between their mean values and the median values. The standard deviation of some of the variables are quite reasonable, showing disparity between the maximum and minimum figures, while few, including

ORC*COR, INF, and PGR have relatively low values thereby providing no evidence to suspect outliers of the variables.

Table .1 Summary of Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

Variable	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Std. Dev.	Obs
Y	2.772253	3.326217	12.45747	-4.16842	3.495438	21
ORC	94.01190	88.83000	172.2100	23.64000	48.68048	21
COR	21.10829	19.01460	38.27800	9.181078	7.567702	21
ORC_COR	1.620306	1.641739	2.930908	0.502803	0.679296	21
INF	1.716765	1.733127	1.976348	1.433812	0.169940	21
HK	35.90476	36.00000	49.00000	25.00000	8.330095	21
DINV	143656.3	142289.0	171881.0	118788.0	13738.30	21
FDI	5181046.	5628636.	7589757.	3088488.	1373891.	21
PGR	2.607335	2.627703	2.680914	2.496357	0.062839	21
SE	39.46829	39.23280	56.20540	23.55180	9.649224	21
TRD	37.08694	36.05871	53.27796	20.72252	9.265640	21
GXP	821.4733	465.0716	2210.241	149.0934	695.7607	21
FD	15.77619	18.00000	25.40000	7.700000	6.651308	21

***Source**: Author's computation*

Unit Root Analysis of the Variables

Table.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root test statistic

	Level			Difference (1^{st})			
Variable	t-Stat.	5% crit. Value	Prob*	t-Stat.	5% crit. Value	Prob*	Remark
Y	-5.6261**	-3.6908	0.0014	-5.3269**	-3.7105	0.0028	I(0)
ORC	-3.2666	-3.6908	0.1034	-3.5821	-3.7105	0.0623	I(1)
COR	-3.2591	-3.6584	0.1017	-4.3066**	-3.6908	0.0164	I(1)
ORC_COR	-2.6991	-3.6584	0.2468	-7.1583**	-3.6736	0.0001	I(1)
INF	-2.8869	-3.6908	0.1887	-3.7015**	-3.6736	0.0475	I(1)
HK	-2.6998	-3.7105	0.2482	-1.5455	-3.6908	0.7738	I(1)
DINV	-3.3723	-3.6736	0.0851	-5.6923**	-3.6908	0.0013	I(1)
FDI	-3.2746	-3.7332	0.1059	-5.9259**	-3.6736	0.0007	I(1)
PGR	-3.7434**	-3.6736	0.0441	-0.6577	-3.6908	0.9609	I(0)
SE	-2.8555	-3.6584	0.1958	-5.7238**	-3.6736	0.0010	I(1)
TRD	-3.2559	-3.6584	0.1022	-5.0806**	-3.6736	0.0035	I(1)
GXP	-1.4204	-3.6584	0.8223	-4.2466**	-3.6736	0.0173	I(1)
FD	-2.2709	-3.6584	0.4291	-4.8745**	-3.6736	0.0052	I(1)

*Note: Key: I(0) denotes that the variable is not integrated (or has unit root), while I(1) means that it is integrated. The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected when t-stat is greater than 5% critical value. ** denotes significant at 5% critical value. Source: Author's Computation*

The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root approach was employed for this analysis. The underlying null hypothesis for the ADF unit root is given, thus "the variable (series) has a unit root and for that not stationary". In the decision rule, the null hypothesis is rejected when the ADF statistic is greater (in absolute term) than the critical values (i.e. ADF > 5% critical value). The summary of the result of the ADF is presented in table 4.2 below, in

their level as well as difference forms. Table 2 result indicates that all the variables, with the exception of Y and PGR, are integrated, and analysing them in their difference form result to a short-run result. Therefore, to avoid presenting a short-run result when ordinarily the underlying theories postulating the relationships among the variables are in the long-run forms, this study proceeds to cointegration analysis.

Cointegration Analysis of the Variables

Engle-Granger single equation cointegration approach was employed for this analysis. The null hypothesis states that variables (series) are not cointegrated. This approach computes two statistics, the tau-statistic and z-statistic. Lag length selection was done automatically. At 5% significant level, the null hypothesis can only be rejected if probability value is lesser than 0.05. The result obtained for the co-integration test is presented in Table 4.

Table .3 Cointegrating equation deterministics Result

Dependent	tau-statistic	Prob.*	z-statistic	Prob.*	Lags	Obs	Stoc. Trends
Y	-4.756670	0.7468	28.90781	0.0000	3	17	13
ORC	-5.502037	0.4920	-24.20126	0.3978	0	20	13
COR	-6.795139	0.1803	-134.4983	1.0000	1	19	13
ORC_COR	-7.414505	0.0920	-29.74453	0.0000	0	20	13
INF	-5.233988	0.5803	-23.09138	0.5430	0	20	13
HK	-4.434179	0.8315	138.4842	0.0000	2	18	13
DINV	-4.703221	0.7585	108.3104	0.0000	2	18	13
FDI	-4.743607	0.7468	101.3706	0.0000	2	18	13
PGR	-3.056079	0.9945	-12.80071	0.9978	0	20	13
SE	-5.025790	0.6496	-22.94446	0.5601	0	20	13
TRD	-4.219986	0.8790	-37.98840	1.0000	1	19	13
GXP	-4.270966	0.8712	12.34415	0.0001	4	16	13
FD	-5.111742	0.6211	-23.72811	0.4657	0	20	13

Source: Author's computation

Table 3 indicates that the number of stochastic trends of the variables is the same at 13 for all the variables, while the number of observations varies according to the lag length. It means that the p-values are estimated using results for 13 stochastic trends. Note, also, that the lower the lag length the higher the number of observations. Based on the result, the tau-statistic found no evidence of cointegrating vector in all the variables, however, the z-statistic found six (6) cointegrating vector (Y, ORC_COR, HK, DINV, FDI, and GXP). On this note, the study concludes that there exists linear combination among the variables, thus, an Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) is implemented. The summarized results obtained from estimation of three (3) different methods (Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), and Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)) were presented in Tables 4.4. One interesting indication from this result is that the 3 models show that Organized Crime (ORC), Corruption (COR), and inflation rate have adverse impact on GDP per capita growth (Y). The negative adversity increased when organized crime is combined

with corruption, as indication by the higher coefficient and significant level of the interaction variable.

Table 4 Summarized Results for Objectives/models 1, 2 & 3

Dep. Var: GDP pc growth	OLS	GMM	FMOLS
Y(-1)	0.504978	0.130447	0.59966**
	(0.1318)	(0.5830)	(0.0106)
	(1.6410)	(0.5656)	(3.2123)
ORC	-0.257326**	-0.16417**	-0.22345**
	(0.1082)	(0.0408)	(0.0235)
	(-7.6414)	(-2.3167)	(-2.6709)
COR	-0.085512**	-0.10057**	-0.253036**
	(0.0565)	(0.0139)	(0.0319)
	(-2.0481)	(-2.6937)	(-2.5373)
ORC*COR	-0.125931**	-0.11484**	-0.309429**
	(0.0050)	(0.0206)	(0.0089)
	(-2.8691)	(-2.6196)	(-3.7478)
INF	-0.145510**	-0.22048**	-0.219320
	(0.0237)	(0.0214)	(0.3223)
	(-2.4662)	(-2.5516)	(-1.1296)
HK	0.240968	0.051730	0.26581**
	(0.1359)	(0.6972)	(0.0442)
	(1.6218)	(0.3994)	(2.3374)
SE	0.183435	0.236179	0.19923**
	(0.3104)	(0.3395)	(0.0323)
	(1.0686)	(0.9984)	(2.4374)
DINV	6.91E-05	4.88E-05	0.10629**
	(0.0789)	(0.3424)	(0.0426)
	(1.9564)	(0.9984)	(2.2131)
ECM(-1)	-0.615388	-0.749359	-0.65523**
	(0.1717)	(0.7163)	(0.0329)
	(-1.4724)	(-0.3739)	(-2.5294)
C	26.42251	16.48180	41.0824**
	(0.1401)	(0.5446)	(0.0214)
	(1.6026)	(0.6254)	(2.7244)
R^2	0.79798	0.64982	0.792553
Adj. R^2	0.61616	0.39513	0.585107
Durbin-Watson stat.	2.10506	2.30974	-

*Note: Key: ** denotes significant at 5% critical value; the first value represents the coefficient, the one in parenthesis () denotes the probability value, and the last in bracket () denotes the t-statistics.*
Source: Author's computation

Table 4. result indicates that a 1% point increase in Organized Crime (ORC), *ceteris paribus*, would significantly decrease GDP per capita growth (Y) in the OLS result by 25%, while in the GMM result this impact reduced to 16%, and lastly in the FMOLS result by 22%, respectively. In a similar fashion, the result shows that a 1% point increase in Corruption (COR) would significantly decrease Y by 8.5%, 10% and 25% in the OLS,

GMM, and FMOLS regressions, respectively. This suggests that both ORC and COR, each exact some remarkable adverse impact on GDP per capita growth (Y). This is in agreement with the report in ENACT, (2019). Furthermore, the interaction of ORC and COR shows that a 1% point increase in the joint activities of organized crime with corruption would significantly decrease Y by 12%, 11% and 30% for the OLS, GMM, and FMOLS regression estimates, respectively. This result suggests that the extent to which organized crime and corruption occurs is an important factor in determining the negative growth effect of both. The implication of this is that the presence of organized crime tends to increase corruption and reduce growth in Nigeria. This finding can be said to reflect that facts that variation in organized crime and corruption within-geopolitical zone may be qualitatively and quantitatively (in magnitude) very strong in Nigeria. Evidence from Table 4 shown that the adverse impact of ORC, COR, and INF on Y is not without spilling over effect. The impact of initiation value of Y on its present state has shown to be positive, due to its significance in only the FMOLS regression. It indicates that a 1% increase in the lag growth of GDP per capita would significantly increase the current growth by over 59%, other factors remaining constant. This suggests that growth in GDP per capita without sustainability would amount to low or negative trajectory in future growth.

Model Robustness/fitness checks

In what follows, we test the robustness of the baseline results under various modifications of our analysis. These include consideration of different regression specifications and the fitness check using coefficient of multiple determinations R^2 and Adjusted R^2, respectively. Based on the result in Table 4.4, the Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) regression possess the best fit in terms of significant, 'a priori' expectations, and R^2 as it shows that all the model variables, with the exception of inflation rate, are statistically significant. It shows that approximately 80% of the variations in GDP per capita growth are explained by organized crime, corruption, their interactions, and other baseline variables included in the model. Also, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model poses a good fit. Besides having sign of no positive serial autocorrelation with Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.10506, it explained approximately 80% variations in Y, using the explanatory variables included in the model. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), on the other hand, has proved to be well specified, having shown no positive serial autocorrelations with Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.30974 and R^2 of approximately 65%, respectively. With this, the GMM model poses a good fit by explaining about 65% variations in Y using organized crime, corruption, interactions and organized crime and corruption, and other covariate factors in the model.

Evaluation of Hypothesis

Hypothesis One: The results in Tables 4 has clearly shown that organized crime (ORC) does not only significantly impact on GDP per capita growth (Y), but it granger causes Y with no feedback relationship. In fact, the study finds that a 1% point increase in Organized Crime (ORC), *ceteris paribus*, would significantly decrease GDP per capita growth (Y) in

the OLS result by 25%, while in the GMM result this impact reduced to 16%, and lastly in the FMOLS result by 22%, respectively. Therefore, this study rejects null hypothesis one, with a conclusion that organized crime has significant and causality impact on economic growth in Nigeria.

Hypothesis Two: Evidence from Tables 4 also indicate that Corruption does not only have statistical significant impact on economic growth in Nigeria, but it exact statistical significant granger causality impact on it. The study finds that a 1% point increase in Corruption (COR) would significantly decrease Y by 8.5%, 10% and 25% in the OLS, GMM, and FMOLS regressions, respectively. Based on this, the second null hypothesis in this study is rejected, and conclusion drawn is that public sector corruption has statistical significant and causality impact on economic growth in Nigeria.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This study has sought to cast further light on the macroeconomic implications of organized crime and its interaction with corruption. These two phenomena are amongst the most vivid examples of poor quality governance and badly functioning institutions. Their adverse effects on growth and development are well documented, and the fight against each of them remains high on the agendas of national and international agencies. What is less well understood is the extent to which their impacts might be reinforced or subdued through linkages between them. Making in-roads to this has been our primary objective in this research work. Crime lowers living standards and takes money away from initiatives that promote growth. As billions of Naira are lost to theft or devoured by criminal activities, more funding is required to combat crime and address its effects. It is surprising to learn that education has had a detrimental impact on economic growth in both the short and long terms. This adverse effect demonstrates that there is insufficient funding from the government for education to produce the intended level of economic growth (Irugbe, 2013). The lack of modern facilities in educational institutions as a result of low funding has an impact on the standard of instruction. As a result, a large number of Nigerians were unable to find employment and, disillusioned, were prepared to leave their country in search of one where they could find employment.Furthermore, domestic investment through gross fixed capital formation boosts income but slows income growth, suggesting that consumption rather than investment is the primary driver of Nigeria's growth. Because crime lowers national production, it causes revenue to stagnate or even decline. Furthermore, progress has not been particularly aided by Nigeria's criminal prosecution system. This is a result of insufficient funding for the legal system and the police. In the near term, punishment has a positive effect on growth and the economy as a deterrent factor. As a result, this research recommends that prosecution be forcefully pursued through the enactment of an accountability legislation for public office holders and the enhancement of police and court system skills through sufficient funding.Furthermore, the government ought to take action to promote a more productive economy, which would lower unemployment and serve as a

deterrent to crime. To determine whether there is a non-linear relationship between crime and economic growth, more research is required.

Emanating from the findings, the following policy recommendations are made: First, organized crime and corruptions are well and alive in Nigeria, growing day-by-day in magnitude and dimension. To curb the menace of these twin evils, and their adverse impact on economic prosperity, governments of Nigeria at different levels should come up with clear proactive policy and not reactive one, which is holistic, with every citizen deeply involved in the fight. Fight against corruption should be systemic and not built around individual government or persons. Government of Nigeria should build a strong system that allows offenders to be punished irrespective of tribe, religion, ethnicity, region, state or whose brothers or sisters are involved. Secondly, with this study's finding of huge adverse impact of organized crime, corruptions and their coexistence on economic growth in Nigeria, government of the day should strengthen the war against organized crime (which has seriously damaged the image of the country), they should see it as a war not only to stop the heinous activities and its outcomes but as a way to push the process of restoring the nation to sustainable economic growth. Over 1.8 trillion naira is reportedly lost to corruption and crime in the last five years, yahaya, (2023). Thirdly, the war against organized crime and corruption in Nigeria requires modern and high powered communication and transportation technological facilities. In fact, the ingenuity of those engaged in 'organized crime' is enhanced and honed by the unrestricted availability of modern technology, especially in transportation and communication. Also, perpetration of various brands of criminal activities in Nigeria is undeniable and has assumed a dimension that threatens all the fabric of human interactions and endeavours. These activities are assuming some sort of sophisticated dimension day-by-day. Fourthly, to eradicate organized crime and corruption in Nigeria, effort should be channeled on identifying their roots causes and a way to nip them in the bud. This is because without identifying what drives the recourse to criminality and sustains its resilience, in spite of the many international conventions and national efforts, nothing tangible may be achieved. The body language or muscle flexing and tough talks by the government and her agencies that are involved in the war against these evils may not be the panacea of choice, in a country such as Nigeria with uneven distribution of assets belonging to all, but controlled by a few. Lastly, fight against organized crime and corruption requires strong international collaboration. In fact, no one nation alone can succeed in solving the problems of organized crime and corruption or 'criminality' without strong international interventions. These activities have indeed gone global, and beyond national efforts alone.

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