On Development and Democracy: The Willing and Unwilling Goers

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Abstract · This article argues that the question of what comes first between development and democracy is a settled question: each is a standalone though not an isolated phenomenon. The analysis put forth, therefore, is an attempt to comprehend some of the dynamics when the two phenomena interact. It is the article's contention that the force which seems to propel and relate the two is the very urge of the people to participate in the developmental and democratic process of their societies. In the final analysis, the article maintains that nowhere in the world have the two phenomena (development and democracy) ever been achieved or received on a silver plate. The powers that be must use their authority to guide even to the point of coercing the 'Unwilling Goers' to significantly participate in the development and democratic process of their communities.

Key words · Development · Democracy · Nation-building · East Asia · Uganda

Sur le développement et la démocratie: les disposés et les non-disposés dans la marche

Résumé. *Cet article soutient que la question de savoir ce qui vient d'abord entre le développement et la démocratie est une question réglée : chacune est une application autonome quoique non etant un phénomène isolé. L'analyse présentée, par conséquent, est une tentative de comprendre les dynamiques lorsque les deux phénomènes sont en interaction. L'argument central de cet article renchérie l'idee selon laquelle la force qui semble propulser et relier les deux phénomènes (développement et démocratie) n'est que l'envie du peuple de participer au processus démocratique et du développement de leurs sociétés. En dernière analyse, l'article soutient que nul part dans le monde ces deux phénomènes ont déjà été atteints ou reçus sur une plaque d'argent : les autorités doivent user de leur autorité pour guider même au point de contraindre les 'non-disposes dans la marche' de participer de façon significative à l'élaboration et au processus démocratique et de développement de leur communautés.*

Mots clés: *Développement • Démocratie • Construction d'une nation • L'Asie de l'Est • l'Ouganda*

Introduction

We write from a stand point of view. From the onset and throughout this discourse, we categorically rule out a presuppositionless approach proposed by Edmund Husserl, nor are we attracted to the Cartesian methodic doubt. Instead, we follow an observatory, critical and analytical approach within a larger existential phenomenological framework.

In this text, we take it that the question of what comes first between development (DEV) and democracy (DEM) is a settled question and we concur with Kaufmann (2008), who simply says, "Neither, we conclude." We know that each is a standalone

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though not an isolated phenomenon. The issue at hand is an attempt to comprehend some of the dynamics when the two phenomena interact. It is the contention of this paper to affirm that the force which seems to propel and relate the two is the urge of the people to participate in the developmental and democratic process of their societies. The mere fact that no human being is an island and the mere fact of being born in a certain community without one's choice but enjoying the benefits of such a society make an individual liable to contract involuntary obligations among which is participation. We borrow a leaf from van der Hoeven (2008) who echoes that the roots of democracy and development are found everywhere. Hence, the question should be how to support home-grown democracy and development effectively. However, we are quick to add, as caution, in agreement with Friberg and Hettne cited in Nurse (2006) that the countries of the so-called Third World that have a real option to choose indigenous rather than Western solutions to their problems are those which have access to a strong cultural heritage.

When we talk of participation, words like involvement, sacrifice, contribution, struggle, activity, work, etc. automatically present themselves. In work, activity and participation, there are different and complex forces that come into play. However, the best would be those that help individuals to create, maintain, and share wealth (from DEV) and peace (from DEM) whose end result would be general well-being. For one reason or the other, facts of countries, regions and individuals show otherwise. At all those levels, there are people who embrace McGregor's theory X (1960), that is, those who are not naturally disposed to work and those whom Mwalimu Nyerere talked of as spending half of their life time on leave. How these three categories should be treated, coupled with the question of a people's culture, consist some of the key issues of discussion in this essay. In the final analysis, the notion of participation in this paper takes cue from Chatterjee's *The Politics of the Governed*, in that, a participating population group is that which finds ways of investing their collective identity with a moral content.

Our submissions and conclusions, and at the risk of appearing odd, are that nowhere in the world have the two phenomena (DEV and DEM) ever been achieved or received on a silver plate. The nature of politics in contradistinction to governance is a determinant for the two phenomena. It is this paper's contention that the powers that be must use their authority to guide even to the point of coercing the 'Unwilling Goers' to significantly participate in the development and democratic process of their communities.

The argument's vantage point

We look at DEV and DEM from an existential-historical standpoint of view taking into consideration Uganda and East Asia. Bardhan (2003) mentions Sirowy and Inkeles (1991), Campos (1994), and Przeworski and Limongi (1993) as respectively attributing negative, positive and agnostic relationships to DEV and DEM. Using a method of 'dynagraphs' of DEV (nature of income) and DEM (regime type) overtime (1995-2000), Goldstone and Kocornik-Mina (2005) enable us to vividly see a

synthesis among the proponents of DEM in the first place and growing incomes thereafter.

From such dynagraphs [dynamic graphs] nine typologies of DEM and DEV, which we here term as "phenomenographs", are adduced. They include stable democracies—sustained growth; stable autocracies—some with growth while many are stagnant; democracies making a democratic transition with economic growth—authoritarian transition following authoritarian stagnation; and democracies making a democratic transition followed by an economic decline/stagnation. Others include; bouncers—multiple moves between DEM and dictatorship which relatively possess a narrow income band at some point in their histories; cyclers with significant moments to change their regimes, significant economic progress at some periods but the moments are reversed in subsequent periods leading to a cycle; different patterns—single move out of democracy to dictatorship; a marked 'reverse Lipset-move' from higher income autocracy to lower income democracy; and wanderers—no clear pattern developing, with weak movements toward DEM/growth but unable to sustain any clear trajectory.

The case of Uganda: DEV and DEM trails

Of the nine categories above, we argue that Uganda falls under the class of *bouncers*. It can be said that the years between independence and 1985 under Obote I, Amin and Obote II were years of civil unrest, stunted economy and what Rotberg (2003) could characterise as a failed state. This is so because, between 1966 and 1971, the Obote I government lacked the geographical (which arose because of the abolition of traditional kingdoms and a declaration of a state of emergency in Buganda), constitutional (with the abrogation of the constitution) and political legitimacy. The period of Amin eventually epitomised the failure of state because it was convulsed by internal violence and could no longer deliver positive goods to a growing citizenry. Again, the Obote II government did not have the types of legitimacy needed for a functioning state. The Museveni era since 1986 to-date has simply lacked legitimacy over the whole of the country's geography. for a while, the negotiation with the Lord's Resistance Army would more or less usher in geographical legitimacy, but it was marred by the non-settlement of the Buganda question which came to a climax during the Kampala riots in 2009 which were triggered by government's refusal of Kabaka (king) Ronald M. Mutebi II to visit Kayunga. Without the settlement of this question, of course among other pertinent national questions, Museveni's government will continue to lack geographical and, to some considerable extent, political legitimacy.

With the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government acquired constitutional and political legitimacy. Currently, the NRM government seems to show signs of a fragile state. Its leadership, in view of the inherent navigational perils of the post-9/11 global economic and political terrain, has turned into a sort of 'authoritarian-neo-patrimonial' state, under the personal rule of a chief who maintains his authority through a customer-like type of politics. This is manifested in the dishing out of new districts, cash and other

tangible goods in the most personalised fashion. It further revealed in intimidation and use of force (Black Mamba), brutal arrests of protestors, and the use of teargas and live ammunition against opposition parties, the wearing of army fatigue while addressing civilians among other ways of personification of state power.

The NRM of 1986-1995 could be taken as a success story. There, we experienced the founding of the institutions and the establishment of a state apparatus, which stemmed from the Resistance Councils–turned Local Councils (LCs). For example, LC I embraced more or less 50 households and all adults residing in a particular village were *ipso facto* members. It was ran by a nine-member executive committee (at least four women) who could assist in maintaining law, order and security; initiate, support and participate in self-help projects; and serve as a communication channel with government services. It could also monitor administration of projects, impose service fees, collect taxes, resolve problems and disputes, and make by-laws.

The LC system found acceptance because where communities had had traditional rulers, kings, chiefs, elders, it appeared to build on the already known. Moreover the ten-man cell administrative system introduced during Amin's time had not been forgotten and the Church had/has more or less a similar arrangement. The system, therefore, was not new per se. Besides, people were weary of the war and the Ten-Point Programme of the NRM's first decade of rule proposed principles that appeared credible to everybody and capable of bringing back sanity to the country. Despite some resistance in some parts of the country, all went well because of the relative stability albeit the absence of a multi-party dispensation. When we look back at those years, we call them lost years because the ground was very fertile for DEV.

DEM and DEV under siege

Amidst the struggle to consolidate what we would term as an attempt to groom a home-grown democracy, a call by big powers, namely the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations to open political space was received in the name of Western democracy. Attached to it were the conditionalities of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that consisted mainly in privatisation and liberalisation of the economy and decentralisation of the administrative structure. In Uganda, many equated it with a return to multi-partyism, and ballot box politics of competition between organised parties. Since 1996 Uganda has seen her chances of developing ruined. The proponents of democracy *à la* Western society thought that this would be a panacea for the country's underdevelopment. Such a view might have been inspired by the fact that the basic democratic principles constitute a fundamental source of common values and hence a common heritage to humankind. However, they forgot to appreciate the fact that DEM is a constantly evolving process and that no country has attained it in its fullness. Not even the ancient Greek city-states attained DEM in its fullness. However, Ake (2000) underscored that ancient Athens was just as precise about the rule of the people as it was about who the people were. While the broad principles of democratic DEV may be universal, Boutros Boutros-Ghali reminds us that their application varies "considerably depending on whether one is talking about a state

that has practiced DEM for years or a state that has just gained independence" (Boutros-Ghali, 2002, p.24).

We look powerlessly astonished at Ugandans who spend a lot of time wanting to institute a copy-cat type of western Europe-American democracy in Uganda. To say the least, the whole idea of majority is too arbitrary and for that matter very dangerous, especially when one comes to think of a majority of 51% and a minority of 49%. Furthermore, it seems as if "democracy legitimises and intensifies contestation between essentially unproductive groups (charlatans, who survive on trading words) which in many contexts make the damaging rent-seeking worse" (Khan cited in Leftwich, 2002, p.277). Sadly, the much popularised post-American civil war notion of democratic rule as 'the government of the people by the people and for the people' in which the category 'people' is not qualified, invokes, in many cases, the idea of a mob, groups of unorganised poor and powerless peasants. In fact, not all cases of public pressure that DEM facilitates help DEV either. To be certain, democracies may be particularly susceptible to populist pressures or immediate consumption, unproductive subsidies, autarchic trade policies and other particularistic demands that may hamper long-run investment and growth. For Bardhan (2003), DEM is neither black nor red; it is gray. It chooses banality over excellence, shrewdness over nobility, and empty promise over true competence. Furthermore, it is eternal imperfection, a mixture of sinfulness, saintliness and monkey business. This is why, Bardhan concludes, the seekers of a moral state and of a perfectly just society do not like DEM. Yet, only DEM, having the capacity to question itself, also has the capacity to correct its own mistakes.

Nevertheless, we remain sceptical on DEM's capacity to correct its own mistakes which as Boutros-Ghali (2002, p.10) says "must be embodied in a culture, a state of mind that fosters tolerance and respect for other people, as well as pluralism, equilibrium and dialogue between the forces that make up society." For the time being, this seems to be a rare commodity in Uganda. Unless something is done, Uganda will remain bouncing upwards and downwards, forwards and backwards every five years—following the electoral cycle—which implies a lot of loss in well-being. The bouncing which now characterises Uganda's DEV and DEM efforts is marked by a game of power-survival struggles typical of the cat-mouse chase, where any of the two (DEM and DEV) is constantly used as utopia or ideology with a life span of five years. Utopia and ideology are at work more especially during the campaign periods where different personalities promise heaven on earth; and whereby those competing for different positions confuse the roles that have to be played by different people in Government. For instance, candidates competing to become members of parliament often promise that they will tarmac the roads; bring electricity to the constituencies; build a school, dispensary, a marketplace, or a public toilet among other far-fetched promises. This confusion is equally manifested at the highest level of Government where the Executive arm meddles into the affairs of the Legislature and the Judiciary. Unfortunately, the people believe them.

However, it is well known that the role of a Member of Parliament (MP) is not the construction of any of the above. Separation of power is a key principle in a DEM.

Moreover, if these are not delivered, the said MP may not stand chances of going back to parliament again because his/her electorate would have lost trust and confidence in them. Hence, in order for the MP to make it appear fulfilling their campaign pledges to the electorate, he/she has to come nearer to the Chief [Executive], and relate with the latter in a clientele-like fashion. Those are the types you never hear contributing anything meaningful in parliament as if their constituencies do not have aspirations that must be looked at from a national perspective. Like powerless clients they are used to rubber stamp the decisions of the chief executive in return for those amenities which in a functioning democracy would have been delivered anyway. After five years, when the same person comes back to campaign, he/she poses to the constituency as having fulfilled the promises. In this way, the people are taken almost as beggars; unfortunately, in today's Uganda, both the vote-seeker and the voter seem to enjoy the status quo. Such a mentality is now so entrenched in our society to the extent that a nursery child in order to be chosen by her/his peers as their class representative must provide them with sweets as an enticement to vote them. The whole idea of individual merit is no longer seen as beneficial; the whole quintessence of politics becomes relationship-based (who knows who) rather than rules-based (efficiency and effectiveness).

The periodic rhythm of five years, which is too short to allow the building of any culture, does not augur well with progress in DEV and DEM as far as Uganda is concerned because whichever party may take power would want to begin afresh with its programme (if any at all). This is diametrically opposed to the very reality of continuity that would invoke the idea of building on and consolidating the achievements of the previous regimes. We behave as if we were 'the flies of a summer', which on the contrary unlike the flies, human beings and in this case Ugandans should have a link, a connection among generations. Such a precarious situation, lack of a link or continuity among generations of rule, is very common in the way in which both the governed and the governors appraise the art of governing and delivering on the promise of governance. They more often than not put all their efforts in thinking about today while disregarding on yesterday and tomorrow. No wonder, it is very common for a young man nowadays to decide to spend a whole day idle because he is not going to be paid there and then instead of working and be paid the next day. Many youths today tend to fulfil the Lord's Prayer (Give Us Today Our Daily Bread) to the letter. This attitude of working for 'daily bread', that is, the mentality of living in continual present has fatal consequences as far as DEM and DEV together with culture are concerned.

Besides enriching or impoverishing our language, it is not uncommon these days to hear of people in the villages, towns, or in urban centres talk of *kagwirawo (there and then)* or *tunonya kikumi (looking for one hundred shillings)* or *tunonya yalwaleero (looking for today's meal)*. *'Ka'* as in *ka-gwirawo* is a diminutive Luganda word that denotes, first and foremost, work that is not much and does not take long to accomplish; it must be done summarily and a small payment to be effected immediately. With such language, it is no wonder that many people in Uganda think at a micro level. They do minute business, for a short time, to get small

monies. It is the very reason why micro-finance institutions have found fertile ground and they continue to 'micronise' our people in all senses. That is why one finds almost everywhere, including the institutions of higher learning, people craving for or talking of minimum standards, a minimum of decency, a minimum wage, and minimum requirements. We are informed that many of the learned people do so invoking Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful* or the Bangladeshi Father of village banks, Yunus Mohammed, for models of development. The technocrats take these models piecemeal, forgetting to look at the time when these models were proposed, which again engenders a failure to focus on the long view of reality.

It is not surprising, then, to learn that many people demand to study short courses which many universities and other tertiary institutions have positively embraced. Certificates are then awarded to each candidate on successful completion of the course. Our policy makers' practice of a one-day consultative meeting wanting to gather opinions and ideas on important matters of concern to the country, which have yet persisted for a longer time, is reminiscent of this micro-mentality. That is why in planning administration, one may appear to be a stranger if one talked of a period beyond ten years' projections.

From a gastronomic point of view, short-termism automatically ends up in fast gastronomic habits with all its associated havoc. Concerning the aesthetics of landscape, short-cuts destroy the intended beauty of a field or a compound. With such a mentality one may not wonder why our daily newspapers report a lot about the prostitution industry where those involved fight over a 'quickie', a short-period of sexual encounter where one of the parties involved would wish to have it last longer than what the agreed amount of money permits.

'Daily breadism' which we here equate with 'short-termism' is reflected in the way people change in valuing resources. It is common to find people, especially the young ones, who sell the only piece of land (in most cases inherited, often bearing the burial places of the clan) that they possess and instead buy a *boda boda* (passenger motorbike) to do transport people as it is expected to bring in daily income. When one compares the long period and the toil one has to go through in cultivating the land, it becomes quicker and shorter to get money through a taxi business while apparently doing little work at a cost of disturbing the eternal rest of the dead. It also often happens that one sells land to buy a piece of iron sheet and a drum and goes to town to trap grasshoppers, a risky venture because it is not always certain that there will be a gainful harvest of these edible insects.

In politics, the same mentality is easily attested to whereby, on the eve of political elections, it is not uncommon to observe literally all candidates and their agents buy votes from voters, at a price of a soft drink, or a bar soap, a sachet of salt or sugar or a tot of packed liquor. When people try to think big, they often do it for the wrong motives. In Uganda it is common for people to plan big lavish 'introduction ceremonies' (pre-wedding parties) and wedding parties for which money they may not have but rather solicit from all possible sources. Who is not aware of the extravagant graduation parties, worse still for pass degrees, yet next day, the graduate

is among those on the streets chasing for an elusive job? Politicians too are culprits, as they often throw big lavish parties upon being elected using borrowed money at an interest rate, and later end up in court as witnesses to the nullification of the celebrated victory.

In all the above cases and the many more that we experience, all those who are involved do it with little regard of the triple dimension of time: past, present and future. Hence, the mentality of *kagwirawo* reigns. The three-time dimension is crystallised to a unilateral view of the moment. As such, the horizons turn myopic, short sighted and unable to form a synthesis between past, present and the future.

Anything to defend?

Experience shows that the way we behave immediately before, during and after elections (a performance of DEM) seems to indicate that we have nothing to defend as far as cultural heritage is concerned. The euphoria that engulfs the would-be regime change is typical of what Burke (1969) talks about history as consisting of miseries, for the greater part, brought upon the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all the train of disorderly appetites which shake the public with the same troublesome storms that toss the private state and render life un-sweet.

Again, that euphoria is seen as negating another common sense fact about states and societies, which ought to be understood as a contract. Burke (1969, p. 194-5) with whom we concur rightly observes:

> The state (society) is a partnership not to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and hence to be dissolved by the fancy of parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporal and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection.

> As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born.

> Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and moral natures, each in their appointed place.

By failing to acknowledge ourselves as a nation (which officially began in 1962), we refuse to go out of our tribal cocoons and through them we use them to destroy what would be our national cultural heritage. By so doing, we fail to make a cultural synthesis. We suppose that the motto of our country was very well chosen and in one way or another was intended to always remind us of that need, hence "For God and my Country". Instead what Uganda has lived through in her over half a century of

independence is in sheer opposition to the country's honourable motto; it is "For Tribe and my Stomach". Failure to forge a synthesis automatically indicates that there is something inherently wrong, because it implies that Uganda lacks the spiritual form of society; therefore, it is dead. For fifty-four years of independence, Uganda cannot speak well; she still stammers a lot for lack of a common national language. The science and techniques of our ancestors have been totally abandoned. For customs, apart from the sphere of costumes where we have almost made a synthesis, there is still a lot to be done. On the level of values, for example, religious and political values, we are not afraid to mention that we live as if we are still in the 1890s when religious wars were normal. It is not difficult to find in the suburbs of Kampala or elsewhere in the country duplicated or triplicated social services like schools or dispensaries, which are poorly furnished, for each religious denomination. This has always made us wonder whether there are things such as Catholic, Muslim or Anglican diseases to warrant such misallocation of resources. We continue to ask ourselves which religion, mathematics, English language or science professes to allow for the multiple existences of those ill-equipped schools?

Furthermore, we truly sympathise with our Muslim friends who, of recent, threatened to declare a holy war on the Ministry of Education of Uganda for not having included the study of Arabic on the syllabus of secondary education. Much as the study of Islam is included, the reason for the intended war was that the Holy Koran is written in Arabic. Likewise, our counterparts, the Christians, would agitate for not having included the study of Greek, Hebrew, Latin or Aramaic from which the Bible is written. Regrettably, in the name of religion, it is almost on daily menu to see macabre pictures in our newspapers of innocent people killed on the advice of the proponents of traditional religions who apparently recommend to the followers to sacrifice people, especially young children in the name of becoming prosperous.

We certainly need an ecumenism of values to put our development efforts to fight against the common enemies of DEV and DEM with common values. It is our universities and other tertiary institutions that should be the hearth of this ecumenism. Unfortunately, the more of those institutions we get the more we distance ourselves from the role of forging a cultural synthesis; instead, they promote the roots of disintegration or we pay lip service to such a call. Yet, without a strong cultural heritage, which hinges on language, technology, customs and values, thinking of meaningful DEV for Uganda is still far-fetched. The question that remains to be answered is whether there is a group of people that has ever developed using a foreign culture (language, technology, customs and values). If not, then we may need to be courageous enough to revisit what had been revived as home-grown trials of 1986.

The case of East Asia: DEM and DEV trails

For our analysis, East Asia is used in reference to both East and South East Asia, which according to McNicoll (2006, p.5) precisely includes Taiwan and South Korea (tiger economies), Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (second wave countries), and

China and Vietnam (market-Leninist economies)[3]. Krasilshchikov (2004) expresses the commonly accepted view that these together have been symbolised as the successful development patterns for the non-western regions. They provide the gold standard of development achievement, which "entailed rapid social development; the transformation of demographic regimes from high to low mortality and fertility and a strong expansion in secondary education on top of near-Universal primary schooling. Through some combination of good judgment and historical luck these countries got the settings right" (McNicoll, 2006, p.5).

External factors for East Asia take-off

We would like to attribute 'historical luck' to what Krasilshchikov calls the structural changes in the Western economies as well as the concrete global situation. That one consisted in the export-orientation, which was conditioned by the removal of mass assembly line production to the East, while the markets for their outputs remained linked to the West. Besides, the United States of America and its allies were eager to restrain the Maoist and Soviet expansion and so they supported the local elites to build 'good capitalism.' The other was the comparative advantage they got from the decline of the development strategies in other regions of the third world and convinced the West that their countries could be modernised better than those other countries.

In addition, we take 'good judgment' to consist of what again Krasilshchikov calls the 'enforced modernisation' which was the only way to neutralise a lot of threats and jeopardy that hung over the East Asian nations during the 1960s and 1970s when political instability and uncertainty were the indistinguishable features of everyday life for the region.

Internal factors

To Fritzen (2003), the relationships between bureaucrats and politicians played a key role where an 'embedded autonomy' of bureaucracy could serve as midwives to economic development under four conditions. First, a political leadership determined to pursue a transformational agenda with little fear of electoral backlash. The second is a meritocracy, which is a technically competent bureaucracy capable of successfully intervening in the economy. The third condition is an embedded bureaucracy enjoying dense informational links to the companies and market sectors to be promoted. Lastly, an autonomous bureaucracy, which is not captured by any special interest and therefore capable of disciplining capital by, for instance, stopping subsidies where this was necessary. Fritzen was quick to intimate that the development model which was employed by the 'tigers' clearly involved less of a

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[3] Singapore is purposely left out as it depicts characteristics of a city-state, which these others do not have and for motives of comparison, the so-called Third World countries are nowhere near to becoming city-states.

steel-frame, disciplined bureaucracy than that implied by the embedded autonomy theory.

Apart from purely economic (macro-economic stability, effective industrial policy) and institutional (good governance, adequate management, mass education) factors, Krasilshchikov raises an important point which is oftentimes neglected. He argues that the socio-cultural traditions including religions and ethical views of the East Asian people played if not a major but definitely significant role in the rise of Asian 'miracle.' It consisted in a compromise between traditions and modernity, which Krasilshchikov termed as 'conservative modernisation' or 'authoritarian modernisation', and which Lee and Matahir, former prime ministers of Singapore and Malaysia respectively, referred to as the 'Asian way' comprising of economic development under limited democratisation which they say is most compatible with Asian values.

McNicoll (2006), therefore, seems to have neglected the contribution of the various Asian religious and ethical traditions in their development process and made an erratic conclusion that 'Asian values' is a culturist term in heavy disfavour, a weak apologia for authoritarian rule that was advanced often by the rulers themselves. Krasilshchikov (2004) seems to be more credible when he attributes the main social agent of the East Asian industrial modernisation to the developmental state whose strength was based upon the partnership between the state officials and entrepreneurs. This state corresponded to some essential principles of the Confucian ideal of a highly moral, socially responsible officialdom, true for managerial, functional capitalism under a strong bureaucratic hierarchy and organisational discipline. Buddhism's contribution is seen from its endeavour to achieve harmony and its attitude that oriented an individual towards the moral and intellectual self-perfection. It is instigated to smoothening various conflicts and sanctified propensity to saving and moderateness, and accustomed to be obedient and respectful to senior members of community. Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism called for indispensable accomplishment of duties by each person, whether he/she was a top manager of a big corporation, a university intellectual or an unskilled worker at an assembly line. Krasilshchikov concludes by remarking that such a synthesis alleviated inevitable inconveniences and tensions conditioned by rapid social transformations in the process of transition from the traditional towards modern industrial society. It can hence be argued that the Asian way described above is a true vindication of the multidimensionality of DEM and DEV.

Former Malaysian Premier, Mahathir bin Mohamad, once showed his indignation about the term 'East Asian Miracle' when he wrote that "personally I never liked the term 'East Asian Miracle' because it seemed to imply that our accomplishments were achieved through some form of magic rather than through hard work, blood, tears and genius of our people" (1999, p. 27). This was complimented by his counterpart's view, former Singaporean Premier Lee Kuan Yew, who is reported by the *Economist* of 27 August 1994 as saying that "I believe what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy. The exuberance of democracy leads to indiscipline and disorderly conduct which are inimical to development."

These views seem to coincide well with a vision of society that had earlier on been enunciated by Burke cited in O' Brian (1969, p.213):

> […] to enable men to act with the weight and character of a people and to answer the ends for which they are incorporated into that capacity we must suppose them to be in that state of habitual social discipline in which the wiser, the more expert, and the more opulent, conduct and by conducting, enlighten and protect the weaker, the less knowing and the less provided with the goods of fortune. When the multitudes are not under this discipline, they can scarcely be said to be in civil society.

We take what Mahathir, Lee, and Burke say as referring to strong leadership, order and stability. These found a natural home in authoritarian states. Now, we should be very careful not to confuse or equate authoritarianism with autocracy and despotism. We take the former to be paternalistic and to be sincerely concerned with the destiny of its people, which people it takes not to know what is expected of it; therefore, it takes responsibility-authority to guide them oftentimes with stringent measures. Paternalism is the same as protectionism and in East Asia it became to be identified with what we may term as the 'insulation effect.' The meaning was well expressed by Bardhan when he posited that the East Asian success story in development over the 60s, 70s and 80s has convinced many that some degree of insulation of the bureaucracy in charge of formulating long-run development policies and guiding their implementation from the ravages of short-run pork barred politics is important. Such insulation came to be reflected in the internal organisation of the state itself, which depended on highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards for members of the bureaucracy as the enabling conditions for institutions in East Asia. The latter, however, is interested in the self-aggrandisement of a clique in power without caring about the destiny of others. This is the same as dictatorship, which is opposed to strong leadership. The interest of dictatorship is in oppressing its subjects in order to exploit them for its own benefit. The former is patriotic whereas the latter is not. In recruitment, it does not look at merit; it is characterised by looting of the national resources for personal gain. It is exactly here that many African countries differ from the East Asia ones.

In the case of East Asia, besides being in the habitual social discipline, the state, as Bajpai (2003) and many others have observed, provided the key disciplines and very little is heard about competition policy or law in the endless accounts of triumph of the Asian tigers. Talking about good governance and discipline, Bajpai mentions self-discipline by management, market discipline and regulatory discipline. In all these cases, the state provides internal checks and balances; the state controls economic agents so that they do not distort the market; the state provides disciplined fiscal and monetary system; basic support services, such as law and order, a conducive legal environment, a decent supervisory and regulatory infrastructure and a reliable accounting system.

All that glitters is not gold

The achievements of the 'tigers' came with a price—that of restricting political opposition and offering little if any scope of redress of claims against authority. Krasilshchikov enumerates four factors, which he calls "internal vulnerabilities" which lay behind the economic growth figures. First, the total factor productivity's contribution to the economic dynamics of the tigers, that is, the input resources growth and the increase in Gross Domestic Product was low/moderate compared to the inflows of capital and labour force. Second, like any accelerated enforced development, the growth of the tigers had been uneven as reflected in the success of addressing macroeconomic disproportions that pierced the whole economy and influenced the social sphere, though this hid the real costs. Besides, the export expansion had been accompanied by the growing imbalance between outward and inward looking sectors of their economies. This was true in terms of foreign direct investment, the use of advanced technologies, the development state's untiring attention, and wages discriminations. Third, gross domestic investments grew much faster than private and public consumption per capita. As a result, a relatively insufficient level of private consumption had been one of the factors that prevented the formation of a labour force that was capable of creating new technologies. Fourth, the scientific technological policy of the development state was oriented to imitation of the borrowed technologies than to elaboration of proper ones.

McNicoll (2006) seems to have captured the whole scene when he observed that offsetting the gains for development, in a broader calculus, was a far less admirable record on human rights! Moreover, we remark that these East Asian countries put a lot of energy in reminding their citizens of their involuntary human duties especially learning how to create wealth and peace, maintain them, and share them.

Reconciling DEV with DEM: A symbiosis of Douglas McGregor and Julius Nyerere

For anything related to hard work as a key factor in the struggle for well-being, both McGregor and Nyerere make very important observations, which, if well understood, would certainly make significant contributions towards the attitude that leaders should have and cultivate in society.

McGregor (1960) made assumptions about peoples' attitude towards work. He seemed to assume that there are two categories of people. The first category is that of those whom he supposes to inherently dislike work and would try to avoid it if they can. Because they dislike work, they have to be coerced, controlled and threatened to work by authorities. These want to be directed; they do not like responsibility, though they want to feel secure at work. So they are much fitter to work at shop floor, mass manufacturing and production because this is conducive to large-scale efficient operations. To manage them, authoritarian and hard management are most suitable. McGregor names this Theory X. We call these the 'Unwilling Goers.'

The second category is what McGregor terms Theory Y. We call them the 'Willing Goers.' These take work as natural and spend the same amount of physical and mental effort in their work as in their private lives. Once motivated they are self-

directing; once satisfied with the work, they are committed, accept and seek responsibility, and are imaginative and creative. Therefore, they are they much fitter to work as professionals and knowledge workers, conducive to participative and complex problem-solving. To manage them, application of participative and soft management is most suitable. McGregor's preferable model and management style is that of Theory Y, although he thought that it was more applicable in small-scale operations.

We argue that the two categories of people are found in different organisations, institutions, small or big, and the same applies to nations. Depending on which category seems to dominate, it may determine the level of DEV and DEM in a particular entity. The teachers who manage a class will bear us witness. If all the students were willing goers then that would be the best class that one would like always to have. However, the facts show that there are always a number of unwilling goers, whom the teacher cannot simply neglect, especially (and worse still) when they are the majority. Certainly, the style of dealing and treating them will differ. It would be like drilling them and acting paternalistically to make them appreciate the teacher's point of view.

It is our belief that apart from other contributory factors, one of the major reasons why the so-called Third World countries are poor in DEV and DEM is that in their arrangement, at all the different levels of activities, the Unwilling Goers tend to dominate. The only way to manage them would be to use authoritarian leadership, which would not rule out coercion and use of force. But because of the vote backlash that these regimes have entangled themselves in, the would-be hard leaders tend to soften and in so doing they allow their nations to remain in such a mess of poverty in DEV and DEM. Those which are considered developed managed to drill their Unwilling Goers) in such a way that they made them turn into Willing Goers even at the risk of being labelled dictators.

Mwalimu Nyerere in his *The Arusha Declaration* of 1967, Part II, drawing from the African traditional heritage, echoes the above rendition. He argues that all people are expected to be workers, so that they may move from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity (Part III on self-reliance). In the sub-topic 'The people and Agriculture,' he is emphatic on the fact that development of a country is brought about by people and not money.

In concluding the Declaration, Mwalimu outlines four conditions of DEV in the following terms: hard work, intelligence, good policies and good leadership. It is from his description of what hard work should look like that his observations of peoples' attitude towards work clearly come out. He seemed to observe three categories of people: those who are bent to a short working week of 45-48 hours (in reference to all who earn a salary especially from public enterprises); there are men who live in villages and some of the women in towns who are on leave for half of their lifetime. The third category includes women in villages who work 14-15 hours a day. In regard to our analysis, the first two groups are the Unwilling Goers and the third category constitutes the Willing Goers.

What Nyerere observed early in his country was that there were millions of men in villages and thousands of women in towns whose energies were wasted in gossip; dancing and drinking; loitering in towns and villages without doing any work and some paying visits and staying a long time among relatives and doing no work. Certainly, if a country or an organisation is dominated by such a category of people, one cannot think of any type of sensible development to take place. In order to manage such, Mwalimu advised on the use good policies consisting of: (i) That people in developing economies should go for a long working week because a short one is meant for those already developed; (ii) That nobody goes and stays a long time with their relative(s) doing no work because in doing so the former will be exploiting the latter; (iii) That nobody should be allowed to loiter in towns and villages without doing work which would enable them to be self-reliant without exploiting their relatives.

As we write, there millions of men and women in Uganda who, on a daily basis, are busy freely and happily working. One thinks of those in the fields of all sorts, sweating with cultivation, fishing, rearing animals and birds; those who are in different institutions of learning, hospitals, churches, mosques, temples, factories; and those working in different service industries like the food catering, entertainment, media, transport, police and the army, and in public as well private offices minding less of the short working week. They seem to be on the hidden side, yet it is on these that our country depends for most of its income. It is to this group of the Willing Goers who sacrifice their time, their love and their souls to help others and to somehow build a better future for all our children, whose work, whose struggle, whose courage and life's journey are in the footsteps of the Uganda Martyrs. However, in today's Uganda, the category of the Unwilling Goers (who comprise of McGregor's Theory X) seem to constitute the majority of the populace.

Re-calibrating DEM and DEV: Lessons for Uganda

First and foremost, we are inclined to fully buy Leftwich's view that highlights the primacy of politics and not simply governance as the central determinant of development. Uganda is being asked to track the double route of democratic politics and economic liberalism that we are afraid to concur with Leftwich (2002). Nowhere in the world has this ever been associated with the critical early breakthroughs from agrarianism to industrialism. Actually, the foundations of most modern advanced industrial economies were laid under non-democratic or highly limited democratic conditions. What makes us to think differently when it comes to Uganda? The sooner we revisit Museveni's no party politics or Yasser Arafat's zero democracy or Nyerere's Arusha Declaration the better for our country. Today, Uganda needs a strong developmental state, which must make its presence actively felt at all levels of the administrative structure, which are already in place.

The second important lesson is an observation which was made by Krasilshchikov that technological transfer and access to Western markets was a much more efficient form of economic assistance for East Asia than the donations and loans that had been plundered by dishonest, corrupt officials and top position cheats typical of the so-

called Third World countries. Besides, Onegi-Obel (2006) rightly remarks that the aid industry does not create jobs. Since it might not be easy to get this technological transfer, the developmental state must support the home-grown appropriate technologies, the likes of Katwe (commonly known as *jua kali*) workshops. In addition, this developmental state must enable the engineering of new forms of technologies from institutions of higher learning with the faculties of science and technology. Needless to emphasise is the fact that these new forms of technologies must be in consonance with socio-cultural and ethical considerations as well as the socio-historical conditioning in question. This knowledge can be gained from institutions of higher learning with faculties of humanities and social sciences. As for the markets, they may not necessarily be Western markets, but now Uganda should be able to utilise and benefit from the relative peace in the African Great Lakes Region in terms of its market expansion. Uganda, therefore, must rethink its policies of privatisation and liberalisation and create a developmental state, with an embedded and autonomous bureaucracy of technically competent cadres who must have partnership with industries and entrepreneurs with implementing powers. Important of all, these must be present and felt at all levels of the administrative structure.

With this, Uganda will need to form a domestic code of discipline to reflect a work ethic, saving culture, accessible and amenable education, health and housing, protection of industries within a sound ecology, and development-induced land ownership and use. Consequently, the developmental state in Uganda, instead of bickering with traditional social organised structures, it should try to make a synthesis and build on the already existing structure. With the traditions still strong, the developmental state can only form a conservative modernisation typical of East Asia. Connected to this is a strategy to develop its human capital. While Africa and for that matter Uganda, sent and still sends students abroad, it does so without a well spelt-out human resource strategy, as Onegi-Obel observes. Yet, East Asia, for the most part, deliberately developed its human capital by sending groups of students to targeted faculties in the best universities of the West with *a priori* plan. This strategy would include compulsory primary and secondary education as well as primary healthcare.

We conclude this section by noting that the road Uganda is being forced to walk on its way towards DEM and DEV is a wrong one because no country has ever trodden that path and succeeded. So, Uganda has to take the normal route of hard work, blood, tears and genius of our people. And we must add that what the dynagraphs of Goldstone and Kocornik (2005) depict in the case of Uganda is not only normal when the two phenomena of DEV and DEM interact, but they bring out another important observation that to attain the two, it would be like going through a labyrinth to get it right: one must go through each and every room; there are no short-cuts.

Conclusion: Uganda, the 'Asian tiger' of Africa?

In his concluding remarks in the Budget Speech of 2008-9 financial year, former Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Ezra Suruma, observed, "We have cause to thank God that our country's speed of economic progress (8.9% in

real terms for 2007/08) is comparable to that of the fastest growing economies of the world such as the People's Republic of China and India. It is fitting to hope that the world will soon recognise that there are also 'African Tigers' and Uganda is certainly one of them." There is no doubt that this can happen. What does not appear to be clear is whether the Minister was aware of the fact that there are millions of Ugandans who are idle; and therefore, will certainly retard the realisation of his hope. He did not address the McGregor X group except in one instance whereby he talked of having committed a fund for the landless class to get a loan to acquire land.

It is undeniable that Uganda's vision of economic and social transformation and of prosperity for all the people is achievable given the opportunities in relative home and regional peace and markets as well as the readiness seen by the Government to take the lead in provision of the necessary public goods and services. However, the following factors must be addressed if we want to see Suruma's hope take shape:

- Repayment of a cultural debt which unlike the financial debts that may be condoned by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the United Nations. This one cannot even be condoned by UNESCO; it is Uganda to do it by forging a cultural synthesis. The responsibility is more directed to Uganda's educational institutions, its universities squarely charged. In terms of values, can we emulate the sacrifice, patience, work, struggle, courage and life of the Uganda Martyrs who as we are informed embraced the major religions in Uganda?

- Systematic rejection of foreign aid because it does not create truly developmental jobs.

- Technology transfer to be made appropriate and endogenised.

- Rethinking the settlement patterns of people, by drawing a systematic master geo-physical plan, for easier distribution of social amenities and infrastructure.

It is true that Uganda has a law against being idle and disorderly which is weakly and erratically enforced. Indeed, what is missing is to systematically and seriously enforce this law. This can only happen if Government makes its presence felt everywhere up to the point of always reminding each one of its citizens, especially, the *unwilling goers* that they have involuntary obligations they contract by the mere fact of belonging to Uganda. One such obligation is to work. If they are reluctant to work, the developmental state has a right and duty to force them to work. Only when this is addressed without fear of vote backlash and favour, then shall 'the world soon recognise that there are also 'African Tigers' and Uganda would certainly be one of them'[4].

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[4] One lesson will have to be learnt from Uganda's colonial legacy, when people wanted to resist growing coffee. The colonial government did not 'spare the rod to spoil the child,' but used 'kiboko' (caning) and stringent measures to make them grow it by force. The unprocessed coffee, therefore, came to be known

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as Kiboko and we understand that it contributes a lot as far as foreign earning is concerned. Furthermore, we must not deceive ourselves that in the beginning there is peaceful development. As argued elsewhere, development by nature is violent (Smitu Kothari and Wendy Harcourt, "Introduction: the violence of development" in D*evelopment*, 2004, Vol. 47 (3-7) URL: *http://www.palgrave-journalscom/development/journal/V47/n1/pdf/1100024a).* Our duty, therefore, would always be to control the violence embedded in it.

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