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Coping with urban crime and resilience factors: The case of the Maasai security guards in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

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Abstract

Academic literature on cities portrays urban residents as passive victims of crime highlighting mainly their strategies in coping with it, strategies which are often not very successful. Using the case study of the Maasai security guards in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, this paper purports that urban residents are not simply passive victims of crime but also deploy various capacities of coping with the threat. The paper examines crime threat among the guards to determine the guards' capacities of coping with the threat and recommend factors for enhancing such capacities. Based on the multi-layered social resilience framework, a qualitative approach was utilised drawing on 64 in-depth interviews, three FGDs, observations and a review of secondary data. The study revealed that on the one hand, the guards managed to develop reactive and less proactive capacities of coping with the crime threat mainly based on the individual, household, community level and to a lesser degree national and international levels. On the other hand, migrants' coping capacities were impeded by their lack of modern weapons, formal security skills and training, limited access to mobile phones and knowledge in using them. These factors should be considered in supporting the guards to more competently cope with the threat. These findings shed light on alternative ways of understanding and alleviating the negative consequences of crime among urban security guards and other urban residents.

Keywords: Security work, urban crime, threats, Maasai migrants, coping strategies, resilience

Introduction

Owing to rapid urbanisation, cities all over the world and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa are confronted with high crime incidences leading to retardation of socio-economic development and urban unsustainability (Muggah, 2014; United Nations,

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2014). Crime levels in Nairobi, Luanda and Lagos for instance are recorded as 78.49, 76.39, and 80.88 respectively, in terms of crime victims. Statistics are slightly worse in South African cities with rates of 80.56; 82.45; 87.89; 91.61;87.5 and 85.71 in Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg, and Rustenburg consecutively as found in the literature. In Tanzania, urban residents are around three times more likely to be victims of crime compared to their rural counterparts (UN-HABITAT, 2014; URT, 2011). Indeed, half of the population living in urban centres in Tanzania feel that crime and violence has increased over the past three years (UN-HABITAT, 2014). The nature of crime experienced in African and Tanzanian cities in particular ranges from petty crime to the armed and organized crime, including murder, robbery, homicides, sexual offences, consumer fraud with theft being the most commonly cited forms (Hove, Ngwerume & Muchemwa, 2013; UN-HABITAT, 2014).

Urban crime is associated with well-known urbanisation-related phenomena notably, increased population, cultural diversity, improved mobility and interaction, as well as physical environmental heterogeneity that attracts individuals and groups with various backgrounds and behaviours (Shopeju, 2007). Massive urban economic and social investments such as banks and shopping centres come hand in hand with increased opportunities for robbery thus exacerbating conditions that lead to crime, and calling upon security services (Owusu, 2016; Shopeju, 2007). Crime is further triggered by government failure to respond to urbanisation forces, e.g. failure in the provision of settlements and other social services. Indeed, expansion of urban spaces lowers the capacity of governments and urban authorities to provide urban security and to supply basic social infrastructures notably health, education, water, and sewage disposal facilities. This leads to a rapid growth of unplanned development e.g. slums that further compound the challenges of security and crime (Shopeju, 2007).

Urban crime is further fuelled by urban poverty and inequalities (Msoka, 2014; UN-HABITAT, 2014; Wakefield & Tait, 2015). This is to say that faced with unemployment, frustrated and deprived of rights, the poor and the marginalised are inclined to engage in crime with the purposes of attaining various needs (Hove et al., 2013; Owusu, 2016). Indeed people of low socioeconomic status tend to engage in crime as a result of their socialization experiences leading them to have attitudes that are conducive to crime (Pare & Felson, 2014, in Owusu, 2016, p. 4).

Urban residents have employed various strategies for coping with crime and theft in particular which is the main focus of this paper. The strategies include, but are not limited to, building walls and electrical fences around houses as well as embedding spikes such as broken bottles atop the security walls (Landman & Schonteich, 2002). Other urban dwellers make use of security cameras in their households and engage in participatory security work (Msoka, 2014). A common way of coping with urban

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crime which is as well a focus in this paper is the engagement of security firms and groups by individual households or companies. While the relatively well-to-do urban dwellers are using private security firms, other urban communities are organising themselves into neighbourhood self-protection groups, and as vigilantes (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2015; Hove et al., 2013; Msoka, 2014).

Several works have looked at urban based crime. One strand of research has focused on the nature and causes of urban crime in urban areas and possible ways of alleviating them (Hove et al., 2013; Shopeju, 2007; UN-HABITAT, 2014). Another strand of research has related crime with urbanisation (Satterthwaite, 2008; Shaw & Carli, 2011). Other research has looked at urban crime and violence in urban formal and informal spaces (Wakefield & Tait, 2015) as well as urban youth challenges and crime (Gupte, teLintelo & Barnett, 2014; Msoka, 2014; Munishi, 2013; United Nations, 2014). Incidentally, these works have not paid specific attention to the nature of crime experienced by the urban security guards and their capacity to cope with such threat. Nearly no attention has been paid to non-professional security guards, notably, those hailing from poor and marginalized backgrounds.

This study intends to fill this gap by focusing on the Maasai security guards in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The Maasai migrants provide a classic example of the marginalised, unskilled labourers serving as non-professional security guards in various Tanzanian cities. The Maasai started migrating to urban centres in the 1990's due to the decline of the cattle economy resulting from bad weather, cattle diseases as well as confiscation of their land (Fratkin, 2001; May & Ole Ikayo, 2007; Munishi, 2013; URT, 2011). While in 2007 nearly 5,000 to 6,000 Maasai pastoralists were migrating to Dar es Salaam (May & Ole Ikayo, 2007) In 2012, around 8,000 to 9,000 Maasai migrants were estimated to be present in Kinondoni District alone (one of the districts of Dar es Salaam) (Riley, Olengurumwa & Olesangale, 2012).

There are several reasons that make the case of the Maasai urban migrants relevant. Maasai migrant workers have experienced social, economic, political and environmental marginalisation (Munishi, 2013) that are considered to have denied them a number of important livelihood entitlements essential for coping with the urban crime threat (Kweka, 2011; May & Ole Ikayo, 2007). The Maasai have lost massive chunks of land to conservation and countless number of cattle to drought and diseases. They have been denied social amenities such as education, clean water, and road infrastructure mainly due to their semi-nomadic culture that did not allow them to practise sedentary life but also due to lopsided institutions that did not take into account their needs (Ole Kaunga, 2007). In the end, Maasai society has been denied equal and meaningful political representation (Ole Kaunga, 2007).

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The main objective of this paper is to determine Maasai guards' capacity to cope with the crime threat and recommend factors for helping them to more competently cope with threats. The paper concentrates on Dar es Salaam, the largest and fastest growing commercial city in Tanzania that has attracted migrants from different corners of the country. The paper therefore, informs researchers and policy-makers concerning the effective ways of strengthening resilience of the urban marginalised groups by providing fresh insights into the debate on crime nature and resilience factors among the urban security guards. Indeed, an understanding of crime-related threats and coping strategies among the Maasai security guards could further facilitate improvement of the existing interventions as well as formulate more effective and culturally appropriate interventions to strengthen the guards' capacities in coping with crime related threats.

Theoretical and conceptual framework

This paper is guided by the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist, Pfeiffer & Henley, 2010). Applying this framework in the context of this paper, social resilience is regarded as social actors' capacities to draw capitals from different social layers to cope with and adjust to crime threats "reactive capacities" and to search for and create options as "proactive capacities" in order to develop competencies of coping with the threats. This framework borrows heavily from ecological (Carpenter & Walker, 2001; Holling, 1973), psychological (Luthar & Zelazo, 2003; Masten, 2001) and socio-anthropological approaches (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986) as well as from the sustainable livelihoods framework of the UK Department for International Development (DfID, 2000).

According to this framework, resilience building must be examined with reference to a threat and to the competencies that should be developed to deal with the particular threat. Depending on the threat under examination, different social fields emerge, each of them consisting of a network of actors across various layers of society. These individual, social, and societal actors can build resilience by strengthening reactive and proactive capacities to deal more competently with the threat. To strengthen their capacities, actors can draw on and transform economic, social, and cultural capital(s) and thus increase symbolic capital (i.e. power) to cope with the threat. The ability to mobilise different forms of capital varies according to actors' position [power] in the social field (Obrist et al., 2010, p. 289).

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Fig. 1: Analytical framework (Obrist et al., 2010)

It is important to note that 'reactive' capacities are direct reactions towards a threat that is taking place or just took place, while 'proactive' capacities are understood as abilities/initiatives such as anticipating threats, changing rules and regulations, creating new options, planning ahead, and recognizing danger (Obrist et al., 2010). Capacities enable social actors to cope with and adjust to adverse conditions ('reactive'), and subsequently create options and responses ('proactive') necessary to increase competence, and thus create pathways for mitigating adversity or threat(s) (Obrist et al., 2010).

In contexts of adversity, positive adjustment based on a learning process is an essential dimension of resilience and leads to increased competence in dealing with challenging livelihood conditions such as crime threat. This framework is useful in several ways. Firstly, like the sustainable livelihood framework of the DfID (2000), it also recognises capitals notably social, economic, cultural, and symbolic capitals as prerequisites for resilience building processes.

Secondly, the framework recognises threats or barriers to resilience building by drawing researchers' attention to question "resilience to what threat" and "what particular threat or risk being examined", thus, redirecting researchers to be explicit about whether they study resilience to a single hazard or to multiple hazards, to recurring, chronic or seasonal threats, etc. It also assesses whether the affected individuals, groups or organisations are aware of a threat. Indeed, if the actors are

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unaware of the threat to be tackled, the situation is considered as not just a danger but also a risk (DfID, 2000, p. 280).

Thirdly, the framework views resilience building as a multi-layered process involving social networks ranging from individual, household, community, meso, national and international levels. This is to say that exchanges between the different layers can improve actors' capacity to cope with threat through accessing resources, learning from experience and developing constructive ways of dealing with problems (Glavovic, Scheyvens & Overton, 2003).

Fourthly, the framework redirects attention to actors' personal strengths and support emanating from institutions surrounding them. Most works that have examined threat (Turner, Roger, MacKarthy, Robert & Lindesay, 2003) have been guided by a deficit approach which emphasises risk and inability to cope (Obrist et al., 2010). The strength aspect of this framework is considered useful in the context of this paper because it raises a positive perspective that draws attention to the ability of the Maasai security guards to positively adjust to crime threat they encounter (Dongus, Pfeiffer & Metta, 2010; Obrist et al., 2010).

Lastly, resilience thinking can provide researchers and policy-makers with solution-oriented way of thinking about populations at risk, qualifying it to be mitigation oriented framework (Dongus et al., 2010). This aspect is useful in this paper as it facilitates suggestions for remedial measures for enhancing the Maasai security guards' resilience to crime threat.

Methodology

This study utilised both qualitative and quantitative data. The study included a total of 64 in-depth interviews including fifty Maasai security guards and fourteen key informants. Moreover, three focus group discussions (FGD) were held with the Maasai security guards in Dar es Salaam while observations and secondary data review were carried out. Key informants (Maasai elders, employers and community leaders) were interviewed to provide first-hand information about the nature of crime faced by the Maasai security guards since they interacted with the guards more closely almost on the daily basis. This helped to triangulate data and ensure reliability and validity as required in qualitative approach.

While the Maasai security guards were selected purposely based on the snowball sampling, a great care was taken to ensure that a representative sample was selected from the three districts of Dar es Salaam, namely Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke. Table 2 details the sample size.

Table 1: Respondents and levels of interviews and FGDs

Levels of respondents in Dar es Salaam	Kinondoni	Ilala	Temeke	Sub-total
District level: District Councillor (DC)	1			1
Division level: Division Executive Officer (DEOs)	1			1
Ward level: Ward Executive Officer (WEOs)	1	1	1	3
Mtaa/Street level: Street Executive Officer (SEOs)	1	1		2
Meso Level : NGOs/ CBOS/ FBOs officials	1	1	1	3
Community level: Maasai elders / employers	2	1	1	4
Individual level (Maasai security guards)	20 1 FGD	15 1 FGD	15 1 FGD	50 3 FGDs
GRAND TOTAL				64

Initially, the study aimed at including both male and female migrants. However, during data collection it became clear that it is mainly men who migrate. Only three young female migrants could be traced. Maasai women usually get married at young age and are traditionally responsible for raising the kids and taking care of the livestock (National Museum of Tanzania, 2004).The field team consisted of a researcher himself and two assistants who were graduates, proficient in Maasai, Kiswahili and English Languages but also well trained in qualitative research interview skills. All interviews were carried out in Maa (Maasai language) and Swahili, recorded in audio tapes and later on transcribed and translated into English.

During interviews calm environment and privacy was maintained at the maximum. Interviews with most Government and NGO officials took place in their offices, while discussion with the Maasai employers and elders took place either in their homes or at work places. Importantly, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted in very convenient venues where all the participants could easily access and feel comfortable to express themselves. During FGDs one facilitator acted as moderator of the activity, while the other one was responsible for taking notes and later on producing a handwritten transcript. Lastly, the Swahili transcriptions were translated into English

and handwritten transcripts were typed and saved as documents in rich text format. Content analysis of the transcriptions was done in MAXQDA 10 [VERBI Software, Marburg, Germany]. Data was grouped accordingly; codes were generated, leading to categories and themes. Quantitative data was analysed using the mixed method function of MAXQDA 10 software.

Findings and Discussion

A: Nature of crime security guards encountered

Generally, the Maasai security guards in Dar es Salaam were attacked, mistreated, injured or even killed by thieves interested in the valuables that they were taking care of. Specifically, 55 per cent (n=50) of the interviewed Maasai migrant youth attested to have either witnessed or fallen victims of attacks by the thieves while discharging their duties as security guards mainly during the night. This data corresponds well with the previous studies which maintain that Maasai security guards operated under constant attacks, mainly from gangs who intended to steal from their working sites (Kweka, 2011; Ole Kaunga, 2002, 2007).

Maasai security guards experienced mainly two major types of crime at their work places. The first type was large-scale attacks that involved professional and heavily armed gangs, who tended to steal larger and more valuable items such as vehicles, machines and equipment worth huge sums of money. The guards involved in this kind of attacks were beaten and tied up with ropes and also locked inside to give way for the gangs. This situation would also cause the migrants serious injuries, disabilities and deaths, as evidenced a testimony below:

> They had particularly come to steal from BRAC [a local microfinance organisation located in the suburbs of Dar es Salaam]. They shot on the air two times. Our friends [other Maasai security guards] who were keeping guard here disappeared, of course! They [thieves] managed to break in and collected for themselves many valuables including cash money. Even the Maasai keeping guide around the neighbourhoods took off *(Male Maasai migrant youth (26), Dar es Salaam).*

The second kind of attacks experienced by the Maasai security guards were small-scale attacks committed by some petty thieves, who do not steal large and highly valuable items such as vehicles. They steal small items such as car spare parts, including car side mirrors, batteries, car seats, lights, wires, etc. which they can quickly and cheaply sell in order to earn their living. Petty thieves became a serious

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crime threat to the guards given that they were always under the influence of drugs as well as using dangerous weapons, such as knives, razors, stones, etc. to threaten the security guards. This caused the migrants some physical harm as explained below:

> There are many *vibaka* [petty thieves] around here who are always intending to steal from my place of work [as a watchman], (...) so I have to be extra careful as I chase them away because they can simply turn against me. (...) they tend to be targeting at me as they know that once they overpower me they can easily steal some car items like side mirrors etc. (...) and this is exactly where I enter into problems with my bosses [employers] (*Male Maasai youth migrant (30) Dar es Salaam).*

The guards explained that crime was further worsened by the fact that gangs used sophisticated weapons, while the Maasai security guards did not have such advanced weapons to defend themselves. The results corroborate well with previous studies among the Maasai security guards in Tanzania (Munishi, 2013) as well as among some rural-urban migrants in South African cities (Min-Harris, 2010) and Ghana (Kwankye, Anafi, Tagoe, & Castaldo, 2007). One security guard in a motorcar repair garage substantiates this:

> You can see all this property here [vehicles] (...) how much do you think they are worth? This is the reason why the thieves will always attack us using very strong weapons and steal from us. And you know what, before getting hold of these precious items they start by injuring us first. How can we fight them or even defend ourselves given the nature of our weapons [too rudimentary weapons]? (*Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)***.**

B: Reactive capacities of coping with crime

The foregoing section has demonstrated the nature and extent of crime experienced by the Maasai security guards. The following two subsections build on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al., 2010) to present factors related to resilience building processes that lead to improved competence of the guards in overcoming the crime threat while discharging security services in the urban areas. The sections present 'reactive' and 'proactive' capacities that security guards developed at various situations in the bid to overcome the crime threats.

A common reactive capacity of coping with crime developed by the migrants was their ability to run away from work places, as well as hiding whenever attacked or

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anticipated attacks from the gangs. This strategy was evidenced by 32 percent (n=50) of migrants as further attested below.

> There is nothing else we can do other than running away (...) the truth of the matter is that we have to run away as we cannot [afford] fighting the gangs using such weapons [swords and sticks]. As you can see we are using only our sticks and the machetes to defend ourselves. How then do you expect us to be able to compete with guns [gangs with guns]? (*Male Maasai youth migrant (28), Dar es Salaam).*

The guards further coped with attacks through changing their traditional attire and wearing other kinds of clothing before hiding or running away from the gangs. The guards did this to specifically camouflage themselves from criminals. Consequently, this strategy prevented the migrants from being easily identified by the gangs:

> In most cases when thieves break into a place that is being watched, the Maasai security guards obviously become a target of aggression as he has to be disabled before he can allow the gangs to leave with some valuables. So, one of the ways in which the Maasai use to avoid this situation is changing their traditional clothes before escaping *(Female key informant (29) Dar es Salaam).*

Another reactive capacity was seeking support from the neighbourhood as evidenced by 23 percent (n=50) of the security guards. Indeed some urban residents provided the guards with some insecurity related tips such as perceived organised crimes or attacks, as well as coming to their rescue. Some security guards also coped with the crime threat by offering free security services to people or households around their working places so that these people would come to their rescue if attacked, as attested by one of the migrants below:

> At times, it is also good to build relationship with the *waswahili* [Non Maasai] so that once they can inform you in case they foresee any possible future invasions. Last time our friend at Mbagala Ward was saved by a S*wahili* who over-heard some people planning to steal from him. He reported to his boss and that night his boss hired many of us to support each other, although we did not manage to arrest them, we chased them away and in this way they [the thieves] realized that we were vigilant at work *(Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam.*

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Another important reactive capacity of coping with crime employed by the guards was the use of mobile phones, as evidenced by 52 percent (n=50) of migrants and 54 percent (n=30) of the key informants. In particular, Maasai migrant youth used mobile phones to call employers, friends, or police to come to their rescue once attacked by thieves. Moreover, the guards coped with gang attacks through working in groups of at least two people when providing security services. This was possible thanks to the strong social networks that existed among the Maasai migrants. Indeed those Maasai security guards who were employed as day-security guards supported those working at night to strengthen their efforts against the gang-attacks.

C: Proactive capacities of coping with crime

Migrants also managed to develop a number of proactive capacities of coping with crime threat notably through searching for and creating options to deal with threats. An important proactive capacity of dealing with crime was the learning of the usefulness of working in groups and thus constantly persuading their employers to employ more than one Maasai security guards at work so that they could work in a team of at least two. According to the migrants, this strategy was particularly practical, firstly because the gangs would fear to attack guards when working in groups, and secondly as group migrants could more effectively react to attacks. Thirdly, working in groups kept the guards awake and thus more vigilant against attacks especially at night. Some security guards and key informants elucidated this below:

> We try to work hand in hand with some other Maasai engaged in the same kind of work in the nearby places. In this way, we can easily contain the threat of thieves. But if you are alone it is really a problem as they can easily overpower you and steal whatever they can *(Male Maasai migrant youth (28), Dar es Salaam).*

> We try to work together with some other watchmen in the neighbourhoods to chase them away and I think this helps to some extent. We keep on supporting each other like brothers and that is what our culture teaches us (...) as *morans* [youth] we should love and support each other as brothers *(Male Maasai migrant youth (31), Dar es Salaam).*

Moreover, Maasai security guards learned that working as security guards in the same place with the non-Maasai people would attract enemies/thieves who would come and attack them because they would easily conspire with thieves and invade the Maasai at

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their places of work. Therefore, they avoided working with the non-Maasai people while discharging security services as yet another strategy of coping with crime.

Another proactive capacity developed by the Maasai security guards in coping with crime threat was the need to strategically invest in other non-security jobs such as entrepreneurial activities, e.g. hairdressing, engagement in domestic and construction work. Moreover, migrants also talked of investing in the education of their children, as well as developing their knowledge and skills to be more competent in providing security services. Some of the skills mentioned by the migrants included undergoing security training such as learning, business skills, Kiswahili language, and how to use modern weapons. Specifically, around 34 percent (n=50) of migrants considered engaging in agriculture and animal husbandry in their original areas as future livelihood activities that would help them avoid security work that exposed them to crime.

> Of course, working as security guards is such a tough task, (…) but the truth is that you cannot leave a job before securing another one. We need to service our daily life and save for the future. Where do you get money if you stopped working now? *(Male Maasai youth migrant (31), Dar es Salaam).*

Proactively speaking, the guards planned to establish an advocacy organisation that would, among other things, empower them on security skills but also help them advocate for good working environment, including dealing with crime related issues. The guards thought that the formation of such organizations could facilitate advocacy against Maasai harsh working conditions, as well as reminding some governmental institutions such as the police to resolve their various livelihood threats especially those related to crime in a timely and just manner as attested below:

> Definitely, there are no non-governmental organizations that speak for us, especially when it comes to the matter of our working conditions. As you have seen, we are working in difficult conditions as we don't have education (…) neither are we provided with working facilities [weapons]. I think it is time that we came up with our own organization that will delve in improving our working environment *(Male Maasai migrant youth (31), Dar es Salaam).*

D: Factors inhibiting successful coping

Although some security guards managed to cope with crime threat based on the aforementioned strategies and capacities, a significant number of them felt that their ability to cope with the threat was still insufficient. At an individual level, a significant

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number of guards incapable of sufficiently coping with the crime threat were mainly due to lack of modern security equipment and security skills. This made the guards rely on rudimentary skills and equipment such as sticks, swords, arrows and spears while the gangs were far better armed with modern security devices as partly attested below:

> Maasai security guards are attacked by the gangs who posses' better weapons compared to them. (...) I mean this is very serious because, how can a Maasai use a stick to fight against gangs who come in with a sub-machine gun or other much heavier weapons?! *(Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam).*

> The problem with the Maasai youth working as the *walinzi* is that they are not professionally trained to do this work and not because of poor weapons! A few days ago our neighbour was attacked by a gang; the Maasai providing security services there were seriously injured not because they were shot by the gangs but because they were escaping so unprofessionally and thus ended up falling down, crushing into some walls, trees etc. You see, they were simply physically unfit! *(Female key informant (38), Dar es Salaam).*

It was specifically noted that the guards could not secure modern security devices and training services from their employers due to their lack of knowledge concerning how to use the devices. The situation was further worsened by the employers' low economic power to supply such devices and the belief held by both the migrants and employers that the Maasai were effective security guards simply by virtue of being Maasai warriors and their strategy of working in groups. However, some employers denied the Maasai security guards these services based on purely exploitative reasons, as attested below:

> They [employers] take them as cheap labour; as they don't give them food, shelter or weapons. They know that they can terminate their work [contract] any time they enter into disagreements with them. Very few employers can value them (...) they [the guards] get low salaries that are not enough even for their daily needs (...) if they don't have weapons how do we guarantee their security once they are attacked? *(Male key informant (44) Dar es Salaam).*

Moreover, some guards failed to deal with or prevent crime due to either lack of mobile phones or inability to use them. They were also unaware of important telephone numbers, such as those of the police and their employers. Some migrants

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did not have phones, while in other cases their phones were either too dilapidated or did not have sufficient airtime, as one of the migrants further explains:

> You can be attacked by thieves and fail even to request for support from your boss or friends simply because you don't have some airtime in your phone or your phone is not functioning properly. Yet, this is important [having airtime in your phone] because as you know, nobody knows the day and time of attacks by gangs. Thieves may come in at any time, whether you are prepared or unprepared; (...) and in most cases, they come when you are unprepared *(Male Maasai migrant youth (28) Dar es Salaam)*.

Maasai security guards' capacity to cope with crime was also impeded by their lack of proficiency in Kiswahili language that impeded them from mobilising some anti-crime support from the rest of the urban community, as evidenced by over 45 percent (n=50) of respondents. Maasai were more comfortable with their traditional language (the *Maa*) rather than Swahili, which is both the official and business language in Tanzania, and is widely used in Dar es Salaam.

At the community level, guards coping capacity was impeded mainly by their lack of connectedness with the rest of community. Indeed, 77 percent (n=50) attested that they received either too little or no support at all from the non-Maasai urban residents whenever they encountered crime threats. Historically, Maasai in Tanzania have been segregated or despised by the non-Maasai people. On the other hand, the Maasai regard themselves as different or special (i.e. better), considering other people as *laioni*, literally, uncircumcised or 'impure'. This makes the Maasai shameful to solicit support from such people, as evidenced by some informants:

> Those ones who can better interact with other community members [non Maasai city residents] are supported by their neighbours [in case of insecurity threat] as people in these particular places are already aware of them and so support them once they are in trouble. On the contrary, those Maasai who don't have good interaction with community have got less support *(Female key informant (45), Dar es Salaam)*.

> Indeed, there is a considerable social gap between the Maasai [guards] and the rest of the urban community. The problem with us the Maasai is that we don't have trust in other non Maasai people and because of that we don't associate with them. So, it becomes a problem on our side when we need some assistance from other people problems *(Male key informant (65), Dar es Salaam)*.

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Furthermore, at national level, it was found that only a handful of migrants managed to solicit security-related support especially legal support from government institutions. Around 86 percent (n=50) of the migrants both directly and indirectly demonstrated their failure to successfully solicit support related to security skills, language skills and legal support from the government institutions such as the police and local government institutions:

> We called the police and they told us that there were some police officers patrolling nearby our place and they would immediately come to our rescue. It seems the thieves sensed our communication with the police and employers. Consequently, they started insulting us. Then, they disappeared. Police however came in after 40 minutes while our employers had already arrived in 30 minutes. We were not happy about the delay of the police because the police post is just a few kilometres [2-3 Km] away, yet they took 40 minutes to come to our rescue. The thieves could have finished us *(Male Maasai migrant youth, Dar es Salaam).*

Several reasons can explain the guards' failure to solicit relevant support from these organisations. Firstly, security related support such as legal education and security skills for unprofessional security guards were not institutionalised and thus not provided by these structures. The second major reason is related to the Maasai's lack of confidence in government institutions such as the police, as well as [local] government structures and courts, mainly due to corruption as partly stated here under:

> Who can waste their time to go to the police or the *mtendaji* [local government official]? They will only look at you and they will not help you. The problem with these people [is that] they will expect something from you before they can listen to your problem *(Male Maasai youth migrant (30) Dar es Salaam).*

> If we happen to capture the *kibaka* [petty thief] we only punish him severely and later on hand him over to the boss. The boss knows what to do with the victim. I think they [police/local government officials] will not listen to us; we just waste our time going there *(Male Maasai youth migrant (27) Dar es Salaam).*

Maasai migrants' failure to access anti-crime related support from the government institutions is also due to their general fear and ignorance concerning the ways in which these institutions operate. Specifically, it was noted that Maasai declined to give witnesses in courts, local government offices or at the police due to fear and lack of

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awareness about these institutions. In such cases, Maasai security guards ran away thinking that they would be victimised rather than supported by these institutions:

> They [Maasai migrants] disappear and at times go back home [their rural homes], especially when the problem [crime] requires them to appear before court or to be interrogated by the police. In this case, their employers think that Maasai may have collaborated with the thieves and that is why they run away or are unwilling to cooperate with the police and the court *(Male Maasai employer/businessman (44), Dar es Salaam).*

Indeed, secondary data also confirms that the Maasai security guards perceive government administrative structures as complex and inaccessible. They perceive them as essentially designed to cater for the *Ilashumba* or *Olashumbai,* i.e. a concept that refers to the 'modernised' as direct beneficiaries of modern development and government (Shackleton et al., 2014). Some public officials ignored the Maasai's insecurity issues either because they sounded inferior to them or simply because these matters were reported by the Maasai. This discouraged the migrants from channelling their crime-related issues through public institutions.

Conclusion

Generally, the findings show that the guards managed to develop both reactive and proactive capacities in coping with threat even though these capacities could be further improved. Reactive capacities included guards' ability to escape from workplaces, as well as hiding whenever they were attacked or anticipated crime incidences as well as changing their traditional attire to hide their identity from enemies. Moreover, the guards offered security services in groups as well as using mobile phones to ask for support from neighbourhoods, police and employers once they were attacked.

Proactive capacities developed by the guards included, being able to learn the usefulness of working in groups and thus constantly persuading their employers to employ many guards for security work. Moreover, the guards proactively looked forward to strategically investing in non-security work. Investment in education would particularly help them be more competent in both security work and other jobs. Furthermore, the guards thought of establishing advocacy organisations that would among other things empower them to deal with crime issues.

However, it was noted that certain factors impeded the guards from successfully coping with the crime threat. They include lack of modern security equipment and security skills, inability to use phones due to lack of or inadequate knowledge and airtime, as well as lack of Swahili proficiency and less connectedness with the urban

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community that constrained their abilities to solicit anti-crime support. Other factors were lack of knowledge and fear of government structures, segregation and corruption practices in responding to the guards' crime-related issues.

Based on the above constraints, the following factors should be taken into consideration in building the guards' capacities to more competently cope with the crime threat. Firstly, the guards should be empowered with security skills and knowledge including how to use modern weapons. Secondly, the guards should be sensitized on the use of Swahili and the effective use of mobile phones as an anti-crime tool. Thirdly, the guards should be sensitised to socialise and associate with the non-Maasai urban dwellers so that they can more conveniently solicit anti-crime support from them. Fourthly, the existing meso-, national, and international institutions should be more responsive towards assisting the migrants to cope with crime in the mentioned areas while the guards should as well be sensitised about the exiting meso- and national level organisations and the relevant kinds of anti-crime related support they can solicit from these levels.

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