

Nigerian Government and Resurgence of Biafra Agitation: A Systemic Analysis

¹.Chibuike E Madubuegwu PhD
totlechi@gmail.com

². Ogbuagu Uchenna Steve
ogbuucsteve@gmail.com

³. Nwoye Chidubem Micheal
cm.nwoye@unizik.edu

¹. Development Studies Unit

^{2,3}. Peace and Conflict Resolution Unit

Institute for Peace, Security and Development Studies, IPSDS.

Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka-Nigeria.

Abstract

The Nigeria state is currently embroiled in crisis of insurrectional campaigns by separatist movements. The resurgent agitation for Biafra state five decades after Nigerian civil war has remained loud, fervent and torrential. From this indication, this study examined issues and events underlying recent campaign of regional resentment in systemic perspective of Nigerian government dispositions. The methodology of the study is qualitative design which relied on documentary and observational sources of data collection as scholarly submissions and observed events were textually analyzed to embellish conceptual, theoretical and empirical imperatives in re-secession drive for eastern Nigeria. It is the argument of this discourse that systemic failures of Nigerian government amid other factors informed the resurgent agitation for Biafra state. In a suggestive sense, this study explored more plausible and engaging options for national integration-a clarion call for Nigerian government to stem the tides of agitation for self-determination in eastern Nigeria.

Journal of Policy and Development Studies (JPDS)

Vol. 16. Issue 1 (2024)

ISSN(p) 1597-9385

ISSN (e) 2814-1091

Home page

<https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jpds>

ARTICLE INFO:

Keyword:

Nigerian Government, Biafra, Secession, MASSOB and IPOB.

Article History

Received:

25th June 2024

Accepted:

7th August 2024

DOI:

<https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jpds.v16i1.12>

1. Introduction

The heterogeneity of Nigeria nation-state is visibly expressed in ethnic and religious identities. Nigeria as the most populous polity in Africa is a conglomeration of over three hundred ethnic nationalities in Islamic, Christian and Traditional faith, and other religious inclinations. These realities inextricably debut a federal political structure of thirty-six states and seven hundred and seventy-four local government areas clustered in six geo-political zones or regions.

However, observations and studies have showed that from pre independence to contemporary era, Nigeria nation-state has been grappling with crises of cohesion among its nationalities in fervent search for national identity. Thus, Alumona, *e tal* (2019) opined that the challenge of forging national consciousness and unity among the different ethnic nationalities has always been compounded by the inability of the successive governments to frontally address the problems associated with citizenship, religion, ethnicity, inequality, resource distribution, native-settler dichotomy and development. The negative fall out from the situation has not only promoted disunity and mistrust among Nigerians but has manifested in the resentful disposition towards the Nigerian state exhibited by the nationalities that feel disadvantaged and aggrieved remaining in Nigeria.

Basically, the prominent resentment against Nigeria state in history was the secession of the eastern region from 1967 to 1970. The region felt aggrieved over what were considered as failure of the then federal government to guarantee safety and welfare of easterners resident in cities of northern region of Nigeria. Madubuegwu (2017) documents that on 30th May 1967 in Enugu the regional capital of the East, Lt. Col Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra as a sovereign state which marked the secession of the region from Nigerian federation. To add, Duruji (2009) assert that deep rooted ethnic grievances and rivalry among the major Nigerian ethnic groups had accompanied the politics of decolonization, culminating in the first attempt at Igbo ethno-nationalism expressed in the declaration of the Biafra Republic in 1967. This attempt at secession was however crushed by the Nigerian state in a cruel three year war that resulted in the loss of over one million lives and displacement of many others in eastern Nigeria.

Over 50 years ago, after Nigerian civil war, the campaign for secession as witnessed in 1967 resurfaced again in strident demand for Biafra state in the current democratic dispensation of the fourth republic. In this vein, Rasheed & Ariyo (2020) noted that in the current Fourth Republic, Nigeria has witnessed series of separatist and secessionist movements. Prominent among these groups are militant organizations in the South-South region and the Igbo dominated Eastern part of the country where we have the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra(MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra(IPOB) which continued to agitate for the actualization of Biafra.

Against this backdrop, this study therefore intends to interrogate reasons for the resurgent agitation for Biafra state from the systemic analysis of Nigerian government dispositions. Also, the study intends to draw logical generalization from findings to advance plausible way forward for national integration in Nigeria. The study is streamlined in this introduction, conceptual explication, theorization of the resurgence of Biafra agitation in Nigeria, resurgence of Biafra agitation in systemic analysis of government failures in Nigeria and conclusion and recommendations.

2. Conceptual Explication

Nigerian government represents the administrative, legislative and judicial organs of the country's central authority. Alternatively, Nigerian government is also referred as the federal government comprising the Presidency (the office of the president and members of the executive council), National Assembly (senate and house of representative) and the Judiciary (the supreme court and other courts of federal jurisdiction). The connate fundamentals of governance revolve enormously in the roles of the executive arm of the federal government (which also include the ministries, departments and agencies) and the National Assembly whose constitutional responsibilities are crucial in representation and legislation. To add, Madubuegwu & Nkwede (2016) posit that in Nigeria, the executive arm and its process are classified into two dimensions-the Political Executive and the Administrative Executive. The Political Executive consists of the President (chief executive) and members of the Federal Executive Council-the Vice President, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, (SGF), the federal ministers, senior special assistants and advisers while on the other hand, the Administrative Executive or what is referred to as state bureaucracy consists of permanent secretaries, head and staff of government ministries and extra-ministerial institutions such as commissions, boards, etc. Subsequently, the members of the Executive stretch to public servants such as the police, the military, Department of State Security Service, and sister enforcement agencies such as the Nigeria Immigration and Custom Service, etc. The fundamental responsibility of this cluster of personnel and structures is the policy formulation and implementation and administration of the Nigeria state.

As earlier noted, the study will interrogate roles played by Nigerian government towards the resurgent agitation for Biafra state. To this extent, what does Biafra state represents? Ayo (2021) opined that Biafra was a sovereign country and former territory of old eastern region of Nigeria. It was declared in 1967 by the old eastern military government. The declaration later led to 30 months civil war which ended on January 1970. Biafra ceased to exist as a sovereign state when the former eastern region surrendered to the federal government and accept to reunite with the rest of the country (Okoro, 2017). In other words, Biafra was a sovereign polity of eastern region of Nigeria from May 1967 to January, 1970.

The resurgent agitation for Biafra state is bringing back memories in affinity with the realities that led to the secession of the eastern region of Nigeria in 1967. Hence, there were conditions or events which triggered fervent agitation for Biafra state decades after the war ended which this study intends to find out. At the core of this regional resentment is "agitation", Cambridge Dictionary (2020) defined "agitation" as the act of attempting to stir up public opinion for or against something. For Macmillan Dictionary, agitation is aim at bringing social or political changes through arguments or protests, or other activities etc. For Merriam Webster Dictionary, it is a determined and continuous attempt to steer up public emotion or stimulate public opinion. The English Oxford Living Dictionary defines "agitation" as the arousing of public concern about an issue and pressing for action on it. Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary defined agitation as a condition in which people complain or argue, especially in public, in order to accomplish a particular type of change. What is to be deduce from here is that agitation has to do with a demonstration or discussion to bring about a positive change in the society. Thus, agitation can only occur when there are social injustices and anti-citizens policies by the government (Ifeanyi, 2022). Perhaps, social deprivation and injustices may be responsible for the resurgent agitation for Biafra state after decades the civil war ended.

Succinctly, the process of resurgent agitation for Biafra state underscores the “concept of 3s”, “Separatism, Secession and Self-Determination”. The polemics of these concepts elicit diverse conceptualizations among scholars in spite of conflated contextual meaning as Adangor (2017) argued that the term “separatism” may be used to connote different things ranging from a demand by a unit of the federation for greater regional autonomy or loosening of political control by the centre to outright secession of a federating unit by way of declaring its own political independence. More succinctly, Ryabinin (2017) opined that separatism is the movement for the territorial succession of a part of a country with the purpose of creating a new state or receiving a certain degree of autonomy. Horowitz, (cited in Taiwo 2017) avers that separatism can best be described as a form of agitation for greater autonomy. Invariably, Gammer (2014) defined separatism as the advocacy or practice of separation of a (certain) group of people from a larger body on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or gender. It is nowadays limited mainly to ethnic/national groups aiming at independence. As such, the term “separatists” is practically synonymous with “secessionists”. Also, in some cases, “separatism” is interconnected with “irredentism”, which is defined as nationalist agitation in other countries, based on historical, ethnic, and geographical reasons, for incorporation of territories under foreign rule (Ugwueze, 2021).

From scholarly perspectives, separatism is advocacy and movement for autonomy or independence of a region, province or unit from a larger federation or confederation. And, the action which invariably facilitates separatist ambition is contextualized as “secession”. Accordingly, Crawford (cited in Pavkovic & Cabestan, 2013) defined secession as the creation of a new state with the use or threat of force without the consent of the former sovereign state. Similarly, Ayo (2021) defined secession as process of separating or pulling out from a larger country. However in contrary to Ayo’s conceptualization, secession may be replete with democratic or undemocratic conditions. Thus, a unit or region of a federation may decide to secede through a democratic process obvious in plebiscite or referendum as enunciated in the constitution of the country. On the other hand, secession may be a violent undertaking by a region against a country. From these illustrative instances, it becomes appropriate to indicate that secession is a process (democratic or violent) to claim independence and sovereignty of a people from a country or federation.

Furthermore to underline the affinity between separatism and secession, Awofeso (2017) asserts that regardless of the nomenclature employed, secession of separatism describes a group behaviour seeking withdrawal from a larger political entity with the view to creating an independent new state separate from the one they belong. The methods adopted by those groups to achieve their goal could be peaceful, violent and even armed struggle. Invariably, separatism and secession in whatever significance and scale aim towards self-determination. In this vein, Thornberly (1997) observed that self-determination represents the right of people in the determination of their own destiny. In other words, people can make their life to be worth living or not, but whatever they make out of life remains their choice. In an exclusive sense, Umzurike (1990) and, Imhonopi & Urim (2013) argue that the principle of self determination honors the freedom of the people to arrange their tomorrow in the areas of politics which may be a unitary system, federal system or a confederal system or other formation that the people will be satisfied with. On another perspective, Akanji (2012) opined that the concept of self-determination referenced to the right of the people to possess a state of their own, enjoy self-government, and have self-management or home rule.

These scholarly submissions though in different perspectives showed that self-determination is liberty for independence in governance and economy of a unit or region from dominance and territory of a larger state. The resurgent agitation for Biafra resonates from separatists' agenda for self-determination. What is or are responsible for secessionists' ambition 50 years after civil war is what this study intends to reveal nay Nigerian government disposition towards the resentful actions of pro-Biafra agitators.

Theorization of Resurgence of Biafra Agitation in Nigeria

Basically, separatism or movement for self-determination is not a novelty in the events of a state across time and space. Hence, scholars and practitioners have advanced logical generalizations alternatively contextualized as theories to establish the rationale for regional nationalism, reclamation and assertiveness from the context of a nation-state or multi-ethnic national polity. In this regard, J Mills conceptualized and advanced National Self-Determination theory to reveal social background factors that propel secession or ambition for self-determination. Accordingly, Mills (1991) stressed that the theory opined that different nations (in a multi nation-state) have the right to secede. It was also believed that in multi-national states; there can be no feeling of commonality and sympathy can only be achieved among same nationality. Impliedly, the heterogeneity character of a multi-nation state inevitably create climate of competition, deprivation, suspicion and frictions which provide fertile ground for secession and self-determination. However, the Mills's logics of empiricism is limited in depth analysis of realities in the process of governance beyond the diversity of identity inclinations underlying the urge or ambition for self-determination. In reference to the thrust of this study, the theory of national self-determination is inadequate on the dispositions of the authoritative institution neither as unifying mechanism against self-determination or non-unifying mechanism encouraging self-determination. In other words, the theory failed to find relevance in issues of resurgence of Biafra agitations from the perspective of government's centripetal or centrifugal tendencies. Similarly, the identity theory of Ethnic Diversity espouses that ethnic diversity and government repression of certain cultural groups even in relatively homogeneous national environment are the major reasons why separatist agitations are high among the different ethnic groups, who find it difficult to live to get her under one administration. Ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity are frequently argued to promote separatist agitations and secessions (Boyle and Englebert,2006). Impliedly as seen in the assumptions of national self-determination and ethnic diversity theories arguably indicated that cleavages elicit divisive relation among nationalities occasioned by government suppression of cultural groups which incite the ambition for self-rule. However, the scale of such government's suppression of cultural groups is logically inexplicable to peculiarities of resurgent Biafra agitation in Nigeria.

Beside the identity explanatory frameworks of self-determination, the liberal theories seek to offer logical insights on secession and self-determination. In this regard, the plebiscitary theory advanced by Buchanan (1998) state that the right of secession is civic and determined by the majority choice in any portion or region of the territory of a state. Thus, the theory accentuate the import of the plebiscite where people within a region decide through majority opinion the right to form and determine their own independent state and political relationship respectively even when such choices are in contrary to the sovereignty of the state. In other words, the right of separatism and self-determination is civic and democratic as advanced by the Choice or Plebiscitary theory. In credence, Beran (1998) argued that all individuals have the right to determine their own political relationships—a right claimed to be both consistent with, and required by liberal democratic theory. Specifically, it was argued that the state cannot be the ultimate right holder in realm of liberal democratic theory. Again, the state represents the

agent of the people, and the people can revoke the agency relationship they have with the state, the state must derive its right from the people, since the state is the agent of the people and lastly, substantial part of the state may terminate the agency relationship and withdraw them from the state within the territory. The plebiscitary theory simply believes in the expression by a group to secede from a state through voting i.e. secession is a matter of majority rule (Mancini,2008). The plebiscitary theory seems to be very permissive and the conditions for secession can easily be met by a majority approval in a referendum. Secession according to the theory is made lucrative and can as well lead to fragmentation of states in international system. Since the only requirement for secession is for majority to affirm the withdrawal of such group (Ojibara, 2016). Obviously, the plebiscitary theory advocates for democratic process of secessions but limited on the circumstances or realities informing the demand for self-determination. In Nigeria context, the logics of the theory is inadequate on the conditions that illuminate the failures of the government towards secession in reference to resurgent agitation for Biafra state.

In an attempt to fill these gaps, Anthony Birch (1984) and Allen Buchanan (2004) developed the Remedial Right Theory. The thrust of the theory indicates that secession and self-determination are justified on four fundamentals: a. the forceful annexation of the region; b. when the government failed to protect rights and guarantee security of people in some region; c. when political and economic interests of a region were not safeguarded .d. Neither bias or ignorance, government ignored agreement made with sections about their essential interests that might easily find themselves to be out voted by the majority (Birch1984). On the other hand, secession is the last option for groups whose basic human rights are violated, territory that have been illegally annexed to the state, and groups whose intra-state autonomy agreement have been violated. When it becomes obvious that the last resort for stopping the preserved injustice is secession, then it is morally permissible for them to secede (Buchanan, 2004). Obviously, the Remedial Right theory highlight the critical realities of government 's failure (when right and security of a people in a country are not guaranteed and socio-political interests of a people are denied and deprived) which motivated secession of the eastern region in 1967 and, perhaps the resurgent agitation for Biafra state in the current democratic dispensation. Arguably, the denial of economic interests embellishing in resources may have informed the race for secession and self-determination.

To this extent, the relevance of resource theory of separatism and self-determination becomes instructive. In this vein, the imperatives of Regional Availability of Natural Resources Theory illuminates. Unya, & Omaka (2021) revealed that the theory states that the demand for separatism is raised when people feel that the union is not investing enough in order to explore the natural resources of the place. The theory find relevance in the militancy of the oil region, Niger Delta particularly some states (Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross River and Akwa-Ibom) against the federal government and foreign capitalist firms. The Niger Delta shared regional affinities in ethnicity, religious inclination and expectations with the eastern region. However, the relevance of the theory in the current wave of agitation for Biafra state is illogically situated but it provides insights on the insurrectional activities of dissidents in the southern Nigeria. More succinctly, the Market Dominant Minorities Theory seems to share insightful perspectives on the underlying factors informing the resurgence of Biafra agitation in the eastern region. Basically, Chua (2003) documents that market dominant minorities are ethnic groups which tend to control a disproportionate share of the local economy whenever they are often in such a manner that it triggers the envy and bitterness of the majority against them.

Tension and conflicts are inherent in the relationship between the economic dominant minority and the poor majority in the context of liberal democracy. It is also argued that when free market democracy is pursued in the presence of a market-dominant minority, the almost invariable result is backlash because “overnight democracy” will empower the poor, indigenous majority. What happens is that under those circumstances, democracy doesn’t do what we expect it to do—that is reinforce markets...(Instead) democracy leads to the emergence of manipulative politicians and demagogues who find that the best way to get votes is by scape-goating the minorities”. Chua listed the Igbos as among the ‘market dominant minority’. In virtually every part, the Igbo people would be the largest ethnic group—after the indigenes. Chua’s thesis of market dominant minorities creates a generalized feeling of a group not liked by the rest of the country (Unya & Omaka, 2021). The lucidity of Chu’s Market-Dominant Minorities Theory illuminate the conspiracy in the inter-ethnic relations between Igbo nationality and other dominant nationalities which underlines the vehemence of campaign for regional secession and self-determination. However, the theory is abysmally limited on government’s dispositions towards the drive for regional assertiveness.

Arguably, scholars and analysts have observed that inspite of domestic challenges informing recent resurgent agitation for Biafra state however there were obvious external connection to its spread. In this regard, Diaspora Theory argued that ethnic diasporas may also contribute to separatist sentiments as they tend to keep grievances alive, offer irredentist support, magnify beliefs in ethnic purity, and provide funding to local organizations (Malkki,1995).In the context of MASSOB and IPOB campaign for separatism, there were visibility of diasporas’ indulgence and support. To add, Unya, and Omaka (2021) argued that Diaspora explanatory framework is in logical credence to the reason why Igbos in diasporas popularized Nnamdi Kanu’s Radio Biafra which the Nigerian Broadcasting Service claimed to have rendered ineffective by blocking the station from broadcasting in the country. While Kanu, the Biafra IPOB leader was still in detention, the IPOB supporters in Diaspora organized rallies and marched across several cities in Europe and North America drawing support for the Biafra cause.

Relative deprivation theory is the leading framework in the scientific analysis of aggression and resentment nay resurgence of Biafra agitation in Nigeria. Runciman (1966) expounded Relative Deprivation Theory to explain attitudes of social inequality in twentieth-century England. Basically, Ezemenaka & Prouza (2019) remarked that the thrust of relative deprivation theory describes that people deprived of the things of high importance or necessity in their society such as status, money, rights and justice among others-tend to join social movements with the hope or expectation that their grievances or dissatisfaction will be attended to. Thus, Runciman recognize ‘egoistic deprivation’ which refers to a single individual’s feeling of comparative deprivation and fraternal deprivation, also called group deprivation... refers to the discontent arising from the status of the entire group as compared to a referent group. It is also noted that fraternal deprivation may strengthen a group’s collective identity. It is further argued that relative deprivation theory belongs to the larger body of interdisciplinary work known as social movement theory. Social movement theory, as described began in the late 19th century and includes the study of social mobilization, including its social, cultural, political manifestation and consequences (Flynn, 2009; Singer,1992). Relative deprivation theory describes an individual or group experience that occurs when People are deprived of something they either hold dear or feel entitled to. It explains the economic, political and social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute; based on perceptions of justice and self-worth just as much as on then led to fulfill basic human rights. Moreover, relative

deprivation theory highlights poverty and social exclusion. The consequences of relative deprivation manifest through behaviour and attitudes, feelings of stress, political attitudes and participation in collective action. The grievances as defined through the deprivation aspect of this theory are considered instrumental in analyzing the convolutions of inequality and the 'raison d'être' of the Biafra separatist movement and agitations in Nigeria. In other words, the theory explains the Biafra agitations as responses to deprivation and inequality that led to grievances, and explains in part the motivations for protests and rebellion against the state which is perceived as failing or insecure (Ezemenaka and Prouza, 2019).

The resurgent agitation for Biafra state in theoretical perspectives embellished underscore crisis of heterogeneity in identity inclination and inter-ethnic relations occasioned by intense friction over control of resources, deliberate government subjugation and denial of freedom and deprivation. Beyond the identity, liberal –democratic, economic and psychological theories, the resurgent Biafra agitation may have resonated from systemic failures of Nigeria state and government. To this end, it becomes pertinent to situate the emergence and trends of agitation of Biafra state in the logics of systems theory.

Systems framework represent a behavioural scientific theory which argued that the development, cohesion and persistence of every human society is the function of the interrelationships of its units, Hence, system is defined as a set of interrelated parts (Madubuegwu and Okafor, 2017). In a historic reminiscence to multidisciplinary relevance of systems analysis, social scientists in the 50's drawn inspiration from the contributions of natural scientists like Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, a biologist who pioneered the movement of unification of all natural sciences. The setting up of the Society for the Advancement of the General Systems Research in 1956 mark a very important event under whose auspices annual year-books appeared to throw special focus on the areas of general systems theory. The subsequent introduction of the systems analysis in social sciences owes its genesis to the realization of some leading American writers like David Easton, G A Almond and Morton A Kaplan who have reacted against the traditional tendency of a rigid compartmentalization of any discipline belonging to the world of social sciences like economics or politics, psychology or sociology, that, in their views resulted in nothing else than a reduction (Johari, 2005).

Similarly, Mahajan (2008) stressed, that "the central proposition of the systems framework is that all social including political phenomena are inter-related and they affect each other. It is assumed that it is not possible to understand one part of the society in isolation from the other parts which affects its operation". Therefore, "system" which is the unit of analysis of systems conceptual framework denotes a set of parts in constant interaction for the maintenance and sustenance of the whole. In this view, Hara Das and Choudhury (1997) opined that there are two crucial characteristics of a system. In the first place, it is composed of separate units that interact in order to perform certain functions. The removal of any unit directly affects the others. This implies that there is a degree of interrelatedness of mutually constraining or conditioning units. Secondly, a system is marked by differentiation.

Distinctively, Apter (1978) highlighted the reflective attributes of systems:

1. Systems have boundaries within which there are functional interrelationships mainly based on some of the communications;
2. Systems are divided sub-systems, with exchange existing between the sub system (as, for example, between a city and a state, or a state and the national government); and

3. Systems have a capacity for coding-that is, they take information inputs; are able to learn from inputs, and translate inputs into some kind of output.

Glaringly, the assumptions of systems theory are further expressed below:

- a. A whole (ie system) made up of various units, parts or sub-systems.
- b. Each sub-system is further divided into units.
- c. Functions and boundaries define the distinctiveness of these units or sub-systems of the system.
- d. A network of relation and communication among the units which expresses the interrelationships and cohesion of the system.
- e. The dysfunctionality or disarticulation of a particular unit or sub-system affects other units or sub-systems.
- f. The cohesion and disintegration of the system depends on the nature and trends of the relations existing between the units or sub-systems (Madubuegwu and Okafor, 2017).

More succinctly to the exclusiveness of systems to political analysis, David Easton's political system model illuminates. The most important name in the list of recent political scientists subscribing to the use of systems analysis is that of David Easton. His monumental work, *A System Analysis of Political Life* published in 1965 was appreciated by leading writers on contemporary empirical political theory and interpreting political phenomena. Easton set out to develop that would help to explain behavioural reality in as much as political theory is but a symbolic system useful for understanding concrete or empirical political analysis (Davis & Lewis, 1971, Toulman, 2000 and Johari, 2005). Easton's conception of political system indicates that system/sub-system where values are authoritatively allocated for the functionality and maintenance of the entire system in a matrix of input-output processes. To this extent, the government becomes crucible institution and process of the political system. To further underlines the imperatives of structure and function of the subsystems, structural-functional analysis illuminates. The structural-functional analysis developed from the sphere of social anthropology in the writings of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski. Then it was developed in the field of sociology by Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton and Marion Levy. Later, Gabriel Almond and his associates developed it into a tool of political analysis. The thrust is that developed political system is characterized by differentiation of structures for performance of specific functions which include interest articulation, interest aggregation, political socialization and political communication as well rule-making, rule-application and rule adjudication (Gaubu, 2003).

To find relevance in logics of these systems analysis, Nigeria state represents a system of interrelated components in governments (federal, state and municipal), institutions (state and non-states), groups (partisan, sectarian, ethnic, professional or advocacy) and organizations (humanitarian, corporate and public) in functions, contacts and communications for the cohesion and development as ideally desired. Arguably, the regulatory and preservative variables of system stability, equilibrium and feedback resonate from the relevance of rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication structure(ie government of the political system). To this extent, failures that stem from dysfunctionality of the out-put structure of the political system (government) create disequilibrium in resources, safety and welfare among the ethnic nationalities. Furthermore, the failure of government in equity and fairness invariably create consciousness of ethnic nationalism and regional resentment from the aggrieved which undermines stability and development of the entire system, Nigeria. To this extent, the resurgence of Biafra agitation represent a trend in system collapse obvious in the failure of the federal authoritative institution (Nigerian government). In other words, the empirical insights

on resurgence of Biafra state in systemic failure of Nigeria government become instructive to establish.

Resurgence of Biafra Agitation in Systemic Analysis of Government Failures in Nigeria

The debut of Biafra in 1967 was historic events of state failure to guarantee security of lives as one of the fundamentals of governance as Achebe (2012) reminiscent that beginning from the January 15th 1966 coup d'état, to July counter coup (staged mainly by Northern Nigeria officers who murdered 185 Igbo officers) and the massacre of thirty thousand Igbos and Easterners in pogroms that started in May 1966 which occurred over four months-the events of those months left millions of Ndigbo terrified. Igbos fled home to Eastern Nigeria when it was obvious that the federal government of Nigeria did not respond to our call to end the pogroms then it was concluded that a government that failed to safeguard the lives of its citizens has no claim to their allegiance and must be ready to accept that the victims deserved the right to seek their safety in other ways-including secession. On May 30, 1967, Ojukwu citing a variety of malevolent acts directed at the mainly Igbo Easterners-such as the pogrom that claimed over thirty thousand lives; the federal government's failure to ensure the safety of Easterners in the presence of organized genocide; and the direct incrimination of the government in the murders of its citizens-proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Biafra from Nigeria, with the full backing of the Eastern House Constituent Assembly.

The failure of inclusivity also illuminates as the civil war ended in 1970, Onuoha (2018) reminiscent that the head of Nigeria's Federal Military Government(FMG), General Yakubu Gowon, maintained that Nigeria was one and would remain so, and with guaranteed military superiority the FMG resorted to military action to bring Biafra back to Nigeria. The war that ensued lasted for 30 months and led to defeat and surrender of Biafra on 12th January 1970. In a statement delivered at Dodan Barracks, Lagos, on 15th January 1970, Major-General Phillip Effiong, Officer Administering the Republic of Biafra, declared that: *We Biafrans affirm that we are loyal Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. That we accept the existing administrative and political structure of the federation of Nigeria. That any future constitutional arrangement will be worked out by representatives of the people of Nigeria. That the Republic of Biafra hereby ceases to exist.....*

After the surrender and allegiance, it was observed that the Nigeria government failed to ensure effective re-integration of the easterners to the federation. Hence, some of the issues that readily come to mind include the 20 pounds ceiling placed on bank lodgments for every Igbo after the war no matter how much such persons had in banks. This has been interpreted as a calculated policy to neutralize the savings and capacity of the Igbos to rehabilitate and re-integrate into the Nigerian economy (Ikpeze,2000;Ojukwu,2005).In addition, the sudden withdrawal of federal troops from the east, a ploy that was aimed at denying the Igbo economy the stimulus for recovery as Igbo people who could have been empowered as suppliers to the troops were denied the opportunity. Also was the timing of the indigenization policy which came shortly after the war when the Igbos were financially constrained to participate, thereby incapacitating the Igbo economically. Of note in post-war Igbo marginalization was the deficient infrastructural development in their home land resulting in the mass migration of the Igbos to other areas of the country for economic survival (Duruji, 2020). Also Ibeanu, *e tal* (2016) revealed that to deepen the Igbo exclusion and further deplete their political influence in Eastern region, federal government's boundary adjustment of 1976 transferred mineral-rich areas of Igbo land in Ndoni/Egbema

and parts of Ndoki South of Imo River to Rivers and Cross River states. This added to the declaration of Igbo property in some parts of Nigeria, especially in Port Harcourt as 'abandon property', which was confiscated and taken away with little or no compensation. Several studies have also tried to highlight how political marginalization and economic strangulation of the Igbo have endured in Nigeria many years after the war (Achebe,2012, Ezeani, 2012).

Furthermore, successive military regimes also failed like the civilian governments in ensuring inclusivity and fair treatment as Joireman (2003) argued that these policies of marginalization were efficiently and effectively carried out through the autocratic military regimes that dominated Nigerian politics for the greater proportion of its post-war history that spanned between 1970 till 1999. The transition into a democratic dispensation has coincided with the emergence of a post-war Igbo generations who do not accept the professed marginalization of the Igbos in Nigeria. The manifestation is seen in the number of groups and movements that have emerged to demand for the resuscitation of the defunct Biafran state as a panacea to the alienation of the Igbos in the Nigerian polity. Similarly, Ifeanyi (2019) noted that the proliferation of violent-oriented 'ethnic organizations and agitation groups operating in Nigeria, is a result of the inability of the Nigerian state to resolve the questions of citizenship, resource control, federalism and political representation. This, of course, is an expression of sub-nationalism and irredentism, hence posing a threat to the survival of the fragile democracy and nation-building in the country. No doubt, the Igbo people who bore the brunt of the Nigerian Civil War has been relegated to the background and are being treated as a minority group in the country, even though they are one of the three major ethnic groups in the country.

For close to thirty years after that war, the major pre-occupation of the Igbos was how to be fully reintegrated into the Nigerian society and possibly attain the pre-eminent position as a power bloc which the people had tried to construct prior to the war and thus end the cry of marginalization (Igbokwe,2005).However, all through this period, there were no recognizable groups that have agitated for the resuscitation of the Biafra Republic as it seem like a forgotten affair publicly. After the war till 1990s,the major public discourse centered on how the Igbos, the major ethnic group in the Biafra rebellion could be accepted back fully as participants in Nigerian political process. But democratic transition in 1999 seems to have created the space for the renewed expression of Igbo nationalism as it marked the beginning of emergence into the scene of organizations and movement scaling for the resuscitation of the defunct Biafra Republic (Duruji, 2009).

Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 coincided with the resurgence of Biafra secessionist movements. Essentially, there was a renewed hope in 1999 that 'the lost opportunities for political progress and economic development squandered by successive despotic military regimes would be regained with the unleashing of the creative energies of the people in a new era of 'governance and democracy' (Adejumobi, 2010).

However, the continued failure of the Nigerian state to deliver on public goods after this period has created social unrest. The first attempt to organize a movement for Biafra re-secession was in 1999,when Chief Ralph Uwazuruike, an Indian trained lawyer who was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi's non-violent revolutionary philosophy, formed MASSOB as a 'direct response' to the failure of the Nigerian state and successive government to address the Igbo predicament since the end of the civil war'(Onuoha2011). Nevertheless, it

was the hoisting of the green-red-black flag of the defunct Biafra Republic at the commercial city of Aba in Abia State on 22th May, 2000 that marked the commencement of MASSOB's re-secessionist struggle (Ibeanu, *e tal*, 2016)

Succinctly, the failure of state towards fair distribution of social welfare dividends and insincerity of the government also spurred recent resurgent agitation for Biafra state as Ifeanyi (2019) documents that the recent agitation for Biafra occurs to correct anomalies. The perceived marginalization, and other injustices, coupled with the lip-service which the government pays to these anomalies triggered off these agitations. In addition, Duruji (2009) argued that the resurgence of Igbo nationalism expressed in the renewed demand for Biafra is connected with the perceived marginalization of the Igbos since the end of the civil war. The unpleasant development led to proliferation of Prof-Biafra movements like Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Indigenous People of Biafra as frontline Biafra movements in campaign for referendum and secession of the eastern region of Nigeria. In this vein, Ojibara (2016) recalled that the Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra(MASSOB)led by Ralph Uwazuruike was the spearhead of the Biafra agitation until recently younger generation of Ndigbo impatient with what they see as the snail pace at which MASSOB has been moving towards the actualization of the sovereign republic, organized themselves under the aegis of Indigenous People of Biafra created to continue the agitation for an independent state for Igbo.

Emphatically, the festering resentment of Ndigbo (as one of the dominant ethnic nationalities) against Nigeria government in the recent time were enormously seen in political marginalization, statutory exclusion, economic deprivation and social restiveness as fanatical systemic failures. In the aspect of political marginalization, the pertinent demands are:

- a. That the country is yet to have a Nigerian president of Igbo extraction since the inception of presidential democracy in 1979.
- b. That leading political parties in the current dispensation, the Peoples Democratic Party, PDP and All Progressive Congress, APC in their respective primaries have deliberately denied aspiring Igbo candidates tickets as party presidential flag bearers.
- c. That the south-east geo-political zone has the least number of states and local government areas in the country.
- d. Ndigbo has the least numerical representation in the National Assembly(senate and federal house of representatives) in Nigeria.

In the aspect of statutory exclusion, the prof-Biafra agitators have wondered why successive governments since 1999 to the current administration can't appoint senior civil servants of south-east extraction to occupy:

- a. office of Head of Service of the federation.
- b. office of the Accountant-General of the federation.
- c. office of the Auditor-General of the federation.

In aspect of the economic deprivation, Ndigbo are cosmopolitan in drive and seen in virtually every part of the federation however often constrained with series of deliberate transactional restrictions in tradeas many easterners daily experience discourteous treatment and restiveness from security men and politicians of northern extractions. In addition, Ugwueze, (2019) and Onwe (2016) revealed that distrust and negative sentiments are some of the factors that have pitched the Igbo against other ethnic groups in Nigeria. It was these sentiments that resulted in the pogrom that led to the mass exodus of the Igbo from other parts of the country, mostly from the north, after the first military coup and the build-up to the Nigerian Civil War. The same sentiments explain the alleged desire to displace the Igbo

from the control of the Nigerian economy. The reasons for these negative sentiments may be difficult to explain, but a closer study of the contemporary history of Nigeria and the literature on inter-ethnic relations between the constituent ethnic nationalities of the country suggests that they were fear-induced. These have been summarized as: (1) the republican and egalitarian nature of the Igbo, which make them very assertive wherever they are found; (2) ubiquity, which arises from the social and occupational mobility of the Igbo; and (3) industriousness, which when rewarded with success can be channeled into self-improvements in the acquisition of real property and other forms of investments within and outside Igboland

Again, Idowu, *e tal* (2018) noted that the struggle and contestations for acquisition and use of state power in Nigeria have always been patterned largely along ethnic lines. Given that the political apex of Nigeria has eluded the Igbo of Southeast, it would appear that the policy and programmes of the Nigerian government are deliberately designed to exclude them. The cut-off marks for entrance to federal unity schools for the 36 states of the federation is a case of reference. Southeastern states of Anambra, Imo and Enugu have the highest cut-off marks in Nigeria. The implication is that a primary schoolboy in Anambra, Imo and Enugu must score ten times above his counter part in Kebbi, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara to gain entrance into federal unity schools in Nigeria.

All these centrifugal tendencies sustained the vehemence of agitation by pro-Biafra movements for the secession of the south-east from Nigeria federation. Basically, Obidimna (2018) indicated that hatred and hostility against Ndigbo become more intense under Buhari's administration. There were frequent clashes between the prof-Biafra agitators and armed Nigeria personnel where lives were lost and properties worth millions of dollars destroyed. The ugly development heightened security challenges in south-east. However, some political commentators reasoned that politics may be responsible for resurgence of Biafra agitation under Mohammed Buhari's administration (2015-2023). To this end, Jimitota, *e tal* (2016) noted that while some believed that the renewed agitation for Biafra is the manifestation of the long cemented marginalization of the region, others argue that the agitation is merely a political weapon of distraction by the opposition to the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC). The lopsided appointments by President Buhari has also fanned anger of the people of the southeast. Hence, Ohaneze Ndigbo, the pan Igbo social-cultural organization, stressed that the lopsided appointments have shown that the Buhari presidency has a deep rooted hatred for the Igbo nation. It is believed that the hate speeches targeted to President Buhari during the electioneering campaign and his rejection by the region was responsible for the lopsided appointment that is against the south-east.

The indicators of the table showed first appointment made by Muhammadu Buhari in 2015.

Table 1.1: The First Appointments of President Muhammadu Buhari in National Security Leadership Structure of the Country

Office	Name	Region/State	Religion
Chief of Army Staff	Lt. Gen Tukur Buratai	North-East, Borno	Muslim

Chief of Air Staff	Air Vice Marshal Sadique Abubakar	North-East, Bauchi	Muslim
Chief of Naval Staff	Real Admiral Ibok-Ete EkweIbas	South-South, Cross River	Christian
Chief of Defense Staff	Major-Gen. Gabriel Abayomi Olonishakin	South-West, Ekiti	Christian
Minister of Defense	Brigadier Gen. Mansur Mohammed Dan Ali (Rtd)	North-West, Zamfara	Muslim
National Security Adviser	Major-Gen Babagana Monguno (Rtd)	North-East, Borno	Muslim
Director of DSS	Lawal Daura	North-West, Katsina	Muslim
Chief of Defence Intelligence	Air Vice Marshal Monday Riku Morgan	North-Central, Benue	Christian
Inspector General of Police	Ibrahim Idris	North-Central, Niger	Muslim
Comptroller of Immigration	Kure Martin Abeshi	North-Central, Nasarawa	Christian
Comptroller of Customs	Col. Hameed Ibrahim (Rtd)	North-West, Kaduna	Muslim
Civil Defence	Commadant Abdullahi Muhammadu	North-Central, Niger	Muslim
Minister of Interior	Maj Gen. Abdulrahman Dambazau	North-West, Kano	Muslim
Minister of Police Affairs	Alhaji Oyewele Adesiyen	South-West, Osun	Muslim

Source: Compiled from Eme and *Onuigbo* (2015), *Nwagbo, e tal*(2016) and *Ndukwe, e tal*, (2019) cited in *Madubuegwu, e tal* (2023).

Below is another indicators of the table that showed first appointment made by Muhammadu Buhari in 2015.

TABLE 1.2: Regional Identity of Persons Appointed by Muhammadu Buhari to Serve as Aides and Executive Positions of Federal Public Service.

Office	Name	Region/State
1.Special Adviser, Media and Publicity to the President.	Femi Adesina	South- West Osun State
2.Senior Special Assistant, Media and Publicity.	Garba Shehu	North-West Kano State

3.State Chief of Protocol/Special Assistant (Presidential Matters)	Lawal Abdullahi Kazaure	North-West Jigawa State
4.Accountant-General of the Federation	Ahmed Idris	North-West Kano State
5. Director General, State Security Services, SSS	Lawal Daura	North-West Katsina State
6.Executive Vice Chairman/Chief Executive Officer, Nigerian Communication Commission	Umaru Dambatta	North-West Kano State
7.Executive Chairman, Federal Inland Revenue Service, FIRS	Babatunde Fowler	South-West Lagos State
8. Secretary to Government of the Federation	Babachir David Lawal	North-East Adamawa State
9. Chief of Staff to the President	Abba Kyari	North-East Borno State
10. Director, Department of Petroleum Resources, DPR	Modecai Baba Ladan	North-West, Kano State
11. Commissioner for Insurance and Chief Executive of the National Insurance Commission	Mohammed Kari	North-West Kaduna
12. Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC	Yakubu Mahmood	North-East Bauchi State
13. Ag. Chairman Economic and Financial Crime Commission, EFCC.	Ibrahim Magu	North-East Borno state

Source: Compiled from Mbah, *e tal* (2019) and Ndukwe, *e tal*, (2018) cited in Madubuegwu, *e tal*(2023).

A cursory view of the two tables showed that south-east was deliberately excluded from early political appointments of the President Muhammadu Buhari. The unpleasant development exacerbated strident remarks from the elite and people of the south-east against the federal government. In this vein, Eme and Onuigbo (2015) writes that Senator Enyinnaya Abaribe, stressed that no one should be surprised at the appointments because the President had allegedly pledged to give priority to those, who voted for him. He said,

...no one should be surprised over what is happening or the shape of the political appointments made by President Muhammadu Buhari. To be fair to him, the President said during his recent state visit to the United States of America, that he will reward those who voted for him. My hunch is that the appointments so far, which has surreptitiously thrown up the prevailing

circumstance, has failed to encourage our people's hunger and quest to build a nation state out of a heterogeneous Nigeria. The appointments as it were do not also support the effort to weave a more cohesive country that would metamorphose into a nation where unity and love will prevail. The founding fathers of our nation had this in mind when the notion of "Federal. Character" was inscribed in the constitution and a commission created for that purpose. That a President of elder statesman status would willfully breach this fiber that holds this country together is highly regrettable. My take is that, it is a 'Buhari country', it is the reality, so he can play around with his choice as his mind and conscience directs him. After all he did not win election in the South East and South-South and yet he became President, therefore, the South should be orphaned for not voting for him. Perhaps that is the stark reality that the people of the South in Nigeria should face. There is an idiom in Igbo language that says: "20 years or more is not eternity". The Buhari government will also come to an end one day. Nonetheless, it could have been good and politically expedient if President Buhari sees himself as President of Nigeria, which is the hallmark of a statesman and not that of President of a section of the country

The situation invariably created more resentment against the federal government of Nigeria as there were incessant incidents of clashes between members of Indigenous People of Biafra and the officers of security agencies (army and police). In other words, Ukpabi, *e tal* (2021) document that the typical response of Nigerian government to separatist agitations over the years is to brand the agitators "troublemakers", and send law enforcement agencies to use force to quell their agitations. This often results in casualties, stoking ethnic tensions in the process, which further fuels or hardens separatist agitations. The federal government always adopt brutal use of force and extra-judicial killing against any separatist agitators in the country whether Niger Delta militancy or Biafra protesters. In June 2016, Amnesty International accused the Nigerian army of killing unarmed Biafra supporters in Onitsha ahead of their planned May 2016 commemoration of Biafra. According to Amnesty International (2016) "opening fire on peaceful IPOB supporters and by-standers who clearly posed no threat to anyone is an outrageous use of unnecessary and excessive force and resulted in multiple deaths and injuries". There seems to be an established history of extra-judicial killings of separatist agitators in Nigeria especially the Biafra protesters. For instance, in January, 2013, fifty bodies believed to be Biafra supporters were found floating in the Ezu River in Anambra State. Still none of the past and present killings have been thoroughly investigated by the Nigerian government (Ibeanu, *e tal*, 2016). These ugly scenarios exacerbated the most recent and fervent campaign of resentment against the federal government of Nigeria currently spear-headed by Indigenous People of Biafra, IPOB as Ifeanyi (2019) recalled that 2015 and 2017 were quite significant in the agitations of the Indigenous People of Biafra. This is because it was in 2015 that the leader of the group, Nnamdi Kanu, was arrested, while 2017 was when he was released. During this period, IPOB was at the height of its activities.

The failure of the federal government to indulge in the expressed plights of the agitators and explore more effective ways to stem tides of campaign of resentment rather preference was given to force and brutality obviously showed a systemic failure of institutions and agencies bereft of ideas. Consequently, Nnam, *e tal* (2021) observed that the use of military and police to suppress unarmed Biafra social advocates is on the increase. Yet, the agitators are not deterred by these punitive measures; the movement is fast growing, currently has assumed international outlook, and winning sympathies among the populace, despite the increased rate of needless bloodshed and victimization in recent times. This is evidenced by the number of reprisal attacks in Aba, Onitsha, Umuahia, Nnewi, Asaba, Abakaliki, Owerri, Enugu and Port-Harcourt by IPOB members, supporters and sympathizers to further drive home their demand for a true democratic governance in Nigeria. Military action cannot stop the cause, given the genuineness of the agitations for social justice and a corrupt-free polity.

3. Conclusion and Recommendations

The failure of Nigerian government to mitigate perils of inter-ethnic relations plunged the former British territory into avertable three years armed conflict that claimed over a million lives, and destroyed infrastructures and economy. Five decades after the unfortunate development, the scars of the war were stirred up by the failure of the federal government to appease, attenuate and assuage fears, apprehension and grievances of Ndigbo.

The discourse begins with issues and events that underscored the rationale to interrogate the process of re-secession campaign for Biafra from the perspective dispositions of Nigerian government. Also, the study further explicates key terms in conceptual and theoretical imperatives in attempt to establish affinity between suppositions and realities. In a systemic sense, the discourse revealed the failures of Nigerian government which have in the recent time heighten the insurrectional campaign for Biafra by MASSOB and IPOB. These findings therefore elicit the need for plausible way forward for national cohesion.

The following are the recommendations to stem the tides of resurgent agitation for self-determination of eastern Nigeria:

1. The Nigerian government should re-acknowledge the fact that cohesion and continuity of Nigeria nation-state lies in its policies and actions either divisive or integrative.
2. The Nigerian government should also re-acknowledge the fact that ethnic nationalism and agitation are informed by absence of equity, inclusivity and justice in a system of imbalance, lopsidedness and corruption. It is therefore a task for a national government to explore more efficient ways to address these irregularities.
3. The Nigerian government should acknowledge the fact that “demand for self-determination” is not a novelty across time and space. In spite of the fact that Nigeria federal republic constitution of 1999 as amended did not make any provision for “self-determination and referendum” however the demand for them represent right of every people irrespective of race and creed as enunciated in United Nations universal declaration of 1948 on human right and Roman Convention of 1950. In other words, persons or groups in campaign for such move should not be seen as dissidents to be

clampdown rather as people that every responsible government should engage in open dialogue to explore ways to address their grievances before violence.

4. The Nigeria government should demilitarize the south-east as part of the measure to ensure stability of the region for peace and development. Special military and police operations in south-east which are currently depleted with series of absurdities (infiltration of criminal gangs, brutality and indiscriminate killings) should be suspended to alleviate incidences of criminalities, provocation and hostilities which often leads to clashes between security men and pro-Biafra agitators.
5. The Nigeria government in deference to rule of law and national reconciliation should as a matter of political expediencies release the leader of Indigenous People of Biafra, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu from detention. This measure should be preceded by national amnesty programme for pro-Biafra agitators in the country.
6. Finally, Ndigbo in the region, other parts of Nigeria and in Diaspora should also demand for more accountable and responsive governance from governments in Abakilika, Awaka, Enugu, Owerri and Umuahia. The pro-Biafra movements in collaboration with civil-society organizations and advocacy groups for safety and development of south-east should hold summits, embark on courtesy visits and organize awareness campaign in five state-capitals in the region to raise consciousness on the need for security, industrialization and economic growth and development, etc.

References

- Achebe, C.(2012). *There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra*. London: Penguin Books.
- Adejumobi, S. (2010). *Democracy and Governance in Nigeria: Between Consolidation and Reversal* in S. Adejumobi, (ed).*Governance and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria: Changes and Challenges*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–21.
- Adangor, Z (2017). Proscription of the Indigenous People of Biafra and the Politics of Terrorism in Nigeria. *Journal of Jurisprudence and Contemporary Issues, Vol. 10(No.1)*
- Adangor, Z. (2017). “Separatist Agitations and Search for Political Stability in Nigeria”. *Dannish Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, Vol.3, No1..*
- Akanji,O.(2012). Migration, Conflicts and Statehood Problem in Nigeria: The Self Determination Issue. *Journal of Nigeria Studies, 1,23-29*.
- Anaya, S. (1996). *Indigenous People in International Law* in R. Bereketeab (Ed.), *Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somali and South Sudan: Challenges of Post-Colonial State-Building*. Discussion Paper 75 retrieved from www.nai.uu.se.
- Apter, A (1978). *Introduction to Political Analysis*. New Delhi: Prentice Hall.

- Awofeso, O. (2017). Secessionist Movements and the National Question in Nigeria: A Revisit to the Quest for Political Restructuring. *Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research*, 2(7), 35-55.
- Alumona, M, Azom N and Iloh, C (2019). The Nigerian State and the Resurgence of Separatist Agitations: The Case of Biafra.
- Amnesty International Report (2016). *Nigeria: Bullets are Raining Everywhere, Deadly Repression of Pro-Biafra Activists*. Retrieved from www.amnesty.org.ng
- Ayo, B (2021). Separatist Movements in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis. *Journal of Political Science and Public Administration*, Vol. 3(2).
- Beran, H. (1998). *The Democratic Theory of Political Self Determination for a New World Order* in Lehning P. (ed.) *Theories of Secession*. London: Routledge.
- Birch, H (1984). Another Liberal Theory of Secession. *Journal of Political Studies* 32 (12). 596-602
- Buchanan, A. (2004) *Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination*. Oxford: Oxford University.
- Chukwudi C, Gberevbie D, Abasilim U and Imhonopi D (2019). IPOB Agitations For Self-Determination and the Response of the Federal Government of Nigeria: Implications for Political Stability. *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies Vol 8 No3 ISSN: 2281-3993*.
- Cambridge Dictionary, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/agitation> retrieved in August 2024.
- Duruji, M (2009) Social Inequity, Democratic Transition and the Igbo Nationalism Resurgence in Nigeria. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol.3(1), Pp.054-065 <http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR>. ISSN1996-08322009.
- Ezemenaka, E and Prouza J (2019). Biafra Resurgence: State Failure, Insecurity and Separatist Agitations in Nigeria. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316559638>.
- Flynn, J. (2009). 'Social Movement Theory: Resource Mobilization Theory Research'. EBSCO Available at: <http://www.academicpub.com/map/items/29755>.
- Eme, O and Onuigbo, R (2015). *Buhari Presidency and Ethnic Balancing in Nigeria*. University of Nigeria Nsukka.

- Gauba, P (2003). *An Introduction to Political Theory*. India: Macmillan India Ltd.
- Gammer, M. (2014)“Separatism in the Northern Caucasus”. *Journal of Caucasus Survey*, Vol.1. No.2, April.
- Hara Das, H and Choudhury H (1997). *Introduction to Political Sociology*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd.
- Idowu J & Olaniyan A (2017). The Politics of Renewed Quest for a Biafra Republic in Nigeria. *Journal of Defense & Security Analysis*, 33:4, 320-332. DOI:10.1080/14751798.2017.1382029.
- Igbokwe, C (2005). “Marginalization: The Highest Stage of Tribalism” in FlosCarmel Magazine No.5.
- Ikpeze N(2000). “Post-Biafra Marginalization of the Igbo in Nigeria” in I. Amadiume & A, An-Na’im(eds.) *Politics of Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice*. London/New York: Zed Books.
- Ifeanyi, K (2022). Human Rights Violation: A Study of the Indigenous People of Biafra Agitation (IPOB).
- Johari, J.(1982). *Comparative Politics*. India: Sterling Publishers PVT Ltd.
- Joireman S, F (2003). *Nationalism and Political Identity*. London/New York: H&K Inc
- Jimitota, E. (2016). *South-East Burns as Biafra Day Turns Bloody*. Vanguard, 31 May.
- Imhonopi, D.& Urim, U.M.(2013). Leadership Crisis and Corruption in the Nigerian Public Sector: Analbatross of National Development. *Journal of the African Educational Research Network*, 13(1), 78-87.
- Ibeanu, O, Orji, N & Iwuamadi, C. K.(2016). *Biafra Separatism: Causes, Consequences and Remedies*. Enugu: Institute for Innovations in Development.
- Malkki, L. (1995). *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Macmillan Dictionary, <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/agitation>, retrieved in October 2020. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agitation>, retrieved in August 2024.
- Madubuegwu, C and Odizobodo, I (2016). *Political Science: An Introductory Reading*. Enugu: Ingenious Creation Services.
- Madubuegwu, C and Okafor N (2017). The Political Economy of Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa: A Critical Analysis. *Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science*, Vol 5, No. 1.

- Madubuegwu, C (2017). *Reading on Politics of Constitutional Development in Nigeria*. Enugu: Dirprints Publishers.
- Madubuegwu C, Eneh I and Maduekwe, C (2023). Ethno-Religious Identity and Government Appointments in Nigeria: A Focus on 2011, 2015 and 2019 Post Presidential Elections in Nigeria: A Cross Sectional Analysis. *Journal of Policy and Development Studies*, ISSN (Print): 0189-5958, ISSN (Online), 2814-1091, Vol.14 (1),July, Pp.1-27.www.ajol.info/index.php/jpds
- Maghan, V (2013). *Political Theory*. India: Rajendra Pavindra Printers PVT Ltd.
- Mancini,S.(2008). Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession: Liberalism, Nationalism and the Right of Minorities Self-Determination. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 6(3-4)553-584.
- Mill, J.S (1991) *Nationality as Connected with Representative Government: Liberty and Essay*. John Gray (ed.) Oxford University Press.
- Nnam, U; Owan U, ·M Eteng, Okechukwu, G, ·Obasi, C and Nwosumba, C (2021).State Repression and Escalation in Biafra Social Movements in Nigeria: Any Way out? *Journal of Crime, Law and Social Change*(2022)77:91–109, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-021-09985-867>.
- Obidimna, D (2018). *Handbook: Buhari's Government and IPOB Agitation*. Enugu: Abic Publishers.
- Ojukwu, C (2005). “The Politics of Integration and Marginalization in Nation-Building: The Igbo Question in Nigerian Politics”. *UNILAG Journal of Political Science* 2(1):130-153.
- Ojibara,(2016).Biafra: Why Igbo Want To Secede. *Arabian Journal of Business and Manage Review (Nigerian Chapter)* Vol.4,No.1,2016.
- Onuoha, G (2011) Contesting the Space: The “New Biafra” and Ethno- Territorial Separatism in South-Eastern Nigeria, Nationalism and Ethnic. *Politics. Journal of Development* 17:4,402-422, DOI:10.1080/13537113.2011.622646.
- Onuoha, G (2018) Bringing ‘Biafra’ Backing: Narrative, Identity, and the Politics of Non-Reconciliation in Nigeria. *Journal National Identities*, 20:4,379-399,DOI:10.1080/14608944.2017.1279133.
- Oxford Dictionary, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/agitation>, retrieved in August 2024.
- Ugwueze, I (2021).Biafra War Documentaries: Explaining Continual Resurgence of Secessionist Agitations in the South-East, Nigeria. *Journal Civil Wars*, 23:2,207-233, DOI:10.1080/13698249.2021.190378.
- Ugwueze, M.I., (2019). Trauma and memory: Explaining the Longevityof Biafra Secessionist Movement in Nigeria. *Africa Insight*, 49(2),56–69.

Ugwueze, M.(2020).Countering the Dismemberment Narrative of Biafra Secessionist Agitations in Nigeria. *African Renaissance*.17 (3), 103–124. doi:10.31920/.2516-5305/2020/173a5.

Ugwueze, M (2021) Biafra War Documentaries: Explaining Continual Resurgence of Secessionist Agitations in the. ISSN: (Print)(Online) Journalhomepage:<https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fciv20> South-East, Nigeria.

Umzurike,U.O.(1997).The African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights in O. Akanji(Ed.), Migration, Conflict and Statehood Problem in Nigeria: The Self-Determination Issue. *Journal of Nigeria Studies*, Vol.11 No 4. Pp23-29.

Unya, I and Omaka, O(2021). Separatist Agitations inNigeria: Historical Background, Problems and Remedies. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences* ,Volume11No2, 207-236.

Runciman, W (1966). '*Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth-Century*. England: University of California Press.

Singer, M.(1992), 'The Application of Relative Deprivation Theory to Justice Perception of Preferential Selection,' *CurrentPsychology*,11(2),128-145. Available at EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Premier.
<<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9603062262&site=ehost-live>.

T N.(1970)"Separatist Agitations in NigeriaSince1914".*Journal of Modern African Studies*,Vol.8,No.4.

Wright, T.(1976)."*SouthAfricanSeparatistMovements*".Johannesburg:ZuluPrints.