Grand challenge of insecurity and Leadership: Humanizing Leadership to enhance security in divided Nigeria nation state.

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Abstract

The past few years has become synonymous with grand challenge of insecurity in Nigeria, impacting negatively on individuals' emotion, the national economy, social collectivity, peace and security. Having been impacted by the militant agitation on her oil resource exploration in the Niger Delta region; the emerged and occurrence of attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents, herders' farmers conflicts, bandit attacks, secessionist crusade and hardship economic protests have made threat her national security. While government have adopted different policies to address the incessant conflicts, much of these are found to be counterproductive. The arrest and re-arrest of secessionists leaders like; Kanu, IPOB leader, and Ighoho who champions demand for Yoruba nation are reference in points. This paper carries out exploratory survey of the occurrence of insecurity as differently experienced in Nigeria from northeast, northwest, southeast and southwest. The article argues that, insensitivity to public opinions, high level of public distrust and bad leadership has brought Nigerians to the point of no return. It suggests that for Nigerians to build confidence on their leaders and institutions; Nigerian leaders must take to their responsibilities, seek more for inclusive social policies, and stand out for equity. Since humanizing approach emphasizes the relational and co-constitutive aspects of leadership; solving grand

challenge of insecurity in Nigeria, requires a sense of leadership responsibility, coordinated efforts, pragmatic collaborations with the stakeholders while commune with their environment.

1.Introduction

Nigerian state has undergone lot of challenges; starting from staggering political struggle for her independent under a leadership mistrust; the events that led to civil war in the late 1970s. Nigerian have witnessed numerous military coups as well as regional politics, ethnic conflicts and secessionist movements (Adibe, 2017; Lewis, 2022). While it seems that Nigeria has overcome its historical oil resource struggle; militancy and lots of economic sabotage from oil resource conflict in the Niger Delta region, suddenly emerged are the Boho Haran insurgent, farmers- herder conflicts, bandits attacks, kidnapping among other experiences that have caused much pains for Nigerians. School children are traumatized while parents are scared, teachers and school administrators are afraid as the attacks on schools are gradually spreading to areas not known to insurgencies (UN Report, 2021). The country has been battling mass abduction of school children and terrorism in the northern swath, while kidnapping and separatist movements have gained momentum in the south. Bandits in different forms coordinated attacks, killed and abducted citizens in hundred across northern states as: Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Zamfara, Plateau and southwestern states ((*Platinum post,* 2023; *Vanguard Newspaper*, 2024; *Daily Trust 2024*)). It has become common knowledge that the security situation in Nigeria is worsening by the day, and that the crime rate is rising to an all-time high. From North to South, East to West, in all six Geopolitical Zones, crime and criminality are apparently taking over the country (Okunna, 2020).

An estimated of 1.3 million children were impacted by the banditry attacks or abduction in schools. Across the Northeast region alone, over 600,000 children remain out of school while some 1.1 million need educational support to stay in school (UN Report, 2021). The numbers of violent crimes as incessant ethnic conflicts, insurgent suicide bombings, religious killings, politically-motivated killing, agitations, youth restlessness, #EndSARS protests, and others have increasingly become the regular experience that characterizes life in Nigerian states. Nigerians are used to persons, groups- ethnic and social cultural-threatening to leave Nigeria and declare their own separate country as they argue to correct the mistake of 1914 and seek new meaning in a new association (Abati, 2024). In essence, there is a fairly generalized feeling of alienation and dissatisfaction among the various constituents of the Nigerian federation, a situation that has also deepened mistrust and incentivized separatist agitations (Adibe, 2017). The struggles for separation among other security challenges have overwhelmed Nigeria government testify to public distrust (Eldelma 2020). Insecurity has assumed formidable dimensions throwing the country's political leadership and economic policy decision managers into confusion; and indeed, the entire nation to rue the loss of their loved ones. Insecurity that arises from ethnic or tribal setting generates and leaves scars of ethnic prejudice, suspicion, distrust, hatred and discrimination, while the conflict problem has posed a number of threats to the development.

Nigeria dilemma started before her independence, when the three ethnically dominated groups and their leaders could hardly agree on what the new Nigeria should be (Abu Bah, 2005). With

population of nearly 200 million, Nigeria nation was created by colonial dictate. It ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional diversity has been an abiding source of ethnic tension and conflict. The three biggest ethnic dominated groups; Hausa Fulani in the northern region consist of 30% of the country's total population; the Yoruba in the western region make up 20%; and the eastern Igbo constitute 17%, with the rest being the so-called "minorities." (Agbiboa and Okem, 2011). These three ethnic groups have dominated Nigeria's political landscape since independence. The minorities who are consist of Ibibio, Tv, Jukun, Ogoni and Adoni have all along felt that they do not receive a fair share of resources, and that their identity is threatened by the majority (Otite, 2000). Being a nation, whose landscape has been overwhelmed and deeply enmeshed with re-occurring conflicts; Nigeria has consistently campaigned for democracy, and tried a variety of institutional arrangements to address the problem of ethnicity (Abu Bah, 2005). Nigerians have employed consociationalism to restore democracy and avert the breakup, but decades of these efforts have yielded largely stagnation or regression. They have been characterized variously as poorly conceived, contradictory, ineffective and counterproductive (Suberu, 1999). For the fact that Nigerians have been actively looking for creative ways to overcome the formidable problems of ethnicity in their country makes the Nigerian experience a paradigmatic case. It magnifies both the problems and the potentials for forging stable and democratic postcolonial multiethnic nation-states in sub-Saharan Africa (Abu Bah,2004).

Starting from colonialism to independence and from the prolong transitions of military rule to democratic rule, ethnic identity and mobilization have been prominent features of the political arrangement, with serious attendant consequences for political stability. The tragic consequences are increasingly clear with rising tide of poverty, decaying public utilities and infrastructures, social tensions and political turmoil. The balkanization of colonial Nigeria into three regions along ethnic, cultural and linguistic lines in the Richards Constitution of 1946, laid the foundation of tribalism, ethnicity in Nigeria leading to the emergence of regional and tribal politics. "Tribalism" was "a mask for class privilege"; the instigation of ethnic identities and animosities was derived from class formation, especially the emergence of "rising class" in business, politics and the profession (Richard, 1967). The formation of political parties as: National Citizen of Nigerian and Cameroon (NCNC) for example, outwardly wore a pan-Nigerian toga as a broad-based national party, yet its foothold or stronghold in a technical sense derived from the eastern region. The Northern People's Congress (NPC), which was formerly a cultural organisation called *Jami'yyar Mutanen Arewa*, represented the collective interest of the north, while the Action group (AG) which emerged in the west as an of shoot of a Yoruba cultural group, *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*, was also pro-Yoruba (Dudley 1982). These parties were really instruments used to promote class interest in the acquisition and retention of regional power (Richard, 1965). From then on, ethnic groupings or nationalities have been jostling for increasingly shrinking economic, political and social advantages.

Ethnicity has been identified a highly significant social phenomena because of its complexity, the social and political threats it poses to the society (Osaghae, 2002). Ethnicity is an element of the ideological super structure of Nigeria society which it rests on, is functional for and is determined by the infrastructure of society, the mode of production (Nnoli,1978). Ethnicity is socially relevant when people unite and condition their actions on ethnic distinctions in everyday life. It is politicized when political coalitions are organised along ethnic lines, or when access to political or economic benefits depends on ethnicity (Fearon 2008). Ethnic factor and the centrifugal forces around it are perceived to be largely responsible for the death of genuine democracy (Joseph,

1991). Nigeria deep ethnic, regional and religious cleavages and divisions have made the goal of institutionalizing an enduring system of democratic governance paradoxically both structurally compelling and profoundly problematic (Suberu, 1997). Ethnicity has been at the center of problem in Nigeria, and it is a potential barrier for the consolidation of democracy. Ethnicity constitutes a major part of every discussion about the Nigerian state and the character of its politics in the face of shared deprivation, inequitable distribution of resources and their attendant problems.

Diversity of its ethno-linguistically difference with the complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts qualifies Nigeria as one of the most deeply divided states in Africa (Blench, 2003). Though, her motto is unity in diversity, the country has been unable to successfully accommodate the interests of all the divergent ethnic groups within its territory. It is in view of this pluralism that Blench describes Nigeria as the third most ethnically and linguistically diverse country in the world after New Guinea and Indonesia (Blench 2003). Every ethnic group in Nigeria is dissimilar to one another based on the uniqueness of their cultures, languages, religions, and value systems. The privileged few employed parochial concerns and loyalties to further sectional interest to the detriment of collective good. The exploitation of primordial differences exacerbates tension and instigates intractable conflicts in different parts of the country (Claude, 1993).

While not denying the historical evolution of violent conflicts in Nigeria, which is often on power-related, the current escalation and emerging violence hang much blame on the leadership incompetence, religion bigotry and ethnic nepotism that have culminated to failure in governance. The weakness on the part of state institutions, political leaders' response towards violence, the perennial primordial leadership style which preferred ethnic and religious sentiment over competence character and capacity with ideological disorder have given rise to eruption of various ethnic suspicion, distrust and agitations for self-determination. Ever from the emergence of their first republic politicians; Ahmadu Bello, Azikwe and Awolowo, Nigerians have been largely unlucky with the sets of people that took over the mantle of leadership. The country's leadership in the recent faced a legitimacy crisis, political intrigues, with ethnically divided polity, where ethnic competition for resources drove much of the pervasive corruption, and profligacy (Fagbadebo, 2007). The need to compete for jobs and leadership positions compels individuals and groups to organize and mobilize themselves around ethnic organizations or movements in order to minimize their transition costs and maximize benefits accruing to them. This interaction is frequently characterized by fierce competition for resource and power at national state or local level (Abu Bah, 2005).

Against this backdrop, this work explores the causes and the occurrence of conflicts leading to insecurity, and the leadership problems in Nigeria. The inability of the Nigerian political leaders to be just and impartial in managing the incessant conflicts among the divergent ethnic groups in Nigeria gives the call for humanising leadership capacity, and skills in order to address the grand challenge of insecurity and the need to provide a positive form of leadership that can help restore the confidence of all ethnic groups. The work is anchored on critical leadership studies; it adopts Edelman Trust Barometer, (2019) to measure the level of trust, mistrust, compliances and relationship between government and the Nigerian citizen.

Theoretical clarification and conceptual discourse

Given to her historical narratives of ethnic formation and conflict experiences; it is certain that, Nigeria's political history had molded and destined the country for disintegration. Forces of Nigeria's political past have rarely been on the side of national identity (Kirk-Greene 1975). On this note, the three major theoretical approaches to ethnic conflict are found relative to this work. *The Primordialism theory* illustrates ethnic conflicts as a natural phenomenon, which occur as a result of cultural differences. It posts that ethnic identities are derived from nature (they were either biologically determined in the past or they were constructed by individuals in the distant past) and have been passed down to the current generations of people from their ancestors (Joseph, 1997). Either way, every individual Nigerian belongs to one ethnic group, which, once acquired and remains fixed over time.

Primordialism believed that ethnicities remained the same over time given that an ethnic group's unique identities and circumstances in life were embedded in their spoken language as it is found in Nigeria among Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups with their peculiarity in their culture and languages. Language, cultural customs, perspective, and manner of life distinguish the Igbo from the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, making these ethnic groups distinct peoples. Primordialism thinkers believed that once people dispersed geographically and established different tribes and nations, these groups developed different languages which reflected their unique situations in life (Dawisha 2002). Historically, cultural, linguistic, economic and geographical differences exist among Nigeria's ethnic groupings. In terms of language, social behaviours, cultural beliefs, and religion, the Ijaw, Ogoni, Kalabari, Andoni, Ikwerre, Ibibio, and Efik of Southern Nigeria differ from the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri of Northern Nigeria. The ancient federal political system of the Izon, Kalabari, Andoni, Okrika, Ogoni, and Ikwerre in the Niger Delta region of Southern Nigeria differs dramatically from the Igbo's traditional kinship structure and the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba's highly centralised systems (Ukiwo, 2005). Primordialism believed that where there is in group there would as well be an out-group, which make it natural for two different ethnic groups to fight with one another in order to achieve their conflicting goals (Jesse and Williams 2011). Lot of historical revolts have entrenched the multiethnic nature of the Nigerian States as conflicts between: the Yoruba and Hausa; Kano riot of 1953; the ethno-religious massacre in Kano, Kaduna, and Plateau in the wake of a sharia judicial system in 1960 and 1966; the Nigerian Civil War in 1967 through 1970; the census crisis. The IPOB issuing a "sit at home" order to all Igbos to honour Ndigbo who were murdered during the Nigeria/Biafra Civil War in most Igbo-dominated States in South-Eastern Nigeria in the recent, indicating that while the Igbos were defeated during the Nigeria/Biafra Civil War, the Biafra spirit is still alive (Ekeh, 1990). It affirms the primordialists claim that; ethnic conflicts are a result of memories of past atrocities which make violence hard to avoid (Dawisha 2002).

Constructivism theory, Constructivism disagrees with the primordialist approach of understanding a group's attributes as natural characteristics which emerge from physiological traits and psychological pre-dispositions, as incorrect. It states that ethnic identities are constructed, reconstructed, and mobilized in accordance with social and political factors. It argues that it is wrong to assume that an ethnic group's members have an internalized "singular social experience" that everyone in the group is exposed to through their group consciousness (Cerulo, 1997). It suggests that ethnic groups are a social construction, which means that they are fabricated and refabricated based on reigning cultural norms. Constructivists also argue that individuals do not belong to only one ethnic category.

The Hausa-Fulani hegemony for example, has ensure dominance in Nigeria political system for some times, and very difficult to differentiate between Hausa and Fulani in northern Nigeria. Occurrence of conflicts between farmer and herders, the experience of bandits' attacks, cattle rustling in recent times have changed the narratives leading to reconstruction of Hausa-Fulani hegemony and demonizing Fulani ethnic group as terrorist (*African independent, 2019).* Thus, *Hausa*-Fulani in Nigeria are made up of several different identities including Kanuri that are unified under one Hausa language. Cerulo supports this claim by brining to attention the idea that there are individuals who have mixed ancestries; and thus, they can choose which ethnic identity they want to stress based on the circumstances that they find themselves in (Cerulo, 1997

That being said, constructivists are of opinion that it is possible to use the concept called the security dilemma to predict the probability of a conflict amongst different ethnic groups. The insecurity experience and response from Nigeria government to herder farmer conflicts in Nigeria has been perceived as ethnic invasion, and fulanization attempt. Nigeria deep ethnic, regional and religious cleavages and divisions have made the goal of institutionalizing an enduring system of democratic governance paradoxically both structurally compelling and profoundly problematic (Suberu, 1997). Ethnic conflicts are likely to happen when political regimes collapse because they often leave behind a number of non-cohesive cultural groups who out of fear are forced to compete with one another in order to gain a sense of security (Ellingsen 2000). The annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential election which believed to have been won by M.K.O Abiola, a Yoruba extraction, and Yoruba response shows that Ethnic conflicts arise due to competition for resource, power and elections that utilize ethnic-based political parties. The centralization of power, resources and modernization that accompanied politics in Nigeria makes minorities felt excluded, marginalized and always struggle to be accommodated. The concern and fear that they would be excluded from the exploration and management of vast hydrocarbon deposits in the region by an Eastern Region government predominately made up of Igbos under General Aguiyi-Ironsi administration, makes the Niger Delta ethnic minorities sparked the revolution (Boro and Tebekaemi, 1982). Ethnic conflicts occur as a result of modernization especially if an ethnic group's expectations are not met and if an ethnic group believes that they are at a disadvantage relative to another ethnic group (Ellingsen 2000).

Instrumentalism theory: sees ethnicity as a tool used by people to achieve their goals because people who share ascriptive characteristics can be effectively organized and mobilized in order to influence public policies. In other words, individuals who believe that they can obtain access to valuable resources or state services by electing a fellow ethnic member to a political position, are likely to do so to achieve their goals (Why Ethnic Parties Succeed). Nigerians have used their ethnic identity very much either for political power or for economic allocation of resources. The balkanization of colonial Nigeria into three regions along ethnic, cultural and linguistic lines in the Richards Constitution of 1946 for example, laid the foundation of tribalism, ethnicity in Nigeria leading to the emergence of regional and tribal politics. The instigation of ethnic identities and animosities was derived from class formation, especially the emergence of "rising class" in politics and the profession (Richard, 1967). The formation of political parties as: National Citizen of Nigerian and Cameroon (NCNC) though, outwardly wore a pan-Nigerian toga as a broad-based national party, yet its foothold or stronghold in a technical sense derived from the eastern region. The Northern People's Congress (NPC), which was formerly a cultural organisation called *Jami'yyar Mutanen Arewa,* represented the collective interest of the north, while the Action group

(AG) which emerged in the west as an of shoot of a Yoruba cultural group, *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*, was also pro-Yoruba (Dudley 1982). These parties were really instruments used to promote class interest in the acquisition and retention of regional power.

Instrumentalists believe that members of an ethnic group (people who share a common history, language, and customs) feel a strong cohesion to other members of their in-group. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs in this situation therefore, mobilize their own ethnic groups to commit violence by convincing them that they are under a threat from another ethnic group (Comaroff and Stern 1994). The Nigeria civil war of 1967 was a war that could have been avoided but the political elite failed to adopt the avoidance. They achieved this by magnifying the differences between their ethnic group and the people from the out-group; this has been done by blaming the other ethnic group for their misfortunes. This is in tandem with Horowitz (1985: 143-144) that lot of the tension between ethnic groups comes from people evaluating their abilities and their situations in life relative to the lives and the abilities of people who have other ethnic ties. When one group of people believe that the people from another ethnic group are better off than them, then they might perceive the other group to be a threat to their own group's identity, which can sometimes be enough to get a group to resort to violence.

The phenomenon of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria as illustrated from the theories is attributable to multiplicity factors. These include the manipulation of ethnicity by the ruling elite; the mismanagement of ethnic grievances by the Nigerian states and its agents; the diffusion of violence into the Nigerian society by prolonged military rule (Ade-Ajayi, 1992). Thus, ethnic conflict in Nigeria occurs as a result of historical events, experiences and arrangement given reference to (amalgamation of 1914), and the combination of different ethnic groups with different culture and language – a prebendal perspective. Throughout the history, Nigerian ethnic groups have been refabricating their past or magnifying certain pre-existing myths and events in a way to provide their ethnic political leaders' historic justification for competing with other groups (Dawisha 2017).

The concept of "humanizing leaders" is an attempt for organizations to cultivate humanistic leadership. Petriglieri & Petriglieri (2015) refer to; *dehumanization of leadership*, whereby leadership breaks its ties to identity, community and context. Scholars have become critical of mainstream leadership approaches with emphasis in dehumanizing leadership and overwhelming discourse on humanizing leaders. Humanizing compels leaders to act in ways that honor human beings, uphold their dignity, shape equality, promote moral responsibility, and foster well-being. Leadership practice requires wisdom *intellectual honesty*, *intellectual humility* and *integrative thinking*. This does not come easy, as individuals are inherently biased, and deeply embedded in their values and belief systems (Razzetti, 2019). Humanizing is a must to be ready to accept "all of humanity" (ourselves and others) (Khilji, 2019; Mathers, 2019).

When we acknowledge humanity with its flaws and virtues, we humanize the act of leading and leadership, we treated humanity with faith, and with the belief that leaders are neither super-heroes, nor demi gods (Khilji, 2019). This position allows leaders to adopt a 'developmental' view, and engage more humanistically with ideas of change, and learning within the given context. They also begin to understand the paradoxes that surround our actions, behaviors and intentions. This helps them remove the tensions and arrive at more integrative solutions (Mathers, 2019). On a more philosophical level, such a mindset allows them to lead more beautifully (Razzaetti, 2018).

Evaluating critical leadership studies (CLS) approach, the emphasis on humanizing is places on dialogue, reflection, question thinking and critical thinking; and influences to deconstruct and then reconstruct their identity as a leader. By constantly assessing who they are, observing themselves and leaders/ learners around them, engaging in reflection, learners are able to facilitate a process of co-construction of leadership (Collinson & Tourish, 2015). The CLS infuses humanism and a strong sense of responsibility to highlight the positive potential of leader (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012; Western, 2008), and to fulfill its goal of humanizing leadership.

Humanizing leadership boost trust in government as provides a different lens through which to look at public governance – a lens that pays much more attention to people's perceptions and how this influences their reaction to policy measures and reforms. Understanding trust make policy makers and analysts of public governance more sensitive and responsive to the expectations of citizens. The decline in trust in government in Nigeria for example, have led to lower rates of compliance with rules and regulations while citizens are in the recent has become more risk-averse as the case in oil subsidy protests, #EndSARS demonstrations, the current naira scarcity protests among other social demands for leadership change. Trust is both an input to public sector reforms – necessary for the implementation of reforms – and, at the same time, an outcome of reforms, as they influence people's and governments' attitudes and decisions relevant for economic and social well-being. As a result, trust in government by citizens and institutions is essential for the effective and efficient political leadership, policy making both in good times and bad.

Trust in government has been identified as one of the most important foundations upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are built. Trust is essential for social cohesion and well-being as it affects governments' ability to govern and enables them to act without having to resort to coercion. Consequently, it is an efficient means of lowering transaction costs in any social, economic and political relationship (Fukuyama, 1995). A high level of trust in government might increase the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations. Trust in government seems to be especially critical in crisis situations, such as natural disasters, economic crisis or political unrest which focuses attention on the core functions of public governance. Nigerians have lost trust in the leadership of the country with the occurrence of insecurity experienced by the Nigerians. Perhaps, the capacity of governments to manage crises and to implement successful exit strategies is often a condition for their survival and for their re-election. Lack of trust has hampered the emergency and recovery procedures causing great harm to the nation leadeship and damaging government's capacity to act. The re-current economic crisis and security challenge in Nigeria however, reveal dimensions of leadership/government trust that are evident in the gradual evolution of countries in the past years that preceded the current administration.

The shortage of globally responsible leaders (Pless & Schneider, 2016; Khilji, Tarique, & Schuler, 2015; Michaels, Handfield-Jones, & Axelrod, 2001) have given to public dis-satisfaction on leadership worldwide and growing criticism of conventional approaches. (Collinson & Tourish, 2015; Khurana, 2007; Petriglieri & Petriglieri, 2015) have exposed inadequacies of prevailing leadership development approaches. With the purpose of humanizing leadership Edelman trust Barometer, has indicated high levels of public distrust with leaders around the world (Edelman, 2019). Much of these feelings have been fueled by world leaders.' Nigerian leaders are characters of financial scandals, nepotic and tribalist; all that have highlighted apathy, ego, and greed among which have led to the intolerance of the followers. Baron and Parent, 2015; Kellerman, 2012; Muff,

2013; Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2008 have argued that there is a growing need for leaders to help restore the confidence of stakeholders. The concerns have led to calls for changing the way we develop leaders and conceptualize humanity in leadership (Collinson & Tourish, 2015; Johnson, 2014).

Osaghae (2010: 407) lists the qualities of good leaders, all which have eluded Nigerian leaders: altruism, patriotism, moral uprightness based on conspicuous religiosity in the case of sense of historical mission, comprehension of developmental challenges and how to overcome them, courage, boldness and determination. These features largely define the charismatic leader. He further enumerates traits such as "sense of mission, oratorical skills, exemplary leadership and boldness" as definers of charisma outside the scope of religion. Achebe (1983: 10–45), quoted in Osaghae (2010: 409), encapsulates the qualities that a charismatic leader must possess, including "exemplary leadership, mental or intellectual rigor, patriotism, capacity for fairness, ability to treat every group equally, meritocracy and incorruptibility." Going by the position of Eisensadt (1968: 223) that moments of crisis provide the opportunity for the emergence of such leaders, and given the conflict and instability that have defined the experiences in Nigeria in recent times, the continued expectation of a charismatic leader that possess the virtues enumerated by Osaghae are not unfounded after all.

To 'humanize' leadership we must be willing to 'humanize' all-round in and out, our actions and inactions (Petriglieri and Petriglieri, 2015). With this in mind, we emphasize the contextual, non-romantic and co-constitutive aspects of leadership. At the same time, we highlight the positive potential of leadership to create and support responsible and humanistic" frameworks (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012; Western, 2008). To help leaders think (and act) with integrity, responsibility (Pless & Schneider, 2016) and promote human dignity and well-being (Khilji, 2019; Pirson, 2017). Thus, leadership needs to move beyond a functionalist and leader- centric view of leadership. CLS offers an alternative and more nuanced approach to leadership- those which foregrounds power, denounces a romantic view of leaders (as super heroes and demi gods), and rethinks followership (Collinson & Tourish, 2015).

A pluralist leader within a given environment, his interests focus on leadership dynamics- as the product of an ongoing process of social construction between myriad of actors within diverse cultural contexts. Leadership therefore, emerges as contextual, distributed, relational, situated and contested. Thereby power relations are 'socially constructed, frequently rationalized, sometimes resisted and occasionally transformed" (Collinson & Tourish, 2015; p. 585). Adopting CLS lens allows us to focus on the co-constructed, asymmetrical, and shifting dynamics within a nation that is characterized by complex, situated and mutually reinforcing relations between followers and leaders. Emphasis on humanizing the leadership is placed on: (a) creating awareness of the tensions and paradoxes that are inherent in the process of leading (Weick, 2012; Smith & Lewis, 2011), (b) becoming aware of the power and relational dynamics through which leadership (and followership) is enacted (Collinson & Tourish, 2015), (c) bridging the knowing-doing gap to focus on critical thinking and experiential learning (Hobson et al., 2014), (d) learning to channel leaders' (and followers') motivation towards personal meaning (Crossan et al., 2013; Raelin, 2004) and social good (Pless & Schneider, 2016), and (e) treating leadership educational institutions as identity spaces (Petriglieri & Petriglieri, 2015).

Addressing the enormous socio-economic challenges that we are facing presently, with (such as growing high level of inequalities, and sustainable development), and to highlight the positive potential of leadership; it is important for Nigerian leaders to become responsible and humanistic in their approach. Muff (2013) argues the importance of broadening the responsibility from serving narrow stakeholders to contribute to issues and challenges that are of concern to society and the world at large. We recognize this is no small feat as it requires *conceptualizing leadership education* and rewriting underlying values (Khilji, 2014). Avolio & Gardner (2005) stated that:

> Unique stressors facing organizations throughout the world today call for a renewed focus on what constitutes genuine leadership [and] on restoring confidence, hope and optimism; being able to rapidly bounce back from catastrophic events and display resiliency; helping people in their search for meaning and connection by fostering a new self-awareness; and genuinely relating to all stakeholders (Avolio & Gardner assertion (2005: p.316).

Pierson (2017) uses the aforementioned humanizing principles to propose a humanistic paradigm. He posits four basic drives that guide all human decisions—the drive to acquire (dA) resources, the drive to defend (dD) against threats, the drive to bond (dB) in order to form long-term caring relationships, and the drive to comprehend (dC) in order to experience engagement and intellectual curiosity. These four drivers are strongly independent, frequently in a state of conflict, and need to be continuously balanced in our daily lives (Hicks, 2011). To allow human flourishing and fulfillment to occur (Spaemann, 2000), leaders need to enable balancing of the four drives. As humanistic leadership develops throughout the organization, this balance will increase with mindful attentiveness. Results of this balance are psychologically safe climate and respectful dialogue among units and colleagues, which is essential to challenge the underlying assumptions and rid conscious and unconscious bias (Isaacs, 1993; Schein, 1993).

Iweriebor, (1990) while analyses leadership; he identified six mechanisms for measuring progress of nation building process which are: leadership, transportation and communication network, economic development, national education, pedagogical nationalism, and civil society. The Nigeria successive governments as in the first republic led by Tafawa Balewa, government for example, promoted territorial division and was biased against smaller ethnic group (Diamond 1998). The second republic led by Shehu Shagari, a presidential system and centralized federation was also biased against minorities (Oyovbare, 1884). The fourth Republic led by Obasanjo failed of institutional arrangement which would have improved the position of marginalized ethnic groups (Ogunbanjo and Ayandiji,2001). The present administration of President Mohammadu Buhari has been equally accused of favouritism and division of Nigeria ethnic groups, especially the way and manner of his leadership on Fulani herders' farmers' conflicts and bandits' attacks (*Premium Times*, 2022). He has failed to adequately incorporate and represent the ethnic diversity of Nigeria. They have unable to balance the four drives of Pierson, and we can describe their approach of leadership to nation building as exclusionary.

Drivers of trust in government and its linkage in the Nigerian political leadership
Trust in government is based on a mix of economic, social and political interactions between citizens and government. A broad empirical literature discusses: (1) the relationships between trust in government and economic, social and governance parameters. It identifies four broad groups of drivers of trust in government: (1) culture; (2) institutional setting; (3) economic and social

outcomes; and (4) performance of institutions. A general finding is that trust and most of its drivers are interlinked and self-fulfilling, and therefore, complementary in their relationship to public governance and economic development. Trust in government according to Bouckaert (2012) can be analyzed at three levels. At the *macro-level*, trust relates to *political institutions and the functioning of democracy*. At the *meso-level*, trust relates to *policy making* – the ability of governments to manage economic and social issues, and to generate positive expectations for future well-being. At the *micro-level*, trust refers to the impact of government on people's daily lives through *service delivery*. Although distinct, these three levels interact and a significant lag in trust at one level may affect trust at other levels and influence policy outcomes. Efforts to strengthen trust therefore need to reinforce synergies across each of these different spheres. Bouckaert's taxonomy is especially useful to investigate the linkage or level of trust between government and the citizenry for two reasons.

First, trust is not just something that *happens* to governments but something that governments can *influence* through their actions and policies. Second it suggests that when it comes to influencing trust, it is not only the *what* of public policies that matters, but also the *how*, for *whom* and the *with whom*. Consequently, not only the final results but the processes used to attain them are also important for the citizens and government. Trust in government at a broad level therefore, is built on two main components: *Social trust*, that represents citizens' confidence in their social community; and *political trust*, when citizens appraise government and its institutions. Political trust includes both macro-level trust, which is diffuse and system based, and institution-based trust. Civic engagement in the community and interpersonal trust have been shown to contribute to overall social trust (Putnam, 2000). This relationship, however, is not mechanical and is affected by a number of contextual factors such as injustice, exclusion as commonly experience in Nigeria where ethnic group mistrust and suspect each other where – social trust has become low –, and government rely on institutions to re-present their interest (Aghion et al., 2010).

The public governance dimension – the institutional setting and its performance – of trust are better understood when this concept is broken down into a set of inter-related *process* components that encapsulate what citizens expect from government as proposed in following components:

- *Reliability:* this is all about the ability of governments to minimize uncertainty in the economic, social and political environment of their citizens, and to act in a consistent and predictable manner.
- *Responsiveness:* the provision of accessible, efficient and citizen-oriented public services that effectively address the needs and expectations of the public.
- *Openness and inclusiveness:* a systemic, comprehensive approach to institutionalizing at two-way communication with stakeholders, whereby relevant, usable information is provided, and interaction is fostered as a means to improve transparency, accountability and engagement.
- *Integrity:* the alignment of government and public institutions with broader principles and standards of conduct that contribute to safeguarding the public interest while preventing corruption.
- *Fairness:* in a procedural sense the consistent treatment of citizens (and businesses) in the policy-making and policy-implementation processes.

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Nigerian state is currently going through a difficult time and there is no doubt in term of social integration and cohesion. The suspicion, religious bigotry, ethnicity, nepotism, injustices, impunity and sentiment seems to be the order of the day as Nigerians become more suspicious of each other and life has become that of Hobbesian state of nature. The state of insecurity in Nigeria is alarming and government seem to have been incapacitated with a radical decline in the trust of citizenry on government and its institutions. Security as a dynamic condition involves the relative ability of a state to counter threats to its core values and interests (Omede, 2012). McGrew (1988) posts that the security of a nation hangs on two important pillars which are: the maintenance and protection of the socioeconomic order in the face of internal and external threat, and the promotion of a preferred international order, which minimizes the threat to core values and interests, as well as to the domestic order.

Nwolise (2006), asserts that security is an all-encompassing condition which suggests that a territory must be secured by a network of armed forces; that the sovereignty of the state must be guaranteed by a democratic and patriotic government, which in turn must be protected by the military, police and the people themselves; that the people must not only be secured from external attacks but also from devastating consequences of internal upheavals such as unemployment, hunger, starvation, diseases, ignorance, homelessness, environmental degradation and pollution cum socio-economic injustices. Rothschild, cited by Nwagboso (2012) states that security given the historic epoch has been about people and that without reference to the security of the individual, security makes no sense at all (McSweeney, 1999).

Dike (2010) and Omede (2012) take discourse on security vice-a-vice insecurity experience a step further through which they conclude that Nigeria's security should be based on a holistic view that must see Nigerian citizens as the primary beneficiaries of every security and developmental deliverable that the state can offer. Nigeria's security matter involves efforts to strengthen the capacity of the government of Federal Republic of Nigeria so it can advance its interests and objectives to contain internal and external aggression, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine leadership development, progress and growth and improve the welfare and quality of life of every citizen.

Insecurity on the other hand is the antithesis of security and has attracted such common descriptors as human want of safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty, want of confidence, state of doubt, inadequately guarded or protected, instability, trouble, lack of protection and being unsafe, and others (Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro, 2013). These aforementioned descriptors point to a condition where there exists a vulnerability to harm, as presently endure by Nigerians with loss of life, property or livelihood. A state experience insecurity is described to be a state of not knowing, a lack of control, and the inability to take defensive action against forces that portend harm or danger to an individual or group, or that make them vulnerable. According to the sage Awolowo (1982), insecurity is a result of malignant environment dominated by man's insensitivity to man. Insecurity, Beland (2005) argues is the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection. It refers to lack or inadequate freedom from danger. This definition reflects physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity such as economic security and social security.

In this work the challenge of insecurity is conceived as a situation where human and national security of a state is compromised by internal or external forces or interests exacerbated by the incompetency on the part of country leadership, government, weak institutions or poor economic, military and human resource development conditions. What the current trend is imprinting on the psyche of Nigerians is that the government, its security apparatus is incapable of guaranteeing the safety and security of its people, a reflection of leadership. This has impacted on the general human security in Nigeria as the situation promotes fear, limits the peoples' ability to develop economically and limit the trust on government. Fukuyama (2004) calls this the breakdown of institutional infrastructures as the foundations of institutional framework in Nigeria are very shaky, broken and have provoked a deterioration of state governance and democratic accountability. It has paralyzed the existing formal and legitimate rules nested in the hierarchy of social order and occurrence of social disorder (Achumba, *et al,* 2013). There are evidences that government has become incapacitated to deliver public goods to its citizens. The lack of basic necessities, high cost of food as a result of hipper inflation, insecurity and wide level of deprivation felt by the Nigerians has created a growing army of frustrated youths, other non-state actors, who resort to violence against the state at the slightest provocation or opportunity.

The perception of marginalisation by many Nigerians which is informed by the ostentation show of political leadership' and the grinding poverty to which citizens are subjected. The security of the Nigerian nation-state has been reduced to that of the political class and their ethnic groups as the immediate supporters, thus, the security calculus of the Nigerian state has been bourgeoisified by the leaders as it does not include vital aspects of nation building, social and national development supported by the provision of basic social, economic or even military conditions necessary for effective national security (Egwu 2000). Leadership deficiency in Nigeria contributed immensely to the grotesque pattern of ethical degeneration that led to the systematic and institutionalized erosion of personal and collective peace, safety, stability and harmony within the Nigerian society. Nigerians are suffering widespread and systematic terrorist attacks by mainly Boko Haram, the ISIL aligned, Islamic state West African province (ISWAP) and unchallenged Fulani herdsmen and bandits' attacks. Over 2,287 persons were reported killed in Nigeria in the third quarter of the year from July to September 2021 in violent incidents including attacks by militia herdsmen, bandits' abduction and gang clashes (SBM, 2021).

Tied to this is the accumulation of morally bankrupt leaders that is brazenly corrupt, incredibly inept, peremptorily high-handed, snobbishly elitist and apathetically disposed to the distressful plight of the majority of Nigerians. The existing social structure in Nigeria is not something neutral nor objective: rather it is framed by asymmetric power relations between the component actors. Asymmetric power relations are embedded in a complex web of structural and material elements, which constructs the fabric of everyday life itself and causes conflict. As the deformed social structure derived from the asymmetric power relations between different ethnic groups is considered as a source of conflict, serious conflict being embedded in an unequal social, political and economic system that reflects prolonged exploitation backed by coercion.

The structural state of inequality, unfairness and injustice has toughened many Nigerians, forcing them to take their destiny into their hands as the quest for secession increases. This because any approach that ignore structural transformation would result in perpetuating the unequal status quo and prolonging and worsening the conflict. The quest for self-determination is in increase as a result of the inability to contextualize occurrence of crisis and drive appropriate inclusive response strategy,

mobilize for national consensus and promote rule of law that appreciate, equality, the supremacy of law and civil liberty. Nigerian federation it states, are littered with remains of innocent, wounds of families/friends and agony of patriots; without sparing generation next to the needless legacy of vandalism, promoted through manifest nepotism flavoured with ultra-ethnocentric hegemonic policy, option and the consequential hyper injustice – driven violent extremism that call for transformation.

Structural transformation asserts transforming relatively enduring asymmetric relationships between/among collectivities in a social structure to new sets of intergroup relations where all groups can enjoy more equal control over political-economic resources within the society. It promotes formal means of securing inclusiveness and respect for diversity in the political systems, institutions and the law. Thus, transformation of the asymmetric power relations in which some groups enjoy social and cultural privilege, greater access to political power, and economic privilege into more civic polity wherein diversity and equality can be guaranteed, is essential for sustainable peace and social stability. A large number of the Nigeria population is frustrated and have lost hope, especially the youths, and have now emerged to express their disillusion about the pervasive state of inequality (Onuoha, 2011). Consequently, because the people do not understand government or have a perception that government does not care about their welfare, they become easy prey to centrifugal forces who co-opt, incite them to vent their anger on perceived enemies of the people and sometimes go to the extent of destroying national totems.

There has been a gradual de-institutionalization of national security agencies, albeit, illegitimacy. Despite of huge military budget for the security of state yet, there is greater insecurity in many states. Much of the budgetary fund in Nigeria have find their way into the pockets of some highly-placed private citizens and the Chief Executives of the states, leaving the hapless citizens to the mercy of criminals and socio paths. Also, the armed forces, paramilitary establishments and the police under federal government control have become weak institutionally, heavily politicized and poorly funded. This arrangement makes it easy for the nation's security to be compromised. Performance crisis and concurrent affront that has characterized the statutory of Nigeria armed forces and police force institutions have become the justification. The government apparent inability to handle the onslaught armed herdsmen, bandits which is threatening snowball into a free-for-all as a result of an overheated polity *(Daily Post, 2022).* The question however is that, 'should the citizens (propelled by grievance) not be allowed to go to any lengths to self-defense and protect themselves based on the postulations of Brown's (1964) 'territorial behavior theory?' In this case, Collier and Hoeffler's (2002) position that grievance on its own is insufficient to instigate war may be countered in consonance with the position of Fanon and Latin (2003) that the weakness of state capacity provides opportunities for the onset of civil wars. It is unfortunate that the unique diversity of Nigeria nation which have been the source of her strength has today turned around to her albatross overnight.

2. Nigeria Collage of vertices of insecurity in the Northeast, Northwest Southeast and Southwest

Nigeria has become one of the most unsafe nation terms of safety and security, insecure and dangerous places to live – Ranked 3rd as the most terrorized country globally, behind Afghanistan and Iraq (Obi, 2020). Though, insecurity is not new in Nigeria; it has been getting progressively worse over the years. The nefarious activities of localised criminal gangs plagued by the seemingly intractable menace of Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, trans-border banditry in the northwest

and killer herdsmen ravaging farming communities in the southwest, while militants riding on the back of a separatist agitation are spilling blood in the southeast (Okunna, 2020; *Punch Newspapers*, 2022). Terrorism and wanton destruction of lives and property in the northeastern part of the country by Boko Haram, leading to what the United Nations (UN) in March 2017 described as the worst humanitarian crisis since the creation of the UN, as hundreds of thousands of people who survived the crisis are on the verge of starving to death. The situation has terribly deteriorated since 2017 and has become quite horrifying with events as:

▪ Militancy and insurgency in the Niger Delta region of the country
▪ Rise of separatist groups, mainly in the Southern parts of the country, glamouring for independence and secession for their regions.
▪ Menace of rampaging herdsmen wreaking havoc on lives and property in several parts of the country.
▪ All manner of ethnic and religious crises that are creating fear and distrust among Nigerians, thus fueling the clamour for the re-structuring of the country, and even a breakup of Nigeria.

Separatist movement have become omnipotent in the post-colonial African states from the division of Sudan, to the continued fragmentation of Somalia, and the protracted struggles of Caborda and Azuward, conflict over secession and separation continues to the present day (Charles, 2020). The rebirth of the agitation for self-determination struggle was reinforced by the longstanding collective memory of the Nigeria - Biafra Civil War in the late 1970s (Lewis, 2022), and economic and political marginalization experienced by the Igbo ethnic group. Such agelong grievances are central to the agitation of the Biafra separatist group championed by IPOB (International Crisis Group, 2015). POB took advantage of a collective memory of War, marginalization, and injustices to mobilize local and international support (Kwazema, 2021). The Igbo-speaking southeast secessionist, Nasi Kanu and his Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) become a monster and makes; Nigeria's new zone of instability with his Eastern Security Network (ESN); adds to a long list of other security troubles aforementioned, including jihadist violence in northeast that has left 11 million people in need of aid; unchecked banditry in the northwest; piracy and organised oil theft in the Niger Delta; and pastoralist-farmer clashes in much of the rest of the country that have displaced hundreds of thousands of people.

IPOB separatist and his unrest in the southeast has particular resonance in Nigeria. From a global and international perspective on separatist movement, Brian et al. (2008), assert that 'nearly two dozen separatist movements are active worldwide, concentrated in Europe and Asia. At least seven are violent and reflect ethnic or religious differences with the mother country.' This *shows that separatist movements span the globe.'* Similarly, Bieri, (2014) indicated that agitations towards self-determination through independence have been on the increase in the EU recently. A major issue fueling these agitations is the economic crisis and an interrelated crisis of confidence that is overwhelming the continent. The self-declared state of Biafra was a mainly Igbo secessionist enclave that existed from 1967 until its defeat by federal forces in 1970, in a war that may have claimed as many as one million lives. Separatist sentiment has continued to flow up again in the southeast. Ojukwu, the harrowed of Biafra has defended the course for the secession of Biafra from the Nigerian federation. Such a declaration for Biafra resulted in a full-blown Civil War between Nigeria and Biafra nation. The defeat of the Biafran nation in 1970 forced Ojukwu to exile in Cote d'Ivoire (Ojo and Lamidi, 2018).

The aftermath of the civil War witnessed the postwar programme, which was centered on healing the consequences of the War. The inventiveness of Postwar reconciliation and peaceful co-existence advocated by the Nigerian state however, promoted the emergence and resurgence of self-determination groups. Thus, postwar plans inability to address transgenerational trauma and prevailing injustices have prompted the renewed call for independence in southeast Nigeria. As a result, the neo-Biafran separatist movements have championed the struggle for self-determination. Such action has witnessed the resurgence of the ideology for the Biafran nation led by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) (Ojo, 2023). It is believed that over centralization of government has added to the secessionist crises in Nigeria, for you cannot centralize too much without marginalizing someone. The fact that the fear of marginalization, characterises exclusion, this will be allayed with wider political participation.

The resurgence of the idea of self-determination was stems from a perception of the Igbo deliberate marginalization by the government and the heavy-handed policing by security forces since inception of this government in 2015, makes Igbo tribe demanding independence for the region; and local grievance has helped drive the rise of IPOB, whose goal is to create a "new Biafra", via a referendum (Amnesty International, 2016; Ojo 2023).. Despite IPOB's non-violent calls for a "Biafra exit", it was proscribed and framed as a terrorist (http://Research gate; Ojo 2023). After IPOB's proscription as a terrorist organization, a counterterrorism strategy had been adopted to suppress Biafra's secessionist agitation. The mobilization and adoption of such a strategy to rebrand self-determination frontiers has been considered a primordial approach often employed to frustrate the agitation of minority groups around the world (Ojo, 2023). States have deployed such mechanisms to quench the ember of related political movements and ethnic-nationalist struggles. Therefore, movements that assert self-determination principles are now 'routinely criminalized by proscription' (Muller, 2008). But, despite militarized approaches to separatism in Nigeria, such strategies have not succeeded in quelling agitations for secession. Rather. it has facilitated the radicalization of neo-Biafra separatists, which led to the creation of the Eastern Security Network, IPOB's armed wing (Nwangwu, 2022). The aftermath of this has make it security network (ESN) taken a far more radical position fighting with security forces in the south eastern states especially the Orlu community in Imo state; after which IPOB declared that the "second Nigeria/Biafra war" had begun (*Sahara Reporter. 2021*). ESN has launched onto a single issue to justify its emergence – driving out Fulani pastoralists from the southeast, whose presence it characterizes as an "invasion" by northern following repeated clashes with local farming communities (*Vanguard, 2021*).

Down the Southwestern Nigeria is the unwanted infiltration and occupation of reserve forests by armed herdsmen with different reports of criminal ventures, including kidnapping, armed robbery, banditry, murder, and rape, which have all been traceable to Fulani ethnic militants. Fulani pastoralists traditionally migrate south with their cattle each year during the North's dry season. They have now travel farther south and stay longer with occurrence of unpredictable rains, a surge in cattle rustling, and banditry in the northwest, plus conflicts with local cultivators there, as expanding farms encroach on traditional cattle routes (Fabusoro & Oyegbami 2009). The Fulani herdsmen infiltration into southern Nigeria has been considered a Boko Haram in different form and shape to target the southern part of the country that Boko Haram could not penetrate (Obi, 2018).

The Fulani hegemony is viewed as a homogenous Islamic terrorist group (*African independent, 2019* – supported by the President Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani himself, and his inaction to either arrest or punish the kinsmen- so the conspiracy theories. The vanguard of a fulanisation plot is perceived to have aimed at grabbing land, Islamizing a largely southwest region, and politically and culturally altering its demographics. Thus, government ranching policy to end transhumance movements and attempt to confine pastoralists to grazing reserves in order to put an end to the conflicts has given reason for the rising perception and mistrust for land invasion and the islamisation agenda. The Yorubas have acknowledged that their developmental pursuit is being retreated in a lopsided federal system where powers are concentrated at the center at the detriment of the federating units (Akinterinwa, 2020). The policies had been resisted by state governors in the Southwest, termed a disguised in land grab, and their reasons against open gracing in their states. The governors who could not fold their arms any longer have further formed the crime-fighting security outfit codename *Amotekun*; the state security network to tackle unprecedented levels of kidnapping, armed bandits, and clashes over grazing rights between farmers and pastoralists (*Punch Newspapers,* 2018).

Similarly, the untimely death of their people in their farms who's their death was traced to unmitigated terror of armed herdsmen in rural communities as experience in Oyo state: Igboora, Ibarapa central and Igangan, Ibarapa North Local government area had given birth to the emergence of Sunday Igboho; championing the demand for Yoruba nation. Igboho has become a lightning rod for grievances related to land rights of farmers and the indiscriminate killing of farmers in his home town, in the southwest. Igboho thrust himself into the heart of one of the communities' deadliest conflicts -clashes between Fulani herders and other groups, over access to land and grazing rights (*Punch Newspapers,* 2018). His emergence has redefined the contemporary Yoruba self-determination movement. The movement which advocates for the creation of the Yoruba nation had followed peaceful protests, sensitization, and awareness creation among the Yorubas of southwestern Nigeria. However, Igboho felt that he had seen enough and captured attention with his demand that the Fulani herdsmen from northern Nigeria, "had escaped justice" because they are close to the federal government, and they should leave within seven days ultimatum the southwest seen as the home of the Yoruba ethnic group, for all their alleged crimes (*Punch Newspapers,* 2018). Igboho has took his campaign across all Southwest states with many of his foot soldiers that; he is seen as a dangerous rabble rouser by the government, accused of inciting ethnic hatred and stockpiling illegal weapons.

Igboho actions over the eviction of Fulani from Yoruba land with command that Fulani herdsman who engages in kidnapping and should be flushed out was widely condemned, especially by the group of northerners who accuse him of inciting ethnic violence and engaging in the unlawful eviction of citizens. Ayoade, (2002) posts, in Nigeria, ethnic groups are real and to the extent they are real, they must be accorded rights. Nigerian government has found Igboho position on Yoruba nation declaration a treat to the national interest, and why his movement was not tagged a terrorist as IPOB; he has been subsequently declared wanted after which he had been arrested in Benin Republic by security operative, with charges bordered on arms smuggling, inciting violence and calling for secession of Yoruba nation from Nigeria. However, like Kanu; Igboho is presently facing court injunction in Benin Republic over immigration offences, and he like Kanu is awaiting extradition back to Nigeria (*Vanguard Newspapers,* 2021; The Nation, 2021).

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Moreover, criticisms have followed the action of government over the re-arrest of Kanu, and the effort in process on Sunday Igboho extradition. While some see their actions as treasonable offence, other see it as the part of their fundamental right advised government to trend safely. Many have argued that Nigerian government must always follows the appropriate legal process in dealing with secessionists, noting that attempt to throw Igboho in a waiting for return to Nigeria is not legal, unhuman and that law guarantee the right of self-determination. Nigerian government had been advised to respect human right and always follow the legal approach in dealing with those calling for secession. Also, it is affirmed that, extradition Treaty of 1984 among Togo, Nigeria, Ghana and Republic of Benin excluded political fugitives; and that where the fugitive will not get justice because of discrimination and/or undue delay in prosecution the host country should not release the fugitive. This made Igoho a political offender who cannot be deported or extradited by the good people of the Republic of Benin for any reason while the extradition of Kanu is considered illegal and against international law. Furthermore, Article 20 of African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights to which the four countries are signatories made agitation for self-determination a fundamental right to be protected by all countries (UN, Report, 2021).

Nigerian security agencies are said to be more active in hunting those who are peacefully agitating for the rights and better deals for their people than they appear to be in dealing with bandits and terrorists who have deprived thousands of innocent Nigerians of their lives and properties. It is believed that: if half of the energy deployed to apprehend Nnamdi Kanu and Sunday Igboho had been deployed to the menace of terrorists and bandits who killed, raped, rob and kidnap people, we would not have been in the unfortunate security mess that we are. On this note Nigerian Government had been challenge to exert the same energy it applied in the case of separatists' leaders, to tackle AK-47 wielding armed bandits, Boko Haram and other deadly insurgents that have continued to hold the nation to ransom. A respondent maintained that:

> He is not impressed with the arrest of Kanu and Igboho, as: the FG appears supersonically efficacious when it comes to arresting and repatriating dissenters and challenges of its morbid nepotism and sectionalist government. The same government paradoxically appears abysmally weak and hopelessly helpless when it comes to fighting AK-47 wielding armed bandits, Boko Haram and other deadly insurgents, including ransom-taking kidnappers who are almost kidnapping the very heart and soul of Nigeria daily. The Nigerian nation appears captured by non-state actors (Interview).

Nigerian government repressive nature according to researchers is linked to its colonial and political experience, which relied on repression to subjugate anti-colonial movements in maintaining order (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014). This repressive behavior was transformed into the contemporary government, and has since become the country's mode of operation for maintaining law and order. The IPOB and Yoruba nation's self-determination frontiers have suffered state repression, which includes invasion, killings, shooting of unarmed protesters, and illegal detention of separatist frontiers, their members, associates, and supporters (Nwankpa, 2021). This according to Kapitan provides a cautionary note regarding the consequences of de-legitimization of actors. According to him, such a strategy circumvents the genuine grievances of the groups, and it can escalate the conflict, particularly between the state security forces and the secessionists (Kapitan, 2003).

Given to these experiences, it is believed that Nigerian Federal Government has created Igboho and Kanu in the context of deadly massacre by herdsmen and insensitivity to people's sufferings. People are agitating for what they believe in and it is the belief that they should be treated humanely, and not as criminals. The Collier-Hoeffler model here resonates in what Brown (1964) describes as territorial behavior - a response which arises when benefits are believed to be greater than the costs. The need to resort to territorial behavior among humans as in case of Igboho is caused largely, by the breakdown of social development policies arising from or attributable to inadequate policing and ineffective project monitoring and evaluation (Brown, 1964). It is critical to note that when a state fails to guarantee the security of the lives and properties of its citizens, the emergence of non-state actors is conceivable (Moderan, 2021). Other drivers of conflict include social and high-income inequality, mutual distrust, social injustice, religious and ethnic affiliations, political cleavages, scramble for insufficient political gains, weak state structures, feelings of deprivation and thirst for power that led to violent confrontations between and by aggrieved groups (Justino, 2007; Onwuzuigbo, 2009). All these drivers ironically characterized Nigeria's socio-political economy problem today, hence need to humanize leadership.

3. Conclusion

Humanising the governance and leadership to address challenge of insecurity in Nigeria is a need measure in order to ensure compliance to laws, policies and trust of citizens. Nigerian as followers and their leaders must learn from this experience and figure a new way of engaging among their diverse ethnic groups. Nigerian must start managing its diversity for prosperity. There is need to derive mental cohesion, not ethnic divides or nationalities. It is hoped that government need to direct more attention to addressing issues that gave birth to ethnic agitations. This is because if the Nigerian state has lived up to its responsibility in ensuring the security of lives and properties, such a movement might not have surfaced in the first instance (*The Guardian, 2021*).

The challenge of insecurity revealed leadership deficiency of which has make Nigerian to become more distrustful, divided amid other challenges. Paying lip-service to the matters of insecurity in Nigeria, had resulted into coercive measure by government and its representatives. Sustaining personal or regime security will not secure government or its representatives if this challenge is not nipped in the bud. The governance process must be erected on the pillars of social cohesion, and dignity of Nigerian must be well protected by a moral leadership that will strive to secure the commitment and support of all citizens to make the Nigerian project a true success. Nigerian leaders need to humanize their approach to address the fundamental reasons for agitations, by listening, understanding, removing prejudices, and allowing for open national dialogue without preconditions, but with one goal, build one cohesive mental for, just and equitable nation for all not for a few or for any section.

Nigeria needs exceptional leader who is humanistic who believe in inclusion, promotion of ethnic unity and inclusiveness. A cohesive society is one where people are protected against life risks, trust their neighbors and the institutions of the state and can work towards a better future for themselves and their families. Fostering social cohesion is about striving for greater inclusiveness, more civic participation and creating opportunities for upward mobility. It is the glue that holds society together, Nigerian leaders must highlight humanistic principle and promoting human dignity and the wellbeing of the citizenry. Nigerian leaders should be able to understand the

diversity of tribes, tradition, customs, and languages of the different people in Nigeria to enhance a better and comprehensive leadership style and effectiveness in governance of the people.

Leadership skills that emphasize character building and non-conventional approach to homing the ideas of responsibility and accountability in humanism is imperative. They must key into the underlying values, pedagogue approach- this we help to address the context as events (Why?), underlying values of every individual (What?) and then highlighting lessons learned and challenges we have experienced in delivering (human) experience-center and question on the dynamic of leadership. With this Nigerian government can restore the trust and confidence on the populace and this could improve compliance with rules and policies and reduce cost of enforcement. This is because rules and regulations are never perfect or complete enough to eliminate abuse. However, their differences depend on the extent to which people see them as far and legitimate enough to outweigh the benefits of man compliance. Trust in regulation as trust in the government of inclusive and constructive with follower can lead to high volume of compliance.

Above all, humanizing leadership should take lead from the pluralist experience of Nigeria federation to focus on leadership dynamic as the product of the ongoing insecurity experienced for social re-construction between myriad of our diverse cultural contexts. Humanizing leadership in the context should emerge as contextual, distributed, frequently rationalized, resisted and occasionally transformed. Nigerian leaders should make sure that impunity does not triumph, and develop attitude to hold leaders accountable. Nigeria government must be committed to analyzing all the variables of violence, develop a robust template for analysis as well purposive policies response and plans that cause deeper understanding of the emerging contexts, effects and propose types of engagements and intervention that stakeholders and communities should expect.

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