BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND WOMEN VUNERABILITIES IN NORTHERN NIGERIA: 2009-2014

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ABSTRACT

Since the turn of civilian regime from 1999 till date, women have been at the receiving end of violence in Nigeria. The Nigeria watch data base provided the opportunity to validate the extent to which women have been victims of homicide and manslaughter. Some factors are responsible for violence against women for example, domestic violence, rape, and sorcery, with domestic violence as high number of cases. The paper draws the conclusion that regions in the south seem to have a high degree of lethal violence against women because violence against women is less reported in the north, the security threat caused by Boko Haram insurgent, is an onslaught and this has reshape socio-economic development in Nigeria. The challenges of this sect have become a national security threat despite lip service from government to curb this menace. This paper addresses an aspect of Boko Haram's activities on gender-based violence and its target on women. However, 2013 marked an evolution of this sect with series of actions like kidnapping anchored on women folk. This provides shift from their operation to include women to increase incessant pressure on male folk. It generated rationale for women within Boko Haram framework to appreciate gender factor ingroup'sviolence.It is the opinion of this paper that security avails the opportunity for socio-economic development and recommends that government should awake to its responsibilities and ensure adequate funding and training of security agencies, and fortify security agents with sophisticated weapons that will effectively outwitthe fire power of this terrorist. The border areas should be tightened to checkmate the high influx of people into its territory collectively. The deployment of vigilante and neighborhood watch would serve as complimentary effort to the machinery of government to identify and locate the sect for such a time as this. Nigeria can only achieve sustainable development through firm prioritization of national security in their development agenda.

1. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria has experienced recurring conflicts and natural disasters which have caused many people to flee their homes since there turn of civilian rule on May 29th 1999, the hope predicated on democracy for liberty, freedom and equity to ensure security of lives and properties for social transformation in Nigeria seems to be a mirage (Otto and Ukpere, 2012). In 2014, the violence caused by Boko Haram insurgent especially in northern Nigeria increased the number of Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, Gome and traba states respectively (Aganga,2009). Nigeria state is under the siege ofeconomic, political, and social crises, metamorphosing intonational insecurity; historically ranging from the coupsd'état of 1960s to 1990s. The civil war of 1967-1970 that claimed more than three million lives, the Maitatsine religious riot of 1980s and early 1990s, the SAP saga and its effects, the 1993 June12 election and struggle to reclaim mandate, Odigenocide, Sagamu bloody riots of 2000, the Niger Delta perennial crisis, armed robberies, inter and intra communal conflicts, kidnappings and political assassinations among others (OgunyemiandAlign, 2011).All effort to end this violence for peace seems not to be realized, many serving and former political office holders swing into this on the aegis of religion and sect extraction.The high degree of insecurity has exacerbated catastrophic terrorist attacks that have languished humanitarian toll and displaced innocent people from their ancestral place of abode. This insurgents partitioned religious and regionalize youths among prominent among them are the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Odua People's Congress (OPC), Arewa People's Congress (APC), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys,

Movement for the Actulization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and recent Boko Haram insurgent, Anasaru, Kala-Kato and Ombastu among others (Onuoha,2012:134).According to United Nations multi-sectoral needs assessment conducted in May 2014,there were 650.000IDPs in the north east region of Nigeria. The bloodiest year since Boko Haram launched I first attack in northern Nigeria in September 2010. So far over 600 people are victim of Boko Haram, only a fraction of 5,00 has lost their lives as a result of the conflict since 1999 (Kaplan, 1994)., Amidst the rising death toll, Boko Haram tactics remain overlooked especially kidnapping meted on women folk. The paper argue that Boko Haram has at one time or the other harassed and abuse christain and moderate muslim women. Their focus on kidnapping women demonstrates enemy of vulnerabilitydetermine to exploit female folk (Ogunyemi, 2011 and Align 2011). This differs from other Islamist groups compared to Taliban, this Islamic sect deliberately kill women and even use them as suicide bombers. This has can be evidence in recent bloody attacks in the town of BuniYadi in Yobe state at the early hours of 25th February, where 50 Boko Haram sects stormed federal government college when student has gone to bed in their hostels was not opposed by any security operatives. They locked the whole doors and set male hostel ablaze sitting outside waiting for any escapee through hostel windows. One week before then theylaid a similar attack to konduga village in Borno state killing about 50 people. In that same week of this attack, they murdered 100 innocent souls in Bamatown; this second assault was less than one year. This gruesome murder is routine process especially in northern Nigeria that live under the fear of unknown but abducting women is a new phenomenon to them. In Konduga, 20 girls were held hostage, this attracted the attention from United States diplomatic mission in Nigeria, and attempts by Nigerian police to stop abducted female students in BuniYadi was futile. Their campaigning is for Islamic state or government of "Allah by Allah and for Allah" However, their new style is women, kidnapped on the orders of the sectoral leader himself, women came into the picture is a very risky not only to women folk but the security situation in the country at large. It is against this background that the activity of this insurgent has undermined the socio-economic development and political matrix terrain of women in Nigeria. The activities create a scenario where destruction of lives, properties and internally displaced people from their place of abode in their homes. The paper explores the activities of Boko Haram insurgency and its effect especially on women in northern Nigeria, and suggest new strategies government should adopt to address the menace.

2. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION

The theory which informed our discussion of insurgency in Nigeria is the Conflict theory. It was propounded by a German theorist, known as Karl Marx. In his postulation, the bourgeoisie drives a passive income from their operations (including land) leads to exploitation of the peasants and workers by the owners, which is tantamount to an irreconcilable and antagonistic of interests, regardless of whether the two sides are aware of its presence (Marx, 1975). He maintained that State is seen as the means by which the ruling class could oppress the working class using the agencies of state. Conflict theory therefore underlines the competition for scarce resources more especially power and wealth. Other scholar also came up with ideas on Conflict theory, a common theme is that different social groups have unequal power, though all groups struggle for same limited resources (Oberschall, 1996, Galtung, 1973, Bae, 1993, Galgliani, 1987, cited in Egwuogu &Ikenna, 2018).

To a large extent, it is the material condition of man usually conceived as the prevailing economic system that for them provides the basis for the understanding of all social issues. Thus as people engage in material production they begin to establish one form of relation or another. Through this relation, distinct social classes begin to emerge and the environment gets enmeshed in class struggle. Most African countries are made up of multi ethnic societies with populations that are sharply divided along racial, cultural, linguistic, religious and similar cleavages. Most are composed of several and some of many different traditional societies each with distinctive institutions to which Members of other traditional societies are not only detached but also declined, if not actually opposed (Jackson and Rorberg, 1998). From the perspective of the European Colonial powers, politically, a colony was not arbitrary. But from the perspective of the subject African, colonial government was essentially arbitrary. It was imposed from outside and worked in accordance with alien and unfamiliar rules and regulations in disregard often in ignorance of indigenous institutions. Guenther Roth (1968) sees the divided plural society as an impediment to the realization of modern, rational-legal institutions (Jackson and Rosberg, 1998). Therefore, the fundamental character of conflict theory as pointed out be Ake, (1996) is that it has limited autonomy. Conflict theory is constituted in such a manner that it is a reflection of the interest of the bourgeois class to dominate in the course of their struggle.

2.1 Gender in Boko Haram's Ideology and Culture

The callfor Boko Haram ideology on the level of violence attack meted against women and the country in general (Barkindo et al 2013). However, this sect has Jihad features exhortations by terrorizing most Christian communities, the war meted on Christians" and victimization of women is an ideal strategy (Punch News, 11 July 2012; Coulter 2008, Onuoha 2010). The rise of Boko Haram coincides with adoption Sharia especially in 12 northern states and to some was a by-product of this sect (Akanji 2009). The Sharia law was supported by Shekau and this insurgent promote gender roles for men and women, enforce strict rules on women dressing, sexual conduct with other abusive practices meted against women. These enforced segregation of school-children to public maltreatment like flogging of women for fornication (BBC,7 January 2003). This norm adopted by Boko Haram leader among other values to be opposed, the rights and

privileges of women, homosexuals, lesbianism, rape of infants, watching blue films, prostitution and beauty pageants are Western ideas (Zenn 2013; World Stage, 18 March 2012).

The ideology of Boko Haram's tag men in hyper-masculine combat roleto violently oppose the west by unarmed men, youths, women, disable and even under age are exempted from battle but are target (Sahara Reporters, 22 January 2012). Muslim women in connection with Christian women have been spared, even when Boko Haram engage Muslim men an attack in Yobecollege on September 2013, where all male students were killed, but female students were spared, the knowledge on gender norms permeate Gender Based Violence as a show for power (Solangon and Patel 2012). However, abuse on Christian women mark their difference from Muslim women to strike on Christian men demonstrate their inability to protect their women. This ideological on masculinity appears have specific resonance with disenfranchising Nigerian men. It was has been noted that such men gathered to watch the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammed Yusuf in a television interviews led Friday prayers, and appeal for population dominated by unemployed, poor males (Onuoha 2010). These men were frustrated on perceived corruption by Nigerian government in his lecture, and unemployment (IRIN News, 18 July 2011). In the face of social milleu, the gendered practice and adoption of 'Western' values, gender-based violence and other gender norms is a source of worth (Barker & Ricardo 2005; Kimmel 2003). These norms are not characteristic of Islamist groups, the early Nigeria Islamist movement like Yan Izala, established in 1978promoted the rights of women compared to some other Salafist movements (Loimeier 2012).

The impact on poverty suggests that ideology is one possible factors in GBV committed by Boko Haram insurgent and supporters, indeed, Nigerian are concerned on matters of ethnicity, commercial rivalries and power (Alao 2009). Agbiboa(2014) cites local disputes, poverty, corruption and long-term injustices committed without any police action asreligious and ethnic violence driven. For instance, in Maiduguri, six Christian women were raped by insurgents claimed this as a tax paid by Christians under Islamic law. These women distinguished the group as ethnic Berom perceived by Boko Haram as "immigrants" to northern Islamic land. The rape effectively is a punishment, and threat to quit (Barkindo 2013). In other sexual attacks against women, the perception of the victim has been that the assaults driven by criminal element of this group, the ideology is likely to drive all Boko Haram sect, as some undoubtedly was coerced into joining the group (AOV & NWGOV 2013).

3. CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS

3.1 Security

Security is the responsibilities of any government as enshrined in the legal framework of the nation (constitution). The primary objective of any nation is to cater for the security and economic wellbeing of its people. The major purpose of national security is to safeguard national values, and the fundamental value for the survival of a nation both internal and external, self-preservation and self-perpetuation. The concept of security is a situation that provides national and international conditions favourable to the protection of a nation state and its citizens against existing and potential threat. Francis (2005: 22), security is a state of being safe and the absence of fear, anxiety, danger, poverty and oppression. It is the preservation of core values and the absence of threats to these values (Alli, 2010:73). A nation is secured when it is free from military threats or political coercion (Aliyu, 2012). Security is free from danger or threats to nation's ability to protect or defend itself, promote its values and legitimate interest to enhance the well-being of the people (Imobighe, 1990). National security encompasses personal and communal state well being secured from the threats to all forms of violence, injustice and violation of human rights (Fayeye, 2007). Security is the absence of conflict, a lasting peace that requires a broader vision encompassing areas like education, health, democracy and human rights, protection against environmental degradation and proliferation of weapons.

3.2 Insurgency

According to USDD (2007) insurgency as organized movement that has the aim of overthrowing a constituted government through subversive means and armed conflict. This definition suggests that insurgent groups employ unlawful means towards achieving an end, which could be political, religious, social or even ideological. The goal of insurgency is to confront and overthrow an existin government for the control of power, resources or for power sharing (Siegel, 2007:328).

3.3 The Nexus of Insurgency in Nigeria

The phenomenon of ethnicity and religious intolerance have led to incessant recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts, which have birthed copious ethnic militias like the Bakassi Boys, O'dua People Congress (OPC), the Egbesu Boys; the Ijaw Youth. Congress (IYC); the Arewa People's Congress (APC), the Igbo People Congress (IPC) and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), amongst others (Salawu, 2010:345-353). The surfacing of these militia groups has made religious intolerance and fanaticism more violent and disturbing. The cycle of violence being unleashed on Nigerians by the fundamentalist group, Boko Haram has heightened serious fears among Nigerian populace and even the international community (Okpaga, Ugwu and Eme, 2012:77). The dangerous dimension the insecurity challenge has posed before the nation has become a source of worry since there is belief in some quarters in Nigeria that the trend has even gone beyond religious or political colouration. The notorious terrorist groups that have

challenged Nigeria's national security, territoriality integrity and sovereignty have been the Niger Delta militant group and Boko Haram sect.

3.4   Emergence of Boko Haram insurgent in Northern Nigeria

Boko Haram issue started as an insignificant agitation of an Islamic sect with a strange commitment to non-conformist standards of social organization in Muslim-dominated Bauchi and Borno states. It began in Bauchi State on July 26, 2009 and since that time, the group has extended its activities to other Northern states as well as to other parts of Nigeria. Unlike the militants in the Niger Delta that were driven by purely economic goals, Boko Haram is driven by proclivity in religious conviction, political aspirations and social practice. Specifically, its ultimate goal is to make Nigeria an Islamic State and uphold only the laws of as set out in the Koran (Walker, 2012). This group believes Islam detests western civilisation and that western education is blasphemous. Boko Haram means 'western education is a sin" or "forbidden". Going by its alleged creation and sponsorship by a famous politician in Borno State in the early 2000s and its socio-religious outlook and agenda, Boko Haram is thus an Islamist insurgent group that arose from political, social and religious discontent within the Nigerian State (Adesoji, 2011). The recruits of the sect are mostly youths from the northern parts of Nigeria that are dissatisfied with the economic, political and social status quo. They include unemployed youth, stark illiterates, and refugees from neighbouring African countries. The sect explores the social-economic negativities of the country to recruit and radicalize its members (Nicoll, 2011). Eso (2011) observes that the push factor to recourse terrorism in a bid to influence public policy is beyond sectarianism. He buttresses this by arguing that most of the attacks of the sect have been focussed at the state and its institutions, plus the civilian populations. It has launched attacks on military institutions like army barracks, police station including Force Headquarters, Abuja; educational institutions at all levels, government agency, places of worship (churches and mosques) and assassinating key political heavy weights, statesmen and religious leaders that oppose their ideology. Their strategies include kidnapping, killing, assassination, and suicide bombingwith Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), ambush drive shooting.

Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe (2013:46) aver that the attack launched on the United Nations Office in Abuja in 2011 gave the militant group a face similar to that of the Al-Qaeda's. Locally, the sect is referred to as the 'Nigerian Taliban' due to the gravity and tenacity of it operations. More importantly is the strong link the group has with other transnational extremist groups, including Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda. Crucial aspects of their relations with other transnational militant groups include training, funding, strategic knowledge on planning and tactical attacks and activities, ideological influence and human power resources (Ogbonnaya, Ufiem and Ehigiamusoe, 2013:46).

While the Niger Delta militancy was a struggle for equity, that of Boko Haram's has been a struggle for control of the state and superiority over the security forces. Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe (2013:46-60) thus infer that what the two terrorist groups represent in terms of the global potential and feasibility for non-state actors as security challengers with destructive capabilities rivalling those of the state is alarming. The tenacity of events between 2011 and 2014 reveals that the Nigerian State has not effectively equipped it security institutions with 21st century equipment and that it has not given its military personnel the requisite training for the much needed capacity to defend the country from internal insurrections and external threats. Furthermore, the government has not lived up to its responsibility in handling these challenges and ensuring security. Militancy in the Niger Delta and the rise of Boko Haram have thus facilitated and aggravated the irony of sectional indifference. During the heightened militancy in the Niger Delta, the North did not care much about the fate of the victims and not until the increasing terror of the Boko Haram in Nigeria did the rest of the country began to be worried about the amount of terror in the north.

The mind-set of united Nigeria and the need for unity in diversity are usually lost in the face of terror and oppression of a group. This attitude of sectarianism, coupled with the weak and slow response of Nigerian government gave an impetus to the insurgency and its metamorphosis into a mainstream terrorist organization. The rest of Nigeria has however, come to realise that the terror group is indeed a threat to the security, sovereignty and stability of the Nigerian State and not just the North. Adibe (2012) captures the profundity of the challenge the Nigerian State faces when he argues that, the state is regarded as the enemy, not just by Boko Haram, but by several Nigerians and groups, each attacking it with as much ferocity as Boko Haram's bombs, using whatever means they have at their disposal: politicians entrusted to protect our common patrimony steal the country blind, law enforcement officers see or hear no evil at a slight inducement, government workers drag their feet and refuse to give their best while revelling in moonlighting, organized labour, inducing university lecturers in public institutions go on indefinite strikes on a whim while journalists accept 'brown envelops' to turn truth on its head or become uncritical champions of a selected anti-Nigerian state identity. What all these groups have in common with Boko Haram is that they believe that the premise on which they act is justifiable and that the Nigerian state is unfair to them, if not an outright enemy (Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012). The implications of Boko Haram's operation include the slowdown of the country's economic growth and development, worsened unemployment, food scarcity due to the inability of traders to transport food from the North to the South due to insecurity reasons, dented Nigeria's public image, increased fear and a false sense of security, recourse to self-help by people and citizens on most occasions such as the emergence of "Civilian JTF in Borno", loss of life and damage to properties, and so forth (Alao, Atere and Alao, 2011).

In the bid to address the menace of terrorism, the federal government engaged development partners like United States (US), European Union (EU) and Israel, to step-up war against terror. Nigeria got proposals of assistance from Britain, Canada, China, France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and UN, to assist locate the over 234 abducted Chibok secondary school girls in Borno State. The US, France, Pakistan, and Britain have also offered to assist with counter-terrorism training (Ajayi, Igbintade, Ukpong and Otokpa, 2014). The US Department of Defence has recently provided funds to Nigeria for the development of a counterterrorism infantry unit (US Embassy in Nigeria, 2014).

Table 1. Boko Haram attacks involving women in Northern Nigeria July 2009-June 2012

S/N	Date	Nature and Place of Attack	Number of Causalities
1	26th July 2009	First clash with the security agencies in Bauchi state after an all-night attack on Dutsen-Tanship police station	42 people killed including 39 sect members, 2 policemen and 1 soldier
2	27th July 2009	First attack in Yobe state during an invasion in Potiskum Divisional Police Headquarters	4 killed including 3 policemen and 1 fire service office
3	29th July 2009	Confrontation with security men at Mamudo village, along Potiskum/Damaturu Road, Yobe state	33 members of the sect killed
4	29th July 2009	An all-night battle with combined security operatives at Railway Terminus, Maiduguri	Unreported scores killed and operational base of the sect destroyed
5	13th March 2010	Attack in Northern part of Jos, Plateau state	300 people killed
6	8th September 2010	Attack at Bauchi Central Prison	No record of death but prisoners were freed
7	24th Dec., 2010	Bomb explosion in BarkinLadi, Jos, Plateau state	30 people killed
8	31 st Dec., 2010	Explosions at Mogadishu mammy market, Abuja	About 10 people killed
9	28th Jan., 2011	Attack on the ANPP governorship candidate's convoy at LawanBukar ward, Maiduguri	7 people killed including the governorship candidate
10	2nd Mar., 2011	Attack on DPO Mustapha Sandamu's residence at Rigasa area of Kaduna state	2 policemen killed
11	30th Mar., 2011	Bomb explosion in Damaturu	A policeman was injured
12	2nd April, 2011	Bomb explosion at DutsenTanship Police Station	2 policemen injured
13	4th May, 2011	Attack at Maiduguri Prison on Kashim Ibrahim Way	A prison warder was killed
14	5th May, 2011	Attack in Maiduguri Government House	2 people killed including the Duty Officer and a 13- year-old boy with another
15	9th May, 2011	Attack on the residences of 2 Islamic clerics, Sheikh GoniTijani and MallamAbur, at Mairi and Bulabulum Wards in Bauchi state	The 2 Islamic clerics were killed
16	9th May, 2011	Chairman of NURTW Bauchi state was attacked	1 person died – the chairman
17	13th May, 2011	Bomb explosion at London Chinki, Maiduguri	2 people killed
18	15th May, 2011 5	Bomb explosion at Lagos Street, Maiduguri	People injured including 2 soldiers and 3 policemen was shot dead same day in the city
19	29th May, 2011	Bomb explosion in Bauchi military barrack	14 killed
20	16th Jun., 2011	Bomb explosion at Police Headquarters, Abuja. Also, bomb explosion at Damboa town, Maiduguri.	2 people killed 4 children killed
21	9th July, 2011	Clash between Boko Haram and the military in Maiduguri. Also, bomb blast in a church at Suleja, Niger state	31 people killed. 4 died in that of Suleja with scores injured
22	26th Aug., 2011	Attack on the United Nations building in Abuja	25 people killed with about 60 more injured
23	4th Nov., 2011	Attack in Damaturu, Yobe state	About 150 people killed
24	24th Dec., 2011	Bomb explosion in Jos	About 80 people killed
25	25th Dec., 2011	Bomb explosion at St. Theresa's Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger state	About 50 people killed and several others injured
26	20th Jan., 2012	Multiple attacks in Kano	About 250 people killed
27	7th Feb., 2012	Another attack in Kano	10 people killed
28	8th April, 2012	Bomb explosion on Easter Sunday near a church in Kaduna	36 people killed with 13 others injured
29	29th April, 2012	Bomb attack at a lecture theatre used as Christian worship in the University of Kano	19 people killed including 2 professors
30	1st Oct., 2012	Adamawa State University, Federal Poly, and school of Health Technology and University of Maiduguri in Borno state	About 43 students killed

31	1st Jan., 2013	Shootout in Maiduguri	14 people killed including 13 sect members and a soldier
32	2nd Jan., 2013	Attack on a Police Station at Song town of Adamawa state	4 people killed including 2 policemen and 2 civilians
33	21st Jan., 2013	Attack of a market in Damboa town	18 people killed mostly local hunters
34	18th Mar., 2013	Bomb explosion in a luxurious bus park in Kano	More than 70 people killed and several others injured
35	16th April, 2013	Clash between the JTF and the sect members in Baga, Borno state	Over 200 people killed mostly civilians
36	6th July 2013	Yobe State School Shooting	More than 14 People killed
37	12 August 2013	Maiduguri Mosque attack	56 people died
38	19 September 2013	Benisheik attacks	161 people died
39	14th January 2014	Maiduguri Bombing	30 people killed
40	14th February 2014	Borno massacre	121 Christians killed
41	14th April 2014	Abuja Bombing	Over 88 people killed
42	15th April 2014	Chibok girls kidnapping	276 female students in Borno state kidnapped
43	5th May, 2014	Gamboru and Ngala Bombing	At least 300 people died
44	2nd June 2014	Gwoza Massacre	At least 200 people killed
45	28 November 2014	Attack on Central Mosque in Kano during Friday prayers	120 people died
46	13th Dec 2014	Attack on Gumsuri in Borno State	30 people killed
47	3rd January 2015	Baga Massacre	About 2000 people killed
48	28 March 2015	Attack on Gwoza	41 people killed
49	1st July 2015	Attack on Kukwa Mosque	48 people killed while 17 wounded
50	2nd July 2015	Attacks on mosques in Borno State	97 people killed while unknown figures wounded
51	13 August 2015	Suicide Bombing	3 people killed
52	22 September 2015	Series of Bombings in Maiduguri	Over 100 people died

Source: Achubaet al 2013; Ezeani&Chilaka, 2014; Wikipedia: 2015.

3.5 The Antecedent Boko Haram attacks on Nigerian State

This piece is to mark 2016 International Women's Day Celebrations and to remind the government and relevant authorities that in the midst of the celebrations going on globally today, some women and children are in deplorable conditions in some organized and unorganized displaced persons camps world over, including Nigeria. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are persons who have been displaced by natural disaster or conflicts from their homes and traditional support structure and have not crossed the borders of their countries. In Nigeria, conflicts arising from the activities of Boko Haram in the North East have resulted in high threats to lives and properties, death of many and displacement of several people.

3.6 Statistics on IDPs in Nigeria

An overwhelming majority of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria are women and children. Even though there are varying statistics about the exact figure of internally displaced persons in northern Nigeria, all sources assessed, indicated that women and children constitute more than 50 percent of the Internally Displaced Camps formation. In December 2015, Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre estimated that there are almost 2,152,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Nigeria (IDMC 2016). The IDP population is composed of 53 % women and 47% men. More than 56% of the total IDP population are children of which more than half are up to 5 years old, while 42% are adults. 92% of IDPs were displaced by the insurgency. The majority of the current IDP population was displaced in 2014 (79%). The IDPs come mainly from Borno (62%), Adamawa (18%) and Yobe (13%). 87% of IDPs live with host families while 13% live in camps (DTM 2015).

Condition of IDPs Lack of health care facilities is a major challenge in Bakassi, camp residents travel at least 40 m to Calabar town to access medical treatment for common ailments like malaria, cold and catarrh. In that camp, only one elderly woman served as local birth attendant to all pregnant women in a population of about 2000 people. The 2016 International Women's Day on March 8th, Abuja, Nigeria, the displaced persons are finding it difficult to regain pre-conflict way of living because of the poor living condition; faced with the rigors of long journeys, psychological trauma, safety challenge, harassment, frequent sexual abuse, children molestation, forced labour, poor sanitation which exposes members of the camps to infectious diseases, poor medical facilities which accommodate growth of infectious bacteria, fungi and virus in their bodies, poor feeding which exposes them to malnutrition, poor condition of infrastructure such as power, water, roads, lack of healthcare, security, education among other basic amenities, (Olawale, 2015). In all these, women and children are more vulnerable. During President MuhammaduBuhari's visit to Malkohi IDPs camp in Yola in

the southern part of Adamawa State in November, 2015, the President described the condition of the IDPs as unfortunate; he said: "the children are the worst hit. The situation has caused anxieties especially when we sleep at night," Not only that, The Director General of NEMA, Mr SaniSidi, told the President that the camp had 80 pregnant women and 175 unaccompanied children". In the same vein, Marama, Yusuf &Ojeme in the Vanguard Newspaper of 18th February, 2015, reported that the Boko Haram insurgent IDPs in their respective camps were experiencing "incidents of unwanted pregnancies, rape, child labour/trafficking and sexually transmitted diseases" The Premium Times News and Guardian Newspaper reported that all the 450 death caused by malnutrition recorded in 28 Borno State IDPs camps in 2015 were children. According to Mr SuleMele (NEMADirector) these children were between age one and five and 209,577 children were screened or various illnesses, including malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea 2016 International Women's Day- March 8th, Abuja, Nigeria and vomiting. He said, about 6,444 severe cases of malnutrition were recorded in the camps, 25,511 have mild to moderate symptoms, while 177,622 among them were not malnourished.

Insecurity in IDPs Camps The level of insecurity in the camps in Nigeria is alarming; it's a situation of running from insecurity to insecurity and that of double jeopardy. Yet to recover from psychological trauma of loss of families, friends and properties, displaced persons are faced with security challenge coupled with a responsibility to protect themselves in their various camps. The inadequacy of security at the IDP camps opens them to attacks from terrorists and armed robbers. In recent times, IDP camps have been attacked by insurgents; in September 2015, the terrorist group, in a suicide mission, attacked members of IDPs Camps in Madagali and Yola killing 12 persons. In one of the attacks, bombs were reported to have been detonated inside a tent at IDPs camp. on September 11, 2015, seven people were killed in Malkohi camp near Yola in Adamawa state, on 31st of January 2016, at least 86 people were killed in Dalori, some 12 kilometres to Maiduguri, on 10th of February 2016, another 80 displaced persons were attacked and killed in an IDP camp in Dikwa, Borno state which houses about 50,000 displaced persons.

Domestic insurgencies perpetrated by Boko haram in Northern Nigeria led to massive destruction, killing of innocent people to draw national and international attention as many view their actions from religion. Danjibo (2009) traced the history of Islamic fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence to MuhammedMarwa an Islamic scholar who lived in Kano, 1945. He stressed on that Marwa attracted followers by introducing the Almajiri system in order to help but later became an instrument of attack affecting the peaceful co-existence of people in the Kano. Marwa was chased away by the Emir of Kano- this was the genesis of religious fanaticism that has caused havoc in the Northern part of Nigerian. That must have given rise to other religious crises in the northern part of Nigeria like the Maitatsine uprising, a radical group during the military regime that threatened the security of the Nigerian state. Their first attack was in Kano in December 1980 when Maitatsine group caused serious mayhem. Also, the areas that such attacks was heavy was Bullumkutu area in Borno, in 1982 Jimeta in Yola in Gongola state- now Adamawa state in 1984 led by Musa Makaniki, Gombe in April 1985, Kaduna in 20 October 1982, Zaria, Ilorin and Makurdi (Danjibo 2009, Abimbola and Adesote 2012). There is hardly any part in north without uprising- Tiv-Jukun case, Birom case, the southern Kaduna and other Muslim uprisings in the North from 1983-2014. In past attacks in the north were linked to fanaticism but recently there is political coloration to all attacks now with allegation of on Almajiri or external people because almajiris suffer abject poverty.

Bokoharam sect attacks on the Nigerian people is very severe in three states (Adamawa, Yobe and Borno states) with minor attacks in other parts of northern states like Gombe, Niger, Kogi and Abuja. Boko haram have defied government securities and understanding because of their mixture with the local people. The Boko haram started as a political thug group before they metamorphosed to an insurgent group or "terrorist" group as a force that forbid western education. The moves to attack schools mean that they are against western education and stop women education by kidnapping 219 girls from Chibok in Borno state. The kidnapped of secondary girls drawn international sympathy on domestic terrorism in Nigeria. The delay in securing Chibok girls release made Balarabe Musa to accuse federal government for politicizing Chibok girls kidnap (Vanguard September 9, 2014) in the midst of United States, United Kingdom, France, and China military assistances to find the girls, became futile and still have not yet be rescued. The Boko haram in their continuous attacks, attack Nigeria military and para-military institutions both army and police barracks searching for weapons or bullets, and at the same time create fear on Nigeria military by testing their ability to stand a long fight. The Boko haram group have seized five local towns of Bara for Yobe state, Banki and Bama in Borno state, Madagali and Gulak in Adamawa state for five days from September 2nd - 7th September, 2014 "killing hundred and leaving thousands of residents flee for safety as it continues its quest to establish a caliphate in the country (Punch, September, 2014). Boko haram seized Mubi the second largest town in Adamawa state in October and renamed the town Madinatul- city of Islam and in control of Michika a trading centre in Adamawa not far from Cameroon border (BBC News 5 November, 2014). They perfect their strategy to attack churches and mosques to cancel the reading of their attacks from religion bias and change tactics from hit and run to seizing towns. The seizure of towns in north by Boko haram forced federal government to place emergency rule without removing governor of the states. Nigeria military should adopt night fighting approach to counter Boko haram, this attack raises question on the problem of security in Nigeria and the impact on West African countries. North edge (1976) maintains that security of people is the supreme law, while defence and survival is the core of external policy, this makes the search for security to become one of the key determinants of relationship among state. The threats

of the Boko haram became massive in the north eastern part of Nigeria as they strike and run toward the border area, an accusation that led to Nigerian neighbours within West Africa. The idea of Hobbe (1968) became relevant in this context that states suffer from a particular sense of insecurity and adopt "the posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another. The more closely one looks at it, the more questions one raises when it lead to the definition of national security which in some cases can be viewed from national interest (Mangold 1990).

3.7 Safeguarding women

The Nigerian government's intention to put pressure on Boko Haram arrest of wives and family members of its leaders has backfired. Shekau made it clear that what government can do that they can do too it more effectively. Boko Haram is increasingly abducting women during raids, capture and exploiting women as domestic support when they flee from security forces through unfamiliar terrain. The state of emergency has seen Boko Haram diversify its tactics by utilizing women to smuggle arms. This mirrors the use of women by other Islamist groups in times of pressure. In the mid-2000s al-Qaeda in Iraq used women to smuggle weapons and carry out suicide attacks. However, Boko Haram's strict gender norms suggest that if women do carry out support operations for the group, it is unlikely to constitute more than an emergency measure. In order to stop the abductions, this aspect of Shekau's tactics must be explored. So too must the Nigerian government address its policy of detaining women related to Boko Haram. It has only strengthened Boko Haram's resolve, and shows no signs of bringing the group to the negotiating table. The government of Nigeria has failed to fulfil its promise to crush Boko Haram, enabling Shekau to widen the group's ambitions. Shekau has called out to al-Qaeda and even proclaimed his intention to attack the oil rich Niger Delta in a speech made while surrounded by Boko Haram's armed personnel carriers, likely stolen from Nigerian troops.. President Jonathan has appointed a new chief of defence staff member to tackle the escalating northern violence. As tensions rise, Nigerians are protesting Boko Haram's targeting of women. Last year, Nigeria launched a National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, on the safeguarding of women in conflict. If 2014 is to be secured for Nigeria's women, this resolution must be rigorously applied, failure to do so will be more difficult to counter the insurgency and protect a part of the population, women, who are already at increased risk.

3.8 Instrumentality: Women as Pawns

However, Boko Harams first abduction came over a year later in May 2013 when in Borno state militants captured more than a dozen government officials, along with their families. In a subsequent video message, Shekau emphasized the importance of capturing the family members as retaliation, saying, "We kidnapped some women and children, including teenage girls." The next kidnapping was carried out during a mass assault on the Bama police barracks, in which insurgents abducted 12 Christian women and children, mostly related to male police workers. Shekau then used another video message to declare that he would make these hostages his "servants", if certain conditions were not met, one of them the release of the wives of the Boko Haram militants. The government's mass detention of Boko Haram's female family members has proved a source of grievance ever since, with Shekau making repeated reference to these arrests in his video-messaging campaign. The government has persisted nonetheless. After security forces detained ten women related to Boko Haram in September 2012, Shekau's 5th video message threatened revenge on wives of government officials. In this address, Shekau alleged the possible sexual abuse of the Boko Haram female family members by the government, promising the retaliatory targeting of "enemy" women *"Since you are now holding our women, just wait and see what will happen to your own women…to your own wives according to Shariah law."* Boko Haram has always victimised Christian women in northern areas and this generic culture of discrimination has no doubt enabled the escalation in recent violence. However, historically the group's gendered ideology did not consider women combatants, casting men in such roles. Shekau has declared *"unarmed men, youths, women, cripples and even under age"* as illegitimate targets. Insurgents frequently spare Muslim women, even where they kill Muslim men. When Boko Haram attacked a college in Yobe in September 2013 they killed all the male students, and let the women live, as they did at BuniYadi. This is not to say that Boko Haram does not kill women, they does. But where this happens, it does not seem to result from a deliberate order. However, Shekau's recent call to kidnap them indicates a marked change in tactics, embedded in an apparent sense of moral justification and desire for revenge. A cycle established by government detains women related to Boko Haram, followed by retaliation, in which insurgents abduct women, both Christian and Muslim. There is no evidence that the women captured on either side have any direct involvement in the conflict; however, all are instrumental in the battle between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government.

3.9 State of Emergency, Effect on Women

Recognising the severity of the escalating situation, President Goodluck Jonathan imposed a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in May 2013, attempting to clamp down on Boko Haram. However, this has had another unintended effect on women. As Boko Haram's men came under pressure, the group has utilised women in weapons smuggling operations around Maiduguri in Borno state. In June 2013, the Civilian Joint Task Force, a youth volunteer group used by the government, found an AK-47, a pistol and multiple IEDs in the garments each of two shivering veiled women. Two months later, two women hiding rifles in their clothing were among five suspected Boko Haram militants

arrested by the security forces. Boko Haram militants were also disguising themselves as women in order to evade arrest. In July 2013, three men dressed as women were killed, and around 20 others arrested in an attempted attack on a police station. The increased government pressure on Boko Haram in its northern strongholds has also led to insurgents apparently abduction of Christian women as they flee security forces. In stories reminiscent of the behavior of rebel movements in conflict zones in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, women in rural areas are soldiers with being increasingly subjected to kidnap, forced marriage, and rape. Militant forces captured and exploited women as assets, using them to cook and clean. Such practices are now evident in Nigeria, where there has been a reported increase in gender-based violence against Christian women in northern areas, with increasing levels of sexual violence, including rape, torture, and also murder. The Christian Association of Nigeria has been reporting the abduction of Christian teenagers since July 2013. In one widely reported case, from November 2013, 19-year-old Hajja told how she was abducted by 14 Boko Haram fighters from a rural region of Gwoza in Borno state. During her three months of captivity, she was forced to cook and clean, convert to Islam, and lure government soldiers into positions where they could be targeted. A Gwoza official estimates that more than a dozen other Christian women remain in captivity in similar circumstances, with young girls being particularly targeted.

4. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

This paper focused on Boko Haram, with the aim of shedding light on a neglected but developing aspect of the group's operations: gender-based changes in Boko Haram's tactics and its instrumental use of women, resulting in increasing GBV targeted at Christians. It outlined the instrumental use of women by both Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces in a cycle of abductions and detentions dating from 2012. Three conclusions can be drawn from these retaliatory actions. Firstly, as implied by Shekau's video messages, abductions of women have since 2012 come to constitute a semi-official Boko Haram tactic, in response to similar tactics by government. Secondly, it seems clear that the recent violence and ensuing state of emergency is causing Boko Haram to evolve tactically, engaging women in support roles in the group, disguising men as women to avoid arrest, and abducting Christian women. Thirdly, women are being targeted by both sides in Nigeria's conflict for pure instrumental reasons. They do not yet appear to be actively and willingly participating in violence to a significant extent. The article also briefly explored the complex factors in the evolution of Boko Haram's tactics. Shariah law, at the heart of Boko Haram, and with a strict control and restriction of women's liberty is implicated in GBV, but other factors emerge. Local grievances and frustrations drive men towards Boko Haram, and a sense of security in its gender norms; perhaps also to GBV. Women victims themselves suggest criminality is a factor in GBV, with women stripped of assets, or raped as an end in itself. Additionally, GBV by Boko Haram is contextualised by an institutionalisation of broader discriminatory practices within Nigeria, but also by the similar sexual targeting of women in other civil.

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