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War and Democracy: Case for Political Violence as a Process of Democratisation

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Abstract

The insinuation that political violence is a potent catalyst for democratization may be regarded as an abhorring statement or one of contempt. Yet, the works of renowned philosophers such as John Locke present an interesting case on the role of conflict, particularly in the human being versus the government dynamic. Locke's Social Contract argument is that violence propagated by citizens towards their non-democratic government is an exemplification of human beings acting in their normal state of nature to take back the self-governance power surrendered to the government. The efficacy of Locke's Social Contract theory can only be measured when considering theories that advocate for the absence of war or conflict from governance or the State. This study seeks to compare and understand the position of peace theories like Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace and The Democratic Peace Theory associated with Michael Doyle, both of which uphold the abstraction that democratization only occurs through a symbiotic and placid relationship, especially among nations, with a Lockean view of politics. Studies that demonstrated negative and positive relationships to the two concepts were considered to conclusively determine the relationship between war and democracy. The study found that evidence of a parabolic relationship political openness and war, the more competitive and open an undemocratic society becomes the more likely the occurrence of political violence or war.

Keywords: *Democratization, Political Violence, The Social Contract Theory*

Introduction

Democracy and violence, at first glance, appear mutually incompatible; if contemporary history is to be believed, democracy and its attendant free-market capitalism felled the wall in Berlin and ended the bipolarity of the Cold War. The triumphalism of democracy at the time also meant that the repression of closed societies and authoritarian regimes had been rolled back, the state's violence against the individual and violence against the state had also been defeated. Democracy would usher in an era of peaceful co-existence, cohesion and compromise in the pursuit of common objectives; similar thinking can be found at the heart of decolonisation. Many jubilant freed nations were eager to exercise their sovereignty and apply the tenets of democracy for themselves. This general process is referred to as democratisation; for a working definition, democratisation refers to the process by which states move towards more democratic structures and procedures (Diamond & Plattner, 2009).

The lessons from decolonisation and The Cold War have taught us otherwise; the reality is that democratisation has occurred in sputtering starts and fits, especially in the former colonial world or the former Republics of the Soviet Union. The effect of these stops and starts sometimes is the exposure of cleavages in a nation mainly along ethnic, racial or religious lines which often find expression through civil strife, violence or even war. Most African, Asian or Latin- American nations in their bids for democracy, fell into civil war, protracted conflicts or had their democratic experiments usurped by the military. Parts of the Eastern Europe Bloc did not fare much better after the Iron Curtain was dropped; conflict, violence and war are also adequate descriptors of their democratisation process.

The justification above is appropriate for intrastate conflict; however, it does not adequately explain the recent resurgence of democratic wars fought between states. The concept is not new; indeed, the Second World War could be framed as a war fought for liberty and the democratic way of life by the Allied Forces on the one hand and fascism, totalitarianism and authoritarianism on the other by the Axis Forces. Recently, however, there has been a spate of international wars and conflicts fought or instigated to force a nation to democratise; American Foreign Policy post-911 is anchored on this idea, and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan was promoted by this notion. It is also possible to see the intervention of the West in the Arab Spring as a play at forcing democratisation through conflict and violence.

It cannot be constricted to the West, closer to home on the Africa Continent; the intervention of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) in the Gambian political process through the threat of violence also reflects the idea of promoting democratisation through violence or conflict. Returning to the opening statement, it is necessary to conceptualise the compatibility of democracy and violence again. Are democracy and violence mutually reinforcing? Can a nation achieve democracy through an undemocratic process? Does democracy foster peace within and between nations and is war a legitimate tool for democratisation?

These are some of the questions that inform the discussion in this study. To answer them, the article explores the following concepts, democracy, war, political violence and societal cleavages, among others.

While the questions above frame the discussion, the central thesis of the article is clear, what is the relationship between conflict and democratisation, and how does it present?

The article proceeds as follows, the next section highlights the essential concepts discussed, the subsequent section provides the theoretical underpinnings of democracy and violence, and the following explains the relationship between the two seemingly contradictory ideas. Given the broad scope of the concepts being discussed, there are two levels of analysis, violence within and beyond the state as it affects democratisation. The method of research is a review of the extant literature, and analysis is conducted using inductive reasoning.

The article has taken the following liberties (1) It is assumed that democracy, democratisation and war are understood conceptually; working definitions are provided, but a broad investigation of these concepts is not deemed necessary. (2) Moral-Philosophical arguments on the value of war are not investigated in-depth either, to the extent that it is, it is because it further clarifies an argument. (3) As will be specified during the article, Conflict, Violence and War are used interchangeably in some sections; however, where distinctions are necessary, they will be made.

Conceptual Framework

Democracy and Political Cleavages

While there are several concepts to unravel, central to all of them is democracy; democracy is a broad normative concept which often has incompatible or rivalling definitions. However, the description that elucidates the relationship between democracy and violence is the Minimalist School of Democracy which eschews the normative values of democracy. Minimalist writers such as Joseph Schumpeter, William Riker and Adam Przeworski have a conservative view of democracy (Thomson, 2007).

Minimalists believe that democracy serves one primary purpose, which is to install and re-install the political elite; minimalists, especially Schumpeter (1962), reject the normative value or moral connotations of democracy. The Schumpeterian view notes that the political class could manipulate the general will of the people, postulated by philosophers like Jacques Rousseau in his Social Contract Theory and does little to bridge the fractures in society.

Schumpeter especially highlighted the lack of a collective will due to social stratification; Schumpeter was sceptical that such stratification and divisions could be bridged. Schumpeter's scepticism introduces the concept of political cleavages; all references to political cleavages have to begin with The Rokkanian concept of cleavages found in the work of Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (Bornschier, 2009). Cleavages highlight the conflict in democratic politics that are rooted in social structures which have been shaped by historical processes (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Given the social construction of cleavages, there are disputes as to what they are or how they are formed (Bornschier, 2009) however further clarification has been provided; Bartolini (2005) states cleavages must feature three elements (1) A social-structural element, such as class, religious denomination, status, or education, (2) an aspect of the collective identity of this social group, and (3) an organisational manifestation in the form of collective action or a durable organisation of the social groups concerned

The Minimalist School of democracy and the political cleavages are especially relevant as they provide an understanding of how conflict may be introduced to democracy. The Schumpeterian version of democracy holds that the central purpose of democracy is to keep the political class in power and society is too divided to be democratic. It is not difficult to see how the more profound the cleavages within a society and the more extensive the manipulation of the general will, the more likely there is to be friction.

Robert Dahl is often conflated with other minimalist writers (Thomson, 2007). However, there is evidence that he strongly opposed the limited Schumpeterian view of democracy; Dahl's focus on competition through election as being at the heart of democracy has often suggested to some readers a minimalist view of democracy. More pertinent, however, is his characterisation of what is necessary for democracy to thrive; in his book Polyarchy Dahl lists three things to consider when determining Democracy. He believes citizens must be able to (1) formulate their preferences (2) Signify those preferences to other citizens and government individually or collectively and lastly, and (3) have those preferences weighed equally with no discrimination (Dahl, 1971).

The absence of these characteristics indicates a lack of democratisation and provides an understanding of how agitation for these characteristics may lead to conflict; Dahl also reveals other thoughts on how democratisation can lead to conflict which will be explored in other sections.

Christopher Kutz (2016) introduces the concept of Agentic Democracy; the idea explores how citizens act together to defend or transform their political life and that citizens can act as democratic agents even before the characteristics that Dahl revealed exist. While not explicit in this definition, it is possible to see how conflict can be at the heart of this, nor is this vastly different from classical philosophers' understanding of citizens' rights to reject a government.

War, Violence and Political Violence

The standard definition of War harks back to the work of Singer and Small in 1972 on the Correlates-of-War project; War is a military conflict that results in at least 1000 battle deaths (Singer and Small, 1972). A nation qualifies as a belligerent if it suffers at least 100 causalities; the writers also present three criteria that distinguish war from other kinds of conflict. War must have quantity, be premeditated and be legitimised by a state or quasi-state entity; this is what differentiates it from political violence.

Singer and Small's definition is admittedly dated and does not elaborate on interstate war or take into the concept of asymmetrical warfare, which is fought between states and non-state actors; it continues to privilege the role of the State in War. It also privileges quantity in the determination of war. Notably, there are several typologies of war; they are, however, conceptually eschewed, as the primary concern of war in this article is how it relates to democratisation.

For a more precise, minimalist definition of war, we turn to the work of geneticist Francis Albert Crew (1952), who defines war as being an organised, intraspecific conflict in which force or coercion is displayed. This definition is helpful as it hides the role of the state and highlights the role of conflict, coercion and organisation. However, the role of the state is still helpful to explore; Max Weber's definition of the state is one that has a monopoly on violence (Weber et al., 1991). Kutz (2016) sees this as evidence that the concept of violence is central to the creation of the state. He believes the qualifiers of a state, a defined territory, people, government and the means to protect the territory are not possible without violence. It should ne noted that these qualifiers are being challenged in todays globalised world, as increasingly Non-State Actors (NSA) are able to operate across transnational borders and in some cases hold onto territory, as is the case with Mali and the MNLA.

Political Violence is distinct from war; Anifowose (1982) understands political violence to be the use or the threat of a physical act against a person, a people or property by individuals or a collective within a political system with the intent to cause injury, death or damage to property. Anifowose's definition is useful as it depicts the element of intent. Much like war, political violence has a purpose, and this is what distinguishes it from other forms of violence. Anifowose translates that intent to be to modify or change behaviour in the political system.

Violence is constructed socially, and the thoughts of Johan Galtung reveal this; Galtung (1969) classifies violence into structural and personal violence. Structural violence is often associated with social injustice; Galtung believes this is the sort of violence that does not reveal itself in personable terms but violence in relationships. The positionality of the Global South and the Global North explains Galtung's argument of structural violence, but so does any example of the disenfranchisement of one group by another. History is replete with these examples, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States of America, the apartheid government in South Africa and the female suffrage movement. Galtung had other typologies of violence; however, Structural Violence is the most salient for the arguments.

Revelations for Democratisation and War

There are several concepts related to war and democratisation; however, these concepts appear to be the most relevant for the questions in this article. To begin with, minimalist democracy limits the use of democracy to elite power preservation without normative value or respect for the general will; if it is understood this way, it should not surprise minimalists when democracy breaks down. Indeed, it may be part of the process. This breakdown may be expressed by war, political violence and other manifestations of conflict and violence. This relationship is the beginning of theories that reveal the relationship between democratisation and violence.

Theoretical Framework

Given the two levels of analysis, Intra and Inter conflict, two theories stand out as relevant. The Social Contract Theories, especially the work of John Locke and Jacques Rosseau are essential to understanding how violence may be introduced to democratisation in a state. The article however prioritises Lockean Social Contract Theory, as it formed the foundation for the Democratic Peace Theory. The Democratic Peace Theory, which is founded on the work of Immanuel Kant, provides clarity on wars between democracies or why democratic nations fight wars.

The Social Contract Theory

John Locke is considered among the finest philosophers of his time and is seen by many as the father of republicanism. Locke's influence has shaped modern political philosophy and our conception of why the State is formed and the attendant rights of being a citizen of that state; this would become known as The Social Contract Theory.

Locke approached human nature and political philosophy using the analytical and methodical framework known as The State of Nature, which many other Social Contract Theorists like Hobbes and Rosseau would also employ.

Locke's First Treatise on Government, one of his most influential works, would directly challenge Robert Filmer's Partriarcha, which bestowed religious and transcendental rights on the Monarch. Filmer's thinking was very much in line with the thinking of the time, where the church and the State were the same. Locke would refute this; his approach was a lot more representative, although he also did not shy away from invoking the divine (Shapiro & Locke, 2003). According to Locke, all men were born with inalienable rights given to each by God; he termed these Natural Rights; in another light, they can be construed as Individual Sovereignty. Locke's conception of the State was to protect these Natural Rights; he concedes that in the State of Nature, there are no rules to guide the pursuit of happiness, or The Good Life, as the Greeks would term it. Therefore, governments were formed to ensure the maximisation of these Natural Rights. The State of Nature is the imagination of how societies lived or man operated before the period of government and rules.

Locke contends that in the State of Nature, all men are self-regulating and endowed with natural rights from their creator (Schmidtz, 1990). The Lockean view identifies the role of morality, even in the State of Nature. It claims that while all men are equal, they are still aware of their Natural Rights and self-governed by the Laws of Nature which prevent harm and conflict and encourages the preservation of life, self and property.

The Social Contract and Government

Locke believes that Natural Laws naturally regulate men, and as such, there is little need for absolute government; he advocated for a limited government (IEP 2019). Government exists primarily to secure the Natural Rights given to each member of society by the Divine. In exchange, members of society cede some, not all their rights to the government, administered by the parliament to protect their Natural Rights. These include the right to life and the right to property (Shapiro & Locke, 2003).

Because Locke's vision of the State of Nature is not so dire, he does not take a worst-case scenario to government and does envision a situation where the Social Contract is broken. Once broken, men can return to the State of Nature by revolting against the government and choosing to form a new one. Locke alludes to a cyclical theory here which results when a tyrant returns society to the State of Nature by bringing members of society into a state of war. Locke argues that people have the right to self-defence as they had before in the State of Nature, as a Natural Right. The Lockean Social Contract it would appear, has an exit clause and justifies the need for violence or war in protest; Locke's cyclical theory also alludes to the very process of democratisation.

Kantian Perpetual Peace

Immanuel Kant has gained a reputation as the consummate idealist in International Relations; this reputation is bolstered when considered against absolutists such as Thomas Hobbes and Nicolo Machiavelli. Kant views the protection and promotion of our own freedom as the most fundamental moral obligation for government and citizens (Kant, 1971). Hewing to the theories of Natural Rights propagated by Social Contract Theorists, Kant believes that such widespread freedoms are only possible if the state is a Republic. He defines a Republic to be a system of government that respects the rights of private property and contracts between citizens and the state (Kant, 1971). Such a republican state should have separation of powers; there should be the creation of legislative, executive, and judicial power, and power should be transferred not through proprietary or hereditary lines; in this, Kant sides with Social Theorists who reject the Divine Right of Kings.

In Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that stable peace will only be achieved when all nations are Republics. He argues that a worldwide federation of free states can only guarantee peace if moral politicians govern those republics and if they adhere to the necessary conditions of perpetual peace, one of which is the need for the centrality of the state to forge international peace (Kant, 1971).

The Democratic Peace Theory

The Democratic Peace Theory was built on Immanuel Kant's perpetual peace. It is now widely associated with Michael Doyle, who has written extensively on the subject (1983, 1986). Daniel Levy (1988) claims that the notion that democracies do not fight wars is the closest International Relations scholars have gotten to an empirical law.

This argument, which is at the heart of Republican Liberalism, rests on three central pillars. The first of which is the existence of domestic norms and cultures, which lends itself to the peaceful resolution of conflict. The argument is that democracy encourages cordial international relations because the individual is supremely sovereign in a democracy and will not sanction the use of force with democratic counterparts (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013). America going to war with Canada or the United Kingdom is almost inconceivable; this demonstrates the argument.

The second pillar is that democracies hold common moral values and norms, which is the Kantian 'pacific union'. The union is not a legalised peace treaty; instead, it is a zone of peace based on the universal moral foundations of all democracies which underpins institutions like The United Nations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013).

The argument is peaceful conflict resolution is extended to International Relations because of the moral foundations which are shared in the Kantian Union. Additionally, the freedom of expression and free communication promote mutual understanding internationally and help to assure that political representatives act following citizens' views.

Finally, peace between democracies is strengthened through economic cooperation and interdependence. In the pacific union, it is possible to encourage what Kant called 'the spirit of commerce'; mutual and reciprocal gain for those involved in international economic cooperation and exchange (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013).

Revelations for Democratisation and War

The Lockean conception of the state is one that distils the essence of the state to the protection of naturally-endowed rights, the right to freedom insofar as that freedom coexist with other choices within the law. Kant also believed this freedom bestowed a duty to enter into a social contract on how to be governed. These rights, according to Locke, are endowed not by the state but by reason of human existence. Once these rights are violated, Locke believes protest, war or violence is justified; the Lockean concept of democratisation sees violence as part of the process of democratisation. Broadening the scope beyond the state, the Kantian perspective on democratic peace has been used to justify the forcible spread of democracy; it is the rationale behind the push by George Bush and subsequent Presidencies to promote democracy through war or violence in the wake of the 911 attacks.

The Relationship between Democratisation and Political Violence

What is clear from a review of theories and concept is that there is a relationship between political violence and democratisation, and it is not as theoretically or normatively incompatible as it would appear at first glance. What remains to be resolved is the nature of the relationship; is it deterministic, probabilistic or exact? Fortunately, such questions have been investigated by scholars who have created statistical models to determine the nature of the relationship. Generally, the discussion can be distinguished by writers who believe there is a positive or negative relationship or correlation between the two variables.

Positive Relationship

The work of Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, writing in 1995 on Democratisation and War, becomes instructive in this regard; the researchers found that democratisation itself can be a cause for conflict. They rely on the statistical analysis of the classification of regimes and wars from 1811 to 1980 used by most peace researchers; they find that the democratising states were more likely to fight wars than states that had not changed regimes. They find that the relationship between war and democratisation is mostly positive in the first year of democratisation and mostly negative in the tenth year of democratisation.

The writers also demonstrate that during any ten years, a state experiencing no change in regimes had a one in six chance of fighting a war in the next decade. By contrast, a state that experiences a change in the regime has a one in four chance of fighting. Recalling the work of Dahl, Mansfield and Snyder highlight the risks of war when political participation becomes more competitive; the risks are also evident when attempting to create adequate checks and balances on governance in an undemocratic regime. More competition increases the likelihood by 90 per cent and creates accountability in governance by 35 per cent respectively. Their research also reveals the dangers of regime transitions, states moving from a mixed regime to democracy were about 50 per cent more likely to fight a war than states that did not transition. Those making the full leap from autocracy to democracy were two-thirds as likely to be engaged in any type of war and twice as likely to be involved in a civil war as those who did not transition. The writers provide several reasons why democratisation can lead to war, from ethnicity, weak institutions and social cleavages.

Cederman et al., writing in 2008 on Democratisation and War, have shown that Mansfield and Synder's work has come under criticism for empirical biases; the peaceful transition of the Eastern European bloc serves as counterproof and has forced the writers to rethink some of their argument.

They are not the only ones, however, to depict a positive relationship between democracy and war; Erich Weede (1984) dispels the notion that democracies tend to be involved in war less often than other states as fallacious. Weede believes that the Post-World War II period saw many countries like America, Britain, French, Belgium and Israel involved in interstate, extra-systemic or colonial wars while maintaining reasonably good democratic performance. Weede concedes that from the seventies onwards, democracies were less involved in interstate wars; however, the period of observation was too narrow to be definitive. Weede concedes that while the argument is that democratic governments are more inclined to avoid war, he does not believe that is the same as guaranteeing peace. Weede believes democracy and war are often counterintuitive; the electorate which is wary of committing to war with life and limb, are the same people who may not be willing to concede that which is necessary for peace. The case of Nigerian citizens objecting to the concession of Bakassi Pennisula to Cameroon by Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo to avoid war comes to mind as a reference (BBC 2006). Additionally, appeasement may project weakness and indecision which invites further exploitation by foreign leaders which further increases the likelihood of war. This fact was undoubtedly the case with the appeasement of the British with Hitler, which did nothing to prevent his invasion.

Wolfgang Merkel (2008) also finds a positive correlation between war and democratisation; like Mansfield and Synder, Merkel finds that democratising regimes are less stable than autocracies. Autocracies are also more likely to be involved in political violence and susceptible to war than mature democracies or stable autocratic systems. Merkel, however, sees some usefulness to this with the suggestion that military defeat can lead to successful democratisation recounting the experiences of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. Merkel's argument is instrumental because he widens analysis to the macro level, which is pertinent to this discussion. Merkel faults the foundations of American Foreign Policy which sees a domino effect of democracy in a region if pivotal states are forced to democratise. Merkel recounts American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan post-911 as evidence of this; he argues that Iraq's chances of rapid democratisation and stable democracy afterwards were improbable. He shows that interventions that set out to dislodge an autocratic leader will lead to incomplete democratisation, as the countries will remain unstable, and this increases the chances of war. He also shows that intervention cannot be short-term but demonstrate a willingness to shepherd the nation beyond the transition period, a period it will be recalled has the most potential for war. This appetite for long-term democratisation is something most intervening powers have neither coin nor appetite for.

Empirically these arguments are well framed by recent events in the Middle East, most notably the Arab Spring that spread across the region spurred by events that began in Egypt. Kinsella and Rosseau (2008) note that this contagion effect is likely when states do not have democratic neighbours; violence is more likely when states in a region have weak democratic institutions. However, what is more, revealing about the positive correlation between War and Democracy is that American interventionist Foreign Policy has failed to meet the conditions highlighted by Merkel. America's foreign policy was interested in toppling Saddam Hussein with the assumption that the nation would immediately democratise; the result has been an incomplete democratisation process still marred by conflict and war. Most notably, the intervention in Libya saw the nation try to move from a complete autocracy to a democracy has given credence to the arguments made by Mansfield and Snyder.

Negative Relationship

Other writers do not conceive of the relationship this way or do not see a correlation. Kinsella and Rosseau (2008) push back against the notion that democratisation necessarily leads to violence; they believe that regime classification is essential before such a conclusion can be drawn. In their view, democracy is more stable; if democratic institutions are fully consolidated, then the chances of violence are at their lowest.

Other writers such as Omar Encarnación (2005) have highlighted the irony of spreading peace through the pistol; something termed as Democratic Imperialism which itself is counterintuitive and most evident in the Foreign Policy of major powers, either through political violence, the threat of it or aid. Encarnación believes the conflation of political violence and democracy has happened because there has been a misreading of the democratic peace theory. He believes war and peace do not have the same anachronistic notions they had during the past, and it has moved beyond the state; he agrees with those who argue that democratic states have fought proxy wars. Additionally, he challenges the Dark Side of the Democratic Peace Theory, which uses illiberal means to promote democracy and presents the contradiction of a peace-loving aggressor. Democracy, he concludes, can never be imperialist.

Josh Schwarzmantel (2010) is also not convinced that the two concepts are mutually compatible; theoretically and normatively, he suggests that democracy aims at the exclusion of violence and should render it unnecessary since society can express divergent views through rational deliberation. He concedes that this is not the case since the state uses violence to maintain its existence; however, he argues this violence may escape democratic control. Schwarzmantel also concedes that conflict is part of the human condition; however, the democratic method seeks to resolve these differences peacefully where violence is viewed as illegitimate and irrational because violence treats citizens as objects and not rational beings. He also adds that using violence in the defence of democracy may undermine the legitimacy of democratic norms themselves.

Despite this strain of counternarrative in the scholarship, writers trying to decouple war from democracy, the dominant strain is those who argue that democracy limits war while still advocating using violent means to promote democracy. This strain is most apparent in foreign policy circles. The literature is still unclear of what to make of this argument, those who believe that there is a negative correlation between democracy and war, that democracy does not foster war but who believe war can foster democracy and democratisation. Dankwart Rustow (1970) writes on the major democratising force of war and the contagion effect of democracy but also argues that democracy is necessary for conflict resolution; Rustow’s approach sums up striking a balance between the two and finding a positive outcome.

Negative Correlation but Positive Outcomes

Militarism has formed the foundation of some foreign policy directives; it is particularly astute in the United States, where cold war sentiments of the Neo-conservatives have shaped the foreign policy and military adventurism of the United States since the cold war (Glassman 2005; Wagner 2015).

As we noted earlier, it is even more prevalent in the post-911 world, where war has shifted to battles between Non-State Actors and States. The response to terrorism is central to the foreign policy of many nations and has expanded the role of warring in International Relations. Notably, it was one of the pillars of the Bush Doctrine in response to the September 11, 2000, attacks on the World Trade Centre (Zakaria, 2008). The Bush Doctrine authorised the use of military force against countries that harboured terrorists. It also expanded on unilateralism, encouraged regime change and allowed for pre-emptive strikes; a 2016 The Economist Report shows that the Obama administration actively pursued this policy and expanded on it using drone warfare.

Edward Luttwak, a renowned strategist, writing in 1999, continued on the idea that war could advance democratisation by exhausting all other options and leading to necessary conflict resolution. Luttwak argues war has proven an able mechanism for conflict resolution in international affairs, and it should be allowed to reach its end, even in the face of economic and human costs. The argument holds that conflict can only truly be resolved when it reaches a natural end. Luttwak contends that when war is not allowed to reach a natural conclusion, it leaves vestiges for future conflict, which is what others have argued results in failed democratisation. Luttwak's argument has some agreement; Williams et al. writing in 2012, also question if wars truly ever end and if they do, do they not just plant the seeds for future discontent? Luttwak contends that war must reach a culminating phase of violence, a phase where hopes of military success have faded, and détente and democracy are more palatable than combat.

While there are obvious limits to this approach, the least of which is the vast human, economic and moral costs, one just has to conjure the images of the Rwandan Genocide to dismiss the argument; however, empirically, there are suggestions that give Luttwak's argument credence. If the argument is that conflict must be resolved entirely before democratisation and peace take hold, then there is evidence of this in the Angolan case.

Case Study- Angola

The Angolan Civil War, borne out of the need for control of the government, raged on for several years, as a matter of fact, for 26 years. It was one of the most murderous proxies of the cold war, with the Soviet Union pitting sides with the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which was predominantly made up of wealthy families that had become so due to the slave trade. The Americans pitted sides with the Africanist movement, UNITA, led by the charismatic Jonas Savimbi (Dowden 2008).

As soon as the Soviet Union fell, the Americans called for an election in 1992, confident that their proxy Savimbi would win, he did not, and the civil war started again, perhaps proving Luttwak's point that the war should have been allowed to burn itself out. The situation was further exacerbated when The United States switched sides; some would argue to secure a closer relationship with the oil-producing MPLA-controlled government (Dowden 2008).

In the ceasefire that had been negotiated for elections, UNITA had rearmed, much like Luttwak points out that cease-fires tend to arrest war-induced exhaustion and let opposing sides reconstitute and rearm their forces.

Angola's civil war only came to an end when government forces killed the rebel leader, Savimbi in 1998 and the military command of the rebel group agreed to a ceasefire in 2002, exhausted from the fighting (Dowden 2008). The economic and human toll the war took has served as a reminder of the need to keep the peace; since the peace agreement, the country has enjoyed economic revival, growth and elections.

Conclusion

As the article concludes, it must return to where it began—having reviewed the conceptual and theoretical frameworks supporting War and Democratisation and dividing the arguments into those who see an explicit and positive correlation between the two variables and those who disagree with that view. A further distinction is made with those who take a middle-of-the-road approach, can the questions posed at the beginning of the article be sufficiently answered?

The answer to this reflects the arguments reviewed in the article and cannot be a one-part summation; the answer on reflection is yes and no. Some questions can be dispatched expediently; one thing that is clear from all the variant thoughts and democracy is that none of the writers questions the normative value of democracy. Nor for that matter, do they question the involvement of war in the democratisation process. What remains unresolved is the nature of that relationship, and that is where the other questions find a less definitive resolution.

Considering the question of how democracy and violence mutually reinforce each other, the research suggests that there is a parabolic relationship between political openness and war, the more competitive and open an undemocratic society becomes the more likely there will be war or political violence. Throughout history, revolutionary warfare, wars of independence and civil strife are a testament to this. Additionally, there are theoretical arguments about why this is necessary if not moral. However, there are counterarguments that, theoretically, democracy cannot be compatible with violence.

Additionally, when the question of how a nation can achieve democracy through an undemocratic process is recalled, the literature is divided on this. There are suggestions that the very nature of the state was forged undemocratically and through violence and no democracy matured without violence. There is still the matter of how violence or war is conceived; there are strong arguments that political violence or war is not a breakdown of democracy but part of the democratisation process. However, this also speaks to the legitimacy of the democratisation process which is another guiding question of this article; there are arguments which also demonstrate how democratisation is coerced, is illegitimate and empirically bound to fail. Democracy should be allowed to develop organically. This argument is countered with the examples of Germany and Japan, which have become models of democracy in the conceptual West despite being forcibly encouraged to adopt democracy under foreign occupation no less. This argument is key to those who believe that war is a major democratising force.

What becomes infinitely clear the deeper the enquiry delves into the discussion between democracy and war is that it remains fertile ground for robust academic debate. That said, some generalisations can be made even if they do not sufficiently satisfy the guiding questions.

The normative value of democratisation has not been contested, nor has the existence a relationship between war and democracy. It is possible to generalise that democratisation that happens too fast will undoubtedly lead to conflict or war. It is also possible to generalise that coercive democratisation which can be related to hurried democratisation, will most likely lead to incomplete democratisation and violence in the process. Another generalisation that can be made is that political violence becomes less or more probable with the regime in place; democratic regimes and autocratic regimes are less likely to descend into political violence; hybrid regimes, however, have the most potential for this. It is also possible to see that the writers challenging the role of violence in a democracy are focused on intrastate wars and wars within a state, and those who believe war can be a democratising force are focused on interstate wars.

The argument can be made as well that where there is a difference or a mismatch between the state and the nation, there is bound to be conflict or political upheaval as questions about the legitimacy of the state will arise. The Nigerian Biafran succession, which is still rooted in the consciousness of Eastern Nigeria, is evidence of this, as is the recent agitation for separation in English-speaking Cameroon.

Lastly, where is the sovereignty of the individual in the entire discussion, and what are the implications for democratisation and governance? This, it appears, is just as contentious as the other themes in this discussion; political violence limits the ability of the individual to participate in the political process, in elections and in open debate. It also limits the ability of a state to be effectively governed, but that is only true if it is believed that civil strife and revolution are illegitimate parts of democratisation. The individual, it has been argued, also has the sovereign right to protest the government and challenge its legitimacy through a revolution which is often characterised by violence.

Coming full circle, the only thing that is settled about this debate is the ideational value of democracy and what it aspires to. Throughout history, wars like the Crusades and the World Wars have always had normative notions; the relationship between war and democratisation is no different today.

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