

## Colonial Development and Welfare in Nigeria (1940-1945): Agricultural Policy

التنمية و الرفاهية في نيجيريا (1940-1945): السياسة الزراعية الاستعمارية

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### Abstract:

*The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 drove the British Government to mobilize economic resources. The task was not easy because in order to meet the War effort, the economic life of both Britain and her colonies had to be reorganized. Indeed, the War did not prevent British officials from taking into consideration the economic development and welfare of the colonized people by adopting a new development policy. However, such a policy was met with many difficulties due to the great need of both the fund and the personnel to promote the War effort and compelled the Colonial Government to undertake urgent measures and plan for future relations. The objective of this research paper is to examine Colonial Development and Welfare in Nigeria during the Second World War focussing on the agricultural policy.*

**Key words:** Second World War, British Government, Nigeria, fund, agricultural policy.

### ملخص:

أدى إندلاع الحرب العالمية الثانية في 1939 بالحكومة البريطانية إلى تعبئة الموارد الإقتصادية . المهمة لم تكن سهلة لأنه للتصدي للحرب، كان لابد من إعادة تنظيم الحياة الإقتصادية لكل من بريطانيا و مستعمراتها. في الواقع ، لم تمنع الحرب المسؤولين البريطانيين من الأخذ بعين الإعتبار التنمية الإقتصادية و الرفاهية للشعوب المستعمرة عن طريق تبني سياسة التنمية الجديدة. لكن هذه السياسة واجهت مصاعب عديدة نظرا للحاجة الماسة للأموال و الموظفين من أجل دعم الحرب مما اجبر الحكومة الإستعمارية على إتخاذ تدابير عاجلة و التخطيط للمستقبل. الهدف من هذا المقال هو دراسة التنمية و الرفاهية التي انتهجها الاستعمار في نيجيريا أثناء الحرب العالمية الثانية مع التركيز على السياسة الزراعية .

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** الحرب العالمية الثانية؛ الحكومة البريطانية؛ نيجيريا؛ تمويل؛ السياسة الزراعية.

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The British officials announced a major change in colonial policy by introducing the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940. This transfer from *laissez-faire* attitude to colonial financial intervention originated in 1926 when the Empire Marketing Board was established to give assistance to the Colonial Secretary for Dominion Affairs and was affected by the Keynesian revolution which sought to disown the invisible hand of Adam Smith. Three years later, when the Great Depression swept Europe and was consequently brought to West Africa and Nigeria in particular, the British introduced the Colonial Development Fund (1929). In fact, the measures adopted to recover from the Depression could not achieve great results in agriculture. Even research to improve agricultural production was limited in extent. This paper attempts to examine British Colonial Development and Welfare in Nigeria during the Second World War focussing on the agricultural policy with reference to background of the change in colonial policy, the Colonial Development and Welfare of 1940, the War effort measures of 1941 and the alternative for future relations.

## **2. Background of the Change in Colonial Policy**

The political and economic conditions which followed the Great Depression of 1929 were considered as the main factors that changed British attitude towards their colonial dependencies. The Colonial Development Act of 1929 which was designed primarily to reduce unemployment in Britain was always regarded as inadequate. In Nigeria, the use of government inspection to grade the agricultural produce, the encouragement of native methods of extraction and the introduction of research work did not bring satisfactory results in agriculture. This was mainly due to the insufficiency of funds and lack of skilled labour. In 1940, however, the policy of self-sufficiency in the colonies stopped to be used and government assistance started to show great concern for the economic conditions and welfare of the colonial people. The inclusion of the Africans in this policy was the object of the Conference of the West African Colonial Governors held in 1939 during which, the Colonial Governors stressed the establishment of a West African University to train African students locally for senior posts.

On the one hand, the first factors, which influenced the new British attitude, concerned the relationship between Britain and the other world powers. The challenge to British power continued during the years that followed the Depression. In 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria and two years later, they attacked Shanghai where British interest was focussed<sup>1</sup>. This together with the withdrawal of both Japan and Germany from the League of Nations threatened world peace especially with the invasion of Abyssinia by the Italians in 1935. Besides this, the revival of Hitler's power threatened both France and Britain who started to make concessions to Germany to assure security. In fact, this was not to satisfy the Germans, who wanted a return of their former colonies. These factors together with the invasion of Poland by the Germans in 1939 resulted in a war against Britain and France.

On the other hand, the second factors concerned the relationship between Britain and her dependencies. The Ottawa Conference, which was considered as Britain's imperial system, was held in 1932. The main reason behind this Conference was the imposition of tariffs on the colonial

people known as preferential tariffs in order to prevent the import of cheaper Japanese cotton. Years later, a series of strikes and agitations took place in the West Indies as a result of the bad working conditions experienced in this area after the Depression. In order to put an end to these agitations, a Royal Commission was appointed in 1938 under the Chairmanship of Lord Moyne, who went out to the West Indies and issued its report in 1940. When MacDonald, then Secretary of State in the Colonies (1938-1940), announced the acceptance of the Report to Parliament, he stated that he had decided not to publish the evidence collected but only the recommendations embodied in the Report should be made public<sup>2</sup>. As a response to the Moyne Commission, the British Government established a Special Development Fund for the West Indies.

In addition to Britain's relations with her dependencies and the other world powers, many organizations of prime importance were to contribute to the elaboration of the development policy. These included the League of the Coloured people founded in 1931, the Negro Welfare Association and the International Service Bureau founded in 1937. Such organizations came together in a Conference in 1939 known as 'African People, Democracy and World Peace'. Members of this Conference supported self-determination of the colonial people and condemned the Mandated System. This challenge to British power drove MacDonald to introduce the first Colonial Development and Welfare Act which was approved by Parliament on 17 July, 1940<sup>3</sup>.

### 3. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940

In 1940, the British Government submitted a policy to Parliament to accept the increase of the 1929 fund. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act (C.D.W.A) of 1940 provided for an expenditure of £ 5 million a year over a period of ten years on social welfare and the economic development of six million inhabitants in the forty colonial territories. It was supplemented by a grant of £ 500.000<sup>4</sup> for colonial research. The aim of the Act was:

*“ to protect and advance the interest of the inhabitants of the Colonies...to further active development of the natural resources of the various territories so as to provide their people with improved standard of life ”<sup>5</sup>.*

CD&W money was to be allocated to meet the schemes related to both capital and recurrent expenditure in the colonies on services such as agriculture, education, health and housing and then given the importance of CD&W, and its management at the central level, CD&W Advisory Committee comprising official and unofficial members was established. With regard to agriculture, the funds were to be spent on improving the quality, output, the development of export produce and the means of transport, and the establishment of university institutions.

Such a policy was also concerned with colonial research. Formerly, this was the task of the Colonial Development Fund of 1929 which relied on British experts. This time, the government was eager to put the system on a regular basis and believed that this could be achieved through the establishment of a Colonial Research Advisory Committee.

CD&W financial policy would not reallocate again the amount of money to the colonies in case of spending difficulties due to little development work and reconstruction and consequently most of the money would be passed back into the British Imperial Treasury

The assistance of Great-Britain was related to the effort of the colonies .Hence, a co-ordination of effort was to be created between the Colonial Government and the Home government. So, in order to make and carry out plans, the British Government had to set up adequate machinery and qualified personnel.

Under this new policy, the staff of the Colonial Office was to undergo changes. The government appointed an Assistant Under Secretary of State. In the Economic Department, a Business Adviser to the Secretary of State was also appointed <sup>6</sup>. With regard to the development of the social services namely health, education and housing, a separate Social Services Department of the Colonial Office was created. Concerning co-operation between the British Government and the Colonial Government, it was the tradition for members of the Colonial Office to visit colonies either on special missions or for consultation with the local authorities.

CD&W policy could not be implemented due to the War-time difficulties and the War requirements which used both the funds and the personnel. The wartime priorities compelled the Colonial Government to undertake urgent measures.

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#### **4. The War Effort Measures of 1941**

The War priorities were the object of a circular of June 1941 with the following recommendations:

*“ to regulate the use of resources in the interest of both the general war effort and the well being and development of the colonial empire, to reduce consumption by taxation direct or indirect, to save actual material resources in personnel, to organize propaganda for various schemes, to encourage gifts and free interest loans and to train personnel in rural teaching”<sup>7</sup>.*

Such transfer in priorities, which aimed to increase production to support the War effort and reduce colonial demands of labour and materials, was to retard the execution of the development policy.

After 1939, when the pound sterling ceased to be freely convertible, the colonies found their overseas trade controlled in the interests of British gold and dollar reserves<sup>8</sup>. Such imperial control of the colonial currency drove the Colonial Government to undertake regulations which included the control of exports through stimulating agricultural production, tax reform and the control of imports.

#### 4.1. The Control of Exports

Concerning exports, the economic blockade of Europe created many problems for the colonial administrators who were anxious about the export surpluses of the colonies<sup>9</sup>. When the Second World War started, Britain assumed more control over the trade of her West African colonies. As to cocoa, during the 1939-40 season, the Ministry of Food agreed to buy the entire West African cocoa. In 1940, this responsibility for the purchase and sale of cocoa was transferred to the West African Cocoa Control Board (W.A.C.C.B), which was financed by the British Government and operated under the Colonial Office. This new regulation was due to the British fear that the decline of cocoa industry would create unrest among the Nigerian peasants who depended on the crop for their survival.

Palm produce received similar arrangements. Since the outbreak of the War, the Ministry of Food had undertaken the purchase of the entire West African oilseed surplus. Unlike cocoa, West African oil and oil seeds had an assured market in the United Kingdom and they became an important contribution to the War effort. In September 1942, for the sake of ensuring adequate supplies for the U K, it was decided to add the control of palm produce purchases and sales to the function of W.A.C.C.B.

With regard to cotton, the policy towards its production and export was conducted by the Colonial Secretary. The latter informed the Governor of Nigeria about the establishment of a Cotton Board which would be concerned with the policy of the import of cotton. He pointed out: "*present indications are that imports will be maintained, if need be on a reduced scale.*"<sup>10</sup> And warned: "*if our dollar exchange position becomes acute, increased reliance may have to be placed on Empire cotton for the U.K requirements.*"<sup>11</sup>

Between 1939 and 1941, the Colonial Government recognized that it was necessary to increase the supply of colonial cotton to save Britain's expenditure on cotton imports from the Dollar area. Thus, Nigerian cotton exports increased from 50. 632 bales in the 1939-40 season to 73. 295 bales in the 1940-41 season<sup>12</sup>. Such an increase in the export of raw cotton was a result of the demand for cotton in the United Kingdom. In fact, in its annual report of 1941, the British Department of Agriculture declared that not much cotton would have been required by the U.K but demand increased and through the British Cotton Growing Association (B.C.G.A), the Ministry of Supply made great efforts to buy as much cotton as possible<sup>13</sup>.

As far as groundnuts were concerned, when the Second World War broke out in 1939, the Ministry of Food took the responsibility of the purchase of the crop through the Association of West African merchants<sup>14</sup>. In 1939-1942, the export of groundnuts witnessed a decline due to the wartime restrictions. The impact of the War on Nigerian groundnuts was great. The Japanese victory caused a worldwide shortage of this produce and drove the Colonial Government to adopt a new programme for the sake of stimulating the production of nuts for export. They introduced legislation which would prevent the export of groundnut oil from northern to southern Nigeria without official authorization<sup>15</sup>. This was followed by other measures such as propaganda campaign stressing loyalty to the Empire and the distribution of higher seeds to encourage groundnut cultivation. In fact, not all the groundnuts produced in Nigeria were exported. In 1943, for instance, 84 .000 tons of the estimated 271 .788<sup>16</sup> tons produced, were consumed in the domestic market.

While the Colonial Government stressed the increase of production of groundnuts for export, businessmen were interested in the extraction of its oil. The first attempt to produce mechanically processed groundnut oil was made in 1940 when Georges Callil made a request to the Central Food Committee to produce sweet groundnut oil and anticipated that his customers would be Syrians and Lebanese.<sup>17</sup>

After approving his plan, Georges Callil set up a groundnut oil processing mill in Kano in 1942 with the assistance of the Agricultural Department. He signed a contract with the Colonial Government to provide both the army and the navy with groundnut oil. However, in August 1943, wartime shortages of fats and oils affected Callil's project. The director of supplies informed the officer in charge of the Groundnut Campaign in Kano that: "*the necessity for increased production is greater than ever, and so long as the export priority remains there was not going to be any relaxation of existing controls*".<sup>18</sup>

The great need to maximize the production of groundnuts for export after the Japanese victory of 1942 was the major reason which changed Colonial Government attitude towards the establishment of the groundnut oil manufacturing industry. At the close of 1943, Callil was allowed to crush 140 tons of groundnuts and sell the oil to the services. Although he was permitted to purchase nuts for milling, the government kept controlling the quantities Callil was able to buy and he began the sale of groundnut oil to the controller of local foodstuffs in Lagos.

These commodities that were intended for export were subject to a price policy which differed from one crop to another. In a debate in the House of Commons, Mr Harold , MacMillan, then Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, said:

*" we employ a different technique for different purposes. As an example, we have set up the West African Produce Control Board. This has been developed out of the original Cocoa Control Board. It will arrange a steady and consistent buying and price policy for West Africa. It will deal not only with cocoa, but with oil seeds, groundnuts, and other commodities. It will fix the appropriate prices at which shippers, acting as its agents, shall buy from African producers and the prices to be paid by agreement with our main consumer, the Ministry of food".*<sup>19</sup>

When the West African Produce Control Board<sup>20</sup> (W.A.P.C.B) took the responsibility of the purchase of cocoa, a great quantity was sold on the New York market. Sales prices were fixed by the market in 1939-1940 but domestic producer prices were set on the ground of the local conditions, and provision was made to allow the board to gain a profit. Despite the limited shipping space and restriction on import of cocoa to the USA during the 1941-42 season, the W.A.C.C.B succeeded to earn a profit of £ 8,7 million<sup>21</sup> through the purchase of the crop at a very low price.

As to palm oil, between 1940 and 1944, the average price of a ton of palm oil imported to Britain from countries outside the empire rose 170 % from (£13 to £35) while the price of palm oil imported from Nigeria increased only 44 % from (£16 to 23)<sup>22</sup>. The price of foreign palm

kernels rose 100% from (£10 to £ 20 per ton) while the price of Nigerian palm kernels rose 65% from (£11 to £ 18)<sup>23</sup>.

Concerning cotton, when the 1941-1942 season started, the British Government adopted a new policy of discouraging its production for export by reducing the price offered for exported cotton. In addition to this, the pre-war competition of the firms to determine the export price of cotton came to an end. Thus, the export price of Nigerian cotton was fixed by the Colonial Government and purchases were made in authorized markets.

In September 1941, the Nigerian Cotton Advisory Committee noted that “the price of seed cotton in local markets was frequently as high as 3 d per lb, as against 1 ½ d per lb in the export markets”<sup>24</sup>. This was because the Nigerian textile industry absorbed all the surplus of cotton. By 1944, the Department of Agriculture reported that “prices as usual were higher in the internal trade than in the export market”<sup>25</sup>. These high prices were to bring profits to the local traders who became subject to new taxes.

#### 4.2. Tax Reform

In order to support the War effort, the Colonial Government enacted new taxes. In 1940, the Income Tax Ordinance no.3 levied a progressive income tax on the whole country but excluded those who were taxable under the Direct Tax Ordinance no.4 of the same year which also covered the whole country except ‘non-natives’ and residents of Lagos township<sup>26</sup>. These ordinances continued to operate until the year 1945.

The income tax which applied to non-natives throughout Nigeria, and natives in the township of Lagos, provided for the payment of a graduated income tax. The rate was fixed at 5s. for incomes up to £24<sup>27</sup>, consequently repealing the exemptions for incomes under £30 introduced in 1937. It also implied for a tax of 3d. in the pound for incomes from £ 25 to £50; 4 ½ d. in the pound on incomes up to £ 150<sup>28</sup>, and for all companies to pay a flat-rate tax of 5s. in the pound<sup>29</sup>.

Since its introduction in 1940, the amount from income tax had witnessed a progressive increase<sup>30</sup>. Natives outside the Township of Lagos were to pay the General Tax<sup>31</sup> with various forms of assessment. In 1943, the Income Tax Ordinance no.3 of 1940 was replaced by the Direct Tax Ordinance no.29 which increased individual rates by 50 per cent. These new taxes were accompanied by other government measures which affected the Nigerian peasant.

#### 4.3. The Control of Imports

The other regulation which was undertaken by the Colonial Government in the War period concerned imports. The decline of the sterling- dollar exchange rate increased the cost of imports from the Dollar Area. Thus, the Colonial Government was enforced to undertake effective monetary reforms to foster economy in the hard currencies such as American dollars and Swiss and Belgian Francs<sup>32</sup>. The policy then adopted by the British consisted of the imposition of the sterling control. Import licences were introduced for the first time during the war to restrict the import of the bulk of goods. The result was the decline of the purchasing power of the Nigerian peasants by 50-67 per cent<sup>33</sup> as compared with the pre-war years.

The wartime difficulties decreased food imports. In 1940-45, the imports of tinned fish amounted to 11 per cent, the imports of rice 8 percent and sugar 26 per cent respectively. Higher prices of consumer goods and foodstuffs affected bitterly the workers whose wages were in 1942 about 70% of the 1939 level<sup>34</sup>.

**Table 1.** Revenue Derived from Income Tax: Individuals and Companies.

1930-40	99.141 £
1940-41	280.737 £
1941-42	565.805 £
1942-43	864.421 £
1943-44	1.517.283 £
1944-45	1.370.714 £

*Source: Colonial Report, Nigeria, 1946, p 25.*

It should be noted that the War effort impeded the implementation of the development policy. A few projects were introduced and concerned only transport, research on the production of the chief crops and education. In 1944, for instance the Colonial Office introduced a plan to build 48.275 miles of roads in Nigeria. With regard to research, this system was broadened with the establishment of the Colonial Research Committee. As to higher education, the Secretary of State for West Africa appointed the Elliot Commission (July 1943)<sup>35</sup> which called for the establishment of a university and regional colleges. Although the development policy was not entirely implemented, the War conditions did not prevent the British from adopting an alternative for future relations.

## 5. The Alternative for Future Relations

The wartime conditions prevented the Colonial Government from carrying out entirely the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act because the colonial resources both human and material were greatly needed to promote the War effort. However, this did not prevent the Colonial Office and the Advisory Committees in London from drawing up programmes for future relations. Indeed, it was not easy to make adequate plans because the officials ignored the post-war economic conditions. Thus, development plans were to be based on the experiences of the First World War. Preparation for future relations required the establishment of adequate machinery which would deal with finance, the means of production and labour requirements.

At the local level, the nature of the machinery was to vary with reference to local requirements. It was proposed to take the following pattern:

- 1- “ the creation of a planning section of the West African Secretariat devoted to planning under the control of an officer whose function would be the same to that of the Development Adviser.
- 2- the appointment of a small Development Council to join the technical departments with the work of



planning.

- 3- the setting up of Regional Planning Committees that would take into account post-war requirements of each area, and in which the representation of unofficial and Native Authorities would join the administrative and technical officers.”<sup>36</sup>

Indeed, the War period witnessed the rise of such machinery which differed in structure from one colony to another. In Nigeria, a Central Advisory Committee on Economic Development and Social Welfare was appointed in 1943. It was empowered to examine all the schemes proposed by the Government Departments. Development Committees were also established in each province to be in charge of the formulation of plans for the areas concerned.

At the regional level, Noel Hall, formerly Director of the British National Institute of Social and Economic Research, was appointed Development Adviser for West Africa in 1943. He worked under the Resident Minister<sup>37</sup> and was empowered to advise the Colonial Governments for the sake of ensuring the coordination of planning in West Africa as well as giving advice on which schemes could be given priority and on the provision of technical assistance. He played a vital role in West African development so that he was member of the Civil Members Committee which consisted of the Resident Minister and the four West African Colonial Governors.

The machinery founded in West Africa was like a pyramid whose base comprised the District and Provincial Committees. At such a level officials should collect facts, figures and opinions on local development projects. At a higher level, the Central Committees in the colonies received the available data, and made plans which were directed to the Development Adviser who would examine them.

Concerning the machinery that dealt with development and economic policies, it was proposed to be strengthened by establishing a body that would be able of coordinating the work of the existing committees namely the Colonial Economic Advisory Committee, the Colonial Research Committee and the Colonial Advisory Committee on Agriculture and Animal Health. The main reason behind this reorganization was that the structure by which one department dealt with development as well as finance required revision. Hence, it was suggested to create a Development Department that would be able to send officers for the sake of giving advice on development problems, and to act as a link between the colonies and the central development organization.

The Colonial Government was asked to formulate an economic plan for the years that would follow the War but had to assure that part of the fund would be available from the Colonial Development and Welfare sources.

Under the CDWA of 1940, the money spent up to February 1945 on welfare and research in Nigeria amounted to only £2.860.000<sup>38</sup>. Indeed, the money provided by the Nigerians to support the War effort exceeded the money offered by the British Government. On 29 November, 1944 the coalition government gave an assurance that balances unspent during any one year would be made available for future spending<sup>39</sup>. In fact, the Colonial Office believed in the need to boost financial assistance for post-war era; but because they ignored the exact costs of the plans no approximate figures were made which prevented the West African colonial Governors to prepare long term plans.

In planning for future relations, agriculture was considered as a prominent sector. In 1943, a memorandum on Principles of Agricultural Policy was submitted to the Colonial Advisory Council of Agriculture, Animal Health and Forestry. After being approved by the Council, the memorandum

was submitted to the Secretary of State for the colonies. The aim of the Council was to put the principles which would govern the policy of Colonial Governments in agriculture. Such principles had also to be made clear to the Colonial Governor who was faced with framing post-war agricultural policy. A departure to a new agricultural policy included three main objectives as follows:

- 1- “ the preservation and improvement of the productive powers of the basic natural resources of the country;
- 2- the social welfare and advancement of the peoples; and
- 3- the economic use of the land and labour available, that is their use in such ways as will produce the maximum return in real value”.<sup>40</sup>

Concerning the first objective, land could be used for many purposes but agriculture had a prior claim on all lands suitable for farming and raising animals. To keep the fertility of land against erosion, animal and plant diseases, it was suggested to use mixed farming and fertilizers, restoration of abandoned areas, irrigation and water control. With regard to social advancement of the people, it was decided ‘*to make the individual realize that he was a member of a community*’<sup>41</sup> by encouraging him to participate in the activities of the community. Since social advance of the population depended on better nutrition, advice should be given on the crops which would be produced i.e. crops of high nutritive value. As to the third objective, the emphasis was put on selecting the farming systems and the crops to be grown whether for consumption purposes or trade.

## **6. CONCLUSION**

The development policy that was introduced during the Second World War was prevented by the wartime priorities. However, planning for future relations was made possible when the colonial officials had traced the major principles of the agricultural policy and had established adequate machinery which would be improved to execute the policy. Though preparations were made on assumptions based the experiences of the First World War, plans were made and the financial assistance was increased to meet the post-war requirements. When the Second World War was over, the British, who were greatly affected thereby, were ready to execute the agricultural development policy that was reflected in the Ten Year Development Plan. This can be the object of another paper.

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- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, p. 261.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p. 262.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, p. 262.

<sup>19</sup> Falola, T, *Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development?* (Zed Books Ltd, London, 1964) p. 125.

<sup>20</sup> *This new established board with jurisdiction over the four British African territories (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia) was to operate until 1949.*

<sup>21</sup> Williams G, "Marketing Without and With Marketing Boards: The Origins of State Marketing Boards in Nigeria", *Review of African Political Economy*, V 12, N ° 34, 1985, p.4.

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, p. 84.

<sup>24</sup> Hinds, A, *Colonial Policy and Nigerian Cotton Exports, 1939-1951*, *op.cit*, p.30.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p 31.

<sup>26</sup> Okwudiba, N, *Path to Nigerian Development*, (Zed Books, London, 1981) p. 102.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p.102.

<sup>28</sup> Onimode, B, *Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria*, (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1983, Nigeria) p.238.

<sup>29</sup> Ekundare, R.O, *An Economic History of Nigeria 1860-1960*, Methuen and CO Ltd, London, 1973, p115.

<sup>30</sup> See Table 1.

<sup>31</sup> The name given to the different forms of tax collected under the terms of the Direct Taxation N°4 of 1940.

<sup>32</sup> Hinds, A 'Colonial Policy and Nigerian Cotton Exports, 1939-1951', *op.cit*, p. 29.

<sup>33</sup> Lempert, A, *A History of Africa (1918-1967)*, (Nauka Publishing House, Moscow, 1968) p. 297.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, p297.

<sup>35</sup> Borsali, F, *op.cit*, p 187.

<sup>36</sup> CO.554/132/33718/1/1943 memo for the West African Governments, " Post -War Planning for West Africa", August ,1943.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, p.166.

<sup>38</sup> Hailey, W.M, *An African Survey, Revised, 1956, A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara*, (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, England, 1957) p .199.

<sup>39</sup> Padmore, G, *op.cit*, p. 159.

<sup>40</sup> CM N° 9, *Memorandum on Colonial Agricultural Policy*, Colonial Office, January, 1945, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p.5.