LEIBNIZ AND RALPH CUDWORTH ON FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND FATALISM

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Cudworth and Leibniz

Cudworth (1617-1688), a Cambridge Platonist, might be regarded as having had a radically different philosophical stance from that of Leibniz (1646-1716). For he was branded by his contemporaries, particularly John Turner, as a Socinian.[1] And that he had nothing in common with Leibaiz would seem to be proved by the fact that Leibniz vehemently opposed Socinianism in general. He considered it a position which tended to "exaggerate the idea of freedom".[2]

Now, the question arises what Socinianism is. It was an evangelical, nationalistic movement which went through three, distinct phases. In the first phase, the thoughts of both Laelius Socinus (1525-1562) and his nephew Faustus Socinus (1534-1604) were predominant. The second phase was dominated by the principles upon which the Reformed Church of Poland was founded. And lastly, socinianism was very much influenced by the rational theology of the Socinised Minor Church in the Netherlands.[3]

Socinianism was an admixture of the humanism as propounded by Juan de Valdes, the Platonism which flourished in Florence, and the Aristotelianism which had a large following in Padua. It was based on four things: a rationalistic and dogmatic reading of the scriptures; perceiving Christ as simply a man chosen by God to provide prophecies to the world; a belief in peaceful and independent coexistence of the State and the Church; and the conviction that both the body and the soul die, but that those who adhere to God's word would rise again.[4] This conception of salvation was central to Socinians. According to them,

> God's dominion comprises a right and supreme authority to determine whatsoever he may choose ... in respect to us and to all other things, and also to those matters which no other authority can reach, such as are our thoughts though concealed in the inmost recesses

> of our hearts - for which he can at pleasure ordain laws, and appoint reward and punishment.[5]

All Socinians denied divine foreknowledge of contingent futurities because they believed that foreknowledge was incompatible with contingency and freedom. Convinced of the incompatibility of these notions, Christopher Stegman, a Socinian contemporaneous with Leibniz, even went to the extent of maintaining that God exists in time. In so doing, he bridged the yawning gap between the creator and creatures; for God would be as exposed to the vicissitudes of living through time as all his creatures. However, Leibniz considered Stegmann's crude anthropomorphism as repugnant and ridiculous, and hence unleashed swingeing criticisms.[6]

But, although Leibniz's derision of Socinianism is quite obvious, it must not be assumed that Turner's reading of Cudworth was correct. For Cudworth was harshly criticised by theologians upon the publication of the first volume of his **The True Intellectual System of the Universe.** This volume earned him so much disrepute that Cudworth never got round to completing the remaining two volumes. As Warburton reports,

> the much injured author grew disgusted, his ardour slackened; and the rest and far greater defence never appeared.[7]

This negative reception explains Turner's misconception of Cudworth as a Socinian. True, Socinianism spread to England before the Minor Church was stumped out in the Netherlands in 1658. But Cudworth, however, does not feature as one of those scholars who got converted to Socinianism. Among the Cambridge Platonists, Benjamin Wichcote is the only philosopher who features on the list of Socinians in England.[8]

Nevertheless, Cudworth was, as Birch points out, "a man of very extensive learning, extensively skilled in the learned languages and antiquity, a good mathematician, a subtile philosopher, and a profound metaphysician".[9] Thus the depth and sagacity of his metaphysics and philosophy in general might, to some extent, be responsible for the unpopularity of Cudworth.

Now, this paper is an attempt to show that despite fundamental differences in their philosophy, Cudworth seems to have anticipated Leibniz in his criticisms of Hobbes' and the Reformer's necessitarianism, and of the Molinistic conception of freedom as indifference of equipoise. But with regard to divine freedom, Cudworth seems to slip back into Molinism. And that seems to confirm the thesis that Cudworth's philosophy is a fusion of two tendencies, namely, the critical and the dogmatic. These tendencies run parallel at times, but at other times they are interlaced. Thus the intertwining of these tendencies seems also to provide an explanation of why Cudworth was easy to misunderstand. As Gysi[10] has observed, Cudworth's philosophy is "unduly difficult of access".

And again, Cudworth shares a common ground with Leibniz on the problem of freedom and necessity; they both considered it as of crucial importance, and worth examining. Indeed this problem was, for Leibniz, one of the "two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray".[11] To Cudworth, it was one of the principal subjects for thought throughout his philosophic life. In fact, had the second volume of **The True Intellectual System of the Universe** been written, it would have concerned itself with

> proving that God is not mere arbitrary Will omnipotent (without any essential goodness and justice), decreeing and doing things in the world, as well good as evil.[12]

The third volume would have exclusively focussed on establishing

> that necessity is not intrinsical to the true nature of everything, God and creatures, or essential to all action; but, that there is ... (a **sui potestas**)..., that we have some liberty or power over our own actions.[13]

According to Cudworth, the publication of the remaining two volumes would have marked the completion of the whole Intellectual System.[14] But for reasons discussed earlier, that was never accomplished.

However, Cudworth's original intention of setting himself the task of writing this book is quite evident. He intended it to be

> a discourse concernming liberty and necessity... to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of all actions and events.[15]

That he would have fulfilled his intentions, had the first volume had a warm reception, is highly suspect in view of what he says in the preface. He seems to have foreseen the unfavourable reception of his philosophical views. For he writes:

> ...we think fit here to advertise the reader concerning these (intentions), that though they were, and still are, really intended by us; yet the complete finishing and publication of them all will notwithstanding depend upon many contingencies; not only of our life and health, the latter of which, as well as the former, is to us very uncertain; but also of our leisure, or vacancy from other necessary employments.[16]

However, Cudworth's views on the problem of freedom and necessity are expressed in his **A Treaties of Freewill.** This work seems to have been written around the 1650s,[17] but was edited by John Allen and published in 1839.

Now, the question is whether or not Leibniz was aware of this work of Cudworth. To attempt to answer this question is not at all to intend to spark off priority disputes, but rather to merely show that Cudworth and Leibniz shared a common ground with regard to Hobbes' necessitarianism and Molina's conception of freedom. To answer the question: judging from Leibniz's works, he was unware of Cudworth's treatise on freedom. Leibniz acknowledges reading Cudworth's **The True Intellectual System of the Universe.** In fact, he obtained a copy of this book from Cudworth's daughter, Lady Masham, in Decem,ber 1703.[18] And Leibniz even published a paper on Cudworth's doctrine of plastic natures.[19] This is a doctrine Cudworth introduced in his metaphysics to get round the Cartesian problem of interaction between corporeal and incorporeal substances. However, no mention is made in Leibniz of Cudworth's **A Treatise of Freewill.** In this work, both Hobbes' necessitarianism and the Molinistic conception of freedom are criticised, and muddles arising from considerations of divine foreknowledge of contingent futurities are somewhat clarified.

But one point is indisputable: Cudworth wrote earlier than Leibniz. He had his ideas crystallised by the very early 1650s when Leibniz was less than ten years of age. And as suggested by Allen,[20] the work on freewill was written in reaction to Hobbes' **A Treatise on Liberty and Necessity** which was published in 1654, and which Leibniz himself wrote against in his 'Reflexions on the Work that Mr. Hobbes Published on Freedom, Necessity and Chance'. This was published in the **Memories de Trevoux** in 1712, twenty four years after Cudworth's death. Cudworth's work is, nevertheless, invaluable in that it provides us with arguments of a philosopher whose views on freedom and necessity very much resemble those of Leibniz, despite fundamental differences in their metaphysics.

Hobbes' and Stoic Necessitarianism

It is important to point out that Cudworth's attitude to Hobbes' necessitarianism differs somewhat from that of Leibniz. Cudworth considered Hobbes' work as "the most egregious piece of ridiculous nonsense that was never written",[21] as the epitome of the "most shameful ignorance in logic, especially for one who pretends so much to geometrical demonstration".[22] Leibniz, however, is less abusive in his language. He says that he found Hobbes' views merely as "strange and indefensible".[23] As to why Leibniz is quite sympathetic and less harsh to Hobbes is due to the fact that he does not regard Hobbes as an absolute necessitarian. It is only that Hobbes is muddled on some fundamental terms.[24] Cudworth, as is to be shown in this paper, in fact charges Hobbes with this same confusion

Cudworth's arguments against necessitarianism on the one hand, and for freedom on the other, are based on **a posteriori** grounds. That human beings are free, not passive in their actions, nor compelled by necessity is proved, according to Cudworth, by the fact that

> we praise and dispraise, commend and blame men for their actings, much otherwise than we do inanimate beings and brute animals.[25]

When scorn is poured on a man who has committed a wicked action, he is blamed

> not only as doing otherwise than ought to have been done, but also than he might have done, and that it was possible for him to have avoided it, so that he was himself the cause of the evil thereof.[26]

Cudworth defends freedom not only from the observation that men blame, punish or commend and reward other men, but also from the fact that individuals blame, curse and condemn themselves:

> men have an inward sense of guilt (besides **shame**), remorse of conscience, with horror, confusion, and astonishment; and they **repent** of those their actions afterwards with a kind of self-detestation.[27]

Cudworth regards freedom as established by these two considerations. Indeed, he goes on to point out that

> if all human actions were necessary, men would be said no more to **repent** of them than of diseases, of that they were not born princes, or heirs to a thousand pounds a year.[28]

Then he concludes that

> there is something... **in our power,** and that absolute necessity does not reign over all human action, but that there is something of contingent liberty in them.[29]

It is important to note that these a **posteriori** grounds employed by Cudworth are also very much in use in modern philosophers' arguments for freedom.[30]

Having established the case for freedom, Cudworth then considers the arguments of necessitarians. At this point we should note that Hobbes maintains not only that contingency is unintelligible because it is impossible for it to exist in nature, but also that even if it were to exist, it would have been a preserve of God. The reasons for denying contingency are: that in the universe there is nothing which moves itself - (**quicquid movetur movetur ab alio**); that even if there were to be such a self determining or self-moving

being, it is impossible for a being to simultaneously be a subject and an object of an action; that since every sufficient cause is a necessary cause, nothing comes into being without a cause; and that since the good determines the will, and also given that the criteria for the good are comprehended by the intellect, then volitions are necessary, and not free.[31]

Cudworth also considers Stoical necessitarianism. The Stoics propounded their necessitarianism by arguing that there exist an infinite number of worlds, coming into existence and ceasing to be serially, and each one of which being exactly like any other. For example, if the life span of each world were an eon, then the world in the n^{th} eon would be exactly like the world in the $(n+1)^{th}$ eon which in turn would resemble the world in the $(n+2)^{th}$ eon and so on. In these worlds, according to the Stoics, every being that existed in the preceding world would also exist in the new world. In any successive world exist another Thales, another Socrates, another Leibniz, another Russell and

> another everything, and another every person, exactly the same, wearing all the same clothes, dwelling all in the same or like houses, sitting upon the same stools, making all the same motions, writing all the same books, speaking all the same words, and doing all the same actions over again.[32]

Assumed in the arguments of the Stoics is that worlds come into being and cease to be in a serial order; but the same conclusion of absolute necessity could still be arrived at even when the worlds are thought to exist concurrently, as noted by Cudworth.[33] Nevertheless in both cases the question has to be faced: what guarantees trans-world identity of the individuals, or in what would lie the difference between one world and another if everything else is held to be the same? Although this problem has achieved prominence in modern philosophy,[34] it did not cross Cudworth's mind, let alone the Stoics themselves. But the Stoical position is notoriously necessitarian; for the essence of Stoicism is, **inter alia**, the outright "denial of the freedom of the will".[35]

Ralph Cudworth, however, regarded the Stoical position as fatalistic. In **The True Intellectual System of the Universe**

he distinguishes three types of fatalism: naturalistic or Democritical fate, Stoical fate, and theological fate. On these Cudworth writes:

> Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to these three heads: First, such as asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of fate, though philosophers and their ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoteric Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient Church. Secondly, such as suppose a Deity, that acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence by a series of causes doth unavoidably result whatsoever is now done in it. Which fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus.... And lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which fate Epicurus calls... 'the fate of the Naturalist', that is, indeed, the Atheists, the assertors whereof may be called also the Democritical Fatalists.[36]

According to Cudworth the ground for necessitarians is twofold. On the one hand are those who maintain that "necessity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that contingent liberty is... a thing impossible or contradictous, which can have no existence anywhere in nature".[37] And on the other front are those who "admit contingent liberty not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be so determined by the will and the decrees of this Deity, as that they are made necessary to us".[38]

And the necessitarians who deny the existence of contingency defend their position, in Cudworth's view, from two different perspectives:

> either from such a hypothesis as this: that the universe is nothing else but local motion; and nothing moving itself, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that... material and mechanical necessity must needs reign over all things; or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding.[39]

These are the philosophers who argue that contingency and liberty are impossible and unintelligible since it is impossible, according to them, for a being to be simultaneously an agent and a patient of an action. To these Cudworth retorts:

> We are certain by inward sense that we can reflect upon ourselves and consider ourselves, which is a reduplication of life in a higher degree; for all cogitative beings such as are self-conscious... when they judge their own actions... and condemn or acquit themselves. Wherefore that which is conscious of itself, and reflexive upon itself, may also act upon itself.[40]

Insofar as a self-conscious being determines itself and effects a change in itself in one way or another, Cudworth concludes that a being of that sort is both an agent and a patient of an action. It is an agent when the being deliberates a change, and a patient when that change is put into effect. But then in that case, the being is not, strictly speaking, **simultaneously** an agent and a patient of an action; for being an agent of an action is temporally, if not logically, prior to being a patient of that same action. The unity is, presumably, maintained in that one and the same being executes and then suffers the action.

Cudworth refutes the argument of Hobbes, that whatever happens does so by absolute necessity, by pointing out that if that were the case, then speculative and deliberative thought would be always necessary in conscious beings. Not only that, the following absurdity follows:

> We could never divest our own thoughts, nor stop the inundation of them flowing in a stream from objects, nor entertain any constant design of life, nor carry any project for the future.[41]

Cudworth also notices a confusion in Hobbes, particularly on his conception of what it is for a cause to be sufficient. In noticing this confusion Cudworth makes much the same observation as Leibniz. On causes he argues that

> there are two kinds of sufficient causes, one is such as acteth necessarily and can neither suspend, nor determine its own action, another such as acteth contingently or arbitrarily, and hath a power over its own action, either to suspend it or determine it as it pleaseth.[42]

Here Cudworth is making a distinction between, in Leibnizian terms, physical necessity and moral necessity; for the latter obtains only in rational agents.

That Cudworth anticipates Leibniz's distinction is supported all the more by the criticisms Cudworth levels against the Socinians who argued that divine foreknowledge and contingency of future events and actions are incompatible notions. In the view of the Socinians, prescience implies necessity. In refuting this position Cudworth argues as follows:

> if the prescience be true, they must be foreknown to be contingents, and therefore to come to pass not necessarily, but contingently - moreover, **they do not come to pass because they are foreknown but they are foreknown because they will come to pass** (my emphasis), the certain prescience is not the cause of their future coming to pass, but their future coming to pass is the cause of their being foreknown. There is no more necessity arising from prescience, than there would have been from their futurity, had they not been foreknown... Here is no necessity but **ex hypothesi** or hypothetical; upon supposition that it will be, it is necessarily future, but there is no absolute necessity in the thing

> itself. When a contingent thing hath been, and is now past, it is then necessary that it should have been; or it could not possibly not have been, **ex hypothesi so** when a contingent thing is now a doing, it is at that time necessary that it should be, **ex hypothesi**; but it doth not therefore follow that it was necessarily caused, or that it was impossible not to have been.[43]

Quite evidently, Cudworth is here making extensive use of the Scholastic distinction between necessity of consequent and necessity of consequence. But his distinction is not as clear as that of Leibniz.

As the passage above bears testimony, Cudworth deploys the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity in his attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge and contingency. But unlike Leibniz, Cudworth seems not to have had a fullyfledged theory of contingency; for, in his view, it is a sign of piety "to believe that God foreknows all future contingent events, though we cannot understand the manner how this should be".[4] Whereas Leibniz defines contingency both in terms of the principle of contradiction and it terms of the distinction between the devine will and divine intellect. So much for Cudworth's criticisms of necessitarianism. It is to his views on the Molinistic conception of liberty we now turn.

Epeleustic Freedom and Liberum Arbitrium

Molina claims that free coice consists in not only being free from necessity, but also from any causal intellectual antecedents. Man is said to be free if and only if, given several alternate courses of action, he chooses to execute one or any other without any reason whatsoever. Freedom, therefore, is an indifference of equipoise, a choice without preference.[45]

Cudworth found this position "monstrous and prodigious".[46] According to him, it fails to recognise the difference between corporeal and incorporeal substances. Corporeal substances have no power of action; they are not self-conscious. But incorporeal substances, says Cudworth, act upon themselves

as well as on corporeal substances; they are agents of thought; and are both agents and patients of actions.[47]

With this metaphysical distinction, Cudworth goes on to distinguish between what, he claims, the Greeks called **epeleustic**[48] liberty and **liberum arbitrium.** Corporeal substances have **epeleustic** liberty because it is possible for them to maintain an indifference of equipoise, just as two equal, but opposite, forces exerted on an object result into that object remaining stationary. But incorporeal substances, according to Cudworth, have a **liberum arbitrium** which is the foundation for commendation, blame or punishment. The fundamental difference, however, between **epeleustic** liberty and **liberum arbitsium** is not so much that they are executed by different types of substances. Liberty is **epeleustic,** in Cudworth's view, when there is perfect equality in the objects of choice or courses of action. And in that case, the question of praise or blame does not arise since all the alternatives are equally attractive.

> For when two objects, perfectly equal and exactly alike, are propounded to a man's choice, as two eggs, or two guineas, or two golden balls, of equal bigness, and weight, and value, he cannot be justly blamed by any other or himself, for choosing one of them rather than another. And the case must be the same in all other objects of choice, that have a perfect equality of good in them, or are means equally tending and conducing to the same end.[49]

And although human beings could be said to have such **epeleustic** liberty, Cudworth denies that they can preserve an indifference of equipoise because "the same motives and reasons have not the same effect upon different men, nor yet upon the same man at different times.[50]

On the problem of Buridan's ass, Cudworth says much the same thing as Leibniz. Both argue that the hungry ass would not starve to death because it will no doubt go for one of the two heaps of hay.[51] But Leibniz goes much further than Cudworth; he makes use of his principle of sufficient reason. "There will therefore always be many things in the ass and outside the ass", writes Leibniz, "although they may not be apparent to us, which will determine him to

go one side rather than the other.[52] Leibniz in effect denies epeleustic liberty in human beings.

The Principle of the Best

Cudworth and Leibniz, however, held diametrically opposed positions on some fundamental points: (a) on the question of whether or not God created the best of all possible worlds; and (b) on the intelligibility of the notions of the will and the intellect. On (a) Cudworth is inconsistent, and on (b) his views are a reiteration of Francisco Suarez. For according to Suarez, there is no distinction between the will and the intellect since there is none between the **potency** and the **act.**[53]

On the question of the best of all possible worlds, some passages in **A Treatise of Freewill** suggest that Cudworth held the view that this is the best of all possible worlds. For instance he writes:

> There is a nature of goodness, and a nature of wisdom antecedent to the will of God, which is the rule and measure of it (i.e. divine liberty)...
> All will is generally acknowledged to have this naturally or necessarily belonging to it, to be determined in good, as its object.[54]

And since in God inheres maximum perfection, which is beyond human comprehension, he is held to "will the best, and consequently make the world in the best manner".[55] But then at some point Cudworth seems to maintain, paradoxically, that divine decrees are arbitrary,[56] not succoured by the principle of the best: "God would not be God, if he did not arbitrarily determine all things".[57] That the world, he eventually brought into existence,

> should be just of such bigness, and not a jot less or bigger, is by the arbitrary appointment of God, since no man can with reason affirm that it was absolutely the best that it should not so much as an inch or hair's-breadth bigger or lesser than it is.[58]

That God operates under the principle of the best is, in Cudworth's view, a kind of fatalism. In fact, he argues against

it in his **True Intellectual System of the Universe;** it is, he says, a mathematical or astrological fatalism which the Stoics defended.[59] Remarking on the Stoical position, Cudworth writers:

> that did also in some sense make God himself as servant to the necessity of the matter, and to his own decrees, in that he could not have made the smallest thing in the world otherwise than now it is, much less was able to alter anything: according to that of Seneca:... 'One and the same chain of necessity ties God and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable course carries on divine and human things. The very maker and governor of all things, that writ the fates, follows them. He did but once command, but he always obeys'.[60]

And these remarks of the Stoical fatalists were, according to Cudworth, 'confused and contradictous jumble of words'.[61] And thus it comes as no surprise that Cudworth insists on preserving divine liberty that is not under the yoke of any principle.

Intellect and Will

But on the will and the intellect, Cudworth maintains that it is absolute nonsense to talk of the will as distinct from the intellect. And, in his opinion, Scholastic philosophy, in which this distinction is observed, is 'manifestedly absurd' because

> to attribute the act of intellection and perception to the faculty of understanding, and acts of volition to the faculty of will, or to say that it is the understanding that unerstandeth, and the will that willeth... is all one as should say that the faculty of walking walketh, and the faculty of speaking speaketh.[62]

In obliterating the distinction between the will and the intellect, Cudworth hoped he would avoid difficulties attending those positions in which the distinction is preserved. One such difficulty is that of what precedes what with regard to the will and the intellect. Thus the will and the intellect are, in Cudworth's view, two activities of one and the same substance. For he continues to write:

> But all this while it is really the man or the soul that understands, and the man or the soul that wills, as it is the man that walks, and the man that speaks or talks... it is one and the same subsistent thing, one and the same soul that understandeth and willeth, and the same agent only that acteth diversely. And thus may it well be conceived that one and the same reasonable soul in us may both will understandingly or knowingly of what it wills; and understand or think of this and that object willingly.[63]

Cudworth's argument against distinguishing the will from the intellect does not hold. In fact, the analogy he uses supports the distinction between the intellect and the will. To say, as Cudworth does, that a person 'understands willingly' is to presuppose that the act of willing precedes that of understanding. On the other hand, to say that the person 'wills understandingly' is nothing less than asserting that the intellect precedes the will. Thus Cudworth does not at all succeed in resolving the distinction between the intellect and the will.

However, if it is felt that Cudworth leaves the problem of freedom and necessity unresolved, that he leaves us where we started, he himself also thought so. He points out that

> if what I shall say concerning freewill seems unsatisfactory to any, I shall think it no marvel at all, for I never was myself satisfied in any discourse which I read of it.[64]

But in making this remark, Cudworth was merely being modest, for his criticisms of necessitarianism and of the Molinistic conception of freedom are significant despite the shortcomings in his philosophy.

ABREVATIONS

EW: **The English Works of Thomas Hobbes,** Molesworth, W.(ed.), London: John Bohn, 1840.

T : Leibniz's **Theodicy,** Huggard, E.M. (trans.), edited with an introduction by Austin Farrer, London: Routledge **and** Kegan Paul, 1951.

TIS: Ralph Cudworth's **The True Intellectual System of the Universe,** with notes and dissertations by Mosheim, J.L, which are translated by J. Harrison, London: Printed for Thomas Tegg, 1845.

FW: Ralph Cudworth's **A Treatise of Freewill,** John Allen (ed.), London: J.W. Parker, 1838.

C : Louis Molina's **Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescentia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione,** Oniae: Collegium Maximum S.I.,1953.

PPL: **Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters,** 2nd Edition, edited by L.E. Loemker, Dordrecht-Holland: D.Reidel,1976.

NOTES

1. John Turner's view on Cudworth is quoted by Thomas Birch in his 'An Account of the Life and Writings of Ralph Cudworth', TIS, Introduction, p.xvi.

2. **Observations on the Book Concerning 'The Origin of Evil' Published Recently in London** in T, Appendix IV, p. 423, para.17.

3. See Williams, G.H. 'Socinianism', in **The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,** Vol.VII, Edwards, P. (ed.), New York: MacMillan and Free Press, 1967, pp. 474-475 See also Jolley, N., **Leibniz and Locke,** Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, Chapter II.

4. **ibid.**

5. See Clow, W.M. 'Socinianism', in **Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,** Vol.XI, Hastings, J. (ed.), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1920, pp. 650-654. For the quote see p. 652. Clow quotes it from **Racovian Catechism.**

6. Jolley, N. 'An Unpublished Leibniz MS on Metaphysics', **Studia Leibnitiana,** Vol.VII, 1975, pp.161-189.

7. TIS, Introduction, p.xvii.

8. See Williams, **op. cit.**, p.475.

9. TIS, pp.xxii-xxiii.

10. Gysi, L. **Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth,** Bern: Herbert Lang, 1962., p.8.

11. T. Preface, p. 53.

12. TIS, p. xxxvi.

13. **ibid.**

14. TIS, p. xxxv.

15. **ibid.**, p.xxxiv.

16. **ibid.**, p.xxxvii.

17. This period is suggested by John Allen. See FW,p.i.

18. See PPL, p. 591, note no. 7.

19. The actual title of the paper is: **Considerations on the Vital Principles and Plastic Natures, by the Author of the System of Pre-established Harmony.** See PPL, pp.586-591.

20. FW, Introduction, p.i.

21. FW. p. 68.

22. FW, p. 75.

23. T, Appendix III, p. 394.

24. T. II, para. 168; also Appendix III,p.395.

25. FW, p.1.

26. **ibid.**

27. FW, p.2.

28. FW, p.3.

29. FW,p. 5.

30. For instance: Peter Van Inwagen, **An Essay on Freewill,** Oxford: Clarendon, 1983, particularly Chapters 1, 5 and 6; Trusted, J., **Freewill and Responsibility,** Oxford: Clarendon, 1984, Chapter 21; Waston, G. (ed.), **Freewill,** Oxford: The University Press; and Franklin, R., **Freewill and Determinism,** London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.

31. FW, pp. 5-9, and EW,IV, p. 275.

32. FW, p. 10.

33. FW, p.12.

34. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see; Grimm, R. 'Individual Concepts and Contingent Truths', **Studia Leibnitiana,** Vol. II, 1970, pp.20-223; Fitch, G.W. 'Analyticity and Necessity in Leibniz', **Journal of the History of Philosophy,** Vol.17, 1979, pp. 29-42; Blumenfeld, D. 'Superessentialism, Counterparts, and Freedom', in **Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays,** Hooker, M. (ed.), Manchester: The University Press, 1982, pp. 102120; Mondadori, F. 'Reference, Essentialism, and Modality in Leibniz's Metaphysics', in **Studia Leibnitiana,** Vol.V. 1973, pp. 74-101, and his 'Leibniz and the Doctrine of Intra-World Identity', **Studia Leibnitiana,** Vol.VII, 1975; and Mates, B. 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds' in **Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays,** Frankfurt, H.G. (ed.), New York: Doubleday, 1972, pp. 335-364.

35. Ross, G. McD. 'Seneca's Philosophical Influence', in **Seneca,** edited by Costa, C.D.N., London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, p. 149.

36. TIS, p.4. It should also be pointed out that this passage confirms Ross's claim that before Leibniz, no philosopher made a distinction between necessity and fatalism. See his 'Leibniz and Fatalism', unpublished paper, Philosophy Department, University of Leeds, May 1978, p.1; also his **Leibniz,** Oxford: The University Press, 1984, p. 109. And another point worth mentioning here is that since Leibniz had a copy of TIS, he must have been aware of Cudworth's classification of fatalism. However, the

point of difference between Cudworth and Leibniz is that Leibniz gives prominence to the notion of **Mohommedan** fatalism, whereas Cudworth merely talks of Astrological fatalism.

37. TIS, p.3.

38. **ibid.**

39. **ibid.**

40. FW, p.71.

41. FW, p. 61.

42. FW, p. 74.

43. FW, p.81. And on waht Leibniz says, see T, I, para.38.

44. FW, p. 80.

45. C, pp. 12-13.

46. FW, p. 49.

47. TIS, especially Chapter III. For a detailed exposition, see Gysi, **op. cit.**, pp. 5-17.

48. The word 'epeleustic' is Greek, and means 'adventions'. See **Greek Lexicon** by Liddell and Scott.

49. FW, p.18.

50. FW, p.73.

51. For Cudworth's account, see FW, p. 57, and for Leibniz's, T.I. Paras. 46-49.

52. T. I, Para. 49.

53. See Mullaney, T.H. **Suarez on Human Freedom**, Baltimore: The Carroll Press, 1950, Chapters 1 and 2.

54. FW, p. 50.

55. FW, p. 52.

56. Cudworth uses the world 'arbitrary' to mean "merely at will, without sufficient reason". In fact, the **Oxford English Dictionary,** edited by Murray, J.A.H. **et. al.,** Oxford: Carendon Press, 1933, p. 426, quotes Cudworth's sentence to put across this particular sense of 'arbitrary' or 'arbitrarily'. The sentence reads; "To which nothing can be arbitrarily added, nor nothing detracted from."

57. FW, p. 77.

58. FW, p. 53.

59. TIS, p.5.

60. The quote is from Seneca's **De Providentia.** But Cudworth cites and translates it in TIS, pp.7-8. The Latin version of Seneca's passage is as follows:

> Eadem necessitas et Deus alligat. Irrevocabilis divina pariter atque human cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditar ac rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semel jussit.

61. TIS, p. 9.

62. FW, p. 24.

63. FW, pp. 25-26.

64. Quoted by Gysi, **op.cit.,** p. 147n.