An Attempt at a Logical Refutation of Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum

Abstract

In the development of Greek philosophy, the focus of the ancient philosophers on realities, trying to determine the ultimate principle of all things, begs the question as to what part or extent of reality is assessable to man’s knowledge. And a kind of skepticism was born, shifting the attention from the object [or the realities on which the ancient philosophers were focused on] to the observing or the knowing subject; man and the means through which he comes into contact with the known object. Thus, the possibility of attaining certain knowledge about realities was denied by the skeptics, giving the unreliable nature of the means by which such knowledge were acquired and the complexities of realities as powerful premises for their conclusion until the emergence of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, proving that there was something that could be known for certain using their [or the skeptic’s] own method [doubting] to prove to them that in their own doubting, they confirm their own existence. This paper is concerned with whether or not the cogito is a suitable premise for the conclusion [“existence”] of his argument. However, my aim in this work is, not to refuse the truth of the existence of any reality, rather to show the inadequacies of Descartes’ argument for them, with particular focus on the context within which his argument proceeds, which might require a bit of logical analysis; perhaps to arrive at a better conclusion for his premises.