

## Aid and Migration: European Union's Externalization for Migration Control Strategy through its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

By

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### Abstract

*This paper discusses the Valetta European Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa as one of the European Union (EU) externalization migration control strategies. By using a case study approach and thematic analysis, this paper analyses the execution of this strategy, the ongoing projects under it and, ultimately, it analyses how Europe's defensive posturing and extra-territorialisation will reshape its relationship with Africa and Africa's stability in general. The findings unveiled the authenticity of the criticisms directed towards the initiative including the EU's hastiness prompted by its quick-fix mentality, the political agenda revolving the EUTF projects and programmes which are against the norms of official development aid mechanisms as well as lack of Africa's ownership of such projects. Despite the immediate benefits likely to be reaped by African countries from the EU's financial support, this paper recommends that long term consequences of the initiative should be analysed imperatively to avoid further devastation to these struggling nations.*

**Keywords:** externalization, migration, Official Development Assistance (ODA), trust fund

### 1.0 Introduction

European migration crises began in 2015 (BBC, 2016) and in that year alone the EU had 1,015,078 immigrants arriving by sea as asylum seekers and others, compared to just about 220,000 the year before (only about 75,000 in the first half of 2014) (UNHCR, 2016). The European statistical agency (Eurostat, 2016) reported that in the year 2015 the EU received over 1.2 million new asylum applications which is over 100% higher than the previous year. Germany, Austria, Sweden and Hungary received almost

two-thirds of those (Eurostat, 2016) while 3,771 people were ported dead or missing in the waters separating Europe from Asia and Africa (UNHCR, 2015). The European migration crisis has brought space and geopolitics back into the political discourses and agenda of the European Union (EU) and its member states (Nitoiu & Sus, 2019).

The massive arrival of asylum seekers in Europe is not something new. Migration in and outside Europe has taken different shapes throughout history. In fact, immobility has never been the normal condition of people before the modern era. Migration is as old as humankind itself. The earliest migrants are believed to be ancient humans who originated from Africa spreading to Eurasia. The “Out of Africa” theory posits that *Homo sapiens* dispersed across Eurasia around 60,000 years ago, but this has been challenged by the evidence of migrations from Africa to Eurasia about 120,000 years ago (Blakemore, 2019) revealing that human migration existed way before those years.

The current human flow into Europe, however, is different from historic migration. The most obvious difference is that most refugees are from culturally distinct countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and North Africa. The current rush of refugees to Europe has thus caused considerable domestic as well as diplomatic turmoil and some unprecedented events carry with them political and economic repercussions that are shaking the European countries to their constitutional foundations.

There are risks and benefits of migration; such has prompted European countries to desire different responses to migration crisis. One of the main arguments for migration is the demographic decline of Europe. As life expectancy rate increases the fertility rate declines, meaning that most European populations are aging and shrinking in size. This decline will eventually reap a decline in workforce which in turn will create a number of financial issues for the European governments as they will be forced to spend more and more in pensions and health care.

Some analysts argue that immigration is the best solution to ease demographic decline. For instance, having the lowest fertility rate in the whole European Union, Germany is expected of experiencing a population

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by about 10 million people by year 2050. Without immigration, Germany's population is expected to shrink by about 14 million people by the same year (Morse, 2014). So, in order to allow more refugees, Germany decided to provide work permits to asylum approved refugees after three months thereby making Germany the preferred destination for asylum seekers. France and the United Kingdom (UK), unlike Germany, have some of the highest fertility rates in Europe whereas by 2050 the population will increase by 10 million people. These projections show that France and UK are in no need of any more people as also reflected in the strict policies such as those related to asylum permits. For example, it takes a year before the asylum seekers are granted with work permits in these countries. On the other hand, countries like Portugal and Greece have low fertility rate but also have high level of unemployment rate thereby forcing the governments to refuse any extra immigrants.

The difference in European migration policies may make some countries seem selfish and other countries seem generous but in reality, it is all based on the demographic and economic projections. Every European nation is reacting according to its own national interests and needs. It is important to note, however, that when something makes economic and demographic sense it does not mean that it is politically feasible. The influx of refugees in Europe produced political and social reactions in European societies. Unlike the past migrations, the current migration is chaotic and, as stated earlier, it affects every European state in a different way. This has created a fatal ground for the creation of anti-immigration groups and political parties within Europe.

The distinction between the term 'migrant' and 'refugee' is vital. A legal definition of a refugee is:

A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (1951 Refugee Convention Amended by 1967 protocol UNHCR)

In sum, a refugee is someone who flees an armed conflict or persecution while a migrant is someone who 'chooses' to leave his/her home in search of better education or employment. Most European countries will turn down migrants and send them back to their own countries. However, according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, refugees have a number of rights under international law including the right not to be returned to their countries of origin (Article 33(1)). Nevertheless, it is important to note that a country has no legal obligation to a refugee until she/he actually arrives in the country. So, in order to bend the rules, the European countries have extensively focused on preventing the refugees from arriving in their countries otherwise they will have legal obligation(s) to the refugees.

Europe's current moral panic over migration has thus generated unprecedented levels of interventions within Africa's 'sovereign' territory. This paper analyses Europe's migration crisis intervention in Africa through the EU Trust Fund to Africa. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the Valetta European Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa as one of the EU externalization migration control strategies. The analyses the execution of this strategy, the ongoing projects under it and, how Europe's defensive posturing and extra-territorialisation will reshape its relationship with Africa and Africa's stability in general.

## **2.0 Methodology**

This study employed a case study research approach where EUTF for Africa was the main policy in focus. It is primarily a qualitative study, utilizing secondary data collected through review of documents from various sources including peer reviewed articles, scholarly books, online sources and renowned international media sources. Thematic data analysis was employed where findings were ordered into descriptive categories around which most of the main elements of data results are presented.

## **3.0 Theories of migration**

According to Borjas (1989), a migration theory should be able to do three things: predict volume and directions of migration movements; take into account the assimilation processes of migrants; and evaluate the impact of migrants on the receiving economy. Currently, there is no single and coherent theory of international migration, but only a fragmented set of

theories that have been developed largely in isolation from one another, quite often segmented by disciplinary boundaries (Ziyanak & Sert, 2018). Current trends and patterns in international immigration, however, suggest that a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline or by focusing on a single level of analysis alone. Rather, their multifaceted and complex nature requires a sophisticated theory that incorporates a variety of assumptions, levels, and perspectives. Most of the approaches are economic and tend to reduce the reality. It is because of such reasons that this study employed several migration theories in order to expound the migration discourse and answer the question: 'Why does migration happen?' The need for migration theories is growing with the rising volume of migration and the globalization processes. More theories are increasingly becoming less monothematic and involve more interdisciplinarity (Massey, et al., 1993).

### **3.1 Push and Pull Factors Model**

In his study of "A Theory of Migration," Lee (1966) proposed the idea of "better opportunities," focusing on domestic and international migration. In terms of push and pull factors, the author provides a broad spectrum of information covering many conditions and factors that initiated domestic and international migration. He argues that immigration was the result of a cost-benefit decision or income-maximizing process between the origin and destination countries. Push factors refer to social, economic, and demographic concerns such as low wages, unemployment, crime, repressive governments, and so on. The pull factors refer to the maximizing opportunities that prevail abroad as opposed to the conditions in the homeland, such as employment, higher wages, freedom, and so on (Ziyanak & Sert, 2018).

The dual labour market theory can also be explained in the 'pull factor' assumption of this model. For example, Piore (1979) who has been the renowned proponent of dual labour market theoretical viewpoint argues that international migration is caused by a continuing demand for immigrant labour that is inherent in the economic structure of advanced countries. According to the same author, immigration is not caused by push factors such as high unemployment and low wages in sending countries, but by pull factors such as unavoidable need for foreign workers in receiving

countries.

### **3.2 Chain Migration / Network Theory**

The chain migration theory and its extensions like network theory, is one of the important theoretical frameworks that can explain the current initiating factors of migration to Europe and it is reflected in the Dublin III regulation of the EU. MacDonald and MacDonald (1964) discuss the functionality of the social network in influencing international migration decisions. Furthermore, the network theory sees interactions among individuals, families and community as basic assumptions for both initiation and continuation of the international migration. According to this theory, migrants establish social ties in their countries of origin and destination, which increase the likelihood of others' immigration to a particular destination. Most importantly, networking decreases the monetary risks of migration by making it more likely the immigrants will gain employment through their connections in their countries of origin (Massey, Alarcon, & Gonzalez, 1987).

This theory also explains the continuation of the immigration process. Having family members or friends at a potential destination also increases the likelihood of migrating to a location (Massey, Alarcon, & Gonzalez, 1987). Networks based on familial ties, or country of origin, such as friends, relatives, and ethnic communities, provide social support and make the immigration process safer and more manageable for the immigrants and their families. Once a network system has been established, migration becomes self-sustaining, and diffuses to the extent that large pools of people are able to migrate safely within its network (Massey, Goldring, & Durand, 1994). In this theory, individuals are not alone in the decision-making process; their families and social networks play a central role in that sense. Thus, even though structural forces caused migration at the outset, this was affected by internal mechanisms such as social networks and family links (Boyd, 1989).

As mentioned earlier, the significance of family reunification through migration is reflected in the Dublin III regulation. Dublin III Regulation, previously the Dublin II Regulation and Dublin Convention before that, is EU legislation which establishes the criteria and mechanisms for

determining which EU member state is responsible for examining an asylum claim made in the EU (European Commission, 2021). The criteria for establishing responsibilities are in hierarchical order where at the top of the hierarchy is 'family unity' provision where asylum seekers entering one of the EU member states will be taken to the EU's country, the state where an asylum claimant's family members or relatives reside.

### 3.3 World Systems Theory

This theory is based on Immanuel Wallerstein's Neo-Marxist assumptions. It focuses on an uneven set up of world economic relations on core – periphery axis. It explains the clear division between the two blocks and the division of labour where core countries enjoy the benefits of global capitalism at the expense of periphery countries. This can explain why economic migrants are often moving from periphery countries to core countries, which is so as to change their positions in the economic hierarchy. Managers and owners of capitalist firms enter the peripheries of the world economy in search of labour, land, raw materials, and new consumer markets. Thus, according to Massey (1993), the World Systems Theory argues that international migration tends to follow the economic and political organization of an expanding global market. This view yields six discrete hypotheses:

Firstly, international migration is a natural outcome of capitalist market formation in the developing or periphery world. This means that global economy penetration into peripheral regions is an impetus for international movement. Secondly, the international labour flow follows the international flow of capital and goods, but in the opposite direction. Capitalist investment instils changes that create a mobile population in peripheral countries while simultaneously forging strong cultural and material links with core countries, bringing forth transnational movements.

Thirdly, international migration is most likely to occur between former colonial powers and their past colonies, because linguistic, cultural, transportation, administrative, investment, and communication links were long established and allowed to develop in the absence of outside competition during the colonial period, leading to the formation of specific transnational cultural and market systems.

Fourthly, since international migration emanates from the globalization of the market economy, the viable option for governments to influence the rates of immigration is by regulating corporations' overseas investment activities and by controlling international flows of goods and capital. However, such policies can hardly be implemented since it is difficult to enforce them, they tend to incite international trade disputes, and they will risk world economic recession, and antagonize multinational corporations with substantial political resources that can be mobilized to block them.

Another hypothesis has to do with military and political interventions by the governments of capitalist countries to protect investments abroad and to support foreign governments interested in the expansion of the global market. When such interventions fail, they produce refugee movements directed to particular core countries, constituting another form of international migration. This resonates to what has been happening directly or indirectly in the Middle East and some parts of Africa. Finally, international migration has little to do with wage rates or employment differentials between countries, but rather, it follows from the dynamics of market creation and the structure of the capitalist world economy.

### **3.4 Institutional Theory of Migration**

This theory examines the impact of state and nonstate organizations on migration. On one side, this theory focuses on the agents that are often needed by migrants and these agents often work illegally through human trafficking. On the other hand, it focuses on institutions that are raising down or up the barriers for migration. The European Union as a regional institution seems to be raising the barriers against immigration by 'strengthening' the institutions in the countries from which most of the migrants traveling to Europe originate or transit so as to curb migration.

There is a tendency for private institutions and voluntary organizations to arise once international migration has begun. They arise to satisfy the demand created by an imbalance between the large number of people who seek entry into rich and advanced countries as well as the limited number of visas these countries tend to offer. These imbalances as well as the barriers to entry that developed countries erect to keep people out, create a lucrative

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economic opportunity for entrepreneurs and institutions dedicated to promoting international movement for their profit, resulting to a black market in migration. As this underground market creates conditions conducive for victimization and exploitation, voluntary humanitarian organizations also arise in developed countries to improve the treatment and enforce the rights of legal and undocumented migrants.

Profit - oriented organizations and private entrepreneurs provide various services to migrants in exchange for fees set on the underground market. Such services may include: clandestine smuggling across borders; surreptitious transport to internal destinations; counterfeit visas and other documents; arranged marriages between legal citizens or residents of the destination country and migrants; labour contracting between migrants and employers; and credit, lodging, and other assistance in countries of destination. On the other hand, humanitarian groups help migrants by providing shelter, social services, counselling, legal advice about how to obtain legitimate papers, and even protection from immigration law enforcement authorities. The recognition of a gradual build-up of entrepreneurs, institutions, and organizations dedicated to arranging immigrant entry whether legal or illegal, yields hypotheses that are also quite distinct from those stemming from micro-level decision models.

First, as organizations develop to support, promote, and sustain international movement, the international flow of migrants becomes more institutionalized and independent of the factors that originally caused it. Secondly, governments face some difficulties in controlling migration flows once they have begun because it is difficult to regulate the process of institutionalization. Given the profits to be made by meeting the demand for immigrant entry, police efforts only serve to create a black market in international movements, and humanitarian groups tend to resist stricter immigration policies (Ziyanak & Sert, 2018).

Massey et.al. (1993) recommend that depending on which model is supported and under what circumstances, policymakers might be recommended by social scientists to attempt to regulate international migration through various approaches such as by:

- changing employment conditions and wages in destination countries;

- promoting economic development in sending countries;
- reducing income inequality in places of origin;
- establishing programmes of social insurance in sending societies;
- improving capital markets in developing countries; or
- combining some of these strategies

Twelve years later, this has been exactly what is done by the EU under the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. They also predicted that given the scale and size of contemporary migration flows and given the potential for misunderstandings and conflicts inherent in the emergence of diverse, multi-ethnic societies around the world, political decisions about international migration will be among the most important decisions made over two decades from when they made such a prediction in 1993. This proved to be true and it came into fruition including the time they predicted that such would happen.

#### **4.0 Findings and Discussion**

##### **4.1 Migration externalization**

The term externalization was raised to describe migration and border controls from the countries that receive migrants in the Global North into neighbouring countries and/or sending nations in the Global South (Frelick, et.al, 2016; Kipp & Koch, 2018; Lavenex, 2016; Menjivar, 2014). In some cases, externalization resembles outsourcing strategies in financial transactions whereby, in order to increase profit margins, most costs are transferred to third parties. This especially comes to light when politicians of developed northern countries suggest that the political, economic and social costs of migration should be transferred to third countries, which are often located far from the country of final destination (Stock, Üstübici, & Schultz, 2019). Externalization measures also imply the policy initiatives geared towards managing migration in third countries. Such policy initiatives result in immobilizing would-be migrants in their countries of origin even along the way in transit-countries, and filter and select those migrants deemed adequate for further mobility (Frelick, Kysel, & Podkul, 2016).

The 1951's Refugee Convention which grants refugees rights under

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international law as long as they arrive on the soil of the country has made European governments paranoid on the incoming of refugees. As a result, European domestic authorities and Europe at large have resorted to the exertion of many muscular policy responses in response to the current migration crisis. These included a range of heightened patrols and militarized restrictions placed along both the sea and land (Landau, 2017). These are important, but by no means the only significant initiatives and, thus, the current move has been externalization of control measures.


Research has unveiled that during the last decade, there has been an increased tendency in certain regions and countries of immigration, especially the EU, the US and Australia to diversify and transfer migration management and border control mechanisms not only to neighbouring transit countries with the aim of diminishing refugee and migration flows, but also to more distant countries in Africa, Middle East, Asia and Central America (Stock, Üstübcü & Schultz, 2019). These efforts are increasingly coupled with the instrumentalization of development assistance such as EU development aid for migration policy - making which are in line with the donors' interests (Geiger & Pécoud, 2012).

In response to the gradual increase in the number of people crossing the Mediterranean to seek asylum in Europe, in 2015 EU adopted its European Agenda on Migration aimed at better managing migration through the implementation of the following four pillars:

1. Reducing incentives for irregular migration.
2. Stepping up border management, both at the EU's external borders as well as by supporting third countries to develop their own border management.
3. Reforming the Common European Asylum System.
4. Developing a new policy on legal migration.

Much of the global attention through both media and scholars, focused on what has come to be known as the 'Turkey Deal', announced on 12 November 2015, through which Turkey was offered around three billion Euros by the EU over two years to manage over two million refugees who had sought refuge in Turkey in exchange for Turkey's agreement in restricting migration through Turkey towards the European Union (Kanter, 2015). This ultimately became a six billion Euros fund in 2016 (Gray, 2020).

Similarly, on 11 and 12 November 2015, a summit between African and European leaders was held in Valetta city in Malta which resulted in a European Trust Fund for Africa which was supported by at least 1.8 billion Euros (Landau, 2017). The plan is part of a strategy responding to a surge in arrivals in 2015 that has not only divided EU governments but also posed a serious threat to the Union's cohesion and credibility. The Trust Fund aims at assisting a band of countries across Africa that are among the most fragile and affected by migration and which draw the greatest benefit from this form of EU financial assistance.



**Figure 1: EUTF for Africa Partner Countries**

**Source:** Annual Report: EU Trust Fund for Africa, European Commission (2017)

#### **4.2 European trust fund for Africa**

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) was created to address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and


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irregular migration to contribute to good migration management. It is the main EU's financial instrument for its political engagement in Africa (CONCORD, 2018). Currently, EUTF for Africa is worth over 5 billion Euros. EU contributes almost 88% of the whole contributions, and around 12% comes from EU member states and other donors (European Commission, 2020). It is at present operating in twenty six African states which are troubled by vast growing challenges including extreme poverty, demographic pressures, weak economic and social infrastructures, institutional weaknesses and internal tensions, environmental stress and limited resilience to food crises (European Commission, 2019). It is mostly dedicated to economic development and jobs creation, especially for women and young people in local communities. The other priority areas are supporting resilience to support basic services for local populations, migration management, as well as stability and governance by addressing human rights abuses, promoting conflict prevention and enforcing the rule of law.

The EU Trust Fund targets African countries that are the major migration routes to Europe. Eligible regions and countries to the Trust Fund are: Sahel region and Lake Chad which include Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad, Mali, the Gambia, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal; Horn of Africa in which Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are included and; North of Africa consisting of Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

To date, 254 programmes across the three regions have been approved by the Operational Committee of the EU Trust Fund for Africa for a total amount of approximately EUR 4.9 billion divided as follows: Sahel/ Lake Chad EUR 2145 million, Horn of Africa EUR 1808 million, and North of Africa EUR 900 million (Commission, 2020). Neighbouring countries of the eligible countries may benefit, on a case-by-case basis, from Trust Fund projects with a regional dimension in order to address regional migration flows and related cross- border challenges.



**Figure 2: EU-ETFA Funding Allocation**

**Source:** Oxfam, 2017.

The main beneficiaries are internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees and the local communities hosting them, as well as other vulnerable or marginalised populations, such as victims of human trafficking and smuggled migrants, women, youth and children. In addition to these, civil society actors such as community or women’s organizations are also supported.

Oxfam found that 22% of the EUTF for Africa budget is allocated to migration management, 13.5% to security, peacebuilding and P-CVE, 63% to development cooperation and 1.5% to research and monitoring.

### **4.3 Types of projects under Trust Fund for Africa**

Under this initiative, the following projects have been implemented as it was summarized in the report of European Commission on EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

#### **4.3.1 Establishing inclusive economic programmes**

This focuses on the programmes that create employment opportunities, especially for young people and women in local communities, with a focus on vocational training and creation of micro and small enterprises. It contains the following projects:

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- i. In Niger - Job creation in transit zones (€30 million), this project is implemented by the French cooperation agency (AFD).
- ii. In Ethiopia - Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia (SINCE). The project aims at addressing the root causes of migration in Ahmara, Tigray SNNPR and Oromis regions. This is a project worth (€20 million) which targets to create economic opportunities and improve the job skills for the most vulnerable groups, women and the youth in particular and it is implemented by the Italian Development Cooperation (IDC) with whom the contract was signed in December 2015.
- iii. In Libya – Regional Development and Protection Programme in the North of Africa. This project targets at contributing to the establishment of migrant- friendly inclusive services, fostering employment opportunities at community level, social cohesion and enhancing advocacy, as well as research and knowledge-sharing. At a regional level, the existing RDP in the North of Africa will receive additional funding (€10 million).

### **4.3.2 Supporting resilience in terms of food security and of the wider economy**

This includes basic services for local populations, and in particular the most vulnerable, notably refugees and displaced people through community centers or other means of food provision and nutrition security, health, education and social protection, as well as environmental sustainability. The following projects are ongoing:

- i. Senegal - Strengthening resilience of the most vulnerable populations to nutritional and food crises in the departure areas (€8 million) implemented by the Spanish cooperation agency (AECID).
- ii. South Sudan – Health Pooled Fund (€20 million). The objective of this project is to increase health service delivery and to strengthen health systems at State and County level. Its activities are ongoing already under the implementation of the UK Department for International Development (DFID).
- iii. Libya – Strengthening protection and resilience of displaced populations in Libya (€6 million), it will be implemented by a

consortium of NGOs led by the Danish Refugee Council.

- iv. Libya – Supporting protection and humanitarian repatriation and reintegration of vulnerable migrants in Libya (€20 million).

#### **4.3.3 Improving migration management in all its aspects**

It contributes to the development of national and regional strategies on migration management, containing and preventing irregular migration and fighting against trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants and other related crimes, effective return and readmission, international protection and asylum, legal migration and mobility, enhancing synergies between migration and development. Based on these strategies, the EU is currently discussing with African partners a number of projects proposed on migration management such as:

- i. Niger - Response mechanism and resources for migrants (€7 million):

The implemented of this project is by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and aims at supporting the country in the management of migration, promoting sustainable alternatives to illegal migration from Niger and fostering economic and social development through circular migration in the region.

- ii. Regional - Better Migration Management (€46 million)  
The project is being implemented by a consortium of EU Member States led by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

#### **4.3.4 Supporting improvements in the overall good governance area**

The aim of this project is to support good governance by promoting conflict prevention, enforcing the rule of law and addressing human rights abuses, through capacity building in support of security and development, law enforcement including border management and migration - related aspects. Some actions will also contribute to prevent and counter extremism and radicalization. In this category we have two examples. Firstly, in Mali there is: *Strengthening security in Mopti and Gao regions and improving border areas (PARSEC Mopti-Gao)* worth €29 million. This project focus on ensuring effective presence of security forces operating in the context of civilian

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missions. It has been jointly designed with EUTM and EUCAP and will be implemented by Expertise France. Secondly, in Uganda, the project: *Enhancing social cohesion and stability of slums populations in Kampala which is worth €4.3 Million* aims to increase social cohesion and peace building amongst refugees and host communities by providing basic services and economic opportunities to both communities as well as enhancing refugees to participate in the social and economic life of local communities. This project is being implemented by IOM in consortium with Action for Fundamental Change and Development (AFFCAD).

These projects were established in the advent of the trust fund in November 2015. On 10<sup>th</sup> December 2020, the trust's mandate was extended until 31 December 2021 after which the fund will be succeeded by a new development mechanism with a small focus on migration, the Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) (Coggio, 2021). At the end of December 2020, the implementation rate of commitment appropriations for the EUTF for Africa was 99% and 4.669 billion Euros had been contracted (Delasnerie, 2021).

### 4.4 Critics of EU-ETFA Projects

The EU Emergency Trust Fund makes predominant use of ninety percent of Official Development Assistance (ODA) which mostly come from the European Development Fund (EDF) (CONCORD, 2018). Its implementation should, therefore, be guided by the key principles of developmental effectiveness. There is a need to prevent the diversion of ODA from its main objective of poverty eradication. There is, however, an increasing concern that the EUTF is being used as a political tool focusing on quick-fix projects with the aim of stopping migratory flows to Europe which is not the purpose of ODA according to the EU's own Lisbon Treaty (CONCORD, 2018). There is also a concern that some funding from the EUTF unintentionally contributes to inhumane treatment of refugees and migrants, as it was in Libya. In addition, since addressing the drivers of forced migration requires a long term, sustainable and coherent approach, it is argued that the EU strategy of "quick-fixes" is very likely to fail.

European governments have been criticized as expecting to see the results of quick fixes where there are no quick solutions. The focus of the EUTF for

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Africa on '*stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*' calls for both short-term and long-term responses to very different situations that have yet to be properly distinguished. The ability of individuals to travel across borders to engage in trade and labour in a regular way is important for their economic well-being, as well as for their communities of origin and the host communities. People who are displaced from their homes by crises such as disasters, conflict and persecution should be supported along their journey. The root causes of their displacement should as well be addressed not only for those who are able to flee but for the benefit of all those affected by crises.

Another critique has to do with political agenda of the assistance. The establishment of the EUTF for Africa, within the context of the European migration agenda, raised concerns among different actors including the NGOs that instead of being used for humanitarian purposes, aid would be used to promote European interests (Oxfam, 2017). The European migration agenda is dominant throughout the EUTF for Africa, and a big portion of its funding is invested in border management and security measures. Such measures have been criticized by Oxfam of not being able to meet governments' expectations of stemming irregular migration and should not be expected to achieve this goal. To ensure that interventions funded under the EUTF for Africa do no harm and are sensitive to conflicts, the flexible funding must be balanced with adequate accountability mechanisms, in line with the development and humanitarian aid principles. Security measures should always be conflict-sensitive and should be designed to promote the security of individuals, with a focus on the needs of vulnerable individuals including women and children. This is particularly important when supporting the security forces of third states (Oxfam, 2017).

Castillejo (2017) argues that despite the stated goal of EUTF of addressing the root causes of irregular migration, it appears that the key actors have additional ambitions for the fund including: demonstrating actions on migration following political pressures, incentivising African cooperation on migration management and related activities, and using the fund's flexibility to develop innovative programming. Many African partners perceive the EUTF as part of European-imposed migration agenda that prioritises EU interests more than African ones and this is evidenced by weak Africans'

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ownership within EUTF. This creates the risk of alienating African partner states as well as overlooking local knowledge, priorities and capacities. Similarly, EUTF projects have been criticized of not being transparent and being ad hoc (Castillejo, 2017).

### 5.0 Conclusion:

Data show that irregular migration from Africa to Europe has declined since the EUTF was unveiled, but this doesn't imply that it is the primary reason for that decline. It is almost impossible to prove the causation, but evidence suggests that the fund has only modestly altered foundational social and economic factors driving migration, and has instead increased the ability of governments and others to control, servile, and at times abuse migrants at or within their borders (Coggio, 2021). The European crisis represents a deepening rupture in the universality of modernist development and an attempt to place African countries in a time-space of their own, if not of their own making. As good as the trust fund sounds, the logic behind it is that it is not the poor African refugee population that it aims to defend, but rather the European citizens. Interventions and political constructions are a defensive and particularistic approach in which it is only through the development of containment mechanisms that Europe can be protected.

What is important is how these initiatives move away from a universal language of human rights or human development, and focus on containment and a kind of autarchy. Although African countries and people will not be disconnected from Europe, they will only be recipients of aid. With this kind of assistance, they must shape their own futures whilst being disconnected from the global mobility networks that shape trade and wealth generation elsewhere. The billions of Euros of development aid promised after the Valetta conference will only be released in exchange for countries' committing to contain.

Reiterating the words of the deputy head of the European Commission Frans Timmermans, 'there are consequences for those who do not.' He openly said that the Union has proposed the mix of both negative and positive incentives to reward those countries that are willing to cooperate more effectively with the EU and they will make sure that consequences will fall upon those who will not. In an era of planetary urbanism and broader

global entanglements (Brenner, 2012), fixing people in space produces a kind of diffracted geography that excludes people from what is required for them to be fully human. Even if the stated aim is to promote the rights of people to development at home, this reflects substantial denudation of humanity and rights.

Another issue in question is EU commission's initiative to finance foreign armies for the sole purpose of complementing their effort to stop people from fleeing to Europe and this includes countries with patchy human rights. €100 million that was initially given as aid would be diverted to finance military-led border control as well as other initiatives like mine clearing (Nielsen, 2016). What is scary is that this money would be pumped directly into these foreign military structures. Refugees flee these states to escape from war, political threats and persecution. This clearly shows that the political and military systems in these states are seriously flawed thus sending money directly to their military authorities to perpetuate the situation of unrest. Thus, it is more likely that they would rather use the resources to stay in power and suppress their opponents. History audibly speaks for itself that sponsoring foreign armies tends to backfire, the case of Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan is one of the many examples.

In sum, there is nothing wrong with a country taking all the necessary means to protect its citizens, in fact that is what every state should do. But such actions should not be taken at the expense of other people. The argument is not that Africa does not stand to benefit from this deal, but given the weak political and legal systems of most of African states, EU should not just shower money to the poor continent and threaten them that there will be consequences for those who refuse to *kiss the ring of their mighty hand*. Instead, long term consequences should be analysed imperatively to avoid further devastation of these struggling nations. If not, it might appear helpful while in reality it is just a time bomb waiting for erupting again in the near future.

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