The Relevance of 'Nyumba Kumi' Grassroots Security Structure in Addressing the Rise of Extremist Violence in Tanzania

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.56279/EURI3193

Abstract
The re-introduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania in 1992 significantly weakened the functioning of security structures at the grassroot level. The weakening of Nyumba Kumi security structure, which had for a long time been part of the governance structure under single party rule, created a security gap in the provision of effective grassroots security early warning system in Tanzania. This paper examines the subsisting relevance of Nyumba Kumi grassroots security structure in addressing the rise of extremist violence in Tanzania. Data were generated from field work conducted in Tanga region in Tanzania. Using case study design, qualitative approach was employed to conduct key informant interviews (KIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) from a population sample of 59 community members obtained through purposive sampling and snowballing techniques. The views and responses were gathered and analyzed through thematic analysis technique. The findings show that Nyumba kumi still remains a viable and reliable grassroots security structure with effective early warning security system in addressing the rise of extremist violence in Tanzania. The paper recommends the review of security policies to allow re-nationalization of Nyumba Kumi security structures into local government administrative structures.

Keywords:
Community policing, early warning systems, grassroots security structures, Nyumba Kumi, violent extremism.

1. Introduction

The Nyumba Kumi[1] grassroots security system was introduced in Tanzania in 1963. The system was the ruling political party (Tanganyika African Union – TANU)'s strategy which established ten house cells governance structures to consolidate grassroots influence in Tanzania (Igle, 1972). The single party rule of the time plus the delicacy of handling the new government during cold war tensions motivated the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) leadership to implement a nation building project through the establishment of ten house cell structures headed by a ten-house cell leader who acted as the bridge between the ruling party and the grassroots population (Rigby, 1977).

The Nyumba Kumi security structure operated effectively in Tanzania from 1963 to 1991 by providing effective early warning which helped in detecting and tracking crimes

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[1] *'Nyumba Kumi'* means ten houses in Kiswahili.

before they were committed. The re-introduction of multiparty system in 1992 in Tanzania disrupted the functioning and structure of the Nyumba Kumi security setting which was directly linked to one political party. The Nyumba Kumi (ten house cell) representative served as the grassroot security personnel who reported to the government on potential security threats facing the ten-house cell grassroots population (Levine, 1972).

During multiparty politics, the ten house cell representatives fail to exert influence on community members who are members of opposition parties. This disrupted the Nyumba Kumi early warning system. The ten house cell leaders gathered security related information and reported promptly to the government security apparatus for quick intervention. The disruption of the Nyumba Kumi security structure created enabling environment that favored criminals to plan and commit violent extremist incidents in the grassroots community without being noticed. Despite the implementation of various alternative forms of security programs such as community policing, neighbourhood nightwatch, *ulinzi shirikish*, or *polisi jamii*[2], public education programs, door to door foot patrol, neighborhood watch programs, neighborhood community and town meetings, these arrangements have failed to produce effective early warning for tracking and detecting potential grassroots security threats in the communities (Yegon, 2019).

2.   Security Threats and Importance of Grassroot Security Structures

Tanzania's proximity to Kenya, Somalia and Mozambique where Al-shabaab and al-Qaieda terrorist groups have firm roots, makes the spread of extremism violence into Tanzania very likely. A series of violent extremist-related crimes were reported in Tanzania from 2000 to 2019. Several measures were therefore taken to strengthen the security architecture to respond quickly to limit further spread of violent extremist attacks in the country. Some reports indicate that Tanzania has been a recruiting ground for terrorist fighters with astonishing evidence that one of the al-Shabaab affiliated fighters who participated in the 2015 Garissa University assault in Kenya, which claimed more than 150 lives, was a Tanzanian (Dang, 2019).

To address the rising violent extremist security challenge activated by the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Dar es salaam, the prevention of terrorism Act was passed in 2002 which set out the country's plan for counterterrorism, followed by the establishment of National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC) which is proactive in countering extremist violence. To prevent the continuation of extremist attacks in the country, decisions were made to reform the Tanzania police force (TPF) in 2006 to allow for the formation of citizen-led community policing security structures (Cross, 2014). This state of affairs requires a thorough scholarly interrogation to establish evidence-based security interventions and recommendations necessary for addressing security threats facing the Tanzania grassroots communities. Therefore, this paper seeks to bridge the gap of knowledge by disclosing the strengths of the Nyumba Kumi security structure versus the weaknesses of the current alternative forms of grassroots community policing security structures.

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[2] *Ulinzi shirikishi* is a concept of involving local community members in providing security services and *polisi jamii* is the Swahili word for 'community police'.

The use of government led security initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism have proved failure to guarantee sustainable community peace and security in the East African region (Ruteere, 2017; Barihuta, 2017). This claim is justifiable by looking at several violent extremism incidents that faced the countries despite the presence of government security forces. Scholars suggest an alternative way in addressing security concerns through the use of grassroots-based community policing security initiatives (Ayiera and Eva, 2017; Gogfrey and Dixon, 2017).

Jingu and Walwa (2017), Jingu (2018), and Dang (2019) argue that community-led security structures are the best mechanisms in the detection and tracking of violent extremism security threats in Tanzania. Killian (2018) and Sambaiga (2018) also showcase Nyumba Kumi as an effective early warning and response mechanism for addressing violent extremist crimes in Tanzania. While community policing is locally considered to be a very effective means of preventing crimes and improving neighborhood safety in Tanzania, the extent to which the current practices of community policing structures constitute more refined accountability and responsiveness in detecting and tracking potential security threats is questionable (Cross, 2014).

This paper focuses on the importance of creating an effective mechanism to bridge the gap existing between the government security forces and the grassroots community's security initiatives as reliable solution in addressing crimes committed by violent extremist groups. It is generally assumed that grassroots-led security structures and government security forces are two independent security regimes which don't trust each other and operate without exchanging reliable intelligence information hence contributing to the failure in addressing grassroots community security threats. The government security forces suffer from superiority complex by undermining and ignoring the capacity of community led security structures to ensure peace and security in the country. These tendencies create difficulties for the grassroots community members to report potential security threats to government security forces. This allows extremist agents to penetrate easily by planning and committing crimes in the grassroot communities.

Security issues are central to the people in the communities and collective measures involving each person in the community is essential because the government security officers are very few in number. The concept of community-based policing, as explained above, started to operate in Tanzania in 2006 due to the rise of violent extremist incidents in the country. The community-based security groups were introduced by the Police General Order (PGO) which requires the police force to cooperate with the grassroot communities and other security stakeholders to address security concerns in the country. The overriding reason is to engage grassroot community members to participate in the promotion of peace and security.

3. Theoretical approach

This paper is guided by the nodal governance approach which emphasize the importance of using multiple stakeholders in the provision of grassroots community security. Nodal governance explains how multiple actors create a capable and powerful force to address the rising potential of security threats facing the grassroots communities. The use of multiple security actors such as the state, private sector, civil society and each community

member can yield positive outcomes in detecting and tracking potential security threats before escalating to harmful violent incidences (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005). This supports the perspective that the state is not an exclusive actor in the provision of security. It needs the cooperation of non-state actors to ensure peace and security in the grassroot communities (Dupont et al.,2003).

The nodal approach helps to understand how grassroots based security initiatives are very effective nodes for effective provision of grassroots community security. In this paper security structures are collective community ways involving each community member in addressing grassroorts security threats. This requires the total involvement of community members in agreed community enforcement mechanisms for tracking and detecting security threats facing the community.

The adoption of Nyumba Kumi grassroots security setting in Tanzania was not only a good example but also a very effective early warning mechanism in addressing security threats during the 1960s to early 1990s. Unfortunately, the Nyumba Kumi security structures changed after 1992. This change compromised grassroots peace and security in the country (Fink et al, 2013). The abandonment of proper Nyumba Kumi security practices, and the application of various forms such as community policing structures resembling Nyumba Kumi failed to function effectively and created safe avenues for criminals and violence perptrators to utilise the security vacuum to plan and commit violent extremism attacks without being noticed easily by the community members. Its in this context that this study set out to examine the performance of alternative security systems of community policing by collecting evidence from Tanga region.

4. Methodology

Data for this study was obtained from two districts (Tanga urban and Mkinga rural) in Tanga region. Using case study design, analysis of violent extremist attacks committed near Amboni caves in 2016, the paper showcases the weaknesses of the alternative community policing grassroots security initiatives. A combination of purposive and snowballing sampling techniques was used in the selection of research participants. Purposive sampling involved the selection of informants who possessed the needed information on the subject under enquiry. Snowballing sampling method helped in identifying individuals with relevant information who were thereafter requested to recommend some other informants having the same information. The use of snowballing sampling created a sample of 24 key informants for in-depth interviews and a total of 35 informants for five focus group discussions. Key informants and focus group participants were carefully selected to represent the marginalized groups within the community such as women, youth, and the elderly.

Key informants were three government officials at the regional level, eight government officials from Mkinga and Tanga districts, three officials from Chumbageni and Mzizima wards in Tanga district, three officials from Mkinga and Mtimbwani wards in Mkinga district. Five informants from Mleni and Kisosora streets located in Amboni and Mzizima wards from Tanga urban district. Five informants were selected from Mkinga Leo and Mtimbwani villages representing Mtimbwani ward from Mkinga rural district. Focus group discussions included two youth groups from Mleni Street in Tanga urban district and the other from Mkinga Leo village in Mkinga rural district. Two women

groups were selected from Kisosora and Mleni streets in Tanga urban district, and a mixed group from Mtimbwani village in Mkinga rural district. Mkinga district represented a rural district bordering Kenya with much experience of cross-border violence and Tanga urban district represented a cosmopolitan society which has experienced violent extremist attacks. An online survey of documentary materials was done to extract related information on the subject under investigation.

Tanga region was chosen primarily because of its proximity to the border with Kenya and the prevalence of security threats such as human trafficking and drug trafficking across the border. The region also faces a problem of illegal immigrant tribes from Kenya such as the Duruma, Taita, and Kamba residing in Mkinga rural district. Duruma and Taita tribes have lived together with Tanzanian tribes like the Digo, Sambaa, Zigua, Segeju, Yao, Makonde, and Bondei leading to the formation of a community with strong ties in Kenya and Tanzania. Tanga as an entry region to Tanzania from Kenya and Somalia shelters a lucrative black-marketing business conducted between Tanzania and Kenya. This involves the transportation of various industrial commodities from Kenya to Tanzania and livestock and agricultural products from Tanzania to Kenya.

5. Findings and Discussion

Field evidences show that community policing engagement security structures practiced currently in Tanga, prove that the Nyumba Kumi security system is no longer operating effectively to guarantee grassroots community peace and security. Nyumba Kumi security system ceased to operate effectively after the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992 in Tanzania. Yet, it is arguable that the system was not abandoned because its ineffectiveness. Actually, neighboring countries in East Africa, like Kenya and Rwanda with multiparty politics, still use security systems similar to Nyumba Kumi security structures and are reported to have reduced significantly the occurrences of violent incidents in the grassroots communities (Kioko, 2017).

In comparison, Tanzania has more favorable conditions than Kenya and Rwanda to implement Nyumba Kumi security systems in the era of multipartyism. The fact that community members have different political ideologies has not created huge divisions among community members. Despite the challenge of tribalism forces which have divided greatly the community members in neighboring countries of Kenya and Rwanda, this has not been the case in Tanzania. It is also notable that there neighboring countries learnt good lessons from Tanzania and then customized the institutionalization of Nyumba Kumi security structures in their local government administration to serve as early warning mechanism to address the rise of extremist violence (Andhoga and Movole, 2017). In Kenya and Rwanda, the adoption of Nyumba Kumi community policing practices has intensified police patrols in the communities, improved police-citizen relations which helps in information exchange and intelligence gathering (Purdeková, 2016), and improved the cooperation of private security firms in keeping peace and security for the grassroots communities (Yegon, 2019; Munyao, 2017).

It is thought provoking to note that while the neighboring countries are referring to Tanzania as a good case study where Nyumba Kumi security system originated, the Tanzania government is still hesitant and reluctant to re-institutionalize the Nyumba Kumi security structure in its local government administrative structures. This decision

has amounted to the current failure to guarantee grassroots community peace and security in the country. Maguta et al argue that:

> The Nyumba Kumi was initiated by the Government of Kenya to address the rising insecurity in Kenya coupled with terrorist attacks by groups like the Al-Shabab. It was initiated in 2013 after the Westgate Mall attack. It aimed at neighbours teaming up and watching on any intruders and people raising suspicion. It is argued that it was borrowed from Tanzania but follows the Western European model of neighbourhood watch (2021, p.155).

Field evidence shows also that the Nyumba Kumi security system has been replaced by the community-based policing structures in Tanga region. In Tanga urban district, the grassroots security structure begins with the five members of the street government who are elected periodically together with the street chairperson during grassroots elections. In this grassroot security setting, community members are required to report potential security threats to the nearby local government authorities which channel the information to higher authorities for further actions. This security setting has not been effective like the way Nyumba Kumi operated in terms of size of the controlled population and the quickness of transforming security signals to higher authorities for action.

In Mkinga rural district, the community policing security structure begins with small hamlet chairperson who receives potential security threats from community members and reports to village chairperson who also reports to village executive officer (VEO) and thereafter to higher authorities for intervention. This security setting falls short of the way Nyumba Kumi operated to guarantee grassroots peace and security. Field evidences indicate that the reporting hierarchy is not always followed by the people when reporting security concerns. In some cases, the people reported directly to any security structure close to them. Despite the presence of ward police officers and the availability of police force contacts provided for this purpose, such arrangements, in reality, have failed to yield the expected results.

This is witnessed by the increasing trend of violent extremist incidents due to structural weaknesses of the present community security structures which have failed to operate as an effective grassroots early warning system. There are notable weaknesses in community engagement in security initiatives in urban and rural settings. For example, the street and hamlet chairpersons have no control of the population residing within the community households which exceed eighty (80) per hamlet and street. The huge number of households does not only cause difficulties for the people to report security threats to grassroots leaders, but also makes the functions of street and hamlet chairpersons irrelevant in responding to potential security threats facing the grassroots community.

The previous practice of Nyumba Kumi security structure before 1992 provided to the ten-house cell leader maximum control of the population residing in ten house cells. The Nyumba Kumi security setting increased trust, commitments and unity among members and the ten house cell leaders exercised successfully their security roles. It is true that the operation of Nyumba Kumi security setting cannot work currently exactly as it operated previously due to many changes in the society, but if institutionalized into local government structures, Nyumba Kumi security structure can effectively guarantee the security of the grassroots communities. The Nyumba Kumi security system operated as

the government's security eye and ear which saw and heard everything at one time in each place regardless of the size of the population (Maguta et al., 2021). Under the Nyumba Kumi proper security setting, all security related information was available and was reported immediately to the ten-house cell leaders who reported the matter to government security structures who responded proactively to prevent the occurrence of violent crimes.

Under Nyumba Kumi security setting, each Tanzanian citizen was not only perceived a security officer but in reality, worked as an intelligence officer because each citizen took security issues seriously with the notion that the security of one was the security of the entire community and the country. Under Nyumba Kumi, every visitor who passed in a certain locality, his or her information was gathered and reported to the ten-cell leader. In this way, it was very rare for someone to plan and commit a crime without being noticed. This is why the country experienced no violent extremist incidents from 1960s to 1980s. This is supported by several scholars reporting that the adoption of Nyumba Kumi security structure in 2013 in Kenya did not only reduce youth community violence but also played a crucial role in community peace-building.

The decision to abandon the proper operation of Nyumba Kumi security setting was followed by a sudden rise of violent extremist related attacks which happened in large numbers in the country, causing insecurity and fear to the community from 2000 to 2019. Global terrorism database reports that for the period from 2008 to 2017, a total of 43 terror attacks were conducted in Tanzania. The number may be higher because the Tanzania government has always reduced terrorism attacks to criminal activities (Dang, 2019). Notable violent extremist attacks which occurred in Tanzania include the 2012 acid attacks on Sheikh Fadhili Suleiman Soraga, the then secretary to the Mufti of Zanzibar; explosive attacks on Sheikh Abdulkareem Njonjo in Arusha in 2012; the December 2012 killing of Fr. Evarist Mushi and the shooting of Father Ambrose Mkenda in Zanzibar; the bombing of Olasiti Catholic parish in Arusha on May 5, 2013; the May 2013 bomb attack that killed three and injured sixty at St. Joseph's Roman Catholic Church near Arusha; the events of February 2013 where a Catholic Priest was assassinated and protestant church burned in Zanzibar; the murder of Reverend Mathayo Kachila, the Assemblies of God pastor due to a fight over the right to slaughter animals in Buseresere, Geita in 2013; explosive attack on Sheikh Sudi of Ansar Sunni Mosque in Kilombero in 2014; bombing of a night park pub in Minazini area in 2014; explosive attacks on a mosque in stone town in Zanzibar in 2014 which killed one person; attacks of two Christian churches and restaurants in Zanzibar in June 2014; brutal butchering of one auxiliary guard in Kilindi, Tanga in 2014 (Jingu, 2018).

Many of the extremist violent incidents occurred in Tanga. These include the setting on fire of a student hostel at Montessori Sisters' school under Roman Catholic Church in Lushoto, Tanga in 2015; the Amboni caves brutal killing of eight citizens in Kabatini Street in Tanga on 31st May 2016; the attack on Sebastian Kolowa Memorial University (SEKOMU) in September 2016 in Lushoto, Tanga where one private security guard was killed and two student hostels set on fire.

The occurrence of the above listed violent attacks in Tanzania is closely associated with the ineffectiveness and embedded weaknesses of the current community policing security

structures. There is no total involvement of every community member in security issues, which is a loophole for criminals and armed gang groups to plan and conduct violent attacks. It's undeniable that, the number of government security personnel in the government security forces is smaller compared to the needs. The government security personnel cannot be present in every location at all time, but the grassroot community members are in a better position to observe every happening in the community. The overriding strength of the Nyumba Kumi proper security setting was its smart inclusive strategy which involved each and every member of the grassroot community both in urban and rural settings.

The notable drawbacks of the current grassroots community security setting in the form of community policing are on the following accounts: first, structural weaknesses in reporting mechanism, as it requires the street leaders in urban setting and hamlet leaders in rural setting to oversee a huge population of more than eighty households, something which is not practical. Second, community members dislike to report potential security threats to grassroots community policing leaders, and to government ward police officers because corruption behavior has removed confidentiality. Third, the lack of trust between the government security forces and the grassroots community policing security structures. This seriously hampers effective exchange of intelligence information for security purposes. Dang (2019:16) reflecting the mistrust between the Tanzania Police Force (TPF) and other security actors, points out that:

> By establishing the polisi jamii as the eyes and ears of the TPF at the ward level, the TPF more frequently interacts with its informants than with ordinary members of the broader community. As a result, the TPF's community policing initiative has failed to pave the way for greater trust building between local communities and the police force.

Fourth, community members lack of concern in security issues, as the philosophy that one's security is security of all is no more believed. Fifth, lack of total involvement for community members in the current grassroots security structures. Presence of disunity and lack of cohesion for community members with different political party ideologies creates unnecessary divisions. This delegitimizes the position of the ten-house cell leader and making it useless in the current security context because the position is not backed up by local government administration structures.

Field evidence from Tanga region reports the existence of very few active and scattered community policing grassroots security groups in Tanga urban district which operate in just four wards of Tanga Sisi, Maweni, Nguvumali, and Chungulieni. Field evidence also reported the existence of ten dormant community policing security groups which operated in case there is an occurrence of violence in the community. It was also discovered that in Mkinga rural district, out of twenty wards, there were no any active community policing security groups which operated to guarantee grassroots community peace and security. Poor relationship between community policing security structures, private stakeholders and the government is another factor contributing the current failure to keep peace and security in the country.

Field evidence revealed that the grassroots-based security structures are more accessible and acceptable by the community members because of having close ties and links with

the people in the community than the government security forces and other private security stakeholders. Well planned community engagement security structures like Nyumba Kumi worked effectively in detecting and tracking down the occurrence of violent attacks in the community. Under Nyumba Kumi, all community members residing in ten house cells were totally engaged regardless of gender and religious orientation. In the current community policing security structures, only a few youths and men are involved thus excluding other community members. Although field evidence reports that some community policing security structures involved both women and men to participate in security process, this does not reflect the total community members involvement. For instance, in Mleni Street in Mkinga rural district there were four women and ten men who worked as local security guards, but in reality, the women participate less in security issues in Tanga region due to religious and gender considerations. In Kisosora street in Tanga urban city, it was agreed that all men would take part in night patrol, and women were required to pay Tshs.1000 to the street chairperson for buying security torches and batteries to facilitate night patrols.

Despite the accessibility and acceptability of the current community policing grassroots security setting, community members complained that, the government did not take seriously the role played by village and street chairpersons in grassroots community security structures as it paid them a very little allowance of Tshs. 20,000 per month. The low payment demoralizes the village and street chairpersons to participate effectively in security activities. This is evidenced by the failure to update the residence register books for all community members within each particular administrative area as required by the government.

The ministry responsible for local government introduced the residence register as one among the mechanisms to track the whereabouts and movements of grassroots population in the belief that it is easier to track violence perpetrators planning to commit crimes in the community. But the village and street chairpersons as responsible grassroots officers showed reluctance due to low incentive. Under the Nyumba Kumi security setting the ten house cells register was very active and effective because all community members were registered. Residence registers captured visitors' information as a household leader was required to report all visitors within his or her household. This helped to track and detect all ill-intentioned visitors planning to commit crimes in the community. The weakness revealed in the current community policing engagement security setting is that there is no such effective tracking of visitors and dwellers in the community which complicates tracing of criminals.

Lack of concern in security issues has gone further to the extent that community members residing in one place don't care of what the next-door neighbor is doing. Suprisingly, even though it happens that community members are suspecting or discovering that their next-door neighbor is involved in suspicious activities causing insecurity, community members are reluctant to report instantly such information to government security organs. Despite the fact that the police issued guidelines for house owners (landlords) in rural and urban setting to take necessary information and documentation on their tenants (which includes sizable passport size photo, identity card photocopy, among others) such directive is not implemented and therefore making things worse as it becomes very difficult. It was reported that, in Mtimbwani ward in Mkinga

district, the residence register books were lastly updated in the year 2014-2015, since that time to the time data for this study were collected, nothing had been done to update the residence registers.

This negligence has made easier for criminals and gang leaders to stay comfortably connected with the community members, who sometimes work as informants to facilitate the planning, committing of crimes and ensuring that the perpetrators escape from the scene without being noticed. The reason behind is the fear of revenge from criminals because of mistrust between the community and the police force which is blamed for exposing confidential information and failing to protect the witnesses. In most cases many of the community policing grassroots security structures have either collapsed or are inactive due to fear of revenge from criminals. These evidences suggest the existence of not only fragmented community policing grassroots security structures but also revealing the presence of poor relationship and coordination between community members, government security organs and private stakeholders when dealing with security issues.

The weaknesses in the current community policing grassroots security early warning practices have influenced the emergence of drivers of insecurity and their manifestations in the community. The poor living conditions have influenced the rise of violent extremism as some villagers in Kibatini Street cooperate with the alleged armed bandits and criminals who resided in the Amboni caves. Community members acted as suppliers of information and basic needs to sustain the lives of armed bandits who sheltered in the caves. It was reported that signs of potential security threats happened as incidences of robbery became normal. These included shops raids, seizing of motorcycles, and livestock's grabbing in the Kibatini street and other nearby communities. Despite such manifestations, the current community policing security structures at Kibatini failed to provide proper early warning signals to counter the criminals. This shows the highest extent of lack of concern in security issues among community members, the matter which would have not happened when Nyumba Kumi security structures worked properly.

Drug and human trafficking were other drivers of insecurity and violent extremism incidents especially in Mkinga rural district. Mkinga district borders Kenya by about 78 kilometres of a long and porous land border leaving aside other kilometers covered by the Indian ocean. This extensive and uncontrolled border contributes to the failure to ensure security across the border. This facilitates human trafficking which involve the Somalis and Ethiopians who normally pass from Kenya to Tanzania using Mkinga district as an entry point. There is a high possibility for these illegal immigrants to traffic illegal weapons from other countries to Tanzania or to use Tanzania as a transit country. In connection to this is drug trafficking business, especially khat or Mirungi in Swahili language which is widely transported from Kenya to Tanzania.

Religious differences between Muslim sects in Mkinga rural and Tanga urban districts are sources of insecurity and drivers of violent extremism. The misunderstanding between the Shia and Suni Muslim believers goes to the extent of not greeting each other despite the fact that they are all Muslims. In one scenario, one mosque was built by a certain Muslim sponsor in Duga village, but great confrontations concerning the

management of the Mosque occurred between the two Muslim sects (Shia and Suni), therefore becoming a threat and source of insecurity in the community.

Lack of confidentiality with police officers is another driver of insecurity. Despite good cooperation provided by community members to Tanzania police force, corruption takes away the expected ethical conduct. It was reported that, once criminals are arrested by the police officers, they get the information from the same police officers about who reported them to be arrested. When criminals are released, they seek revenge against those people who reported them. This tendency demoralizes and discourages maximum cooperation of community members with the police. In order to address this relationship puzzle, Dang, (2019: 19) stresses that:

> To strengthen the community-police relationship, the TPF will not only have to expand its community policing approach but also address broader complaints of police corruption, abuse of power, lack of professionalism, and poor service delivery. To mitigate some of the risks of an informant-based system, cooperation between the police and local communities should be as transparent as possible while also protecting the confidentiality of informants.

The failure to keep peace and security in Tanzania at the grassroots setting reveals the weaknesses in the alternative community policing security structures, which despite their presence, the number of violent attacks skyrocketed from 2000 to 2019. The quick rise of violent extremist-related attacks in the country is a clear manifestation of the lack of alternative of community policing after abandoning Nyumba Kumi system.

This study uses the Amboni cave violent extremist attacks to justify how far the current community policing security structures have failed to detect and track potential security threats in Tanzania. The Amboni caves brutal killing happened on 31st May 2016. A total of eight citizens were butchered in Kibatini Street located just 55km from Tanga city. Findings show that perpetrators who engineered the event started living in the Amboni caves since the year 2012 with false pretense of conducting mineral exploration in the area around the Amboni caves.

Initially, the strangers appeared as good people with positive intention to cooperate with the villagers to uncover the precious minerals in the area. The strangers promised the villagers that once minerals are discovered it would be the end of poverty for them. Slowly the strangers mingled with the locals in the area and because of the absence of Nyumba Kumi security mechanism in the area, neither leaders nor villagers bothered to report to government authorities about the presence of these strangers in the area. This reveals the failure of community policing security structure in providing early warning.

As time went on, everyone in the village new about these people, and the fact that they were living in the Amboni caves did not scare the villagers. Communication ties and links were more developed and strengthened where some community members become middle men supplying basic needs such as food, water, drinks and other needs required to sustain the lives of armed criminals. It was reported that one of the victims who by the time was member of the Mleni street government had a small shop in the area. This shop was reported to have expanded enough to supply many commodities in the street and to the strangers living in the Amboni caves. Field evidence associated this person and other few

villagers with the armed criminals who lived in the Amboni Caves. The community members after seeing that their grassroot leader was close to these strangers, they had confidence that the strangers had no bad intentions, and therefore nothing was reported to government security organs.

At the midst of the continued armed robbery events conducted in Mleni and Kibatini streets, the armed bandits organized two successful events in April, 2016 in Tanga urban city. The first event was an invasion at the famous bakery supermarket which involved the killing of four innocent citizens and robbing of a sum of ten million Tanzania shillings from the owners. The second armed robbery event targeted one petrol station in Tanga urban city. These two violent incidents sent an alarm to government security organs in Tanga and after a careful investigation the security organs detected that the armed bandits group lived in Amboni caves.

After the two robbery events in Tanga city, the community members at Kibatini and Mleni streets became conscious that the strangers living in the caves were not good people, the situation which stopped the supply chain of foods and other services for sustaining the life in the caves. It then followed that, the police patrol car in cooperation with Mleni and Kibatini streets security committee members launched unsuccessful ambush in the Amboni caves which failed to arrest the criminals. The failure of this mission was facilitated by the network of informants in the two streets who informed the armed criminals to hide. Then the armed criminals lacked basic needs to sustain their lives in the caves and started looking for ways to get food from the village. In the same week the people in Kibatini area noticed the presence of five children aged eight to twelve years, coming from the Amboni caves to the community to find food. This time the information was reported quickly to government security forces who responded quickly and successfully arrested four children and the fifth one who had a gun ran away successfully back into the caves.

This event was well noticed by networks of informants and close allies of the armed criminals. Therefore, everything was reported to the group of armed criminals telling them exactly who reported their where abouts to the government security organs. On the night of the third day after those children were arrested by the police force, a group of those armed criminals from Amboni caves visited the Kibatini street and marked the houses of the people whom they were sure had reported them to state security organs and planned to conduct revenge attacks. The villagers reported instantly via mobile phones to the police in Tanga city and to Pande Military base located few kilometers from Kibatini street. Unfortunately, (or deliberately) the police force arrived lately at 4:00 pm the next day and failed to arrest the criminals. Explaining the series of violent incidents conducted in Rufiji and Kibiti and about the danger of community members who turn to be informers of armed criminals reflecting the failure of community policing structures at the grassroots, Jingu (2018:9) reported that:

> Illuminatingly, according to the police, in one of the incidents where the police were in a mission to ambush one of the camps of a criminal enterprise, they met a group of about five women who claimed to have been looking for firewood. On reaching at the camp, they found it empty without the suspects; it was later realized that the women who met the police along the way were informers of the criminal enterprise.

Surprisingly, the state security organs never took extra attention in making continued patrol to guarantee the people's security in Kibatini street despite the fact that the villagers continually reported to security organs about the pending potential insecurity of being attacked by those armed criminals sheltering in the caves. Field evidence shows that, if the Pande military base could have responded immediately on foot using the shortcut way, they would have arrested the armed criminals and stop the next day brutal killings. This is what this paper considers as weakness of community policing security structures which reveals a high degree of mistrust, poor cooperation, and coordination between the community members and the government security forces not only in exchanging intelligence information but also in cooperating to counter the suspected armed criminals.

The lack of seriousness from the state security organs paved the way to the next day violent extremist brutal killing by beheading a total of eight citizens belonging to earmarked households in Kibatini street. Among the victims of the killing was the Kibatini street chairman. Following this event, all Kibatini street dwellers abandoned their residence and found safe settlement in the nearby places for their safety. In the operation to crack down the group of gangsters in the Amboni caves in a fierce fight, one soldier was killed and four police officers were badly injured (George and Paskal, 2016).

According to law enforcers in Tanga urban district, some of the suspected armed criminals who were arrested after the February 2016 robbery at the Central Bakery Supermarket in Tanga urban revealed the names and identities of their allies who had set up a camp at the Amboni Caves. The four suspects were killed on May 2016 in a gunfight with the police at the Amboni Caves. Those shot dead were two Tanzanians and one foreigner. After the successful operation which killed some of the criminals while others ran away through the porous Mkinga district border to Kenya, the police force in cooperation with the Tanzania People Defense Force soldiers managed to recover various items which were hidden in the Amboni Caves. The items included 195 mobile phone vouchers, seven swords, four machetes, a seesaw, 17 shotgun bullets, militia uniforms, caps resembling those worn by Tanzania Peoples Defense Forces and two motorcycles. They also recovered several cell phones suspected to have been stolen from the Tanga Central Bakery Supermarket.

Then from that time the Amboni caves were declared a special security area which was followed by the establishment of the permanent military base to provide security in the area. Despite the measures taken to address the situation, the community members still have doubts of their security because of the lack of viable and effective grassroots security structures to offer the needed early warning for tracking and detecting potential security threats. After the violent attack in Kibatini and Mleni streets, the participation of community security patrols by the people and local guards stopped to operate unlike the period before Kibatini Killings. The overriding reason was the fear of revenge that was generated from the terror killing of the people in Kibatini street. The people are still feeling insecure despite the establishment of a permanent military base near Amboni Caves. The community was not sure if the Amboni Caves armed gangsters were successfully cleared or still there is a remaining network in the community. This explains why there is decreasing trend of active community led grassroots security action. Dang (2019:1) in a special report on violent extremism and community policing in Tanzania

reports that:

> A lack of shared understanding between the community and police as to what constitutes violent extremism, along with a lack of trust in working together on a response, means that police efforts to prevent or counter violent extremism could aggravate rather than mitigate the problem.

This is a clear manifestation of the total failure of the alternative community policing grassroots security structures to guarantee peace and security. This failure is proved by the continued occurrence of other violent extremism terror attacks in Tanzania. These incidents include the systematic killing of village government leaders and ruling political party leaders in Rufiji and Kibiti districts in 2017; killing of two police officers in the invasion of the Ikwiriri police station in 2017; killing of Kibiti Criminal Investigation Officer (CIO) plus two officials from the ministry of resources at the tax collection center in Majawa ward on February 21,2017; robbery of CRDB and Access Banks in Mbagala and National Microfinance Bank (NMB) in Mkuranga district which lead to the death of one police officer in 2017; killing of eight police officers in an ambush attack in Mkengeni village in Kibiti district on April 13, 2017 (Jingu,2018).

6. Conclusion and policy implications

The drawbacks on the new security systems replacing the Nyumba Kumi system in Tanzania outweigh the observed merits and successes. This evidence is seen in their inability to provide security early warning in urban and rural settings in Tanga and Mkinga districts. This paper suggests that the government should take deliberate action to re-institutionalize Nyumba Kumi proper security system into local government administration structures to allow its operation in the grassroots communities as it operated before 1992. The government should strengthen the current operating alternative community policing security initiatives by reducing the number of households managed by the cell leaders. The adoption of alternative community policing grassroots structures has failed to guarantee grassroots community peace and security, the matter which contributed to mushrooming of many violent extremist incidents from 2000 to 2019 in Tanzania.

The Tanzania government should, in addition, device better ways on how Nyumba Kumi security structure can successfully be implemented in the current era of multiparty politics without comprising its effectiveness in tracking and detecting security threats facing the grassroots communities. Nyumba Kumi security structure still remains the best, reliable and viable grassroots community security structure to address the rise of extremist violence in Tanzania if customized to fit in different security contexts across the country. Before re-institutionalization of Nyumba Kumi security structures, there should be a national campaign to provide awareness to the grassroots communities on the importance of keeping peace and security through Nyumba Kumi grassroots security structures.

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