

The Role of Foreign Aid in the Dissemination of Civic and Voter Education during 1995 – 2020 General Elections in Tanzania

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Abstract

This article examines the extent to which foreign aid played a role in shaping the electoral practices related to the dissemination of civic and voter education in the past six multiparty general elections conducted in Tanzania from 1995 to 2020. The study employed a qualitative research approach and used primary data through key informant interviews. Secondary data were obtained from a documentary review. The findings reveal that in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 foreign donors had a significant influence on determining the content of civic and voter education materials used to conduct the exercise. In the 2015 elections, donors' funds were reduced significantly and in the 2020 election, the budget was fully government-funded. The study recommends that the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) should establish elections consolidated funds that will be funded by the government yearly to ensure the availability of sufficient funds to conduct the exercise and ultimately limit the intervention of foreign donors in the dissemination of civic and voter education.

Keywords: *CSOs, electoral processes, EMBs, foreign aid, voter education*

1.0. Introduction

The 1980s and 1990s were a period of economic and political reform (Bird, 1996; Dijkstra, 2002). During this period, donors started to tie their aid policies with political conditions related to elections, good governance, and human rights (Stokke, 1995; Crawford, 1997). These conditions became the most important aid policy instrument used by donors to push for political reforms and were described as the most salient characteristic feature of foreign aid (Carlsson et

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al, 1997; Selbervik, 1999; Mukandala, 1999). The relationship between foreign aid and dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania elections seems not to be an issue adequately covered in many debates and studies.

The first elections in 1962 were held under a multiparty system and when the country adopted a single – party system, elections were held after every five years, (i.e. 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990). Zanzibar, as well, has had a long history of multiparty elections which are recorded before the year 1992. These include the 1957 July multiparty elections, 17 January 1961 elections, 1st June 1961 elections, and 1963 elections (Ndumbaro, 1997; Mmuya, 1998).

All these elections were funded from within and there was either little or no civic and voter education provision. Most of the materials for these elections, and the campaigns for the entire electoral process, were funded by the state. The single party phenomenon ensured that the party has its structures firmly rooted in the grassroots ten – cell leader’s system to the national level (Ndumbaro and Yahya – Othman, 2007). Although multiparty elections were conducted before 1992 in Tanzania, the then political playfield was skewed and unable to guarantee the freeness and fairness for disseminating civic and voter education. From 1965 to 1985 the single – party government excluded civil society from participating in political activities (Cliffe, 1967; Malya, 2006).

Donors started disbursing foreign aid to elections in the country immediately after the restoration of the multiparty political system in 1992. This development was due to government’s inadequate resources to finance the whole electoral process. It was also because the government's quest to acquire international legitimacy of the electoral process and certification of elections results. Another reason was that there was a multiplicity of electoral process actors such as NGOs and opposition parties which depend on foreign support to disseminate civic and voter’s education. Since 1992, Tanzania has conducted six general elections, which are as follows 1995, 2000,

2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020. Carothers (1999) argues that foreign aid has never been non – political, neutral, or simply a technical exercise of providing resources to improve development.

In this sense, many aspects of foreign aid hold political implications that require consideration, including how it is disbursed, the areas prioritized, who gets funded, how the funds are utilized by the recipients, and the outcome of such interventions (Nyagetera, 1995; Bagachwa et al, 1997; Wangwe, 1997). Since the 1990s, there has been a significant donors' presence in the electoral politics in Tanzania. Foreign funds have been part and parcel of financing various aspects and stages of the electoral process. While many studies on the role and influence of foreign aid on the development and politics of the Third World countries like Tanzania are available, little knowledge exists concerning the role and influence of foreign aid in the dissemination of civic and voter education. This study is an attempt to bridge the gap in knowledge concerning the relations which exist between foreign aid and the dissemination of civic and voter education in the country.

2.0. Literature Review:

2.1. Foreign Aid for Civic and Voter Education

The provision of civic and voter education is an important aspect that attracts donors' involvement in electoral processes. The main goal of such programs is to expand democratic participation, particularly among marginalized and underrepresented segments of society. Activities include raising awareness of the rights and responsibilities of citizens, such as voting rights, and practical information about where, when, and how to vote. Civic and voter education is often conducted by different types of civil society organizations (international, national, and local level organizations). These organizations require long – term support that spans the entire electoral cycle and, supporting them is expected to produce informed voters and high voter turnout (Reeves, 2006; DFID, 2011).

Donors' involvement in civic and voter's education provision and specifically non – violence training programs can reduce violence happening during the electoral process. This is done by encouraging voters to vote outside of ethnic and religious lines, avoiding vote buying, and supporting non – violent tactics. In this way, civic and voter education can reduce violence by reinforcing voters' understanding of the electoral process through encouraging electoral choices based on candidates' programs, and by fighting against the 'strong man syndrome' and vote – catching. Voter education can help to prevent these types of electoral violence which result from a misunderstanding of the electoral process (Laserud, 2007; Haider, 2008; IFES, 2012).

Electoral assistance in this category is often quite material and technical. For example, international organizations may repair or construct voter lists and teach local authorities how such lists should be assembled and maintained. This can influence who votes in a given country. International actors may also provide ballot boxes, help print and distribute materials, provide computer and communication equipment, and so forth. For instance, The European Commission supervised electoral reform in the Palestinian Authority, but it also financed millions of euros' worth of technical equipment and assistance (EC, 2006). The influence of such logistical assistance is clear and observable. However, in addition to the direct and immediate observable outcomes, logistical assistance may also influence how elections are run in the future (Lopez-Pintor, 1998). Thus, even plain donors' logistical support in civic and voter education provision can influence elections in several ways.

In addition to logistical support, international actors reduce inexperience by training administrative officials and poll workers and educating voters. They may even help to organize debates. Such direct engagement may socialize domestic actors into international electoral norms. Staff training and voter education may teach poll workers, election officials, and voters how to protect the secrecy of the vote. In new multiparty states, such socialization may occur more

readily because beginners tend to be more prone to outside influences (Manning and Malbrough, 2010; Elklit, 2011; Heinrich and Loftis, 2019).

3.0. Methods

The study employed a qualitative approach. The collected data were subjected to content analysis. This approach allows an in – depth understanding of a social phenomenon from 1995 to 2020 (Babbie, 1992). The study used two main methods of data collection, namely key informant interviews (KIIs) and semi – structured interviews to collect information through questions and discussions with different informants.

Interviews were conducted in person mainly in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma. A total of 25 key informants from local and foreign institutions were interviewed between January and June 2020. The study collected 13 responses from men and 12 from women. Key informants were purposefully chosen because they were well positioned to produce first – hand information concerning the role of foreign aid in the dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania. The documentary review involved a review and assessment of various documentary sources containing information related to this study. This included newspapers, peer-reviewed articles, working papers, scholarly books, election Acts, theses, and multi – party elections reports for donors, governments, and other various stakeholders in Tanzania.

4.0. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework informing this study is based on the determinants which influence recipients' compliance with donors' conditionality. There is much literature on compliance and conditionality which explains various reasons that influence recipients' compliance with donors' conditionality. Several scholars share ideas on factors such as the lack of financial capacity on the part of recipient actors wishing to participate in the electoral processes and the weak strategic position of recipient actors to

negotiate with donors in which case the recipients fail to demand better terms of agreements related to foreign aid to be disbursed to recipient actors (Riddell, 2007; Kilby, 2009; Stone, 2011; Hernandez, 2016; Li, 2016; Girod and Tobin, 2016). This section only highlights a few relevant concepts and conclusions to guide the analysis of the role of foreign aid in the dissemination of civic and voter education in the Tanzanian electoral process conducted in the first six multiparty elections from 1995 to 2020.

Freaks (2006:15) provides a useful definition of the concept of conditionality: “Conditionality is the promise of increase of aid in the case of compliance by a recipient with conditions set by a donor, or its withdrawal or reduction in the case of non – compliance”. Likewise, Stokke (1005:12) defines conditionality as ‘the use of pressure, by the donor government, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient.

Policy conditionality, as insisted by Kaul *et al* (2003), has been one of the means to try to ensure that objectives are met. Donors may impose explicit conditions and requirements about how they believe that aid should be used and then withhold or withdraw aid if these conditions are not met (Rachel et al, 2021). These ideas and concepts fit in explaining the real nature of Tanzania's electoral actors who participate in the dissemination of civic and voters’ education. It is only the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) that have the budget though not enough to conduct the exercise and therefore depend on foreign support. Actors such as political parties, NGOs, and CSOs depend entirely on foreign support from donors to do the exercise (Dietrich and Wright, 2013). Therefore, the weak strategic position and lack of income sources for domestic actors significantly affect their role in the process, for them to get foreign support they should comply with donors’ conditions.

Several scholars such as Dietrich and Wright (2015; Carothers (2015; Zamfir and Debreva (2019) emphasize that democracy aid has

political conditionality which aims to influence the democratization process in the recipient countries. For the case of Tanzania, this seems to support pro – democracy institutions which actively engage in the dissemination of civic and voter education to the electorate. These include civil society organizations, electoral institutions, political parties, media organizations, and human rights commissions.

5.0. The significance of civic and voter education in Tanzania

The relationship between democratization in Africa and training for everyone from the grassroots level to the highest political ranks and the success of the new multiparty political systems will, to a large extent, depend upon the effective dissemination of civic education and human capacity building. For the western type of democracy to be stable and sustainable in Africa, there is a need for a minimal level of education and political awareness to spread throughout the social spectrum and the majority of the population. This is necessary so that the voting process is understood and electorate participation is high (Maliyamkono, 1994; Hodd, 1994). This wide understanding is what is popularly called “civic education”.

According to Shaba (1993), civic education is the process of empowering the civil society with information that gradually transforms the people into an active and vibrant society. It is the information that will enable them to demand the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development, and people’s full participation. She further argues that people will increasingly monitor what goes on in government; they will query government systems, procedures, regulations, and officials who serve them. People should know who does what so that they can demand a replacement be it a member of parliament, minister, president, ward councillor, village chairman, director, or any other official who does not fulfil his or her obligations.

Voter education is just one aspect of civic education that deals with the process of passing knowledge of the electoral process to the electorate. The information disseminated to the citizen includes the

location of the polling station, organization of the polling station, voting procedures, behaviour, secrecy of the vote, and mechanisms to discourage election fraud. Various strategies are employed such as training manuals, theatre group performances, seminars, workshops, and political parties' roles. Schools and tertiary institutions are also important actors in civic and voter education dissemination (Rugalabamu, 1996).

From the same perspective, Wanyande (1997) also narrows civic education to the dissemination of information and knowledge about the importance of casting a vote, especially in councillor, parliamentary and presidential elections. This information is about why people should vote, how to vote, what action to take when one is dissatisfied with the electoral process in general and voting in particular. He further cites the government itself, the media, and political campaigns by politicians, NGOs, trade unions, and the electoral commissions as agents of civic education.

Given the preceding discussion, one may argue that voter education should aim at empowering citizens in general and potential voters in particular, to effectively participate in the electoral process and to make informed and rational choices when choosing leaders and political parties. In Tanzania's context civic and voter education is important as it is the way of introducing and encouraging a new political culture that recognizes the value of participatory politics. It is also important for enabling voters to make informed and rational choices when electing their constituency representatives, presidential candidates, or a political party. The information and knowledge generated through voter education provides voters with information upon which to decide how to vote, and who to vote for, including the party to vote to power and why to vote in that particular manner.

Civic and voter education is also important because, through it, citizens are made to understand and appreciate the value of democracy and the power of the vote. The voting exercise enables the people to control the government and the leaders in power by making

these leaders accountable to the electorate. Through voter education, citizens understand the importance of the voting card, and casting the ballot represents real power that the voter must use to elect government and leaders that are going to be responsive and accountable to the citizens.

Dissemination of civic and voter education is an attempt to sustain the democratic gains that have been made so far in Tanzania since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1992. Voter registration is an important exercise that should be carried out continuously by the electoral management bodies as many changes happen in between election cycles such as the passing away of registered voters, new unregistered voters, registration of new political parties, and nullification of existing political parties among other factors. According to Thesing and Hofmeister (1995), the general aim of political education is to create the conditions for the understanding of and active participation in democracy. One task is to encourage interest in politics. What politics is and how it works in a democratic system are questions to be dealt with, as this is the fundamental goal of preserving and reinforcing democracy through political education.

Simply put, civic and voter education is significant and it needs the deliberate cooperation of all stakeholders responsible for making the exercise a success for the electorate in Tanzania. If civic and voter education is not provided effectively and the general public is not informed, the obvious effects are harmful to successful elections as low voter turnout may appear for the electorate who may not see the importance of voting believing that the voting exercise or participating in the electoral process may not bring any changes.

6.0 Actors for Civic and Voter Education Dissemination

There are many actors involved in the dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania. The introduction of multiparty politics in 1992 widened the spectrum to enhance participatory democracy and civic competence for the public to make informed decisions in the electoral process. The observation of the past six multiparty elections

in Tanzania from 1995 to 2020 revealed several actors or agents who have been involved in the dissemination of civic and voter education. These actors include EMBs, political parties, NGOs, CSOs, media, politicians, and tertiary education institutions. In an actual sense, every responsible citizen as a member of the community is by design a source of information and opinions regarding political issues which directly and indirectly influence others to make important decisions that will affect the community and country's development in general (Jennings, 1999).

The government system whether central or local governance structures are agents for civic and voter education because the public has much trust in the information provided by the government and that information disseminated by the government is reliable and confirmed. On the other side, the government's success to implement many development projects in the public depends on the politically aware and informed citizenry. The government in Tanzania has been allocating resources dedicated to enhancing the provision of political education to create public and civic awareness of issues related to voter education and the right of the people to participate in elections.

The most important agents for the provision of civic and voter education in Tanzania are the EMBs in particular the National Electoral Committee (NEC) for Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar Electoral Committee (ZEC) for Zanzibar Islands which has constitutional rights to manage and administer elections. The EMBs are very crucial in the exercise because they issue regulations, rules, policies, and laws governing the conduct of elections in Tanzania. The EMBs can do the exercise through the use of mass media, seminars, workshops, and public meetings to explain election rules and regulations to the public and potential voters (USAID, 2002).

The mass media is an important agent for civic and voter education in the country. The media has many advantages as it can disseminate information to a larger audience than any other means or channel of communication. The use of radio, television, newspapers, brochures,

posters, and online channels like whatsapp, websites, blogs, etc., are very effective methods for the dissemination of information and knowledge about electoral activities and voter education in particular. However, those involved in the mass media should not be manipulated to provide wrong information to the public (Simom, 1998; MCT, 2015).

Politicians through political party campaigns are very influential agents for civic and voter education. It is the politicians who are very close to the community and the people who voted them to power. Civic and voter education is also provided by politicians to the public through seminars, public meetings, and political campaigns. Politicians normally have trust in the public and have the responsibility to pass information from their political parties, and the government machinery on certain issues related to voter education before and during the electoral process (Thesing and Hofmeister, 1995).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) represent the civil society community in the democratic process. There are many NGOs that are involved in the dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania after getting permission from the national electoral commission. NGOs have the advantage of being closer to the people at the grassroots than other agents of voter education; this gives them much trust in the public because they are community – based and hence have wide acceptance by the community. NGOs mostly use several methods like seminars, workshops, and the media to communicate with the public about political education though sometimes they are keenly regulated by the government in the fear to implement donors' interests and manipulate the electoral process activities (Mpangala, 2007).

The most important thing worth emphasizing here is that all the agents which have been involved in the dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania cannot generate their resources to conduct the exercise. The national Electoral Management Bodies

(EMBs) get funds from the government and other agents get their resources from external donors to perform the work. The EMBs also significantly depend on donors to efficiently provide civic and voter education because normally the amount disbursed from the government is not enough to cater for all the requirements of elections management and administration.

7.0 Findings and Discussion

The dissemination of civic and voter education to the electorate is the legal mandate of the EMBs in Tanzania as per the national elections law (1985), and the 1977 constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. EMBs conduct the activity, regulate, supervise, and coordinate other actors participating in the exercise. The lack of funds from the government makes the EMBs in the country unable to exercise their constitutional powers in this particular role.

The debilitating nature of EMBs in this area allowed other donor – funded actors like NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education to the electorate. The dependency of both the EMBs and NGOs makes donors’ involvement in this area indispensable. This section analyses the systematic role and influence of donors’ support in the dissemination of civic and voter education in the Tanzania electoral processes from 1995 to 2020.

In the first 1995 multiparty general elections, the EMBs requested a total of Tshs. 44 billion from the government. The government approved Tshs. 37 billion and provided only Tshs. 21 billion which equals 78% and donors contributed Tshs. 8.5 billion which equals 22% of the total election costs. A group of six (6) foreign donors financed twenty – two (22) local NGOs not only to disseminate civic and voter education but also to carry out mobilization campaigns at various levels in the electoral process.

Omari (1995) noted that some of the programs carried out by local NGOs were multimillion dollar programs in nature, while others were

medium – size grants dished out to local NGOs to conduct workshops and seminars on democratization and the electoral process in particular. In any case, the donors', whether local or foreign, aim to influence the voters' behaviour through the dissemination of civic and voter education. Seminars, workshops, conferences, study groups, and research and mobilization systems were established and they carried out their activities before and during the election campaigns. Although in principle, the donor – funded NGOs were supposed to remain neutral in the process, the experience proves the contrary. Evidence suggests that some NGOs dedicated to civic and voter's education provisions in the 1995 elections were campaigning openly for one particular party. Other NGOs representatives in the field turned out to be political activists and campaigners for certain political parties, most of them favouring the opposition parties.

For instance, it was reported that with the same motive representatives of the Women's Council of Tanzania (BAWATA), Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), Zanzibar Electoral Monitoring Committee (ZEMOG), and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (ELCT) - Democracy division campaigned for the NCCR – Mageuzi party in Dar es Salaam, Singida, and in various parts of Tanzania. They were convinced by the foreign donors' attitude that regime change was necessary and the opposition party led by Mr. Augustine Mrema (NCCR-MAGEUZI) was the answer to their quest for change (NEC, 1997).

Association for Regional Integration of Eastern and Southern Africa (ARIESA) campaigned for an opposition party CHADEMA in Dar es Salaam, notably in the Kawe constituency, and ARIESA was headed by Mr. Eric Mchatta who contested the Kawe constituency parliamentary seat through CHADEMA. Similarly, PORIS campaigned for NCCR-MAGEUZI in Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Iringa, Mbeya, and Ruvuma Regions. It was also true that PORIS was headed by Mr. Prince Bagenda who contested the Muleba South

constituency parliamentary seat through NCCR-MAGEUZI (NEC, 1997).

The evidence presented above indicates that some of the NGOs representatives were activists, and were against the ruling party CCM in general because of its alleged corrupt past and inefficiency in governance. Their inclination to favour the opposition parties was not a surprise to any student of Tanzania's political development. The donors who funded the NGOs wanted the elections to bring changes in the government as their motive for supporting the overall project of democratization in Tanzania. Chaligha and Limbu (1996) claimed that in the 1995 elections, foreign donors supported the opposition parties in various ways to gain strength which would enable them to win the October 1995 general elections. Since this was the first Tanzania experiment to conduct multiparty elections supported by foreign donors', the donors were optimistic that the regime change was necessary for the country, even though it never happened.

In the same vein, Shivji (2007:19) supporting the above observation, suggests that NGOs' donor dependency has resulted in a situation where it is the donors who determine the survival of NGOs mentioned above. He writes: "An overwhelming number of NGOs are donor – funded. They do not have any independent sources of funding and have to seek donor funds through the usual procedures set by the funding agencies. While some NGOs may be quite involved and appreciated by the people whom they purport to serve, ultimately NGOs, by their very nature, derive not only their sustenance but also legitimacy from the donor community".

In the 2000 elections, the EMBs requested a sum of Tshs. 76.7 billion but the government approved Tshs. 39.8 billion and provided to EMBs only Tshs. 34.1 billion equal to 86% and donors contributed 5.7 billion equalling 14% of the entire elections' costs. The Donor Basket Group funded sixteen local NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education in these elections. This time around, the donors' refused to finance voters' education using public – owned media such

as Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam. Donors also did not finance voter education programs through television for two reasons: first, donors said that it was too expensive and only a few Tanzanians had access to television. Second, donors expected those media houses to conduct the programmes for free. The refusal of donors to finance the activity via public Radio and Television compelled the EMBs to use the government's inadequate funds to finance those programs. Later on, with the assistance of the Donor Basket Fund and the EU, EMBs were able to conduct civic and voters' education by using khanga carrying elections message, leaflets, posters, slogan dye, and the distribution of leaflets through the post office (direct mail marketing).

As explained above, while donors refused to support the EMBs, they financed voter mobilization activities through radio spots in privately – owned radio stations and newspapers from 10th July 2000. This situation indicates how donors had no trust in the commitment of the EMBs. However, later on, with assistance from USAID, the EMBs were able to conduct seminars with News Media, the Police Force, the Federation of Associations for the Disabled, and Political parties to educate them on election issues (NEC, 2001).

The above facts reveal a trend that even though EMBs needed much support from donors to conduct civic and voter education, donors' support for EMBs decreased while at the same time it increased for NGOs. This happened because donors' conditions to EMBs were too difficult to be implemented; thereafter donors directed their support to NGOs where they easily implemented their interests. It was posited by donors that NGOs have a further reaching impact on the provision of civic and voter education than EMBs. This is because NGOs are widespread in every part of Tanzania and are closer to the voters than the EMBs which are active only during the starting of the electoral process. Another reason is that EMBs are limited in terms of resources and human resources which are not present at the grassroots.

The above mentioned reasons were not the only obstacles that determined the relations of donors, EMBs, and NGOs for the 1995 and 2000 elections. Another critical factor that favoured donors' assistance to NGOs over to EMBs was the 2005 Amendments of the Law Section 4(C) added to the Election Act. No.1 of 1985. The amendments empowered the EMBs to prepare one guideline for all and to review guidelines used by NGOs to conduct civic and voter education. This meant that before 2005 donors determined the contents of civic and voters' education to recipient NGOs. This development was not well welcomed by donors who deliberately refused to finance voters' education conducted by the EMBs.

In the 2005 elections, the EMBs requested a total sum of Tshs. 88 billion from the government, whereas Tshs. 48.4 billion was for the general management and administration of elections including dissemination of civic and voter education, and Tshs. 39.6 billion was intended for the establishment of the Permanent National Voter Register (PNVR). The EMBs received from the government Tshs. 58.7 billion equal to 95%, and Tshs. 3.53 billion equal to 5% from donors. Then it followed that only a few NGOs, supported by donor basket funds conducted civic and voter education in the 2005 elections which did not cover the whole country. This happened because the donors did not like to fund activities not under their control. The civic and voter's education materials at this time included brochures, posters, leaflets, booklets, radio programs, cultural performances, songs, theatre performances, television programs, and other materials containing information related to voter's education (The Guardian, 05/09/2005; NEC, 2005; EISA, 2005).

In the 2010 elections, the EMBs requested from the government a total sum of Tshs. 151.8 billion but received from the government Tshs. 135.6 billion equal to 89% and from donors the EMBs received 18.9 billion equal to 11% of the total election costs used. Donors through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) - Election Support Project (ESP) funded both the EMBs and sixty five (65) local

NGOs, which facilitated the dissemination of civic and voter education throughout the country.

Surprisingly, this time, the UNDP prepared its own civic and voters' education materials which were to be used by recipient NGOs who disseminated civic and voters' education in the 2010 elections. This time around enough funds were allocated to several local NGOs for the same activity because the donors controlled the contents of civic and voters' education materials. The UNDP issued guidelines on how interested organizations should apply for funding to disseminate civic and voter education in the elections.

This time, the funding of civic and voter education through the UNDP was a very competitive process whose management was contracted to a consulting firm called Deloitte and Touche. This was done in order not only to avoid conflict of interest in the selection process but also to reduce the burden on donors for managing the 2010 Election Support Project coordinated by UNDP. However, the consulting firm extremely delayed the process to the extent that some NGOs either rescheduled or cancelled their programs for fear of ending with no impact. This contributed to the failure of reaching the target groups in rural areas.

Likewise, the UNDP through other implementing agencies such as the UNIFEM, and through women NGOs, trained over 350 women candidates in seven regions including Zanzibar on their role in the elections regardless of their political affiliation. Part of the training including election laws enhanced the knowledge of women on issues related to elections and civic and voter education. Also, with the support of UNDP, 125 community radio broadcasters were trained and 1,500 radio sets were distributed to various listening groups including the pastoralists. TAMWA and HAKI ELIMU utilized the media to sensitize the public about the 2010 elections. TAMWA designed media spots on TV that showed the qualities of a good leader and portrayed those women were also competent leaders (TEMCO, 2010; ESP, 2010; NEC, 2011).

The EMBs believe that donor – funded NGOs end up misusing the funds by doing their activities far from the electoral process activities. The Pastoralists Indigenous Non – Governmental Organization Forum (PINGOs) was stopped to function in Arusha by the Arusha Regional Commissioner for the allegation that it turned out to be an activist group, which was campaigning for a certain opposition political party in Arusha. Thus, such evidence tells how the government EMBs are afraid of donors’ involvement in this area and suggests that when donors happen to empower NGOs with more funds than the EMBs, it means that the voters are likely to make an informed choice and change the regime in power.

It is thus clear that the conflicting interests between the donors and government become inevitable. The EMBs noted that many of the activities of the 43 NGOs funded by donors to disseminate civic and voter education on the mainland did not take place according to their informants and that some persons at the district level were not aware of the NGOs implementing the activities. This blame was caused by both (donors and EMBs). First, the difficulties were caused by Deloitte and Touche consulting firm in disbursing the donor funds, in some cases, poor reporting on behalf of the NGOs, some activities were either postponed or some NGOs found themselves having to fund the activities to be later reimbursed. Secondly, on the other side, some NGOs claimed that the EMBs substantially delayed the approval of voter education materials which, in some cases, severely hampered the NGOs ability to carry out enough activities ahead of time for the general elections.

The government is still somewhat cautious of NGOs and suspects that they are a cover for opposition parties, donors’ and other political interests as well as competitors for donors’ funding. Interestingly, since the funds were sent directly from donors to local NGOs for civic and voter education provisions, it is not possible to state the exact amount of money received and spent on such programs and activities in all elections from 1995 to 2020. This situation raises much uncertainty about the credibility and trust of stakeholders

(Donors and NGOs) regarding their motives to participate in the electoral processes.

The NGOs are frequently accused by the government and EMBs of being briefcase organizations created with the sole intent of raising funds from foreign donors. It should be noted that the adoption of the NGO policy in 2001, followed by the 2002 Act, was partly due to pressure from donors' because donors' fund is now directed toward democratization (Iheme, 2005; Mogella in Kiondo and Nyang'oro, 2006). Likewise, the NGOs legal framework in Tanzania, like the NGO Act 2002 and the Societies Act Cap. 337 R.E. 2002, prohibit civil societies and non-government organizations from participating in political activities.

According to Shivji (2006:24), the term 'political activities' is unclear as applied in the above legal framework. The question will be where does politics start or end? Or is anything non – governmental or non – political? Shivji again answers this question by arguing that when NGOs accept being non – political they contribute to the process of mystification and, therefore, objectively side with the status quo contrary to their express stand for change. Since civic and voter education provision is a power game, it is no wonder that these organizations are strategically incapacitated by the government to participate in providing civic and voter education. It is also interesting to note that the EMBs were also sceptical of the documents of the Tanzania Episcopal Conference and Shura ya Maimamu Tanzania that aimed at providing civic education in the country before the October 2010 elections.

Baregu (2001) points out that empowering citizens through civic and voter education remains a contested terrain in Tanzania. Those in power, normally look at the exercise as something harmful to their existence while those outside the ruling powers, take the exercise as necessary for them to get support from the informed citizens. Pye (1997:246) notes that "since the play of politics almost invariably favours some people and hurts others, it, therefore, easily stimulates

suspicion and distrust”. Seen from this perspective, the issue of power is central to the state of Tanzania through the EMBs' reluctance or willingness to provide civic and voter education, as the activity is ultimately a question of power itself (Riutta, 2007).

Therefore, the donors' intervention in this area has been very instrumental, especially in empowering the NGOs with much funding so that they may disseminate effective civic and voter education to the electorate, rather than channelling their support through EMBs, which will do the same activity in a biased way to favour the ruling party. In his critical article entitled 'Civic Competence and Participatory Democracy' Mhina (2009:100) raises an important question concerning the power and provision of civic and voter education in Tanzania. In a power relationship between 'A' and 'B', when 'A' has power and 'B' does not, the question is whether we can expect that someone or an institution would empower an individual or group that would reduce its power. The logic of this analogy is quite telling when the donors decide to fund civic and voters' education, it is not uncommon to find that the same will determine its content, structure, timing, place, and actors.

This explains why the donors have been reluctant to cooperate with EMBs in the selection of NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education. The obvious reason is that the ruling party benefits enormously from state instruments and resources to remain in power. In this situation, the ruling party via EMBs does whatever it can to monopolize power through, among other things, defining 'what is voter's education, what is not, and who should provide voter's education to the electorate. The above state of affairs reveals that the influence of donors in this area was quite significant and was seen especially in the contents of voter's education and the selection of actors to provide civic and voter's education. The recipients' NGOs were obliged to use the voter's education materials supplied by donors to disseminate civic and voter education.

Reflecting on this matter, in his critical article entitled '*Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What we are, what we are not, and what we ought to be*' Shivji (2004: 689), argues that "Whoever pays the piper calls the tune" still holds, however much we may want to think otherwise. In many direct and subtle ways, those who fund us determine or place limits on our agendas or reorient them. Very few of us can really resist the pressures that external funding imposes on us". Therefore, the EMBs' refusal to use donors' guidelines led to the donors' withdrawing their support for EMBs. The donors deliberately opted to provide many funds to NGOs where their interests could be implemented easily.

In some instances, donors' support to NGOs did not help to effectively inform the potential voters because the recipients' NGOs operated under the influence of partisanship, which is beyond the donors' reach. As such, when this happened, the NGOs operated like activist groups campaigning for certain political parties; thus, became harshly treated by the government EMBs and seriously hampered the efficiency of the civic and voter education program in the electoral processes. Likewise, another factor noted beyond partisanship influence, was NGOs self – motives as revealed in the Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA) case of the 2010 elections. This situation contributed to the limited provision of civic and voter education to the electorate.

The situation in the 2015 elections was slightly different compared to what happened in the previous elections as discussed above. This time around the government changed its approach because of the bitter experience of depending largely on donor funds to finance the dissemination of civic and voter education. Donor dependency syndrome largely contributed to the mismanagement of the exercise and disruptions of electoral activity schedules to provide civic and voter education. Donor funds were either deliberately delayed or provided in less amounts than the amount pledged by bilateral and multilateral donors.

In the 2015 elections, the government responded timely unlike in the previous elections. The EMBs requested a total amount of Tshs. 273,648,993,370/= and received a total sum of Tshs. 273,634,130,372/=, which is equivalent to 99.99% of all the funds requested by the EMBs for the management and administration of elections. Surprisingly, donors contributed to the EMBs a total of Tshs. 1,523,886,833/= equivalent to 0.01% of the total elections' costs, and the same donors provided Tshs 62.26 billion to 211 NGOs for civic and voter education dissemination. The reason why donors' generosity decreased to the EMBs and increased to NGOs is puzzle (THRDC, 2015; NEC, 2016).

In these specific elections, the EMBs managed, to a large extent, to disseminate civic and voter education effectively despite the raised complaints that some areas like the Maasai lands, Rukwa, Iringa, and Pemba had a big number of people who participated in the elections without getting civic and voter education (TACCEO, 2015; EU,2015). The EMBs had a strategic focus on how civic and voter education will be provided in cooperation with other non – government organizations and institutions which applied to participate in the exercise. The EMBs prepared ethical guidelines to guide other stakeholders who wanted to provide civic and voter education in the elections. In this respect, all non – government organizations and institutions which got accredited to disseminate civic and voter education were obliged to follow the guidelines and ethics of the EMBs.

A total number of 451 non – governmental organizations applied but only 447 institutions qualified and were accredited to disseminate civic and voter education in various parts of Tanzania in the 2015 elections. However, CSOs' role was highly affected by the fact that only a few numbers of CSOs received funds from donors for election programs. The number of CSOs with funded election programs was not above 200 out of 30,000 CSOs in Tanzania (THRDC, 2015). The total amount of resources granted to 211 CSOs in Tanzania in the 2015 elections was 28.3 million USD, equivalent to Tshs. 62.26

billion. Together with this amount of funds dedicated to civic and voter education, still there were complaints that the provision of civic and voter education did not reach every part of Tanzania.

This poses a question about the motive of the local CSOs and the donors who provide a lot of resources to non – governmental entities and not to the mandated national EMBs to conduct the exercise. This is where the conflict of interest happens and this is between the donors and the government EMBs concerning the management of electoral activities which if left to external control the influence is always harmful. Local CSOs and NGOs complain every time that the funds were not enough but the resources, they get are huge but mismanaged by paying for very lucrative seminars and workshops rather than using the funds to reach the voters through cheap techniques to disseminate civic and voter education. There are also complaints from local CSOs that a large amount of foreign funds and resources were awarded to a few foreign NGOs. The actual total amount of resources granted to 211 local CSOs in Tanzania was 28.3 million USD, equivalent to Tshs. 62.26 Billion out of 21,128.3 million USD which was given by donors.

This explains why the EMBs are very sceptical of civic and voter education provided by non – governmental stakeholders because of the resource scramble among the beneficiaries. The recent threat to local CSOs resulted due to an increase of UN Agencies, International NGOs, and some donors assuming the role of domestic CSOs during elections by conducting training and seminars on civic and voter education in the 2015 elections. One UN Agency that is blamed to have done the electoral activities which were to be done by domestic CSOs in 2015 was UNDP.

UNDP secured election grants from foreign donors based in Tanzania such as CIDA, SDC, DANIDA, etc. UNDP under the Democratization Empowering Program Managed to solicit about 22 million dollars from Dar es Salaam – based foreign donors. This practice affected many CSOs who expected to receive such grants

from the same source that channelled election funds to UN Agencies such as UNDP and UN Women.

On the other side, the Foundation for Civil Society despite the little sum of elections funds they had, supported more than 50% of all 200 CSOs which received elections grants in the 2015 elections. Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition (THRDC) findings indicate that out of USD 28 Million allocated for CSOs, not more than 10% was used by local CSOs. The majority of CSOs have raised their concerns that international NGOs and UN agencies are increasingly replacing their space during elections. More than 50% of all 211 supported CSOs were supported by the Foundation for Civil Society which acted as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of other actors in the exercise.

In these specific elections, the key methods used in the dissemination of civic and voter education included the following; first, conducting public meetings with elections stakeholders like religious leaders, political parties, media news editors, women, youth, and people with disabilities. Second, using television and Radio broadcasting where the EMBs experts provided explanations regarding elections issues such as elections laws, registration of voters in the permanent voter register, elections ethics, candidates' nominations, elections campaigns, voting regulations, counting, and advertising of the results. A total number of ten TV stations and 47 community radios got involved in the exercise.

Third, Websites and social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and hulkshare were used to create civic awareness. Fourth, EMBs prepared posters carrying election messages which were displayed in various places in big cities to educate voters. Fifth, a communication centre was prepared by the EMBs to allow direct communication between the voters and the EMBs concerning election issues. This centre was launched on 12th October 2015 and closed on 30th October 2015 where about 78,911 calls from the voters were received

and clarifications and actions were taken to address the challenges which emerged in various places.

The above discussion revealed that, to a large extent, civic and voter education was disseminated in the 2015 elections because the EMBs had significant resources to conduct the exercise compared to previous elections. This emphasizes the importance of the government to treat well the electoral process internally as a sensitive exercise not to be controlled by external actors (donors) as it happened in the previous elections. The EMBs controlled the content of civic and voter education and had the power to choose which NGOs to participate in and what to be disseminated to the voters.

“Election management can efficiently and effectively (professionally) be executed if adequate funds are secured on time” (Chaligha, 2010: 403). The 2020 multiparty general elections were the first to be conducted without any foreign donors’ support to the EMBs. This makes a sharp difference from the experience of the previous elections of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 which significantly received foreign funds. The lack of adequate funds compelled the EMBs to depend on foreign support to finance the dissemination of civic and voter education. This tendency gave donors more influence on how the exercise was conducted. In 2020 the government was well prepared as it prepared and set aside a total amount of Tshs. 331,858,287,981.00/= dedicated for elections purposes. During the implementation time the EMBs requested a total amount of Tshs. 268, 493,380,671.00/=, and the government disbursed timely the entire amount as requested. This was to enable the EMBs to handle effectively the management and administration of elections.

Surprisingly, the EMBs used only a total amount of Tshs. 262,493,380,671.00/= to complete all election activities including dissemination of civic and voter education. The remaining total amount of Tshs. 6,000,000,000.00/= was returned to the national treasury. This is a piece of open evidence that the EMBs had

sufficient funds and did not face any financial challenge in carrying out their constitutional mandate. Elections costs declined due to the use of the government electronic tendering process (TANePS) which enhanced transparency and increased competition between tenderers which decreased elections costs (NEC, 2021:45).

The EMBs accredited 28 CSOs to disseminate civic and voter education during the exercise of updating the permanent national voter register (PNVR). In the general elections, 252 CSOs were accredited, but surprisingly only 107 CSOs participated successfully in the exercise (NEC 2021). The methods used by the EMBs and other actors to disseminate civic and voter education included the use of media, i.e. radio and television talk shows and interviews, newspapers, EMBs websites, social networks, civil society organisations, special cars with PA systems, leaflets, brochures, billboards, participation in various national exhibitions, stakeholders' meetings, public commuter posters, banners, arts and numerous publications, official and informal gatherings. Civic and voter education programs on radio, televisions and newspapers started earlier during the period of updating the PNVR and throughout the time of general elections campaigns (REDET 2021; NEC 2021).

The new act, Miscellaneous Amendments Act No. 3 of 2019 introduced new requirements which required donor – funded NGOs to submit their contractual agreements with foreign donors and also excluded faith – based organisations from participating in the elections. Following the implementation of the law, the giant and experienced NGOs in the country failed to secure EMBs' accreditation. The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition THRD, Tanzania Election Monitoring Group (TEMCO), and the Tanzania Constitution Forum (TCF) (REDET 2021). The exclusion of many CSOs from the process of deregistering and freezing bank accounts of large civil society coalitions created a huge vacuum of NGOs with financial power and competent human resources to participate in the elections.

Tanzania Elections Watch initiative (TEW) was established to fill the gap between excluded domestic and international actors. TEW was organised and coordinated by Kituo cha Katiba: Eastern Africa Centre for Constitutional Development (KcK) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) (TEW 2021). The EMBs wanted the CSOs to disclose their sources of funds to participate in the elections. EMBs and the government were suspicious of there being a hidden agenda of mismanaging the whole exercise as it happened in the previous elections. In support of the EMBs' decisions, Kendra and Aseem (2022:189) argue that “A common criticism is that NGOs dependence on foreign funds is more responsive to donors’ concerns as opposed to the needs of the communities they serve. This means that the local community views NGOs as advocating for issues that are important to Western audiences and not to local people. Second, even the public goods that NGOs supply may not be of the appropriate type – a common criticism of foreign aid”.

As stated above, this time the EMBs did not only have sufficient funds but also had full control of the contents to be disseminated and which actors should participate in the exercise. The EMBs and other accredited civil society organisations provided the same content of civic and voter education throughout the country (NEC 2021:94). The availability of enough funds to the EMBs denied donors influence in the exercise and donors became spectators as they had no means to intervene in the exercise. The report of the EMBs emphasizes that the provision of civic and voter education was successfully done in the 2020 elections. This increased the number of voters registered in the PNVR to 29,754,699 which is an increase of about 6,593,259 voters compared to 23,161,440 voters registered in the 2015 elections. EMBs count the exercise as successful as the number of voters who voted on the Election Day was 15,091,950, equal to 50.72% of the total voters registered. The number of spoiled votes was only 1.739% which represents only 261,755 registered voters, and the votes which were okay were 14,830,195 equals 98.27% of total votes (NEC 2021).

However, the REDET observation report opined that civic and voter education provided by EMBs and other CSOs did not cover the whole country as they commented that “In general, TEMCO/REDET observed that there were limited voter education campaigns in many districts in the country in the process of updating the voter register. An overwhelming number of the LTOs (79%) reported that they did not witness any CSO conducting voter education in their respective areas. Only 36 per cent of the LTOs witnessed some voter education campaign activities conducted largely by NEC/ZEC in certain parts of the country through TV, radio, and posters. This limited voter education was provided through radio (53%), TV (27%), and leaflets and brochures (21%). Also, there was hardly any voter education specifically tailored for special groups” (REDET 2021:116). There is a general criticism that the content of civic and voter education provided in the past elections focused on directing the voters to listen carefully to elections campaigns and choose the candidate of their choice without linking the candidate to the political party. This message applies to a situation of one political party and not in the era of multiparty politics.

Pius Msekwa points out that “voter education is primarily intended to enhance the voters’ awareness of the true meaning of the outcomes which may result from his vote, to enable him to vote wisely and in a way that will achieve the kind of outcome which will be of maximum benefit to the country’s governance system” (Daily News 03/09/2020). This should be considered and taken into practice by the EMBs and other actors who would be involved in the exercise to provide meaningful civic and voter education to voters in the forthcoming general elections in Tanzania.

8.0 Conclusion

The responsibility to disseminate civic and voter education to the public is principally vested in the national EMBs in Tanzania. Civil society organizations and non – governmental *organizations* got involved in this role when they got accreditation from EMBs. The intervention of donor support has been inevitable in the Tanzanian

electoral process especially in the dissemination of civic and voter education to the electorate because the agents involved in the exercise such as NGOs, CSOs, and EMBs largely depended on financial and material support from donors to conduct the exercise. In response, donors made their support available and had significant influence from the 1995 to 2010 elections, where they controlled the contents of civic and voter education materials and the choice of actors.

This happened because the EMBs lacked enough funds to exercise the constitutional mandate. In 2015 the EMBs had a significant amount of resources and in the 2020 elections, the EMBs had sufficient funds from the government and, to a large extent, it controlled the exercise unlike in the previous elections. The involvement of other actors in the exercise such as the mass media, political parties, and CSOs as indicated above to complement the weakness of the government EMBs, raises some issues of concern to understanding their motive behind and if the exercise will not be manipulated for their interest and donor influence.

9.0 Recommendation

This study makes the following recommendations: First it should be understood that elections are a fundamental part of the domestic political processes. Donors need to recognize that their role is limited, as is their influence on the process or results. Secondly, all actors in the electoral process in the country need to carefully revisit their engagement with donors. Foreign donors' always have their interests which must well be studied before the aid they give is accepted. The best way of doing this is by developing self – reliant initiatives to avoid increasing their dependency on overseas support. Thirdly, the EMBs should adhere to Elections Acts which require the establishment of elections consolidated funds to ensure availability of funds during election time. Lastly, the study recommends that foreign aid recipient actors should be transparent in their financial matters. This can be done by declaring openly the funds received whether from local or foreign sources and how funds were used. This would help to curb corruption, dubious foreign influence, and motives

infiltrating through recipients and which can be harmful to the country and its sovereignty.

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1. Six donors who financed 22 NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education in the 1995 elections were Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, The Netherlands, and European Commission.
2. The 22 institutions which received foreign support to disseminate civic and voter education in the 1995 elections were IDS (Institute of Development Studies (UDSM), Survival Africa Trust, Tanzania Information Services (MAELEZO), TGNP (Tanzania Gender Networking Programme) TAMWA (Tanzania Media Women Association), BAWATA (Women's Council of Tanzania) BAKWATA (The Muslim Council of Tanzania), Institute of Adult Education, The Tanzania Arts Council (BASATA), Tanzania Home Economics Association (TAHEA), Tanzania Federation of Trade Unions (TFTU), African International Group of Political Risk Analysis (PORIS), Christian Professionals of Tanzania (CPT), Christian Social Services Commissions (CSSC)-CCT& Tanzania Episcopal Conferences (TEC) and Association for Regional Integration of Eastern and Southern Africa (ARIESA), TEMCO, ZEMOG, The Tanzania Professionals, ESAURP, Tanzania Association of Non- Government Organization and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (Democracy Division).
3. The Donor Basket Group funded sixteen local NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education in the 2000 elections. The following 12 countries were included; Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, USA (USAID).
4. The 16 local NGOs which received foreign support to disseminate civic and voter education in the 2000 elections were LHRC, TGNP,

WLAC, SAHRINGON, TAMWA, ForDIA, LEAT, Policy Forum, TANLAP, MPI, HAKIMADINI, ACCORD, TAHURIFO, TLF, YPC, ZLSC, and WiLDAF.

5. NGOs that received support from donor basket fund to conduct civic and voter education in the 2005 elections which did not cover the whole country were the Supreme Muslim Council of Tanzania – BAKWATA, Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), Umbrella Organization for Disabilities in Tanzania, (SHIVYAWATA), Information Centre for Disabilities (ICD), National Consortium on Civic Education in Tanzania, (NACOCET), Tanzania Council of Social Development (TACOSODE), Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO), Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), and Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC).
6. The donor countries that contributed to the 2005 Elections Basket included Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom as well as UNDP. The USAID supported the costs of printing all the civic and voter’s education materials.
7. Donors through the UNDP Election Support Project (ESP) funded both the EMBs and sixty-five (65) local NGOs. Some of the NGOs which played a great role in the dissemination of civic and voter education for the 2010 elections were TAMWA, HAKIELIMU, LHRC, TGNP, and TAWLA.
8. According to Taj, H & Frederick, A. S (2009) and Jinmi, (2013), “Brief-case Organizations” refers to NGOs which have been set up for unethical ends; they function mainly to try to attract grants or donations to enrich their owners. Sometimes are called “Unethical NGOs” which tend to exploit people’s giving nature and weaken the trust of the public and donors in the NGO sector. MONGOS and PONGOS – “My NGO or Pocket NGOs”: these also are briefcase NGOs founded for tax evasion or private gain.

The distinction is that the MONGOs, “my Own NGOs”, are created solely to serve the interest of one person who features at large in every consideration, while PONGOs are pocket NGOs that serve a cabal, or limited criteria of people. FONGOS: these are NGOs that

exist largely on paper but can be used to source or attract funds. NGOs in this category often have a fictional structure that exists in law but without structural content.

9. *Shura ya Maimamu Tanzania, Kamati Kuu ya Siasa, Kuelekea Uchaguzi Mkuu 2010, Juni, 2009, Dar es Salaam.*
10. Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC), Manifesto, Proposal of National Priorities, Justice and Peace, Dar es Salaam (No date).
11. See the Speech by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Benjamin William Mkapa, at the Opening of the Ninth Conference on the State of Politics in Tanzania, Nkrumah Hall, University of Dar es Salaam, 10th May 2001.
12. Donors who funded CSOs to conduct civic and voter education in the 2015 elections included Open Society Foundation for East Africa (OSIEA), UN-Women, OXFAM; Foundation for Civil Society, SIDA, DANIDA, Finish Local Cooperation, Swiss Development Cooperation, Tanzania Women Fund (WFT), Tanzania Media Foundation (TMF), UNDP and USAID. One of the main donors who supported a big number of CSOs in 2015 is Foundation for Civil Society (FCS).
13. There are also complaints from local CSOs that a large amount of foreign funds and resources were awarded to a few NGOs and some were foreign. The actual total amount of resources granted to 211 CSOs in Tanzania was 28.3 million USD equivalent to Tshs. 62.26 Billion out of 21,128.3 million USD which was given by donors in the 2015 elections. The skewed distribution was as follows; Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) 1,121.4 million, OSIEA 51.4 million, DANIDA 260,000 million, SIDA undisclosed, CIDA Unknown 500,000 million, Oxfam – Tanzania 56 million USD, UNESCO Undisclosed, UN-Women 92.4 million, SDC 1 2. Million, USAID 149 million, UNDP Undisclosed, DFID 615 million, Total 21,128.3 million.
14. Some of the involved stations in 2015 to disseminate civic and voter education included Tanzania Broad Casting Cooperation (TBC 1), Azam TV, Channel Ten, Clouds FM, Micheweni FM, Zanzibar Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), East African TV, Voice of America

(straight talk Africa), BBC (focus on Africa), Independent Tanzania Television (ITV) and Star TV.

15. Some institutions which were accredited by the EMBs to provide civic and voter education in the 2020 elections include the University of Dar es Salaam, Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), Tanzania Cross Party-Platform (T-WCP Ulingo), and the University of Dar es Salaam, Institute of Development Studies, Action for Change (Acha), the Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), the Dar es Salaam University College of Education (Duce) and the Tanzania Youth Coalition (TYC). The list omitted all of the main human rights organizations such as the Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition, the Legal and Human Rights Centre, the Tanzania Constitution Forum (Jukwaa la Katiba Tanzania), and the Tanzania Episcopal Conference.

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