

## **Challenges of United Nations Military Observers in the Contemporary Peacekeeping Operation Environment in Africa**

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### **Abstract**

*United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) are now targeted by Armed Groups (AGs) due to the change of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) practice from a traditional one to the modern one which involves the use of force. The use of force has caused AGs to be violent and start attacking all peacekeepers as a reprisal. This article uses the theory of collective security to analyse the challenges of UNMOs operations in the contemporary PKOs environment in Africa. The study used both primary and secondary data qualitatively. The sample of the study was selected by a purposive sampling technique and in-depth interview and documentary review methods have been used to collect data. The article concludes that UNMOs are ineffective under the contemporary PKOs settings and therefore military contingents are to do the tasks of UNMOs.*

**Keywords:** *armed groups, collective security, robust peacekeeping operations, United Nations military observers.*

### **1.0. Introduction**

The United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), also known as Military Observers (MILOBs), are unarmed forces deployed to monitor, supervise and report any violation of a ceasefire agreement signed (UN, 2017). The deployment of this force was the best option when Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) were invented (Blanco, 2019). This was because, the traditional PKOs, which can be defined as the UN forces deployed to safeguard global peace and security operating without enforcement powers, were based on the three main principles of consent, impartiality, and use of minimum forces except for self – defence (Doyle, and Sambanis, 2007). This means that the UN was always deploying forces that were not intended to wage war with either side of the conflict.

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It is with this fact that the first two UN PKOs, the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) of 1948 for the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) of 1949 were just UNMOs missions (Lyons, 1998). UNMOs were deployed after signing the ceasefire agreement and they were free to meet and interact with all parties in the conflict without any fear of being attacked by any party to the conflict including non – state Armed Groups (AGs). Non-state AGs are dissident armed forces who fight national armed forces or fight each other within a given state or several states (Geneva Convention, 1949). The protection of UNMOs had been drawn from those PKOs principles which gave confidence to AGs. UNMOs are a non – threatening force; as such AGs have not been harming UNMOs, and instead, they have been interacting with them on different peace initiatives. The UN flag, UN marks, and blue helmet/beret are distinguishing marks that show that they are a peaceful force.

However, when the threats to Peacekeepers increased, the UN deliberately decided to change its operation concept and came up with a relatively powerful force for the self – protection of peacekeepers. The deployment of the UN Emergency Force 1 (UNEF - 1) during the Suez Crisis in 1956 to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed between Egypt and Israel was the first time in PKOs that the troops carried weapons (UN, 1956). But the security situation on the ground continued exponentially to be worse. Because of that, the necessity for Peacekeepers to use force was increasing.

The deployment of “*Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*” (ONUC) on 20<sup>th</sup> July 1960 which waged war with AGs changed the dynamic from non – use of force to fully using force (UN, 1960). In contrast with the traditional PKOs, which emphasised impartial and unarmed peacekeepers, the new environment required peacekeepers to use force and to be aggressive (Gibbs, 2000). The situation went like that and reached a climax in 2013 after the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in DRC which was mandated to carry out targeted offensive operations in a robust, highly mobile, and versatile manner to neutralise and disarm AGs in DRC (UN, 2013). It

was for the first time the UN – mandated peacekeepers to have artillery, Special Forces, drones, some Airpower, and others. Almost all missions nowadays are issued with a robust mandate.

Carsten, Iverson, and Silva (2020) define robust peacekeeping as those Peacekeeping missions in which peacekeepers are authorised to employ armed *force* beyond the traditional exception of self – defence. Regardless of this change in the PKOs environment, the UN still deploys UNMOs working in conjunction with other components of PKOs which have been mandated to use force.

As a result of these changes, AGs have become more violent to peacekeepers including UNMOs as a reprisal. They attack even UNMOs because they fail to distinguish between UNMOs and other PKOs components. This has posed a big security challenge to UNMOs because they are not armed, as such they become a soft target to AGs. The fatality rate of peacekeepers including UNMOs is on the increase since the UN adopted the aggressive and robust concept. For example, about 196 Peacekeepers including UNMOs were killed by acts of violence from 2013 – 2017 (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano 2017).

It is from this background that this study was undertaken to analyse the challenges facing UNMOs in carrying out their obligations under the current peacekeeping environment and possible alternatives for replacing their tasks. The study concludes that UNMOs are ineffective under the contemporary PKOs settings as such it has been recommended that, military contingents do the tasks of UNMOs.

There have been different studies done on the evolution of PKOs by different scholars such as Goulding (1993); Di Salvatore and Ruggeri (2017); Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova, (2016), but all those studies did not cover the relations between evolutions of PKOs and the functionality of the UNMOs. Therefore, this study is expected to add knowledge to the area of peacekeeping with a focus on the challenges of UNMOs operations in the contemporary PKOs environment, especially in Africa.

### **1.1. The United Nations Military Observers**

As stated above, the United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) are unarmed forces deployed to monitor, supervise and report any violation of the ceasefire agreement signed (UN, 2017). They form part of the military component of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in line with collective security. The military component in the UN peacekeeping mission always comprises military contingents (troops), staff officers (MSOs), and UNMOs (UN, 2002). It is common, especially in intrastate conflicts that the states involved in conflict fail to trust each other after the ceasefire agreement. After signing consents, the UN always establishes a neutral zone between them where it deploys unarmed, impartial, and credible observers to monitor and report violations of any ceasefire agreement reached. This force is the UNMOs and their operations end after genuine peace has been achieved, in most cases after signing a peace treaty. The force has no authority or power to stop either side from violating the ceasefire agreement; instead, they have been reporting those violations to the Security Council (SC) (Baker, 1994). *The sole duty of the UNMOs is reporting*, said one MILOB in Darfur during an interview.

According to UN Military Observers in Peacekeeping (UN, 2017), each mission has specific tasks for UNMOs, but the common ones are observation, monitoring, and reporting which are the core role of UNMOs where they observe and timely report on general or specific issues concerning the implementation of ceasefire agreement or any violation observed. They monitor the ceasefire, withdrawals, and demilitarisation agreements; supervise destructions of weapons and ammunitions; patrol; undertake different investigations; and others. UNMOs may be employed to assess or verify reports related to AGs, different violations such as violations against ceasefire or human rights.

They may be tasked to coordinate negotiations and mediations formally or informally between different groups in conflict. They may also be tasked to coordinate and liaise between the mission and other actors in resolving conflict. In fulfilling these tasks, the UNMOs conduct foot, vehicle, air, and waterborne patrols (Mandel, et al.,

2010). To achieve neutrality in reporting, UNMOs are always grouped into teams of 6 observers made of officers from different countries with at least two female officers (UN, 2017). They are deployed in remote areas for one year and are internally rotated frequently. Only military officers are deployed as UNMOs because of the sensitivity of the task.

During the foundation of PKOs as a tool for collective security, especially during the cold war, it was expected that the UN will be deploying UNMOs for such tasks. The traditional PKOs' principles (consent, impartiality, and use of minimum force) which guide the operations of PKOs fit the UNMOs operations and those principles make them acceptable by all parties in the conflict and by the local population. A UNAMID UNMO commented that the UNMOs are real peacekeepers according to the UN Charter. It is with this fact that many PKOs before 1988 were unarmed UNMOs (Yilmaz, 2005). It should be recalled that the first two UN PKOs were observer missions with unarmed troops. The first one was the UNTSO which was a UNMOs mission deployed in 1948 under UNSCR 50 of May 1948 to monitor the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Arab countries (UN, 1948). The second UNMOs mission was the UNMOGIP deployed in 1949 under UNSCR 47 of 1948 to monitor the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan. These two missions are in operation to date (UN, 1949).

UNMOs are friendly to all parties in the conflict including AGs. The three principles of PKOs (consent, impartiality, and minimum use of forces) gave trust and confidence to warring parties that UNMOs' intention is not to fight them but to resolve the conflicts. Their status of being unarmed made AGs to consider them as non – threatening force which they could face at any time. The UN flag and blue helmet/beret offer protection to UNMOs, and they are perceived by parties in the conflict, especially by non-state AGs as harmless. Consent is one crucial principle of PKOs that protects UNMOs.

A Peacekeeper in Goma commented that, if consent has been given, it simply means that Peacekeepers deployed are not part of the conflict and so they will be respected and protected. However, consent cannot

always guarantee the safety of UNMOs especially when there is weak command and control or when the parties in the conflict especially non – state AGs are internally divided and they are not under the control of strong leadership. The principle of impartiality also gives protection to UNMOs. Under impartiality, all parties in the conflict are treated equally whereby there is no enemy of UNMOs.

But article 3 of the Convention on the Safety of the UN and Associated personnel (Safety Convention of 1994) protects UNMOs and their facilities against any violence from any party in the conflict (UN, 1994). The UN personnel and facilities are required to have proper documentation and be marked with distinctive UN identifications (UN, 1994). This regulation was aimed at facilitating the protection of UNMOs and other components of the PKOs. Apart from those principles, the host government has a duty and responsibility to protect UNMOs for the whole period of their deployment in line with the UN Security Management System (UNSMS) policy (UN, 2011). The UN will only supplement the efforts of the host nations if it feels that there is need to do so. The protection includes evacuation in case of danger. We can conclude that the traditional PKOs still conform to the traditional PKOs principles in UN military observer missions.

Because of those mechanisms, AGs had been inviting UNMOs to interact with them and air out their demand, and discuss any other issues relevant to the peace process such as Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process. They have been more active and effective during the cold war when interstate conflicts were dominating. However, their big operational challenge is their security because they are deployed in small numbers in a remote area and do not carry weapons; as such they have become a soft target and are vulnerable to attacks, hostage taking, or even harassment from AGs or any other party to a conflict. The major condition for them to work effectively is the assurance of the condition of security (UN, 2017).

## **2.0 Materials and Methods**

This paper analyses the challenges of UNMOs in contemporary peacekeeping operation settings. Data for preparations of this article were collected between July 2020 and March 2021 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (henceforth, referred to as the DRC or Congo) and Darfur, Sudan. The study involved senior and junior UN staff members including military commanders of the MONUSCO and UNAMID, some academicians, and locals.

The researcher used in-depth interviews by targeting key informants and documentary reviews to compile the needed data. The study employed a purposive sampling procedure, by which samples were selected based on their knowledge of PKOs, population characteristics, and the objectives of the study. A total of 20 respondents comprising different sexes, ages, races, knowledge bases, and expertise were involved.

The study employed a qualitative research approach. The validity of the data collection tools was achieved through face validity where the data collection methods were crafted before application to detect whether or not they would measure what was intended to be measured. Data reliability was achieved by pre – testing the data collection methods on a small sample of respondents in Darfur, Sudan through expected respondents from those who have been involved in peace – keeping missions, armed forces, and similar engagements before full swing data collection.

## **3.0 Theoretical Consideration**

This study is guided by collective security theory. The theory is based on the idea that each member state accepts that, the security of one state is a concern of all states and agrees to join in collective measures against the aggressor (Fitzmaurice, 1989). Collective security is machinery for collective actions to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order (Ebegbulem, 2011). The League of Nations and the United Nations (UN) are examples of collective security mechanisms for the prevention of war. It is through this principle that the UN has the power to discourage any member state from acts that would threaten peace and security.

Collective security theory has not escaped criticism from different scholars. For example, Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton (1985) argued that, the theory is perfect, but it is idealistic because it works under some assumptions which have been criticised. For example, it assumes that there will be a common understanding between all member states on which state is the aggressor and that, all states will be committed to dealing with the aggressor, which practically is not a reality. The fact is that states tend to be power – seeking and this behaviour is rooted in the biological drives of a human being.

The theory also admits that war (though the use of PKOs) is a means to resolve conflicts that are contrary to its principles of prevention of war. In a similar tone, Claude (1992) argues that the theory can transform the local war into a global war by involving all nations in a particular conflict, and also it always has bureaucracy in taking decisions. Dinesh (2021) points out that, the theory has given rights to states to wage war as a measure of self – defence which undermines its objective.

#### **4.0 Results and Discussion**

Due to the nature of security challenges during the foundation of PKOs, it was envisaged that the use of force would be very minimum. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force whereby member states are advised to refrain from using force or threats against the territorial integrity or independence of any member (UN, 2021). However, it gave rights to the use of force for self – defence and in maintaining International Peace and Security under given conditions as stated in Article 51 of the Charter (UN, 2020).

*The UN was formed as a result among other many factors, of the bloody atrocities committed during World War Two (WWII), fought from 1939 to 1945. Thus, the use of force by the UN was perceived as going back to what the UN did not want to happen again,*

This was said by a member of a diplomatic corps in Dar es Salaam during an Interview. Therefore, PKOs using UNMOs as a collective security tool were believed to be more peaceful than the use of force under those conditions. But even resolving conflicts at that time was



easy based on the type of conflicts and type of actors; their interests and their demands were easy to be addressed.

But the experience from the two UNMOs missions showed that there were some threats to UNMOs from conflicting parties that require peace keepers to carry light weapons for their self – defence. The deployment of the UNEF - 1 during the Suez Crisis in 1956 to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed between Egypt and Israel was the first time in PKOs for the troops to carry weapons (UN, 1956). But threats to Peacekeepers were increasing and the use of force by peacekeepers was unavoidable. The deployment of ONUC on 20<sup>th</sup> July 1960 saw increased use of force beyond self – defence. ONUC sometimes was forced to fight conventionally.

The use of force was extended to the protection of civilians (POC) which can be defined as all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual following the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (Willmot, Mamiya, Sheeran, & Weller, 2016). POC was given more emphasis following the UN failures in the 1990s, especially in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia where there were mass killings and atrocities on innocent civilians (Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis, 2017). The biggest failure of PKOs was the United Nations Assistance Missions for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Rwanda. The sources of the failure were many, but the mainly weak mandate given by the UN Security Council Resolution 872 of 1993 made the SC not to deploy sufficient Peacekeepers in Rwanda and with limited weapons and equipment to deter genocide (Totten, & Bartrop, 2004). The failure of PKOs in other missions such as in Somalia and Bosnia was mainly attributed to a weak mandate. The failures were a direct indication of the limited capability of the UN forces to mitigate violence and protect against human rights violations using the traditional PKOs concept as a collective security tool. But the failures were also in line with the criticism of collective security whereby, the UN always has bureaucracy in taking a decision and is always reluctant to use force (Dinesh, 2021). Following the report of those failures, the UN adopted UNSCR 1265 of 1999 mandating Peacekeepers to use even deadly force to protect civilians under

imminent threats (UN, 1999). The UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was the first mission with an emphasis on POC (UN, 1999). Then in 1992, the “1992 Agenda for peace document” initiated the enforcement operations in intra – state conflicts mostly without being given consent (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

The UN’s 1995 Supplement to ‘Agenda for Peace’ acknowledged that the shifting from interstate to intrastate conflicts after the cold war exposed civilians to be victims and they have been the major target in the conflicts (UN, 1995). The emergence of terrorism and other transnational criminality in the 2000s which are connected to AGs made the situation worse (Solà-Martín, & Woodhouse, 2011). Peacekeepers in the contemporary security environment face AGs, Terrorists, Organised crime, street gangs, criminals, drug dealers, political exploitation, and many other threats.

For example, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has turned its political objectives of wanting to overthrow the government of Uganda into a terrorist group connected to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Cengiz, & Cinoglu, 2022). Other terrorist groups which pose security threats are Al-Shabaab in Somalia, BOKO Haram in Nigeria and surrounding states, and Ansar Sunna Wall Jamaa in Mozambique. Their tactics include attacking using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide which causes massive damage. For example, in 2015, Al-Shabaab killed about 148 people at Garissa University College in Kenya (Cannon & Ruto, 2019). The UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) report showed that more than 1,300 people were killed by AGs in the DRC from January to June 2020, three times more than in the same period in 2019 (UN, 2020). The shooting down of a UN helicopter by M23 rebel group, killing 8 peacekeepers on 29 March 2022 in Eastern DRC is a testimony that AGs have more capability than ever before (African News, 2022). There is an increase in the number of Peacekeepers killed in this period compared to some years back. For example, about 196 Peacekeepers have been killed by acts of violence from 2013 – 2017 (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano, 2017).

It is a fact that this situation necessitates PKOs to be more robust, and flexible with strength and military capacity to operate in a wide range of operations and situations. Contrary to the traditional peacekeeping principles which emphasize neutral and lighter armed peacekeepers, the UN now has been deploying PKOs in civil conflict zones even before the cease – fire agreements, as such, their operations are beyond monitoring of cease-fire agreement. The environment requires PKOs to use chapter VII of the UN Charter, with a much stronger and more robust mandate to use more sophisticated weapons to be able to conduct a wider range of operations. In that regard, the UN was forced by the situation to migrate from traditional peacekeeping (UNMOs) to the use of force which fits with security challenges occurring in the field.

As such, the UN started slowly giving Peacekeepers robust mandates and the authority to use force beyond self – defence. Since that time, almost 95% of all UN PKOs deployed have been mandated to protect civilians using all available means even using force (Weller, Solomou, & Rylatt, 2015). As of now, the UN is issuing a more robust mandate with equivalent resources (weapons, equipment, and technologies). To achieve the required objective contemporary PKOs carry out military operations in a robust posture, collect intelligence, carry out preventive measures such as patrols, and protect civilians at all costs, even by using force. For example, the FIB in DRC had been mandated to use drones, Artillery, Attack Helicopters, Special Forces, and others which are contrary to the traditional PKOs principle of use of minimum force. It is a fact that no AGs will be ready to face a strong UN force, meaning that weak peacekeepers are vulnerable to being attacked by AGs. In all these changes, the UN is still deploying UNMOs who are undertaking their obligations alongside other forces with robust mandates.

Different studies done on the effectiveness of PKOs have been suggesting PKOs be robust and not refrain from using force. The Brahimi report of 2000 introduced the concept of robust peacekeeping which require PKOs to be aggressive in executing their duties. Though with a condition, the report recommended the use of force at the tactical level with authorization of the SC in defending

mandate (Brahimi, 2000). On the same, the Cruz report of 2018 also recommended the UN change its mind set from using chapter VI to a more robust posture and not fear to use force where necessary (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano, 2017). Other Scholars such as Von Hippel (2000), O'Hanlon, (2003), and Dobbins, (2003) support the idea of robust use of force (peace enforcement) and argue that any actor (UN or non – UN actor) may undertake an enforcement mission.

Huntington in his study on the Clash of Civilisation asserted that, because of the Clash of Civilisation, there will be an increase in terrorist attacks against states whose governments support the government of the terrorist home country (Huntington, 2000). He also predicted that there will be excessive terror attacks on Western targets because of its strategic value. This means that the capacity and capability of terrorists will be increasing as such the use of force in the future will be on increase.

The achievement of FIB in DRC to defeat the M23 rebel group in 2013 is testimony that the use of force is necessary for contemporary security threats. The robust mandate (Chapter VII of the UN Mandate) played a great role in availing FIB troops the freedom of operations. Firepower possessed by FIB such as Artillery, Air power, and drones also contributed much to the effectiveness of the FIB. Up to now, PKOs with a robust mandate are doing better in the field than those which use traditional peacekeeping principles. In DRC, for example, the UN depends more on FIB during any threat than the rest of the forces (Framework Brigades) which still use traditional peacekeeping principles (Karlsrud, 2015).

However, the role of peacekeepers is becoming complicated and dangerous because Peacekeepers are deployed to fight and not monitor. Their safety is not guaranteed by any principle as the AGs are directly targeting them. The UN badges (Blue beret/helmet), UN flags, and insignia are no longer offering protection to peacekeepers (UN, 1990). UNMOs who are unarmed, are the ones who have been affected more by this new approach which has reduced their effectiveness. As we have seen above, UNMOs are unarmed and work freely with all parties in the conflicting areas, especially non –

state AGs and civilians. Because of the offensive nature of the PKOs adopted, the AGs are targeting UNMOs as a reprisal. This is because they all have similar distinctive UN identifications (insignia and the UN colours). AGs cannot distinguish between other peacekeepers with a robust mandate and other UN staff like UNMOs (Muller, 2015). UNMOs now have been perceived by AGs not to be impartial because they are taking the side with mandate to attack them. The consequences of this have been seen on the ground whereby UNMOs have been killed by AGs in different situations because they cannot protect themselves and also, they are always moving out and becoming a soft target. Their convoy is always vulnerable to AGs attacks as records show that about 50% of all fatalities in PKOs are sustained during vehicle movements (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano, 2017).

The fatality of peacekeepers (both UNMOs and others) has been increasing because of the new posture of PKOs. For example, in 2017 alone, more than 56 peacekeepers were killed, which is the highest number since 1994 (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano, 2017). Under these contemporary PKOs conditions, one may ask, how can the UNMOs do their operations effectively? What will be their safety? What will be the substitute for UNMOs? For example, due to these challenges, it was even proposed for FIB in DRC to be separated from the rest of MONUSCO forces (framework brigades) and to refrain from putting on UN badges (Blue beret/helmet) and insignia so that they can be distinguished from other neutral UN forces. But it was argued that, even if they were separated from MONUSCO, FIB would affect the general peace process as rebels will fear coming to a negotiating table thinking that perhaps UN forces would hunt them down as what FIB has once done (Spijkers, 2015).

There was the recommendation that UNMOs need to be carrying weapons for their protection, especially when operating in an insecure environment. But it was argued that letting UNMOs carry weapons might increase their risks instead of reducing them as this would give the impression that they were part of the conflict (Cammaert, & Blyth, 2013). One academician in Dar es Salaam during interview

commented that it also would negatively affect the capability of UNMOs to interact with AGs and the local population which is part of the conflict. Furthermore, carrying weapons will make UNMOs lose their peculiar status of protection under the Safety Convention by being considered to be part of combatants. A member of diplomatic corps in Dar es Salaam said the following during an interview:

*The AGs and other parties to the conflict will question the UNMOs' impartiality as an "unarmed neutral force" as such confidence-building efforts will be doubtful, resulting in complications in monitoring and observing the peace process in the conflicting areas,*

Similarly arming UNMOs may even endanger local populations and hence affect the collateral damage. But in very exceptional circumstances such as the presence of terrorists and any violent AGs, UNMOs may be allowed to carry weapons for their protection after recommendation and approval from their respective authorities (UN, 2017).

We have seen that the UN is still deploying UNMOs working alongside other PKOs components. Also, the use of force makes the AGs violent and attack peacekeepers especially soft targets like UNMOs. In that case, the challenge is how to protect those soft targets. Resolving this puzzle, the UN has been protecting them using other PKOs when they are operating in a violent environment. The question is, how are UNMOs going to be protected or armed and at the same time retain the same status of being harmless to AGs that they had before? The simple answer is that you cannot protect UNMOs using other PKOs components or arming them and be effective because the AGs will not be free to meet them. The confidence of AGs is built from the fact that UNMOs are unarmed. Instead of interacting, the AGs will be attacking UNMOs after failing to distinguish between UNMOs and forces aimed at neutralising them. Equally, the AGs will be attacking UNMOs as revenge because of the offensive actions of other components of the UN. On the same line, we have seen that, one of the important environments which enable UNMOs to effectively work is a peaceful condition, but the reality is that the contemporary security situation is violent. How are

UNMOs going to be effective in this environment? Therefore, it is a fact that, under the current peacekeeping environment, the UNMOs are ineffective. It is difficult for UNMOs to be effective under the current situation where almost 90% of all PKOs mandate is the protection of civilians using all means, including using deadly force. During an interview, one academician in Goma asked the following question during an interview.

*How will UNMOs operate in such conditions, knowing that they are the eyes and ears of Mission?*

The other question is what will be the substitute for the UNMOs if they are not fitting in the current PKOs environment? The current PKOs environment which involves bandits, terrorists, drug dealers, and others does not require UNMOs to sit down with them and negotiate peace. As we have seen, their demands and interests are beyond the capability of a state to fulfil. Therefore, in the case of the collection of information, the UN needs to train contingents who are armed to collect information, especially from the population.

By the way, they have been collecting information during their patrols whereby they have been meeting populations as well as AGs and talking to them. One of the tasks of patrol, whenever it goes out, is to collect information, what is that special information which contingents cannot collect? What is needed is training. By the way, if the situation is so tense, UNMOs never go out, instead, it is the force that goes out to collect information. As one academician argued in Dar es Salaam:

*It is a duplication of tasks to employ UNMOs who are escorted by the force to do the task which contingents can do.*

## **5.0 Conclusion**

During the crafting of the UN charter, the security challenges we are facing today were not predicted, as such UNMOs were expected to be effective in addressing global conflicts using PKOs as a collective security tool. But the UN has been forced by the current security situation to adopt the use of force and migrate from its traditional PKOs where UNMOs were desirable and effective. However, with the recent security dynamics, the deployment of robust forces is the

solution to the challenges of contemporary PKOs. The biggest challenge now is how to strike a balance between using force by one component of PKOs and the risks of AGs' attacks on other components of the UN PKOs who by nature of their activities, are not supposed to carry weapons such as UNMOs. In this regard, under the contemporary PKOs environment, the UNMOs are ineffective. Since the collection of information and monitoring of the situation is still required by the UN, then the UN needs to strengthen the capability of the force itself to substitute the UNMOs. These forces have been doing almost all UNMOs' activities, especially during the worse security threats where UNMOs have failed to go out.

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