

## Does Election Observation Matter? Examining the Implementation of Election Observation Recommendations in Tanzania and Uganda

**Rodrick Henry**

University of Dar es Salaam

henryrodrick@yahoo.com

### **Abstract**

*Electoral observation has become an integral part of the democratic and electoral processes in Africa. In the short term, international and local election observers enhance the transparency and credibility of elections and the acceptance of results in the continent. Moreover, in the long term, proposals issued by observers are critical in improving the quality of future elections. This paper is concerned with the long-term goal of election observation. Focusing on Tanzania and Uganda, it examines the extent to which reforms that observers propose are considered in improving subsequent elections. The paper relied on a desk review of documentary sources. The review paid particular attention to the recommendations issued in each election, focusing on how often they have been repeated across elections. The paper notes that the proposed reforms in the two countries are, by design, not adequately implemented. Addressing the lapses identified by election observers is uninteresting among political actors since it threatens the electoral advantage and the status quo. The paper recommends the formation of inclusive coalitions and networks that will strategically push for implementing election observers' recommendations.*

**Keywords:** *Election Observation, Election, Democracy, Tanzania, Uganda*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Election observation is an essential pillar of democracy promotion. In the short term, election observation deters fraud, intimidation, and violence while ensuring public confidence and adherence to international election standards (Daxecker, 2012; 2014; Smidt, 2016). Nevertheless, the roles mentioned above contribute little to the quality of elections over the long term (Kelley, 2012). The focus of this paper is the long-term goal of

election observation. It centres on election observation recommendations and their lasting impact on the quality of elections. The undertaking is more linked to the democratisation aspect of election observation. The paper builds on Lindberg's (2006) view that elections not only signify democracy in Africa but are also the vehicles of the continent's democratisation. As election observation intends to improve the quality of future elections, it is therefore critical to the consolidation of democracy in Africa (van Cranenburgh, 2000; Laakso, 2002).

The long-term goal of election observation is to improve the quality and integrity of elections over a long period (Kelley, 2009; Hyde, 2011). After observing various aspects of the election, observers issue comprehensive reports on the conduct and management of the election. The report's comprehensiveness is owed to the corroboration of sources, analysis of the legal frameworks, and contextual analysis of the election and democracy (OSCE, 2016). Contrary to the preliminary statements, final election observers' reports contain recommendations to address institutional and organisational gaps holistically. The proposals are directed to actors such as EMBs, government, political parties, civil society, law enforcement, and security apparatuses. A survey of issued proposals depicts a quest for broader and far-reaching reforms on electoral laws, management of elections, civic and voter education, gender inclusion, voter registration and election playing field (Roussias & Ruz-Rufino, 2013). Apart from the proposals on inclusiveness, other recommendations have remained the same for the past 30 years of multiparty African elections (Dodsworth et al., 2020). The nature of respective proposals corresponds to the long-term goal of election observation, which ultimately leads to quality elections and consolidation of democracy (Obi, 2007).

Ideally, there must be a follow-up on implementing observers' recommendations (Bjornlund, 2004). The actors may work individually or through a coalition comprising international organisations, development partners, regional groupings, individual states and domestic actors, including civil societies (EU, 2008). The nature and gravity of proposals determine the type of follow-up mechanisms to be deployed (Lynge-Mangueira, 2012). However, monitoring the implementation of observers' recommendations is challenging (Kelley, 2012). Local actors, including domestic observation missions, lack substantial leverage to influence actors' consideration of their proposals (George & Kimber, 2011). In the

same vein, although research has shown that international observers' sending states and organisations have more influence than local actors (Dexcker, 2012), economic and political interests may dent their resolve to propose or influence the changes proposed (Henry, 2017).

Nevertheless, conducting an election is a matter of sovereign states' domestic affairs, giving them the right to refuse or limit the extent of implementation of observers' recommendations (Kelley, 2010). Most importantly, democratic reforms take time and need buy-in and support from multiple actors, including the incumbents (Huntington, 1991; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Bakari, 2001). Experience from elections in sub-Saharan Africa indicates that institutional and organisational flaws, whether by design or default, are primarily advantageous to the incumbents (Collier, 2009; Levtsky & Way, 2010; Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Makulilo, 2016). The research further shows that observers' recommendations, likely to alter the political status quo, receive little attention (Kelley, 2012). That enlightens why observers' recommendations remain the same in subsequent elections.

The short-term impact of election observation and observers is relatively well studied, whereby the focus has been on the behaviour of international observers (Carothers, 1997; Kelley, 2010), the role of election observers in preventing electoral violence and fraud (Hyde, 2011; Dexcker, 2012) and the conduct of domestic observers (Makulilo, 2011). On the contrary, the long-term impact has yet to receive deserved attention. Little is known about the lasting effect of election observation despite its theoretical potential for consolidating democracy. Except for Kelley (2012), Comma and colleagues (2015), and Dodsworth and colleagues (2020), the research on institutional and organisational reforms and behavioural changes among actors attributed to observers' recommendations needs further attention.

The existing literature indicates an unconvincing trend in implementing election observation recommendations. The study by Dodsworth and her colleagues on implementing election observation recommendations in Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria and Sierra Leone revealed that only 14% of the recommendations were fully implemented in particular countries. Further, the study established a "significant variation in the implementation of election observation recommendations across sub-Saharan Africa, with implementation varying both between countries and between different types of recommendations" (Dodsworth et al., 2020: 4).

The implementation of recommendations takes time, and when it is done, it is partial. Election observation recommendations are implemented after being made in several elections, albeit inadequately (Comma et al., 2015). Actors, particularly incumbents, carefully work on observers' proposals to avoid weakening their position (Bjornlund, 2004).

Against this backdrop, this paper examines the implementation of election observation recommendations. It focuses on the recommendations issued by domestic and international election observation missions. Based on the case studies of Tanzania and Uganda, the paper analyses the extent of implementing the reforms proposed by observers to improve the quality of elections. The paper argues that the proposed reforms in Tanzania and Uganda are yet to be adequately implemented. The paper holds that political actors deliberately avoid election observation recommendations to maintain electoral advantage and the status quo.

## **METHODOLOGY**

This paper is based on a desk review of documentary sources. The method involved the analysis of election observation reports by international and domestic election observation missions from 1995 to 2021 and 2006 to 2021 in Tanzania and Uganda, respectively. The review paid particular attention to the recommendations issued in each election, focusing on how often they are repeated in different elections. A total of 26 observers' reports were thoroughly analysed. Also, the reports by election management bodies in the two countries were examined to understand the implementation of the reforms. As most election observation recommendations require legal reforms, the legal documents or specific legal provisions guiding the conduct of elections were revisited. Lastly, election observers' entry and exit reports, embassy assessments, political context reports, and other relevant documents on related topics were examined and corroborated with data from observers and EMB reports. The triangulation method guided the analysis of data obtained from various sources and the discussion of findings in this paper.

## **Details of the Case Studies**

The paper focuses on Tanzania and Uganda as its case studies. Since the return of multiparty democracy, every election in the two countries has featured election observers. International observers have included the Commonwealth, East Africa Community, European Union, and African Union observers. Local observers include the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), the Tanzania Civil Society

Consortium for Election Observation (TACCEO) for Tanzania and the Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMGroup) for Uganda. The two countries are the founding members of the East African Community (EAC). The Freedom House ranks Tanzania and Uganda as partly free (36 scores) and not free (35 scores), respectively. Based on a one-point score difference, the ranking corresponds to the 'electoral democracy' and 'dominant party-system' description assigned to the two countries. Both countries have highly disputed elections because of fraud and manipulation claims. However, Uganda's elections are relatively competitive as compared to Tanzania. Also, Tanzania and Uganda maintain sound diplomatic and economic ties with the Western 'democracies' and 'autocratic' regimes. Lastly, the ruling parties in the two countries have won every election since the return of multiparty politics.

Specific to individual case studies, Tanzania was considered because the proposals by the Presidential Commission on the change from a single to a multiparty system had been unattained upon the first multiparty election of 1995. Also, Tanzania is among the African countries with institutionalised and vibrant domestic election observation. Uganda was considered because it was among African countries, which delayed the return of a multiparty system. Secondly, Uganda has the experience of coups and armed rebellions. Theoretically, such experience poses a challenge to democratic institutions, including elections. Lastly, unlike Tanzania, election observation by domestic observers is relatively weak and underdeveloped in Uganda.

### **Implementation of Election Observers Recommendations**

Election observers have issued proposals on several areas in Tanzania and Uganda. The quest for reforms to the legal framework of election management has featured in both countries. Similarly, there are country-specific election observation recommendations. In the following sections, we analyse each recommendation, focusing on the issues that have been proposed, the extent of reforms attained so far and the explanations on the state of implementation. The joint proposals and those specific to the two cases are analysed, commencing with Tanzania and finalising with Uganda.

#### **Tanzania**

Tanzania re-introduced multiparty politics in 1992. Since then, it has conducted six uninterrupted elections in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020. Tanzania has a dominant party system, whereby the ruling

party has been in power since independence. Although Tanzania is described as 'partly free', electoral results and civil and political rights situation indicate a rising authoritarian trend (Tanzania Election Watch, 2021). For instance, from 2010, Tanzania elections were progressively becoming competitive. However, the trend was halted in 2020 as the ruling party garnered over 84% of presidential votes and 89% of seats in the parliament. Election observers have observed every general election in Tanzania and issued recommendations on improving the quality of elections and political institutions. Table 1 summarises the election observation main recommendations for Tanzania and shows the implementation status. The 'tick' (✓) mark indicates the issuance of the recommendation, while the 'X' mark denotes the non-issuance of the recommendation. Where the recommendation is issued in three successive elections, it indicates the lack of implementation.

**Table 1: Summary of Election Observers Recommendations in Tanzania**

N/A	Area	Specific Recommendation	Election Year						Status
			1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	
1	Electoral Administration and Legal Framework	<i>Reform the appointment of the Electoral Commission.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	No implementation
		<i>The commission employs its staff to administer elections.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
		<i>The commission to have its law</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
		<i>Allow petitioning of presidential election results.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
2	Inclusivity and Representation	<i>Enhance women's electoral participation</i>	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	No implementation
		<i>Ensure the participation of youth and people with disabilities.</i>	X	X	X	X	✓	✓	
3	Balanced Media Coverage	<i>Enhance equal access to media among all political parties and candidates during elections.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	✓	Partially implemented
		<i>Adopt a media code of conduct.</i>	✓	✓	✓	X	X	X	
4	Election campaign	<i>Adopt a law to monitor and regulate campaign finances.</i>	X	✓	✓	X	X	X	Fairly implemented
		<i>Adopt an election code of conduct.</i>	X	✓	✓	X	X	X	
5	Civic Education	<i>Conduct a national civic education campaign</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	No implementation
6	Voting, Counting and Tabulation	<i>Update and improve the accuracy of the voters' register periodically</i>	✓	✓	✓	X	X	X	Fairly Implemented
		<i>Ensure the secrecy of polling stations and locate them in public buildings.</i>	✓	✓	✓	X	X	X	

**Source:** Compiled from Election Observation reports

In Tanzania, as shown in Table 1, the recommendations concerning electoral administration and legal framework, inclusivity and representation, and civic education are inadequately implemented despite being repeatedly issued over several elections. These areas' specific proposal and their implementation are discussed in the forthcoming sections.

### **Electoral Administration and legal framework**

Management of elections is critical to the quality of elections and strengthening democratic institutions. Election observers have consistently highlighted the shortcomings concerning electoral administration and legal framework in Tanzania. The issues of concern include the appointment powers, composition and staffing of the electoral commission, and petitioning presidential results (TEMCO, 1997 – 2016; Commonwealth, 1995 – 2020; TACCEO, 2010 & 2016; EU, 2010 -2020). Observers, in light of these areas, propose that the powers to appoint the electoral commission should be inclusive, members of the commission should have security of tenure, the commission should have its staff, and restrictions on litigation of presidential results should be lifted. The following sections discuss specific issues.

The appointment of the electoral commission is the sole prerogative of the President. There is no requirement to consult any other authority in making the appointment.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the Constitution bestows the President with powers to remove commissioners. The grounds for the removal of a commissioner are provided in the Constitution.<sup>2</sup> Principally, the President cannot be questioned for exercising that power (Makulilo, 2015). Election observers have consistently recommended the amendment of such provisions on two grounds. First, the provision is inimical to democracy and “does not reflect good practice because it does not adequately provide for consultation and political confidence in a vital body which needs to be impartial and inclusive” (Commonwealth, 2010, 14-15). Secondly, it curtails the commission's independence as the President may appoint party members to the commission. Two cases suffice this concern. In 1995, Judge Mark Bomani, who served as commissioner, resigned from the commission and sought presidential nomination through the ruling party, CCM. Also, Justice Augustino Ramadhani, who had served as the commission's Vice-Chairman for ten

---

<sup>1</sup> Article 74 of the Constitution and Section 4(1) of the National Elections Act, Chapter 343.

<sup>2</sup> Article 74(1&2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977



years, from 1993 to 2003, sought presidential candidate nomination through CCM in the 2015 election. The two incidents raise concerns about potential conflict of interest among the commission's members. Partisan members of the commission are unlikely to work against an incumbent candidate who is also a party chairperson and their appointing authority. The state of affairs affects political actors' perception of free and fair elections in Tanzania.

Second, observers have raised concerns about the staffing and composition of the electoral commission. Staffing of the commission at the national and local levels attracts complaints of real and perceived bias. The Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, and Commissioners are part-time commission staff at the national level. A domestic observation mission report held that the "absence of full-time commissioners, who are senior advisers of the NEC, obviously makes operation of NEC to be ineffective as it would have been if all staff could have been engaged on a permanent basis" (TACCEO, 2010: 149). The commission's day-to-day activities are overseen by the Director of Elections, appointed by the President amongst civil servants following the commission's recommendation.<sup>3</sup> However, the tenure of the director is unsecured. The setting gives the President overwhelming powers over the electoral commission, curtailing its independence (TEMCO, 1997). Observers have recommended the full-time commission and security of tenure for the director of elections.

Similarly, apart from the national office, the electoral commission has no permanent staff at other levels. The commission relies on public officers as election coordinators and returning officers at regional, district or ward levels. The law automatically makes local government directors, including City, Municipal, Town and District Directors, as election returning officers at the constituency level where they are located.<sup>4</sup> The electoral commission also relies on the Village Executive Officer (VEO) and Ward Executive Officer (WEO) for village and ward levels. However, the officers are appointees of political leaders. The President appoints the local government directors, whilst the Minister appoints the WEO and VEO in charge of local government authorities. The officers are answerable to their appointing authorities first before the commission as a domestic observation mission held: "The independence of NEC is obviously at stake. Naturally, the NEC staff would not avoid favouritism

---

<sup>3</sup> Section 6(1) of the National Elections Act, Cap 343 [R.E. 2015]

<sup>4</sup> Section 7(1) of the National Elections Act, Cap 343 [R.E. 2015]

on the part of the person or government in that case which appointed them into the current positions” (TACCEO, 2010:149). The concerns become even more appealing when the appointing leaders are active party leaders or candidates in the election. To be sure, in its reports on the management of elections, the Electoral Commission acknowledged that the government exerted pressure on appointing some regional elections coordinators and returning officers (NEC, 1997).

In 2016, President John Magufuli appointed new local government directors. Contrary to the long-held practices of appointing local government directors from among senior public servants, most of the appointees were ruling party cadres who were aspirants, candidates or members of campaign teams during the 2015 general election for CCM (Henry, 2021). Contrary to the Public Service Act, a number of the local government directors remained active in party politics even after their appointments. The state of affairs prompted Bob Chacha Wangwe, an activist, to file a petition at the High Court in 2018, demanding that it declare the use of City, Municipal, Town, and District directors as returning officers unlawful.<sup>5</sup> The petitioner's ground was Article 74 (14) of the Constitution, which prohibits any election presiding officer from being a political party member.<sup>6</sup> The petitioner successfully submitted the evidence that the ruling party cadres had been appointed as election presiding officers because the provision in the Elections Act makes them the Returning Officers automatically by their positions as Directors of the respective local government authorities. The petitioner argued that since local government directors are appointees of the President, the ruling party's Chairperson and a potential electoral candidate, they can be easily trapped to protect the interest of their party.

The High Court ruled in favour of the petitioner. It declared that sections 7 (1) and 7 (3) of the Elections Act were repugnant to Articles 21(1), 21(2) and 26(1) of the Constitution<sup>7</sup> because they violate the constitutional requirement of an independent electoral commission. The Court held that there were no mechanisms in the Elections Act to ensure adherence to the prohibition of the political party affiliation of electoral commission officials involved in managing elections. Furthermore, the Judges were satisfied with the evidence submitted by the petitioner that

---

<sup>5</sup> Miscellaneous Civil Cause No.17 of 2018, High Court of Tanzania (Main Registry) at Dar es Salaam, Ngwala, J., Matogolo, J., and Masoud, J.).

<sup>6</sup> Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977

<sup>7</sup> Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977

74 Directors were still active CCM members – upon filing the petition. The government appealed against the ruling at the Court of Appeal. Among other grounds, the government argued that local government directors take oaths to pledge impartiality before assuming duties, making them execute their roles impartially. Similarly, the government cited the Public Service Act, which prohibits civil servants from being leaders of political parties but permits membership in such parties. The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court ruling, allowing local government directors to continue serving as returning officers. However, the Appeal Court ruling does not insulate the Directors from suspicion of bias. The fact that the High Court ascertained that several City, Municipal, Town and District directors were still active ruling party members confirms the worries of election observers on the commission's independence. Similarly, the appeal by the government proves the extent to which election observation recommendations for an independent and impartial electoral commission are deliberately avoided to prolong the status quo.

Lastly, observers have proposed rescinding the limitation on petitioning of presidential election results. The existing Constitution does not provide for judicial inquiry of the presidential election results once declared by the electoral commission.<sup>8</sup> The prohibition is contrary to the principles of democracy, which require the judicial review of all matters related to governance (Eylon & Harel, 2006). Also, it downplays the separation of powers among tiers of the government, which, among other things, aims to guarantee that no branch of the government commits ultra-vires. As a result, it denies contenders the right to clear doubts in electoral processes. To be sure, the provision conflicts with Article 13 (6) (a) of the same Constitution that states: “When the rights and duties of any person are being determined by the court or any other agency, that person shall be entitled to a fair hearing and to the right of appeal or other legal remedy against the decision of the court or of the other agency concerned.”<sup>9</sup> The limitation is, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, which grants every citizen the right to approach the Court whenever that person considers being in his best interests.

The restriction of petitioning of presidential results aggravates the potential to use violence as aggrieved parties cannot seek judiciary remedy when they have complaints against results. Since the commission

---

<sup>8</sup> Article 41 (7) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977

<sup>9</sup> Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977

is perceived as unfair, prohibiting judicial review is considered a politically engineered decision. For instance, in 2010, the CHADEMA presidential candidate Wilbroad Slaa refused to accept the results, citing rigging allegations. Slaa vowed to make the country ungovernable. On 5 January 2011, just two months after the general election, the riots involving CHADEMA and the police led to two fatalities and scores of casualties, including Slaa's wife. The riots resulted from demonstrations by CHADEMA party leaders, led by Slaa, over a dispute concerning the election of the Arusha City Council Mayor, despite ongoing negotiations to resolve the matter. The riots were partly attributed to CHADEMA's disgruntlement towards election results (Henry, 2021). Also, in 2015, CHADEMA and its presidential candidate, Edward Lowassa, denounced the presidential results. They claimed that the results were rigged in favour of the ruling party. CHADEMA had submitted a petition, albeit in vain, demanding NEC to halt the announcement of results. Subsequently, they boycotted the presidential winner declaration ceremony, the swearing-in of the presidential elect and the inauguration of the 11<sup>th</sup> parliament (TEMCO, 2016). The moves, although peaceful, daunted the country's democratic consolidation and culture.

### **Civic Education**

Democracy thrives when the people in a polity embrace a democratic political culture. Citizen needs to be inculcated on their civic rights and duties as well as the values of a democratic political system (Riutta, 2007). Civic education programmes are the most important means to achieve these ends. To be sure, the African Conference on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2003 called on the continent's Election Management Bodies (EMBs) to develop education programmes on democratic values, good governance and constitutionalism with a specific emphasis on electoral democracy in rural areas, considering cultural and linguistic diversity. It further argued that the EMBs should work closely with civil societies and ensure adequate resources for the effective delivery of civic education. Election observers have repeatedly recommended civic education programs to impact the conduct of electoral actors (TEMCO, 1997-2016; Commonwealth, 1995-2015; EU, 2005-2015; TACCEO, 2010 & 2015).

On the eve of the multiparty system in Tanzania, the Presidential Commission on Multipartyism proposed massive civic education countrywide to inculcate multiparty values and usher in a democratic political system against the background of single-party values. Kapepwa

Tambila summarises the purpose of civic education as to instil “the political culture of expressing differences without fighting, the inculcation in students and pupils of the ideas on the constitution and Human Rights” (Tambila, 1995: 480). Notwithstanding, the government rejected the proposal. Most Tanzanians, including politicians, are inept in democratic values and political culture. Tanzania's political culture is "characterised by frequent tradeoffs between these values; none reigns supreme. Liberal democratic values may be compromised if they are seen to threaten social harmony or civic peace...Tanzanians still often tend to be deferential and prefer to keep quiet rather than challenge authority in public” (Hyden, 1999:151).

The study by REDET described Tanzanians as unveiling essentially "subjects" culture. That was due to the values so well imparted to them by the party order (1965 – 1992) and "Ujamaa", a form of socialism. Similarly, Afrobarometer survey results (2002 and 2013) consolidate this observation when it was found that Tanzanians are not actively demanding their rights. Observers missions have noted that a lack of civic education impacts voters' and political parties' effective election participation. For instance, low voter turnout in the 2010 general election resulted from a shortfall in civic education (Commonwealth, 2010). In the same vein, the conduct of law enforcement agencies during elections has been affected by such a deficit (TEMCO, 2011; TACCEO, 2010; 2016; Tanzania Elections Watch, 2021). Despite the recommendations made by election observers, a countrywide civic education campaign is yet to be realised after 31 years of multiparty democracy.

### **Women Electoral Participation**

The participation of women in elections, as aspirants and candidates, remains low in Tanzania. Women comprise most of the population, so their marginalisation in elections negates inclusive democracy principles. Election observers have consistently recommended to political parties, EMBs and the government to increase the participation of women in elections as candidates (TEMCO, 2006-2016; Commonwealth, 2005-2015; EU, 2005-2015; TACCEO, 2010 & 2016). The data of general elections, held every five years since 1995, show the magnitude of the problem. Tanzania had its first female presidential candidate in 2005. There was none in 2010, one in 2015 and two in 2020. The percentage of women parliamentary candidates was 13%, 18%, 19% and 23% in the 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020 general elections respectively. The figures for the councillorship election reveal a rather unconvincing trend. Their

percentage of female candidates was 6%, 7%, 6% and 8% in respective elections, as shown in Table 1 below.

**Table 2: Distribution of Women and Men Candidates (2005-20)**

Election	Parliament			Councillor			Percentage of Women	
	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men	Total	Parliament	Councillor
2005	159	1,063	1,222	441	7,120	7,561	13%	6%
2010	191	845	1,036	559	7,375	7,934	18%	7%
2015	233	976	1,209	670	10,046	10,716	19%	6%
2020	293	964	1,257	669	7,893	8,562	23%	8%

Source: NEC reports (2006; 2011; 2016 & 2021)

Political parties, although not the only ones, are the critical factor for women's low participation in elections in Tanzania (Makulilo, 2009; TEMCO, 2016). Political parties are gatekeepers of electoral participation, as candidates must vie through a political party.<sup>10</sup> However, the decision-making structures and norms within political parties affect the participation of women in decision-making and, subsequently, their electoral participation. It is held that “most of existing political parties are male dominated in decision-making positions...Male-dominated political parties will only support some quotas or affirmative action which favour their position, rather than those which will substantially transform party politics and finally have a larger impact on the political play field” (Meena, 2009:14-5). Despite repeated proposals by observers, the law does not set a mandatory quota of women nominated as electoral candidates by political parties or women member constituencies as in neighbouring states of Kenya and Uganda.

On the contrary, Tanzania implements a quota system known as special seats.<sup>11</sup> Here, women do not seek direct election. Instead, they are nominated by political parties into decision-making bodies subject to the performance of their parties in the election. Although the system has been a significant channel for women into decision-making bodies, it has equally attracted criticism. It is patriarchy-controlled and subjected; leaders from the system lack power and status vis-à-vis those directly elected, and it is marred by corruption (Makulilo, 2009; Makulilo &

<sup>10</sup> Article 38 (1) (c) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977

<sup>11</sup> Article 66 (1) (b) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 & The Local Government (District and Urban) Authorities CAP 287 and 288

Henry, 2021). In the light of observers' recommendations, the quota system does not enhance women's electoral participation. Special seat candidates do not seek the mandate of voters but that of their political parties. Hence, the proposal to increase the number of female candidates seeking direct electoral tickets remains pertinent.

## **Uganda**

Uganda re-introduced a multiparty system in 2005. Political parties had been banned from 1986 after President Yoweri Museveni came into power. Since the return of multiparty politics, it has conducted four successive general elections in 2006, 2011, 2016 and 2021. Uganda is described as a dominant party system with overtly military involvement in politics (Tangri & Mwenda, 2013). Despite being categorised as 'not free' by Freedom House, Uganda's elections are relatively competitive. For instance, in the 2021 election, the share of the ruling party's and the opposition's presidential votes was 58% and 42%, respectively. Elections observers have monitored elections in Uganda since 2006 and issued proposals on reform areas to improve the quality of elections. Table 3 summarises election observers' main recommendations for Uganda and shows the implementation status. As in Table 1, The 'tick' (✓) mark indicates the issuance of the recommendation, while the 'X' mark denotes the recommendation was not issued. Where the recommendation is issued in three successive elections indicates inadequate implementation.

**Table 3: Summary of Election Observers Recommendations in Uganda**

N/A	Area	Specific Recommendation	Election Year				Status
			2006	2011	2016	2021	
1	Electoral framework and administration	<i>Reform the appointment of the Electoral Commission to make it independent.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	No implementation
2	Inclusivity and Representation	<i>Ensure the participation of women, youth and people with disabilities.</i>	✓	✗	✗	✗	Fairly implemented
3	Media Environment	<i>Enhance equal access to media among all political parties and candidates during elections.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	No implementation
		<i>Uganda Broadcasting Corporation will transform into an independent public broadcaster.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	
		<i>Ensure unrestricted internet and social media during elections.</i>	✗	✗	✓	✓	
4	Campaign Finances	<i>Adopt a law to monitor and regulate campaign finances.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	No implementation
		<i>Public resources should not be used to the advantage of any one political party.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	
		<i>Regulate the use of state resources for campaign purposes.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	
		<i>Enforce the current legislation against vote buying.</i>	✗	✓	✓	✓	
5	Observance of Human Rights and Electoral Freedoms	<i>Protect fundamental liberties in the entire electoral cycle.</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	Partially implemented
		<i>Create a new National Voter Register.</i>	✓	✓	✗	✗	
		<i>Security forces to avoid undue displays of power and exercise restraint</i>	✗	✓	✓	✓	

**Source:** Compiled from Election Observation reports



Research shows that in Uganda, only 5% of election observers' recommendations have been fully implemented, and 17% partially implemented despite being issued after every election (Dodworth et al., 2020). Specifically, critical unimplemented proposals, as shown in Table 3, concern electoral framework and administration, campaign finances, and the media environment. The specific proposal and their implementation are discussed in the forthcoming sections.

### **Electoral Framework and Administration**

The Uganda electoral commission has been described as not independent. The basis for such a view mainly rests on the legal framework guiding the appointment of the commission. The Constitution and Electoral Commission Act mandates that the President appoint the electoral commission.<sup>12</sup> The parliament should approve the appointment.<sup>13</sup> The President is also vested with powers to remove commissioners due to incapacity or incompetence to hold the position.<sup>14</sup> Election observers have consistently proposed the reform of the commission's appointment mechanism to ensure inclusiveness, a broad-based process, protection of members from any vested interest, and credibility and security of tenure for commissioners (DEMG, 2006; HRW, 2006; AU, 2016; Commonwealth, 2011 & 2016; EU, 2011 & 2016). Also, in 2009, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) panel of eminent persons recommended reforming "a system of appointing electoral commissioners so that only non-partisan, independent and professional people with a high reputation are selected" (APRM, 2009: 284).

The provisions mandating the President to appoint the commission give the executive the power to appoint loyal individuals to uphold its interests (HRW, 2006; Abrahamsen & Bareebe, 2016). Although the parliament must approve the appointment, the parliament has always been dominated by the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). The opposition, activists, election observers and researchers have pointed to the commission's lack of independence and impartiality (Tangri & Mwenda, 2013). The commission's decisions and conduct favour the ruling party in several elections. For instance, in the 2006 general elections, the local election observer group noted that 1500,000 eligible voters were denied the right to vote. It further projected that the total

---

<sup>12</sup> Section 60 of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995

<sup>13</sup> Article 60(1) of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995

<sup>14</sup> Article 60(8) of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995

number of such cases nationwide could reach over 400,000 voters. Most victims were from opposition strongholds, exacerbating allegations that the move was deliberate (DEMGGroup, 2006).

In the presidential results petition, filed after the election, the Court established that the 2006 elections were significantly marred by voter bribery, intimidation, multiple voting, ballot stuffing and disenfranchisement of voters, and inaccuracies in the counting and tallying of results.<sup>15</sup> A significant number of these malpractices were attributed to electoral officials. However, the commissioners were re-appointed by the President and subsequently approved by the parliament. That was despite poor performance and accusations of bias, as shown in the court ruling and reported by election observers. The anomalies were advantageous to the incumbent, making the commission competent for the task in the eyes of the President and the parliament. As a response, the opposition threatened to withdraw from electoral processes and called for the disbandment of the electoral commission towards the 2011 general elections. They claimed the commission lacked independence and impartiality to deliver free and fair elections (Sekaggya, 2015).

The 2016 election was described as the most rigged in Uganda (Cheeseman et al., 2016). The electoral commission and its officials were heavily involved in election manipulation and fraud in favour of the ruling party (Henry, 2017). Nevertheless, This was expected as in the time heading to the election, "the President had the EC [electoral commission] more or less in the palm of his hand" (Abrahamsen & Bareebe, 2016: 752). The statement by the Commonwealth Observer mission Chairperson on the election read: "Uganda has fallen well short of meeting many of the key democratic benchmarks for the conduct of credible elections" (Commonwealth, 2016: iv). Election observers reiterated their call for reforming the appointment of the commission to make it independent and impartial. However, the proposals were ignored. The ruling party, NRM and its presidential candidate were the beneficiaries of such lapses, making the recommended reforms unfeasible. As a result, the EU and USA observation missions declined to deploy observers in the 2021 general elections, citing a lack of implementation of previous recommendations and the credibility of elections, respectively.

---

<sup>15</sup> Col. Rtd Kizza Besigye vs Yoweri Museveni and the Electoral Commission (Election Petition No. 1 of 2007).

## **Monitoring of Campaign Finance**

There are no effective mechanisms to oversee the campaign finances in Uganda. The NRM and its candidates are the primary beneficiaries of this opaqueness. That gives the ruling party an advantage vis-à-vis the opposition. Even the Electoral Commission acknowledges its weakness in the oversight of campaign finance (Sekaggya, 2015). Against this backdrop, election observers have recommended regulating political parties spending during campaigns to create a levelled playing field, enhancing the electoral commission's capacity to oversight campaign finance and change the law to enable eligible political parties to receive State contributions for the election campaign on an equitable basis (EU, 2011 & 2016; Commonwealth, 2011 & 2016). However, there has not been a will to implement the recommendations. The ruling party and other actors have been reluctant to accept and implement the proposal as they will weaken their key electoral advantage.

Using public resources for electoral campaigns remains a critical problem in Uganda. The government and ruling party rely on public resources for campaigns. In the 2011 election, observers noted widespread vote buying and voter bribery, mostly involving NRM candidates and officials (DEMGGroup, 2011). For instance, in the Mbale district, EU observers directly observed two NRM rallies where money believed to have been obtained from public funds was given to supporters (notes of US\$ 1,000 together with a specimen ballot paper with a tick mark for the incumbent President). Also, in Kapchorwa, observers witnessed the delivery of two combined harvesters valued at US\$ 1 billion during the rally of the NRM parliamentary candidate. In Masaka, the meetings of the NRM Entrepreneurs League at the regional level, attended by five entrepreneurs from every district, each participant received US\$ 50,000 for mobilisation of the voters in their district (EU, 2011:13). Similarly, in the run towards 2016 election, President Museveni spent over USD 4 million in donations between January and August 2015. It was estimated that Museveni spent at least 773 billion Ugandan shillings (about £170 million) in his 2016 presidential campaign. The funds were obtained from public coffers (Commonwealth, 2016).

Lack of campaign finances monitoring mechanisms induces corruption in Uganda's elections. Elections are when candidates compete to buy support by exchanging money and materials to win the election (Abrahamsen & Bareaebe, 2016). In 2005, the domestic judicial commission of Inquiry into misuse of money from the U.N. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis

and Malaria disclosed that Ministers had borrowed funds from the Ministry of Health to campaign during the 2005 referendum (HRW, 2006:18). In the same vein, unregulated spending has resulted into the entry of dirty money into politics. For instance, there were reports of undisclosed sums of money from various sources during the 2016 election (Commonwealth, 2016). That raises the danger of money laundering, insecurity and impediments to democracy. Therefore, election observation recommendations on monitoring campaign finances remain relevant for a functioning democracy in Uganda despite the lack of implementation.

### **Media Environment**

In Uganda, the media environment has been severely restricted. In 2023, Uganda is ranked 102<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Boarder press-freedom index. Journalists in Uganda face restrictions on what to cover, arrests, proprietor influence and acts of violence (HRW, 2005). For instance, from October 2015 to the 2016 general election, more than 40 journalists had been arrested, beaten, prevented from working or deprived of their equipment by police (Commonwealth, 2016). The media environment significantly affects elections in Uganda. The media openly favours the ruling party and grants the opposition minimal access. Election observers have proposed reforms to the environment and conduct. Specifically, election observation missions recommend that the media ensure equal coverage and access by all political parties and provide voters with relevant and adequate information (Commonwealth, 2011 & 2016; EU, 2011 & 2016; DEMGroup, 2006; 2011). However, the recommendations remain inadequately implemented.

The public media is required to exercise fairness in elections. The requirement is enshrined in the Constitution, which states, "All presidential candidates shall be given equal time and space on the state-owned media to present their programmes to the people."<sup>16</sup> The Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) has failed to comply with this requirement. It has repeatedly given the incumbent President and the ruling party more coverage than the opposition. For instance, in the 2011 election, UBC broadcasted the NRM and President Museveni's campaigns for fourteen hours a day while allocating only 56 minutes for all opposition parties and candidates (EU, 2011). Also, issues concerning the opposition are often reported negatively. UBC enjoys more coverage than

---

<sup>16</sup> Article 67 of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995

other private media, so its conduct unfairly benefits the ruling party and its candidates. Thus, the demands for UBC's fairness and balance in reporting election issues according to the law are yet to be seriously addressed.

The media environment in Uganda has impelled the opposition to turn to internet-based platforms for political and election activities. Increasingly, opposition political parties and candidates use social media accounts and other internet-based channels to reach voters and deliver information (Abrahamsen & Bareebe, 2016). However, the government has frequently interfered with the internet to restrict the use of social media to curtail the opposition. In the 2016 election, the government blocked access to social media platforms at the order of President Museveni, an NRM presidential candidate. President Museveni justified the ban as a security measure to curb lies that incite violence and illegal declaration of results (EU, 2016). The ban lasted for five days. It affected the opposition's ability to monitor voting and report illegalities and the media's ability to report election day events. It restricted the freedom of speech and access to information among Ugandans.

Election observers voiced against blocking the internet and social media as they were the viable information channels during elections amid a restricted and repressive media environment. In its recommendations, the Commonwealth observation mission held that "government authorities should refrain from blocking social media during future elections, as this represents an unwarranted infringement on freedom of expression and freedom of the press" (Commonwealth, 2016: 29). Yet, the proposal was neglected. In the following election, held in 2021, the government imposed a five-day internet blackout. This time, President Museveni, a presidential candidate, justified the ban by accusing Facebook and other platforms of taking sides against his political party (AlJazeera, 12 January 2021). The ban on social media in the 2016 and 2021 elections shows how much the ruling party benefits from the existing media environment. Unsurprisingly, the ruling party presidential candidate jubilantly justified such an undemocratic endeavour in 2016 and 2021. Interfering with the internet suppresses alternative channels of freedom of expression and getting information and confines the opposition to a restrictive environment against election observers' recommendations.

## **Explaining Non-Implementation of Observation Recommendations**

This section explains the state of implementation of election observation recommendations in Tanzania and Uganda. First, the nature of the Third Wave of democratic regimes is inimical to free and fair elections. Political institutions in these regimes retain their previous role of serving certain actors at the expense of others, as during the pre-transition period (Carothers, 2002). The executive branch of government is under a strong president whose powers exceed those stated in the Constitution (Basedau, 2011). Levitsky and Way (2010) categorise these regimes as competitive authoritarianism, characterised by abuse of state powers, biased media coverage and harassment of opposition candidates and activists. These traits are paramount for the life and survival of the regime (van de Walle, 2003). Against this backdrop, the election observation recommendations to improve the quality of elections are contradictory to the regimes' typical features and, therefore, unwelcome. However, the implementation is partial or selective even when observation proposals are accepted. For instance, as shown in this paper, there is unequal treatment of opposition candidates by the state-owned media public contrary to the Constitutional requirement. Similarly, in Tanzania, the government appealed the Court's decision that barred the use of DEDs as returning officers despite reiterated concerns about how their use dents the independence and impartiality of the electoral commission.

Secondly, Africa's *raison d'être* of political power is adverse to election observation recommendations. Regimes are to stay in power by any means possible (Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Kovacs & Bjarnesen, 2018). That is well captured by Kwame Nkrumah's assertion that "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else shall be added unto you." Political power is a window of economic opportunities and resource access in Africa, translating to more political power (Bates, 1983; van de Walle, 2003). Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of election observation recommendations is to create a level playing field favourable for free and fair elections (Kelley, 2012). The goal is paradoxical to the African regime's *raison d'être*. While the improved quality of elections gives credit to incumbents in the eyes of 'democracies' and at home, it potentially threatens their stay in power or erodes their dominance (Huntington, 1991; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). Incumbents are thus forced to choose between being in good books or maintaining a grip on power. Since the cost of democratisation outweighs the benefits to the incumbent, holding onto power becomes an overriding objective (i.e. a necessary evil) above democratising.

Lastly, election and governance are primarily domestic affairs of sovereign states. States may use sovereignty as a pretext to refuse to implement the election observation recommendations (Laakso, 2002). International election observers rely on their parent states, agencies, or organisations to influence the implementation of their recommendations (Hyde, 2007). The international community apply various political and economic measures to ensure the implementation of the recommendations (Marinov, 2005). However, compliance mechanisms have become less effective with the rise of a multipolar world, which encourages equality and respect for sovereignty among states (Kelley, 2012). As such, the Western 'democracies' leverage over African states has diminished. Certainly, the rise of China and Russia has provided Africa with an alternative to economic and security affairs. These emerging powers exhibit little concern for domestic governance as their 'modus operandi' is based on non-interference doctrine. That contributes to democratic backsliding (Hess & Aidoo, 2019). The Freedom House's 2022 notes that the world, particularly Africa, has experienced 16 consecutive years of democratic decline. Thus, since 2006, the countries backsliding to authoritarianism have outnumbered those with democratic gains (Freedom House, 2022).

## **CONCLUSION**

This paper was set to examine the implementation of election observation recommendations to improve the quality of subsequent elections. Focusing on Tanzania and Uganda, the paper has argued that implementing observers' recommendations is inadequate. Further, it has established that, in the two countries, actors deliberately shun observers' recommendations to avoid weakening their position. Where reforms have been adopted and even put into law, the paper has shown that they are often disregarded or selectively implemented in favour of the incumbent. The accounts of hesitancy to implement election observation recommendations include the nature of regimes, Africa's *raison d'être* of political power and assertiveness to state sovereignty in an increasingly multipolar world.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

This study recommends the formation of inclusive coalitions and networks that will strategically drive the implementation of election observers' recommendations. However, as democracy and elections are primarily domestic affairs, domestic stakeholders should play a sizable

role through advocacy, activism, cooperation, lobbying, litigation, and oversight of implementing election observation recommendations. As shown in the paper, the government's involvement is equally paramount in implementing election observation recommendations. As for further research, there is a need for a comparative study dealing with many cases. Also, future studies can employ quantitative methods as well as primary sources of data collection such as surveys and interviews.

## REFERENCES

- Abrahamsen, R. & Bareebe, G. (2016). "Uganda's 2016 elections: Not even faking it anymore", *African Affairs*, 115 (461), 751–65
- Afrobarometer Website. (2023). "A pan-African series of national public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, and society", <https://www.afrobarometer.org/> [accessed 25 March 2023].
- AlJazeera. (12 January 2021). "Uganda's Museveni says social media shut down ahead of tense vote", <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/12/unprecedented-violence-as-uganda-gears-up-for-elections> [accessed 21 June 2022].
- APRM. (2009). "Country Self-Assessment Report: Republic of Uganda", APRM Country Review Report.
- AU. (2016) "African Union Election Observation Mission to the 18 February 2016 General Elections in the Republic of Uganda: A Preliminary Statement" AU: <https://eisa.org.za/pdf/uga2016au1.pdf> [Retrieved on 10 July 2018].
- Bakari, M.A. (2001). *The democratisation process in Zanzibar: A retarded Transition*. Hamburg: Institute Für Afrika-Kunde.
- Basedau, M. (2011). "Managing ethnic conflict: The menu of Institutional Engineering", GIGA Working Paper No. 171.
- Bates, R. (2008). *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. University Press.
- Bjornlund, E. (2004). *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy*, Washington DC; Baltimore; London: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bratton, M. & van de Walle, N. (1997). *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carothers, T. (1997). "The Observers Observed", *Journal of Democracy*, 8 (3), 17–31.
- Collier, P. (2009). *War, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*, HarperCollins, New York.



- Comma, M.F., Ferran; Nai, A., & Norris, P. (2015) "Democratic Diffusion: How Regional Organisations Strengthen Electoral Integrity". Executive Report. Washington D.C.: Organization of American States, 2015. <https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/democratic-diffusion>. [Retrieved:10 August 2021].
- Commonwealth (2011) "Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group Uganda General Elections 18 February 2016", The Commonwealth: <http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/Uganda%20COG%20Report%20-%20Final%20-%20PRINT.pdf> [Retrieved:20 June 2015].
- Commonwealth. (2010). "Tanzania General Elections 31st October 2010." Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group; <http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/232431/FileName/FinalReport-TanzaniaCOG.pdf> ; - [Retrieved on 13 August 2013].
- Daxecker, U. E. (2012). "The cost of exposing cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-election Violence in Africa", *Journal of Peace Research*, 49 (4), 503-16
- Daxecker, U. E. (2014). "All quiet on election day? International election observation and incentives for pre-election violence in African elections". *Electoral Studies* 34, 232–243.
- DEMGroup. [Democracy Monitoring Group]. 2006. "2006 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections: Final Report", <https://ujsccommittee.blogspot.com/2014/04/2006-final-electionsmonitoring-%20report.html> [Accessed: 15 August, 2017].
- DEMGroup. (2011). " DEMGroup Long Term Observation Finds Elections Mostly Free but not Fair", [https://www.ndi.org/files/demgroup\\_lto\\_report\\_feb2011.pdf](https://www.ndi.org/files/demgroup_lto_report_feb2011.pdf) [Accessed: 15 August, 2017].
- Dodsworth, S., Bertrand, E., & Hitchen, J. (2020). "Learning from Success: The Implementation of Election Observation Recommendations in Sub-Saharan Africa", Westminster Foundation for Democracy, <https://www.wfd.org/what-we-do/resources/learning-success-implementation-election-observation-recommendations-sub> [Retrieved:10 August 2021].
- EU. (2010). "Tanzania Final Report on General Elections October 2010"; [http://www.eods.eu/library/tanzania-final-report\\_en1.pdf](http://www.eods.eu/library/tanzania-final-report_en1.pdf)
- EU. (2011). "Election Observation Delegation to the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Uganda: 18 February 2011", [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/election\\_observation/missio](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/election_observation/missio)

- ns/2009-2014/2011\_02\_18\_uganda.pdf [Retrieved on 10 July 2022].
- EU. (2016). "Election Observation Delegation to the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Uganda (18 February 2016)", [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/election\\_observation/missions/2014-2019/uganda-2016-02-16.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/election_observation/missions/2014-2019/uganda-2016-02-16.pdf) [Retrieved on 10 July 2022].
- EU. [European Union]. 2008. Handbook for European Union Election Observation, European Commission, Elanders Sverige AB.
- Eylon, Y. & Harel, A. (2006). "The Right to Judicial Review", *Virginia Law Review*, 92(5), 991–1022
- Freedom House. (2022). "Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarianism Rule", Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org> [accessed 21 June 2022].
- George, B. & Kimber, S. (2011). "Developments in election observation" in Schmeets, H. (ed) *International election observation and assessment of elections*, (pp. 27–70), the Hague: Statistics Netherlands.
- Henry, R. (2017). "Guardians of Peaceful Elections? Revisiting the Role of International Election Observers in East Africa", *The African Review*, 44 (2), 83–111.
- Henry, R. (2021). "Electoral Violence in Africa: Tanzania and Malawi in Comparative Perspective", PhD Thesis (Unpublished), University of Dar es Salaam.
- Hess, S. & Aidoo, R. (2019). "Democratic backsliding in sub-Saharan Africa and the role of China's Development Assistance", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57:4, 421-444, DOI: 10.1080/14662043.2019.1646008
- HRW. [Human Rights Watch]. (2006) "In Hope and Fear: Uganda's Presidential and Parliamentary Polls" Issue 1 of Human Rights Watch report, United States of America: Human Rights Watch.
- Huntington, S. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratisation in late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hyde, S. D. (2011). "Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion" *American Journal of Political Science*, 55 (2), 356–69
- Hyden, G. (1999). "Top-Down Democratisation in Tanzania", *Journal of Democracy*, 10 (4), 142-55.
- Kelley, J. (2009). "The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations", *Perspective on Politics*, 7 (1), 59-64

- Kelley, J. (2010). "Election Observers and their Biases", *Journal of Democracy*, 21(3), 158–71.
- Kelley, J. (2012). *Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why it Often Fails*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kovacs, M.S. & Bjarnesen, J. (Eds.). (2018). *Violence in African Elections: Between Democracy and Big Man Politics*. Zed Books.
- Laakso, L. (2002). "The Politics of International Election Observation: The Case of Zimbabwe in 2000", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40(3): 437-64.
- Levitsky, S. & Way, L.A. (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindberg, S. (2006). *Democracy and Elections in Africa*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Lynch, G. & Crawford, G. (2011). Democratisation in Africa 1990–2010: An assessment. *Democratisation*, 18(2), 275-310.
- Lynge-Mangueira, H. (2012). Why 'Professionalizing' International Election Observation Might Not be Enough to Ensure Effective Election Observation, *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm: IDEA*
- Makulilo, A. (2011). "'Watching the watcher': An evaluation of local election observers in Tanzania", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 49(2), 241–262. doi:10.1017/S0022278X11000036
- Makulilo, A. B. (2009). "Whose Affirmative Action is Affirmative? Lessons from Tanzania" *CEU Political Science Journal* 4, (4): 607-637.
- Makulilo, A.B. (2015). "Tanzania", in *Election Management Bodies in East Africa: A Comparative Study of the Contribution of Electoral Commissions to the Strengthening of Democracy, A Review by AfriMAP and Open Society Initiative for East Africa*, (pp. 197-253), Open Society Foundations.
- Makulilo, A.B. & Henry, R. (2021). "Making Inclusion Matter: An Assessment and Recommendations to increase the representation of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities in Tanzania", Final Report, TCD/NDI
- Marinov, N. (2005). "Do economic sanctions destabilise country leaders?", *American Political Science Review*, 49(3): 564–67.
- NEC. (2011). "Report of the National Electoral Commission (Tanzania) on the 2010 Presidential and Parliamentary and Councillors' Elections." Dar es Salaam: Tanzania.

- NEC. (2016). "Report of the National Electoral Commission (Tanzania) on the 2015 Presidential and Parliamentary and Councillors' Elections." Dar es Salaam: Tanzania.
- NEC. (2021). "Report of the National Electoral Commission (Tanzania) on the 2020 Presidential and Parliamentary and Councillors' Elections." Dar es Salaam: Tanzania.
- NEC: (2006). "The Report of the National Electoral Commission on the 2005 Presidential, Parliamentary and Councilors' Elections." Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press.
- Obi, C. I. (2007). "International Election Observer Missions and the Promotion of Democracy: Some Lessons from Nigeria's 2007 Elections", *Politikon*, 35 (1): 69-86
- OSCE. (2016). *Handbook on the Follow-up of Electoral Recommendations*, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw.
- Riutta, S. (2009). *Democratic Participation in Rural Tanzania and Zambia: The Impact of Civic Education*, Boulder, CO: First Forum.
- Roussias, N. & Ruiz-Rufino, R. (2013). "Electoral Observation and the Promotion of Democracy: Wishful Thinking or a Reality?" [https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/90\\_60\\_0.pdf](https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/90_60_0.pdf) [Retrieved on 10 July 2022].
- Sekaggya, M. (2015). "Uganda", in *Election Management Bodies in East Africa: A Comparative Study of the Contribution of Electoral Commissions to the Strengthening of Democracy, A Review by AfriMAP and Open Society Initiative for East Africa*, (pp. 254–93), Open Society Foundations.
- Smidt, H. (2016). "From a perpetrator's perspective: International election observers and post-electoral violence", *Journal of Peace Research*, 53 (2), 226–41
- TACCEO. (2010). "Report on the United Republic of Tanzania General Elections of 2010", LHRC and TACCEO.
- TACCEO. (2016). "Report on the United Republic of Tanzania General Elections of 2015", LHRC and TACCEO.
- Tambila, K. (1995). "The Transition to Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania: Some History and Missed Opportunities", *Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, 28(4), 468-88.
- Tangri, R. & Mwenda, A. M. (2013). *The Politics of Elite Corruption in Africa: Uganda in Comparative African Perspective*, Routledge.
- Tanzania Elections Watch. (2021). "Final Observation Report on the General Election Held In Tanzania On October 28, 2020", <https://www.khrc.or.ke/publications/226-final-election-observation->

- report-on-the-general-elections-held-in-tanzania-on-october-28-2020/file.html, [Retrieved on 9 March 2023].
- TEMCO (2006). "The Report of the 2005 General Elections in Tanzania", Dar es Salam University Press, DSM.
- TEMCO. (2016). "The Report of the 2015 General Elections in Tanzania", REDET, DSM.
- TEMCO. (1997). "The Report of the 1995 General Elections in Tanzania", Dar es Salam University Press, DSM.
- TEMCO. (2001). "The Report of the 2000 General Elections in Tanzania", Dar es Salam University Press, DSM.
- TEMCO. (2011). "The Report of the 2010 General Elections in Tanzania", Dar es Salam University Press, DSM.
- van Cranenburgh, O. (2000). "Democratisation in Africa: the Role of Election Observation", in Abbink, J. & Hesselings, G. (eds.), *Election Observation and Democratization in Africa*, New York: Palgrave Publishers (pp. 21–36).
- van de Walle, N. (2003). Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41 (2), 297-321.