The Southern African Development Community and the Challenges of Southern Africa Regional Security

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Abstract: Southern Africa currently faces several challenges threatening the regional's security architecture. Many of these challenges are inter connected and can be identified as causes of insecurity or factors contributing to insecurity, and take many forms, including governance issues, intra-state conflicts, and social inequality and election manipulations. Moreover, they constitute a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the African continent. This paper draws upon mostly primary sources including treaties, protocols, reports, communiqué, and statements, as well as secondary information from previous research.Based on data from official documents and qualitative interviews, this paper found that SADC lacks the capacity and culture to deal with some of the challenges facing the region. And its legal and political framework in dealing with some of challenges is seriously questioned. Thus the regional body needs time and more experience for the successful evolvement in dealing with variety of challenges and crises such as unconstitutional government changes in Southern Africa. The paper recommended that SADC member states must strengthen regional body, and they must enhance the capacities of the regional security architecture in order to address challenges pertaining to the region.

Keywords: regional, regionalism, security, peace, challenges, and
governance

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Southern African region has been peaceful and stable compared to other regions in Africa (Hammerstad, 2005: 77; SADC, 2010b: 45), largely due to the dramatic end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, which was most intense in the region compared to other areas of Africa. The end of the Cold War contributed to the significant diminishing of threats to national and regional security following the ceasefires in Mozambique (1992), Angola (2002) and the Democratic Republican of Congo (DRC) (2003). In addition, peaceful democratic transformations from one-party states to multi-party states and the successful holding of periodic elections in some countries in the region, such as Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania contributed to an increasing stability in the region.

However, as contended by Galtung (1990; 1996) and Klingebiel *et al* (2008) this stability does not constitute real peace, but rather simply the absence of war.[2] The militarisation in the political arena, poverty, election manipulations, and violations of basic rights, communal violence and bad governance posing threats are also indicators of lack of real peace in the region. Often entire threats are purely internal and render some states in the region as hot spots for violence. Malawi, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, DRC, Comoros and Swaziland provide examples of Southern Africa region security challenges that SADC as a regional organisation needs to attend to. These countries manifest the consequences of governance deficit and problems of democratic transition. In a nut shell, the SADC region is facing an "erosion of democracy" partly caused by a failure of regional leaders to live up to their own agreements concerning the rule of law.

Against this background this paper discussed the challenges to the peace and security facing SADC region. In this paper term SADC region refers the areas in East and Southern Africa occupied by member states of SADC, which are Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The discussion is divided into four sections. It begins with an overview of the literature related with linkage between security and regionalisms. Subsequently, the challenges to peace and security facing Southern Africa are addressed in the third section. It will consider the attempts by SADC to address challenges to peace and security facing the regional. This paper also seeks to explore the strengths and weaknesses of SADC in addressing political crises emanating from bad governance, unconstitutional changes of government and contested electoral results. These problems are among the most prominent sources of instability confronted by SADC. Lastly the paper discusses why most of the challenges persist despite all effort to address it from SADC and its member states. It finalise with conclusion and some suggestion on how to address those challenges.

METHODOLOGY

The paper is derived from field trips conducted by the author in April, May in 2014 and June in 2015 in the SADC Headquarters in Gaborone. The purpose of the journey was to meet with SADC officials in Gaborone to

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[2]According to Galtung (1990, 1996) and Klingibiel (2008) Peace does not mean the total absence of any conflict, but rather the absence of violence in all forms and the unfolding of conflict in a constructive way. Peace therefore exists where people are interacting non-violently and are managing their conflict positively-with respectful attention to the legitimate needs and interest of all concerned.

discuss on the issue related to peace and security in Southern Africa. The paper also heavily draws from detailed interviews and numerous discussions since April 2014 with diplomats, military officers, and foreign officials and leading analysts on regional and continental security in Africa. In addition, official documents from SADC and other publications obtained in the libraries and online sources were reviewed. The principal documents for evaluation include the SADC Treaty, Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), SADC resolution related to DRC, Madagascar, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe, treaties, protocols, declarations, reports, communiqué, statements, and previous research findings from different research institutions on SADC and its institutions. These documents were accessed through different means; that is, from relevant authorities in Gaborone and on their official website.

LITERATURE CONSIDERATION

The available literature indicates that security and regionalism have been on the African agenda since the wave of most African states' independence in the early 1960s (van Walraven, 1999, 2010; Franke, 2009; Lisakafu, 2013). SADC as an inter-governmental and multipurpose regional organisation was established in August 1992. The organisation committed member states to eleven principle objectives, most of which revolved around promoting self-sustaining development, economic growth, socio-economic development and poverty alleviation through regional integration; consolidating, defending and maintaining democracy, peace, security and stability; promoting common political values and institutions that are democratic, legitimate and effective; achieving complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; the mobilisation of regional and international private and public resources for the development of the region; combating deadly and communicable diseases; and main-streaming gender in the process of community building (SADC, 1992: 5).

In order to achieve the objectives set out in Article 5(1) and Article 5(2) of the Treaty, it outlines ten strategies and projects, including harmonising political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states; cementing cultural ties across the region and human resources development; promoting the coordination and harmonisation of member states' international relations; and creating appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of the SADC and its institutions.

Article 4 of the SADC treaty provides five principles that commit SADC and its member states to the sovereign equality of all member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy, the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Additionally, SADC member states agreed to co-operate in certain areas, including politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security, food security, land and agriculture, infrastructure and services, industry, trade, investment and finances, human resource development, science and technology, natural resources and environment; social welfare, information and culture (SADC, 1992a: 21(3)(a-g)).

SADC was preceded by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was founded in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 1980 (SADCC, 1980). The organisation was originally an alliance of Frontline States (FLS), whose main objectives involved the political liberation of Southern African states and their defence against aggression by the South African apartheid regime. At that time, the nature of the security cooperation was held as a combination of formal and informal nature, and aimed at lobbying for the liberation of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Realising that economic development and security were closely interlinked, in 1996 SADC member states decided to establish the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), a security regime with the purpose of preventing, managing and resolving regional conflicts primarily through peaceful means, and also promoting political, defence and security cooperation among member states (SADC, 1996).[3]

During the process of strengthening its peace and security mechanism, SADC member states signed the Mutual Defence Pact in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 26 August 2003 (SADC, 2003: para. 40). The aim of the pact was to provide mechanisms for preventing conflict between SADC countries and with other countries, and furthermore for SADC member states to act together against outside aggressions. At the time of writing this paper both the OPDSC Protocol and Mutual Defence Pact were not yet signed and ratified by all member states.

The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was also approved on 26 August 2003 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and launched by SADC's Head of States and Government in August 2004 in Mauritius (SADC, 2003, 2003: para.37, 2004: para.7, 2005: 11; 2010: 6). The SIPO is a five-year strategic

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[3]See Makinda and Okumu 2008: 55 for a similar observation.

plan policy document that was established with the aim of providing guidelines and strategies for the implementation of the objectives of the Organ Protocol. Thus, in 2007 SADC officials started the process of reviewing and re-evaluating SIPO in order to ensure it is in line with changing circumstances in SADC region (SADC, 2010a: 19; 2012: 5). As will be discussed later, the evaluation process was successfully completed on 20 November 2012 after a second edition. The revised SIPO was officially launched in Arusha, Tanzania (SADC, 2012).[4]

The brief review provided above highlights that SADC passed through different phases of security cooperation in the region prior to reaching the current regional peace and security architecture (Cilliers, 1995, 1999; Malan, 1998; Omari and Macaringue, 2007). However, within this new peace and security architecture, the conflict management component in SADC body now focuses on diplomatic means for conflict resolutions, exemplified by attempts to address the insecurity situations in Zimbabwe, DRC, Madagascar and Lesotho. Later on in this paper provide a detailed explanation of how the regional body addresses various challenges arising in member states.

LINKAGE BETWEEN PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONALISM

As emphasised from the aforementioned discussion, there is a strong linkage between peace, security, the tendency of local conflicts to be regionalised, and a need for conflict resolution to be embedded in regional security arrangements. This implies close linkages between peace, security and regionalism as referred to by several scholars as "security regionalism" (Buzzan, 1991; Hettne, 2008: 403-404; Söderbaum and Hettne, 2010: 16; Söderbaum, 2015:120), that is regional dimensions of security (Hettne, 2008: 403).

Prior to proceeding further with this discussion, it is useful to clarify the meaning of the term "region", because the two terms "region" and "regionalism" are widely used in the field of International Relations (IR), yet defining these terms has been a difficult task within IR literature (Godehardt and Nabers, 2011: 2-3; Paul, 2012: 4). In the political arena, the term "region" refers to space and place (i.e. territorial unit/geographic area such as Africa, Europe or Asia), whereas "regionalism" as the formation of and policies pursued by inter-state groups based around regions has stood

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[4]The first version of the SIPO covered 2004-2009. The updated version- The Harmonised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO II) covers the period 2010-2015. (http://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/) (24.12.2014).

the test of time (Nye, 1968). Also it denotes an aim or objectives (Paasi, 1996: 208; Tavares, 2004). Nevertheless, several authors consider two issues in defining the term region: the role of state and geographical proximity (Godehardt and Nabers, 2011: 3). For instance, Nye (1968: xii) defines region as a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and a degree of mutual interdependence. Thompson (1973: 101) regards region as patterns of relations or interactions within a geographic area that exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a change at one point in these patterns affects others. The above definitions show that regionalism and state power do not stand in opposition to one another, and that states remain an essential building block from which arrangements are constructed. Based on the above definitions, in the context of this study regionalism is regarded as the willingness of states in the region to co-operate in order to deal with common problems or challenges.

However, there are two definitions of security: a traditional (narrow) and more recent (broader). The traditional concept of security is based on a state's ability to defend itself against external threats. As Walt (1991) articulates, this is a position in which security is state-centric and restricted to the military realm. Traditional security has been seen as closely related to the threat or use of violence and military means regarded as central to the provision of security.[5] This is typically related to the notion of "regime security" and particularly closely linked to the nature of the post-colonial African states, whereby the ruling state's elites are more concerned with the security of the regime (state) than the state as a whole. Thus, they employ a mix of internal and external security strategies aimed at regime survival (Clapham, 1996: 120; Jackson, 2007: 154-155). Internally, ruling elites create policies designed to protect them from internal threats, including the expansion of security forces and their use in suppressing opponents. Externally, they tend to join alliances with external powerful actor(s) to boost regime security by providing a degree of international legitimacy and preventing external threats. Furthermore, they can join other neighbouring states in regional security arrangements primarily designed to support each other, as exemplified by the formation of the SADC, AU and ECOWAS.

The above perspective of security is based on the nation state and has been challenged by many scholars given that the problems faced by the SADC and Africa in general cannot be solved by a single state acting individually. National security challenges require a transnational approach founded

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[5]Theoretically, traditional security view bases on a realist theory pioneered by the German-American scholars Hans J. Morgenthau. The normative core of this theory is national security and state survival (see Jackson and Sorenses 2007: 60).

upon a states' co-operation, and a coordinated strategy that responds to military, political and social challenges. Therefore, in the early 1990s, and after the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) presented human development reports that redefined the concept of security as security for people rather than land or territories, a new term of "human security" was introduced. This emphasised that new concepts of security must focus on the security of people (i.e. human security), and not only of nations; "human security" is described as one of the five pillars of a people-centred world order (UNDP, 1993: 2).[6] In the following year, UNDP argued that "security" pertains to "people rather than territories and development rather than arms", identifying seven sub-areas of "human security": economic, political, food, health, environmental, personal and community (UNDP, 1994).[7]

 Similarly, the ICISS report explains that human security means the security of people, namely their physical safety, economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms (ICISS, 2001: 15). Despite minor differences in each of the above definitions, they commonly emphasise a "widening" of the security concept beyond the national level of states and considering other perspectives such as environmental, health and economic factors.

In linking security and regionalism, Hettne (2008: 404) notes that these two terms could be related in many different ways depending on the unit of investigation or approach chosen. For example, through the Regional Security Complex Theory Buzan (1991: 190) views security regionalism as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot be realistically considered separate from each other. Another potential linkage between regionalism and security was clearly highlighted with former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali's in his report "*An Agenda for Peace*"[8], which was written in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The report provided analysis relates to United Nations (UN) peacemaking, peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy-task which regional arrangements such as AU,

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[6] Other pillars include: new models of sustainable human development; new partnerships between state and markets; new patterns of national and global governance; and new forms of international cooperation (UNDP 1993: 2).

[7] See also Evans 2008: 34-35 for similar observation.

[8] Butros Butros-Ghali, an Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, United Nations: New York 1992.

ASEAN and SADC were invited to share. This is due to the multiple challenges facing the UN system have encouraged regional arrangements in Africa and elsewhere in the worlds to take on much more active roles in the area of security.

As exemplified by the above brief overview of linkage between security and regionalism, the challenges to peace and security in Southern Africa and Africa in general are diverse and pose great demands on regional security apparatus. As it will be discuss in detail below, some of these challenges emanating from bad governance, unconstitutional changes of government, and unequal distribution of resources among citizens among citizens and contested electoral results. These challenges are among the most prominent sources of instability confronted by SADC.

Challenges to Peace and Security in Southern Africa
The challenges facing Southern Africa in terms of peace and security have been discussed for years. Moreover, the overall challenges facing the SADC region apply to other regions of Africa to a significant extent. Such challenges have purely emanated from domestic affairs and governance-related issues, resource allocation, unconstitutional changes of government and many other factors. A lack of good governance, intra-state conflicts and post-election-related violence remain serious challenges for most of the states in Africa, leading to serious security breakdowns and miserable living conditions for the people in the continent. Without neglecting other relevant issues concerning security challenges and attempting any hierarchical ordering of such challenges, this section focuses on the following challenges: lack of good governance, intra-state conflicts, election-related violence, lack of common political regional value, external interference, poverty, social inequality, and the shortage of funds.

The first challenge relates to the lack of good governance. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, almost all threats facing this region, and to a large extent other regions in Africa, purely originate from internal affairs of the states, with the "litany" of these threats emanating from the crises of good governance (Hendricks 2010: 6-7; SADC-CNGO, 2010: 8). According to Cawthra (2006: 90), failure of governance accelerated by lack of good governance constitutes the single most important factor behind the insecurity of many states in Southern Africa. Similarly, a SADC official pointed out during an interview that poor governance from most of the states in the region significantly contributes to insecurity and violence at

national and regional levels.[9] In this study, term "governance" is defined as the exercise of political power to manage the nation's affairs. The lack of good governance is one of the major challenges behind many political crises in the region, marked by the phrase "lack of good governance" being repeatedly mentioned in one of the important policy documents of the SADC (SADC. 2003: 15; SADC-CNGO, 2010: 8). The state leaders of Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Swaziland and Angola have recently created their own "self-defense", building up personal networks of influence rather than holding the all-powerful state accountable for its systemic failure. These state leaders have been accused of diverting state funds for their own benefits, running the countries they lead like their personal properties and refusing to hold credible elections. Consequently, the political field in the affected countries is uneven, with patronage essential in maintaining power.

A SADC official interviewed added that most governments in Southern Africa have thus far failed to address the increasing cost of living, growing poverty, inequality in distribution of resources and corruption due to bad governance. When citizens demand government action towards addressing these problems, governments always react by using brutal force, with such cases witnessed in Zimbabwe, Angola and Swaziland. An increasing militarization of the state and use of armed forces to enforce law and order and quell peaceful protests, for example, in Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Angola and South Africa and neighbouring states in Burundi and Uganda, have exposed these countries to both political and economic crises; adversely affecting the entire population of the respective countries, with women and children often the most affected. Poor governance at national level, resulting in the state's political and economic instability, can lead to instability within the region as an overwhelming number of illegal immigrants cross the porous international borders in search of a better life in nearby states. Therefore, conflict prone areas such as the DRC, Zimbabwe and Somalia have caused insecurity in the SADC region and the Horn of Africa at large.

The second challenge is associated with poverty and social inequality. The SADC Regional Strategic Indicative Development Plan (RISDP) revealed poverty as one of the major development and security challenges facing the SADC region (SADC, –n.d.: 15).[10] Several scholars have highlighted the SADC region as one of the areas in Africa with the poorest countries in the

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[9]Interview with Habib Kambanga, Gaborone, Botswana, 04.05.2015.

[10] See also SADC 2003; Cawthra 2006: 89 for a similar observation.

world, exemplified by around 40 percent of the whole region living on less than one US dollar per day (AU Monitor, 2008). Poverty and social inequality are due to bad governance, raising levels of unemployment and the majority of citizens' inability to access basic needs. In addition, the gap between the rich and poor is increasingly widening in Southern Africa, more than elsewhere in Africa. For example Namibia has one of the highest per capita GDPs in the SADC region. However, Tjatindi (2011) notes that most Namibians live in severe poverty due to large-scale unemployment, while a small proportion of the population enjoys the country's wealth (Mail and Guardian, 05.10.2011). This paper describes the situation as "alarming due to the fact that when people's grievances are not met, economic decline, extreme poverty and marginalised citizens might then reinforce tendencies to resolve to violent means. Accordingly, if African states and regional bodies do not properly address poverty and social inequality, there are high tendencies for conflicts erupting, with Admore Kambudzi suggesting that poverty represents the fundamental course of conflicts on the African continent.[11] As will be later shown in this paper, SADC and member states come-up with many initiative to address the problem including roadmap for poverty reduction, termed RISDP which highlights poverty reduction and eradication as one of the overarching priorities within its integration agenda (SADC, n.d.: 55). Member states also address this poverty and social inequality through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP), and other strategies through the World Bank and IMF programmes. However, there has been no substantial relief, as masses of people in the region remain in extreme poverty, with Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique the most affected countries in the region.

The third challenge is intra-states conflicts, which are perhaps the most significant challenges facing the Southern Africa regional and its people, with crises continuing to erupt without any sign of an end (SADC, 2003; AU, 2009: 21). The most recent intra-state conflicts in the region include those in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, DRC and Madagascar. Most of these crises are purely internal and have a negative impact on the socio-economic development of Africa. Kambudzi pointed out that intra-state conflicts have been the single most devastating challenges for the African continent.[12] According to him, these conflicts come with different names such as election-related violence, rebel movements, guerrilla movements, or private armies, terrorists or secessionist bandits. Furthermore, they are made more complex and lethal by modern technology, modern

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[11]Interview with Admore Kambudzi, Addis Ababa, 30.03.2015.
[12]Ibid.

communications and highly destructive weapons that pose serious challenges not just for individual states' peace and security, but also to the region and Africa as a whole (ICISS, 2001: 4). A key characteristic of these conflicts in Africa is the deliberate targeting of violence on poor and vulnerable civilians, including children and women. The African Commission report (2005: 100) acknowledges that "the toll on human lives has been enormous: civil conflict causes as many deaths in Africa each year as epidemic diseases and is responsible for more death and displacement than famine or floods".

In addition, most of the intra-state conflicts often develop into cross-border wars and become a regional conflict (Jackson, 2002; Söderbaum, 2009; Dersso, 2010). For example, a conflict in the DRC has demonstrated how neighbouring states such as Tanzania, Zambia, Angola and Uganda become involved in one way or another, with a spillover effect on regional stability. The intra-state conflict in the DRC became a matter of international concern, forcing the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force. Such conflicts had a devastating effect on the economic growth of the continent, severely curtailing the realisation of regional objectives such as sustainable economic development through regional economic and social integration.

The transnational character of these conflicts is manifested by an influx of small arms and light weapons, large refugee outflows, illicit trade in natural resources and cross border rebel movements, all of which inevitably affect the security situation in neighboring states. In some instances, rebel groups have fled to nearby states to launch their insurgencies, such as northern Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels operating from Southern Sudan, and Rwandan rebels operating from the eastern DRC. According to Jackson (2002, 2007), intra-states conflicts will continually threaten African states, given that most states are weak and poor. He further suggests that most of the state government machinery in Africa such as administration, security sector, justice system, parliament and local structure are either non-existent or fail to work properly.[13] Similarly to Brown (1996: 573) and Cilliers (2004: 27), he argues that the underlying African peace and security crisis is a serious developmental failure, resulting from bad policy, poor governance and structural factors such as a weak state.

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[13]See also Nathan 2001: 2 for a similar observation.

The fourth challenge is associated with election-related violence. Following the introduction of multi-party systems in Africa in the 1990s, there has been an escalation of more election-related conflicts and political violence than ever before in the SADC region and Africa in general. To-date, Southern African states having experienced election-related violence include Zanzibar (part of Tanzania), Zimbabwe, Lesotho and, Madagascar.

Besides the SADC region, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea already have also experienced such violence, with the trend repeating itself from one election to another. Free and fair elections have become a rare event in these countries, and subsequent elections have become a primary source of conflict, instability and insecurity. For instance, more than 30 Zimbabweans died, with dozens injured and thousands displaced during the post-election political violence of 2008 (*Mail and Guardian* 14.05.2008a). There are several reasons sparking election-related violence.[14] For instance, a report from the AU Panel of the Wise cited the election-related violence in Africa as a sign of weakness in the administration of the election, governance, and a lack of impartial judiciaries to interpret and adjudicate electoral disputes (AU, 2010: 20).

A similar report from the UNDP (2009: 15-17) provides list of underlying and proximate causes of election-related violence, including weak governance, corruption, biased media and security and policing. Tanki Mothae, former director of the SADC Organ, states that election-related violence is one of the challenges confronted by organisations in the democracy project since the early 2000s.[15] He added that post-election violence raises special challenges to peace and security in the region. In fact, states and especially their incumbent presidents are often to blame for these disturbances, despite being aware of new norms and standards of democratic governance adopted by regional bodies such as "SADC Principles and Guideline: Governance Democratic Election" of 2005 and Article 5 of the SADC Treaty, and the NEPAD and its peer review mechanisms. When incumbents lose elections they often refuse to accept the results,[16]recently Zanzibar presidential election stalemate exemplified this statement.

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[14]There is currently no accepted definition of election-related violence, and many definitions strongly rely upon elements of intent or motive. In these definitions, violence is "election violence" if carried out with the intent to influence the election in some way.
[15]Interview with Tanki Mothae, Gaborone, 06.05.2013.
[16]Ibid.

Therefore, a further challenge for the SADC body is reviving political will and creating a new neutral space for citizens' participation and confidence in various aspects of the country's governance process. Given that election-related conflicts are escalating more than ever before, the organisation finds it difficult to gain potential mediators from within national boundaries. The international community has been frequently forced to walk the thin line between respecting the sovereignty of concerned nations while simultaneously placing high regard upon universal principles such as the responsibility to protect in cases where disputes spill over into fully-blown conflicts.

The fifth challenge is related to worrying trend of constitutional amendments aimed at extending the mandates of incumbent president which has led to a number of tensions on the SADC regional and Africa at a largely. Recent years have witnessed Presidents of Namibia, Angola, Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Rwanda successfully extending their power beyond the constitutionally permitted two terms. Similar but unsuccessfully attempted to have their constitutions changed to allow them an additional term in office was followed in Zambia's President Frederick Chiluba in 2001, and Malawi's President Bakili Mulizi in 2003 and DRC's Joseph Kabila in 2015. All those attempts to abolish term limits sparked public demonstration and unrest by citizens. This trend continues in neighbouring countries of SADC, specifically Burundi and Rwanda which also sparked unrest from citizens. This situation exemplify the growing trend of abolishing presidential terms limits without concert of citizens which often leads to protracted in court, on the street or in the worst cases a military crackdown or civil war.

The sixth challenge relates to the lack of common political values from SADC member states. Despite the SADC having adopted a number of steps towards harmonising the continent's numerous security initiatives, including the creation of the SADC Standby Force and the Regional Early Warning System, a lack of common regional values binding members of the SADC remain an obstacle hindering a real approach of peace and security. Franke (2007) noted five possible causes of such divisions: divisions in the mode of administration; the lure of nationalism; institutional weaknesses; and personal powers policies. Franke's explanation is evident in the SADC where most of the member states do not trust each other, with competition on various matters concerning how to move forward for peace and security plans (Nathan, 2004, 2006a; CCR, 2005: 30). The empirical findings of this study note that two camps persist in the region, one of which includes

Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and South Africa. According to them, the states under this camp recognise the SADC Organ as a security regime whose primary basis favours multinational cooperation and peace-making, while the second camp comprising Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe favours a Mutual Defence Pact and has prioritised military cooperation and responses to conflict.[17] This problem emerged as apparent during the crises in the DRC conflict in 1998, whereby member states from the two camps criticized each other regarding how to deal with the DRC conflict (Nkiwane, 2003: 67-69; Nathan, 2006: 280-283). The above division has led SADC to have poor a record of peace making in the region (Schalkwayk, 2005: 37; Nathan, 2006a: 612). Its lack of common political values is similar to other RECs in Africa, where some of the states forge regional ties without any attempts to create common principles and values for a shared regional identity.

The seventh challenge is associated with external interferences mainly from former colonial masters. This perhaps is another of the most significant challenges facing the SADC in addressing current security threats in the regional. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, incidents of Western countries led by Britain, France and the USA interfering with domestic affairs of SADC member states have increased. In an interview, Maaparankoe Mahao[18] stated that such Western countries use aggressive foreign policies towards Africa, and especially in Southern Africa, to protect their own interests. Most of these policies are very destructive, causing security problems and undermining the region's development process. He further highlighted that Western countries currently work openly with rebels in order to overthrow legitimate governments for their own interests. For example, evidence exists that France played a significant role in the Madagascar coup of 17 March, 2009 with favour of Andry Rajoelina (Ellis, 2009: 30-31). Similar explanations emerged from Cawthra (2010: 16), namely that "immediately after the Madagascar coup of March 2009 the French government was quick to work with Rajoelina, and gave him protection during and after the coup". France's behaviour is contrary to Article 4(p) of the AU's Constitutive Act, which condemns and rejects unconstitutional changes of governments. Furthermore, Article 30 of the Act restricts any government that comes to power through unconstitutional means from being allowed to participate in AU's activities.

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[17] See also Omari and Macaringue 2001; van Schalkwyk 2005: 38 for a similar observation.
[18]Interview with Brig. Gen. Maaparankoe, Mahao, Gaborone 03.05.2014.

Similar situation occurred in Zimbabwe whereby the British and their allies used an aggressive foreign policy towards regime change in Zimbabwe, for instance by using the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to fund the opposition, mainly the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), with commitment to free-market policies and the restoration of white farms to their owners. In addition British and its allies that is USA and Australia have imposed economic sanctions on the Zimbabwean government and individuals close to President Mugabe.

In contrast, SADC opposed the economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe, which have had detrimental effects on the people and hindering economic development in the SADC region (see AU, 2009; SADC, 2009). The sanctions generally brought Zimbabwe's economy to its knees with a high rate of inflation, unemployment and poor standards of living. In an interview with SADC Organ officials on 3 May 2014, they admitted that despite problems related with the "fast-track" land reform programme conducted since 2000, foreign interference in the land reform exaggerated the problem through an openly sponsored campaign to see Robert Mugabe ousted. Accordingly, western interference can only make the process of stability in the country and economic solution more difficult. In this regards this paper argues that Zimbabwe needs to find its own path to a peaceful political revolution, rather than those imposed from outside.

The eighth challenge is transnational security threats such as maritime piracy which is a growing threat for security in the eastern part of the SADC region. Since the collapse of the Somalia state in early 1990s, the country has become a breeding ground for pirates, which have posed a threat to international trade and security. In the mid 2000s, Somalia pirates conducted maritime piracy along the coast of Somalia, Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden (Middleton, 2008; Onuoha, 2009).

However, since 2009, pirates have extended their reach to the Southern part of Africa, threatening not only the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and East coast of Somali, but also the south-eastern coast from Kenya, Tanzania to Mozambique, Madagascar and Mauritius territorial waters, affecting people who use the sea and economies of all countries surrounding the horn of Africa, and SADC member states (Onuoha, 2009: 35). For example, Tanzania has experienced almost 30 accidents of pirate attacks (Coetzee, 2011). These accidents not only affect Tanzania but also the whole of Eastern and Southern Africa. The spread of piracy in Southern African waters took top discussion during the SADC Summit in Windhoek,

Namibia from 16 to 17 August, 2010. Additionally, the economic and security threat posed by piracy in the coast waters of SADC member states was noted, especially concerning Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania (SADC, 2010a).

Similarly SIPO II mentions maritime piracy as one of the areas of concern in the region (see SADC, 2010b: 37, 47, 56, and 63). The implication of this situation in Southern Africa and SADC is that the pirate threat has become a reality (Coetzee, 2011). Coetzee (2011) highlights one of the reason why pirates have travelled further from the Horn of Africa to the SADC region: is because Southern Africa route becomes an alternative route for international vessels wishing to avoid the pirates around the Horn of Africa by taking the longer route via the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. Despite the problem is declining due to the fact that there has no ship hijacked in Somalia since 2013. However, many of the root causes are still persist, and the network for the piracy operations that have been built up have not yet probably not been dismantled. Therefore, it is believe that SADC need to continue address this challenge through expanding its remit from counter-piracy to maritime security in general along the coast.

Finally, another major challenge facing the SADC in dealing with security issues in Africa is the lack of financial resources for implementing many projects related to peace and security at continental and regional levels. This situation has become worse. Contributory funding from member states is relatively low, resulting in the large dependence on external partners.[19]However, the evolution of the security mechanism of the organisation, particularly from the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) to the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and the launching of other security programmes, have further underscored the urgency of the regional body to seek alternative funding. In order to fill the gap of budgetary deficit, SADC has partially depended on grants, donations and loans from external partners, which have represented an important means of financing for the organisation and its various projects (van Schalkwyk, 2005). Despite Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe urging African leaders, especially from the SADC region, to

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[19]In this study, external actors refer to external development finances, foreign donor agencies that are not African in origin, for example foreign donor agencies, donor countries and the international development agencies such as UNDP, GIZ and USAID. External actors' support to the SADC has involved a number of issues and programmes in the SADC region, including peace and security, good governance, political integration, strengthening of the SADC secretariat and infrastructure development (water, telecommunication and energy).

pool resources for development and cut down dependency on donor funds during the SADC Summit in Windhoek, Namibia from 16-17 August, 2010 (Njini, 2010), to-date there has been no change towards ensuring that SADC reduces donor dependency. This means that external partners have emerged as crucial stakeholders in SADC's development, playing an essential role in supporting the regional organisation in confronting its peace and security challenges (Tjønneland, 2006; Klingebiel *et al,.* 2008). For instance, sixty percent of the SADC Budget of 2006-2007 was provided by external actors.[20]

Therefore, it is notedin this paper from the preceding discussions that the challenges of peace and security facing the Southern African are not only primarily military, but also political, economic and social in nature. Poverty and social inequality, as well as lack of good governance, are at the heart of the region's instability and insecurity. Accordingly, the following section examines how SADC has addressed peace and security challenges, particularly those resulting from member states such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the DRC, to mention but a few, which provide useful benchmarks for assessing SADC's overall normative and institutional capacity.

SADC Responses to Address Challenges to Peace and Security

Since its restructuring in 2001, SADC, and particularly OPDSC, has been busy trying to calm current security challenges within the region. In order to deal with peace and security challenges, since earlier 2000s SADC initiating various legal instruments that define norms, standards, rules and decision-making procedures agreed by all member states. These legal instruments include various forms of treaties, protocols, principles and guidelines, whose mandates include prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the region. For instance, the founding SADC's Treaty commits member states to peace and security, human rights, democracy, rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes (SADC, 1992a: 5). In this respect, SADC Treaty is very informative about regional challenges and what needs to be achieved. The protocols, declarations, Mutual Defence Pact and the MoU have provided equally clear directions in supporting a regional agenda. Additionally, SIPO as the implementation framework of the Organ Protocol emphasizes a need for peace, security and democratic consolidation in the region (SADC, 2003: 20), including the development of principles governing democratic elections to enhance the

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[20]Interview with Habib Kambanga, Gaborone, 04.05.2015.

transparency and credibility of elections and democratic governance, as well as ensuring the acceptance of elections results by all contesting parties.

Furthermore, in addressing conflicts and instability that have tended to escalate during and around elections in many Southern African states, SADC has developed several norms, principles and guidelines for conducting free and fair elections in the region between 2001 and 2004. For instance, SADC Parliamentary Forum Plenary Assembly, in Windhoek, Namibia adopted norms and standards for the election in SADC region on 25 March, 2001, which was followed by the adoption of an election observation guide for members of parliament in the same year and place. In Durban, South Africa, SADC's Heads of States and Governments put another election instrument in place in 2004, namely the principles and guidelines governing democratic elections in the region. This initiatives clearly set the stage for SADC's efforts towards acceptable, credible and legitimate elections, conducted based on a level playing field and with minimum incidences of violence and conflicts. Among other things, the SADC principles and guidelines for elections commit member states to the following important principles: acceptance and respect of election results by political parties proclaimed as free and fair by the competent National Electoral Authorities in accordance with the law; full participation of citizens in the political process; political tolerance; independence of the judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions; and equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media (SADC, 2003).

These principles do not fundamentally differ from those adopted in 2001. Apart from the election principles and guidelines, SADC is party to various declarations of the UN committing member states to democratic governance and respect and observance of human rights, as enshrined in the 1949 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Despite the aforementioned increased prevention and reaction capacities of the regional body, internal conflicts and other related crisis still occur and there is no sign of an end. The crises in the DRC, Zimbabwe and recently, in Madagascar provide this study with useful benchmarks for assessing SADC's overall normative and institutional capacity.

In addressing problem associated with poverty and social inequality, as previously highlighted there is relevant instruments in place for addressing poverty reduction namely the RISDP and PRSP. Unfortunately there is no relief, as citizens in the regional remain in extreme poverty. Interview with SADC official highlights that it is difficulty to eradicate poverty and inequality in the regional for the reasons that many governments do not

promote the interest of the poor, rather spending taxpayer's money on frivolous expenses that only worsen the impact. Similar to RISDP notes the lack of good governance is one the main reasons for the increasing level of poverty and social inequality in the region (SADC, n.d: 17). Resultant effects include a further rise in poverty, social inequality, socio-economic woes and cultural tensions among different groups. This means, poverty and inequality will persist due to the fact that there is a clear indication that the problem is not or inadequately addressed properly in the implementation of the RISDP and other SADC poverty eradication framework.

Why Challenges Persist and how to avoid them

As we leant earlier in this paper, the fundamentals of an effective and morally acceptable response to the challenges are already articulated in the SADC Treaty, Protocols, guidelines and resolutions, which sets out the core responsibilities that organization and states have towards addressing various challenges facing the region. In spite of all above efforts some of security challenges persist in the region, among these include attempts to abolish a presidential two-term limits, post-election related violence, poor governance as well as social inequality to mention but a few.

Increasing attempts at presidential term extension by some of the governments of the SADC member states and its surrounding neighbours is perhaps the biggest challenges which still continue and seem like no sign to end soon. As we noted earlier SADC and AU adopted several declarations in their quest to ensure the rule of law and good governance, but the implementation on the ground is challenging due to lack of political will from head of states. As noted earlier in recent years Africa has witnessed a number of heads of state particularly long-servicing leaders attempting to extend their tenure beyond the constitutionally permitted number of terms. Sam Nujoma of Namibia, Yoweli Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame and Nkurunziza of Burundi all have amended their constitutions to allow them to stand for a third term in office, and all won subsequent re-elections. And in the DRC, it is still unclear what President Joseph Kabila's next move will be. This new political culture of abolishing presidential term hinders the process towards prospects of good governance, peace and security in the SADC regional. In order to address this challenge SADC need to come with another mechanism such as reviving SADC Tribunal which was suspended in 2010 and total dissolution in 2011 in the SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit of heads of states and governments in Windhoek, Namibia (SADC, 2011). SADC tribunal will

help citizens recourse to justice when term limit, rule of law, democracy and good governance, are ignored by their own governments.

Issue of violence related to electoral processes is another challenge facing SADC today. Although the regional body adopted norms and standards for the election in 2001and 2004 unfortunately the norms have been not followed, as a result most of elections in Southern Africa are marred by violence at various stages of election process. For example the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines have often not been observed by individual member states, and have been occasionally disregarded by the organisation itself, as in the cases of elections in Zimbabwe and DRC in 2005 and 2011 respectively. In addition, elections are often poorly managed, and sometimes subject to rigging, irregularities, and weak independent oversight which lead to violence. Although this paper focuses on the Southern Africa, this challenge is not uncommon in other African countries. With the Kenyan post-election violence still fresh in our minds, were are currently witnessing in Burundi and Uganda elections which were characterized by torture, assassination, unlawful arrest, detention, destruction of campaign rallies and public meetings as well as destruction of properties. In addition, annulling a presidential election of 2015 in Zanzibar by the Chairman of Electoral body without announcing the result to serve the interest of the ruling part that is Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) to the disadvantage of opposition parties exemplified how the problem is acute in SADC member states and its neighbours. This situation is not only harming societies in the states concerned, but also it is undermining SADC region and its neighboring countries stability. The most notable security implication from above mentioned states is collapse of public order, militarization of state and society, internal displacement, and flow of refugees. Moreover, this scenario indicates that electoral management bodies in some of SADC member states have suffered from significant capacity, competence, and credibility deficits.

In attempting to address the challenge of election-related violence in SADC region, first there is much need for sufficient political will from member states to address the weakness in their election management bodies, by building the capacity of election management bodies to deliver their constitutional mandate. Reforms need to start from member states level to strengthening their electoral system, rule of law and to apply principles and standard. Therefore, the successful of SADC to address electoral-related violence depends on the role played by individual member states. The former option involves member states taking all necessary measures to support SADC in reviewing their existing treaties and protocols in order to

provide much needed power to SADC Organ to address violence related to election processes.

Good political governance is another challenge persisting among SADC member states. Despite the fact that member states recognize one of the main pillar of SADC integration agenda is good political governance; meaning SADC member states must respect the rule of law, and have a democratic system where the judiciary is independent. As previously shown although a number of efforts made by SADC focusing on emphasizing on the elements of good governance and it impact on development,[21] unfortunately this challenge still persists in devastating rate as if there are no any efforts made by regional body to address it before. As a result most of low income people suffer from the consequence of lack of good governance. Among the consequence of poor governance Southern African citizens suffer today include weak governance, absence of monitoring institutions which seriously affects economic growth and poverty reduction in all member states. In order to address security challenges, poverty and other social issues SADC member states must address lack of good governance in order to pull out from insecurity and poverty. In addition member states need to offer greater power to SADC in order for them to make decisions without undue influence. This suggestion arises from SADC policies not originating from SADC Secretariat, rather that regional body depended on policy made by individual nations with SADC Secretariat only able to attempt to persuade them. Thus, SADC need more political space to deal with those challenges internally in atmosphere of calm without political pressures from states and interest groups.

Lastly, despite the fact that this paper didn't discuss in detail threats of terrorism as challenges to regional security in Southern Africa, the regional body need to address this problem in effectively manner, the rising of terrorism in the region poses a threat to regional security, to the values of local societies and to the freedoms of citizens. Since the events of terrorist attack in Tanzania in (1998), Kenya (1998, 2013 and 2014), as well rising number of militant Islamic attacks that have targeted local community and foreign tourists, in Zanzibar and Mombasa, it indicates that terrorism threat do not recognize borders, thus SADC should view itself as a target of active international and local terrorist groups.

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[21]The concept of good governance has been clarified by the UN's Commission on Human Rights and identified the key attributes of good governance as Transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, and responsiveness.

In addition this situation should serve as a wake-up call for SADC to develop comprehensive regional strategies, plans and guidelines for preventing and combat acts of international and local terrorism within member states. Although the UN have Global Counter Terrorism Strategy of 2016, and the AU have a Counter Terrorism Framework of 2002 these are not enough to protect SADC region. SADC need to take preventive measures this is due to the fact that global security is deteriorating and they cannot take UN and AU terrorism framework for granted. SADC need to have its own proactive strategy, which can be embedded to the continental counter terrorism framework. Also SADC can utilize banking on good relations with the states surrounding its member states in terms of giving information of any suspicious people through early warning mechanism. Therefore, SADC need to develop its own counter terrorism strategy that addresses region-specific and realities.

Conclusion

As exemplified by the above discussion, the paper demonstrated that the challenges to peace and security for Southern Africa are diverse and pose great demands on a regional security apparatus. Some of these challenges are emanating from bad governance, unconstitutional changes of governments, unequal distribution of resources among citizens; amendment of the constitutional to remove presidential term limits and contested electoral results. These challenges are among the most prominent sources of instability confronted by SADC.

Furthermore, the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar, and removed presidency term limits in Angola and Namibia and similar attempts in Zambia, Malawi and DRC has once again brought this reality to the fore, reminding SADC and the international community a need to act decisively in these growing challenges and threats to security in Southern Africa. Unfortunately the effectiveness of SADC legal and political framework in dealing with this phenomenon is seriously questioned, as most of the challenges still exist to-date and show no sign of shrinking. As mentioned earlier in this paper SADC needs more experience and time for the successful evolvement in dealing with different kinds of challenges emerged in the Southern Africa. In addition, individual member states need to support SADC for following up the implementation of legal instruments.

This paper argues that despite the process of implementation of various policies related to governance needs time by the regional body, there is currently a substantial gap between what is written in the legal instruments

and policy paper and what is actually happening on the ground. Therefore, SADC and member states need to address those challenges through revising their legal instruments particularly at state level in order to be mutual compatible; they need to change behaviour affecting the regional body attaining prosperous peace and security. This means that to address challenges which still continue to hurt SADC and its member states will not only be realized through the adoption of "nice" legal documents and agreement amongst member states on principles, rules and norms, but also requires the performance and behaviour change of member states and organisation.

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