AOSIS

Religious inconsistency on corruption behaviour among Muslim politicians in Indonesia

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The problem of corruption in Indonesia is like an unbroken chain. Since the 1998 reformation until now (2021), many persons with corruption cases involving politicians or officials have been arrested and even imprisoned. Among those entangled in corruption are many Muslim politicians and religious leaders known to the public as having a high level of religiosity and a clean reputation. Ideally, these Muslim politicians will be at the forefront of guarding the nation's anti-corruption morality. However, the reality is different. This study explains the discrepancy of the relationship between religiosity and anti-corruption attitudes by Muslim politicians. This study relies on a qualitative approach with a descriptive analysis of the online media findings regarding Muslim politicians' corrupt behaviour. The results of this study indicate that there is no correlation between religiosity and unethical behaviour. Politicians entangled in corruption come from all circles of political parties, socio-economic levels, intellectuals and various religious backgrounds. It means that other factors besides religious morality encourage a person to commit corruption, such as motives for power, high political costs, a hedonistic lifestyle, an incompetent law enforcement system and a deep-rooted culture of corruption.

Contribution: Efforts to eradicate corruption in Indonesia need to be carried out in an integrated and comprehensive manner with various approaches. Thus, the goal to minimise the corruption behaviour in Indonesia can be achieved.

Keywords: discrepancy; inconsistency; religiosity; corruption; Indonesian Muslim politicians.

Introduction

Religiosity used as a moral reference has not prevented anyone from corrupt behaviour. It shows a discrepancy in religion with unethical behaviour (Gokcekus & Ekici 2020; Xu et al. 2017), as demonstrated among Muslim politicians in Indonesia who practise corruption. After the 1998 reform until now (2021), thousands of politicians and state officials have been arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and tried for corruption. According to the Chairman of the KPK, Firli Bahuri, from 2004 to 2021, 1126 cases of crime have been recorded in Indonesia (Sucipto 2021). Among the perpetrators of corruption are people considered to have good religious knowledge and they come from parties with a religious background. Religious people who have a high level of religious observance and have a good reputation in the public's eyes should not indulge in corruption.

Nevertheless, in reality, this problem cannot be resolved quickly. There are conjectures about knowledge of religion in Indonesia that is still very weak and has not been able to prevent corrupt behaviour (Khodijah 2018). Religion is still considered to play an essential role in eradicating corruption because all faiths believe that this dishonest behaviour is contrary to God's will (Widiyanto 2017).

Many politicians such as former party leaders, former ministers, members of parliament, regional heads and officials involved in corruption cases were clergy and religious figures. From the records shown by the KPK, until 2020, politicians convicted of corruption cases reached 274 members of the legislature and there were as many as 28 cases against the heads of institutions and/or ministry (https://www.kpk.go.id/). The majority of the cases involve Muslim politicians. This phenomenon reverses the opinion that has been believed to be the truth that in-depth knowledge and adherence to good religious teachings will deter a person from indulging in corrupt practices.

Studies on the relationship between religion and corrupt behaviour have received much attention from researchers and academics, both in the form of books and journals. Several studies that

discuss the relationship between religion and corruption tend to look at three things. Firstly, religion is an antidote to someone doing corruption (Alazzabi, Mustafa & Abdul Latiff 2020). Secondly, corruption is discussed because of religious politicisation bias (Arjon 2018; Sommer, Bloompazit & Arikan 2013; Valdovinos-Hernandez, Szymanski & Grabowska 2019). Thirdly, morality is discussed in relation to corrupt behaviour (De Oliveira Leite, Dias & Mendes et al. 2021; Swanepoel & Meiring 2017; Torsello 2020). Existing studies only look at the relationship of religion with corrupt behaviour and not many studies have shown that religion does not correlate with unethical behaviour. In other words, religiosity does not necessarily correlate with corruption.

This study aims not only to complement existing studies on the relationship between religiosity and anti-corruption attitudes but also to explain the corrupt behaviour of Muslim politicians. There is a perspective stating that religion contributes to preventing corruption. As a result of this view, people look down on noble and sacred religious values as something that does not give moral support. This question can be formulated in some ways. Firstly, knowing the corrupt behaviour of Muslim politicians done after the reformation; secondly, understanding factors influencing Muslim politicians to commit acts of corruption; and, thirdly, finding out the implications of Muslim politicians' corrupt behaviour on people's mindset. These three questions will be answered through the discussion of this study. At the same time, it is expected to provide valuable inputs to prevent and eradicate corruption.

This article is based on an argument developed in a society. Furthermore, religion can shape the religiosity of its adherents so that the level of one's religiosity is closely related to one's behavior, including corruption. The attitude of religiosity or religion is a complex integration between religious knowledge, religious feelings and actions. The doctrine of Islamic teachings states that corruption or *risywah* is an act that is prohibited (*haram*) and a sin for those who do it. The principle is believed to be a truth for devout Muslims and firmly held to be violated in their lives. Muslims also believe that Allah's inherent supervision is that there is accountability for all their behaviour, both in this world and hereafter. So ideally, people's adherence to their religion should be sufficient to guarantee good behaviour. But in practice, people or politicians whose religiosity looks good also participate in corruption. There must be other factors that trigger someone to commit corruption. These other factors need to be looked for to obtain a comprehensive theory to prevent and eradicate corruption in Indonesia.

Literature review
Corruption in Indonesia

Corruption is defined as the abuse of public power or trust for profit, which is a global problem (Wickberg 2021). Corruption can be divided into three parts: firstly, corruption is a material framing, namely some laws regulate corruption and movements that limit the movement of corruptors in taking advantage of state money (July Esther 2020; Khambekova, Los & Huss 2021). Secondly, corruption is seen as a legality, namely the extent to which the process of using cash is 'legal' by officials by abusing their power and including criminal acts (Čepas & Dobryninas 2016; Dincer & Johnston 2020). Thirdly, corruption is seen as a moral issue related to the attitudes and norms of corruptors (Abraham & Pea 2020; Kreikebaum 2008). Consequently, the fraud triangle and the theory of planned behaviour, which studies opportunity factors, financial processes and rationalisation factors, emphasise that corruption has a relationship with psychological and moral aspects (Zulaikha et al. 2021). Furthermore, the increase in corruption cases in Indonesia is not only due to a weakening of supervision. Still, it comes from the character of each member of the legislature that influences each other (Juhana et al. 2020).

Corruption has become the culture of the Indonesian nation (Fawaid 2010). Corruption in Indonesia is not enough just to be dealt with by arresting corruptors, but the root of corruption has not been entirely resolved (Kaaba 2007). Corruptors in Indonesia are classified by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) into four parts, namely, conflicts of interest, bribery, illegal gratuities and economic extortion (Hamdani, Kumalahadi & Urumsah 2017). The number of existing corruption cases has given rise to a movement to fight corruption, which they call the anti-corruption movement. The anti-corruption movement carried out in Indonesia is a movement to prevent and fight corruption. This movement uses social media to voice information related to anti-corruption education, law enforcement, bureaucratic reform and the integration of government officials (Kurniawan et al. 2021). The anti-corruption movement in Indonesia tries to involve youth, including students, to take law enforcement actions (Alfaqi 2016; Kholis Rahma 2014).

Islam and corruption

Corruption in the view of Islam is defined as the term '*akhdul amwal bil bathil*', which means consuming other people's property in a vanity way. This term refers to surah al-Baqarah verse 188 and surah al-Maidah verse 42 (Rabain 2014). Correspondingly, corruption is associated with *ghulul*, which means stealing people's property (Fikriawan, Kholiq & Parangu 2019). Corruption has been considered a crime for the survival of the bureaucracy. At the same time, corruption has become the most destructive social disease in the system of social values in Islam (Fatih 2014). As described in Surah al-Fajr verses 15–20 as social upheaval, corruption itself is not only a matter of money but also moral matters that have been damaged and the loss of self-confidence (Alazzabi et al. 2020; Rabain 2014). In terms of Islamic law, corruption cases fall into the area of *mu'amalah* Maliyah [socio-economic] or fiqh *siyasah* [constitutional law] based on the problem of Maliyah [objects] (Rabain 2014).

Some existing writings on Islam and corruption discuss moral education in Islam used to prevent corruption (Alazzabi et al. 2020; Womb 2019). However, Muslim-majority countries viewed from a Western perspective are seen most often as 'highly corrupt' by the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indexes (Jomaa Ahmed 2018). In Islam, corruption is highly condemned and corruption is pervasive, which opposes corrupt practices (Faridah Abdul Jabbar 2013). Corruption that is widely practised in this Muslim-majority country has significantly impacted Islamic banking. Bougatef (2015) showed that this disease of corruption has prevented Islamic banking from becoming a more effective and meaningful pathway for poverty alleviation and economic development. Montes and Luna (2021) showed that a solid legal system can increase perceptions of control over corruption cases.

Power and corruption

Corruption takes place at the level of government, where the higher the hierarchy, the higher the level of corruption. A survey conducted in France has represented the levels of in several countries. The federal cabinet has the highest level of corruption, then the second level, namely senators, local governments and municipal governments, which are considered to have the lowest levels of corruption (François & Méon 2021). Political corruption that often occurs in Indonesia is defined as the abuse of power by government actors by taking large amounts of state wealth for personal gain or maintaining control (Abiansyah 2019). Several recent corruption cases in Indonesia involve government officials, namely the KPU General Election Commission's taxi funds in the procurement of goods, the People's Endowment Fund, which abused power by adding funds for hajj for pilgrims. The third case, which recently boomed, namely the case of corruption by the Minister of Social Affairs regarding the social assistance funds that should have been channelled to people affected by coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), was corrupted (Octavia 2019). It can be concluded that scientific integrity, religious knowledge and religious affairs are not enough to prevent corruption (Kaaba 2007).

Power in government is often abused, one of which is through bribery cases. This bribery case has involvement with many side businesses whilst working in the government sector will significantly impact performance and accountability, thereby increasing the practice of fraud through bribery (Zahari, Said & Muhamad 2021). Correspondingly, Indonesia's anti-corruption law lacks clarity and does not regulate transnational accountability (Suhariyanto, Mustafa & Santoso 2021). Studies conducted in China have shown a change in corruption from taking small cash quickly to big theft and accessing money. This new form of corruption is made possible through access to land, mining, property and company assets under Badan Usaha Milik Negara (state-owned enterprises [BUMN]) that state officials can carry out (Bakken & Wang 2021). Several factors that cause corrupt behaviour include a materialistic-consumerist lifestyle, an expensive political system, weak leadership, lack of religious

and ethical education, social and legal systems that support immoral behaviour (Siroj 2017). One way to control corruption, besides emphasising moral factors, can be suppressed by developing e-government, which can effectively reduce crime in countries with certain cultures (Zhao, Ahn & Manoharan 2021).

Method

The issue of eradicating corruption in Indonesia has warmed up again because many officials were caught by the KPK. The last case that shocked the public was the corruption of the COVID-19 social fund assistance involving the Minister of Social Affairs Juliari P. Batubara. Similar cases will continue to emerge if the political system and corruption eradication strategy are not changed. One of the efforts to prevent corruption is through a religious approach. Religious doctrines, especially Islam, are believed to control free individuals. Eradication of corruption through religious jargon has become a priority, such as religious curricula and religious lectures. So it is necessary to study in depth whether there is a significant relationship between religiosity and the spirit of anti-corruption.

This research is based on primary data and secondary data. Primary data are in the form of corrupt practices involving Muslim politicians (ulama or *kyai*) during the reform era, which are tracked through online news. Interviews about political costs will also be conducted with 2–3 sources to complete the online data. At the same time, secondary data are the number of politicians and state officials sentenced to prison for corruption, which can be accessed through online media.

The stages of this research start from a literature study to get an overview of the relationship between religiosity and corrupt behaviour, then continue with tracking data about corruption involving ulama or religious leaders through online news, and conducting interviews with selected sources. The existing data were then analysed using the Hubermann method, which included data reduction, display and verification using descriptive analysis.

Results

Since the reform era (May 1998), the issue of corruption in Indonesia has become a severe concern for the government. The eradication of corruption has become the central issue promoted by reformers and demands democratisation and law enforcement. Various efforts to eradicate corruption have been and are still being carried out, both through the formation of laws and regulations, strengthening institutions, outreach and education and enforcement efforts. However, corruption practices among state officials continue to increase every day.

The corrupt practices carried out by Muslim politicians and politicians throughout the presidential period from the beginning of the reform until today (2021) can be briefly stated as follows:

Era of President Gus Dur (1999–2001)

Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) is a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) cleric, a world-acclaimed Indonesian Islamic figure, who succeeded in becoming the first President of the post-reform election results. At first, Gus Dur was able to publish anti-corruption initiatives. Still, eventually, his attention was drawn to resolving political conflicts with the parties, which ended in his dismissal at the MPR Special session and being replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri. The corruption eradication agenda was somewhat neglected and the reform agenda stalled. However, President Gus Dur has not recorded any corruption at the central or regional levels.

According to Mahfud MD, under Gus Dur, there were no corrupt ministers (news.detik.com). At that time, there was no KPK, but Gus Dur was not kidding. Officials were detected as corrupt and immediately dismissed from their positions before being proven in court. It can happen because Gus Dur always prioritises the human side in politics. Politics takes place above humanity. Not the other way around, sacrificing humanity for political interests. Gus Dur eliminated corrupt practices, including disbanding two ministry institutions established well in the New Order era (President Soeharto). Those two institutions are the Ministry of Information (now the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology) and the Ministry of Social Affairs (now the Ministry of Social Affairs) (Trianto 2020). Gus Dur got the justification when the Social Ministers, Idrus Marham, and Julairi Peter Barubara, were caught by KPK because of corruption.

The Muslim figure who was also the Minister of Industry and Trade and was fired by President Gus Dur for alleged corruption was Jusuf Kalla (JK), who came from the Golkar Party. Jusuf Kalla is also suspected of being involved not only in corruption but also in nepotism, which is known as 'SDM' (All for Makassar). This JK track record was brought up again by Ahmad Doli Kurnia at the moment of the Vice Presidential Candidate Debate paired with Joko Widodo (Republika.co.id 2014). However, JK's alleged corruption was never proven in court.

Era of President Megawati (2001–2004)

Megawati Sukarnoputri was the fifth president to be sworn in after the Special Session who forcibly removed Gus Dur for being involved in the Buloggate corruption case. In Megawati's era, many ministers were implicated in corruption, such as the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Rokhmin Dahuri, Minister of Health Achmad Sujudi, Minister of Home Affairs Heri Sabarno and Minister of Social Affairs Bachtiar Chamsyah (Kompas.com 2020).

Rokhmin Dahuri is an Islamic figure who is also the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in Megawati's Gotong Royong Cabinet involved in corruption. Rokhmin, an NU activist, was found guilty of committing a criminal act of corruption related to collecting deconcentration funds collected through officials from the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, which was deemed to have caused a state loss of Rp. 15 billion. Therefore, he was sentenced to prison for seven years and a fine of Rp. 200 million; later, his sentence was reduced by the PK Decision to four years and six months (Detik.com 2020).

Bachtiar Chamsyah was the Minister of Social Affairs in the Gotong Royong Cabinet from 2001 to 2004 and the United Indonesia Cabinet from 2004 to 2009. Bachtiar is a cleric and a senior politician from the Islamic party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan [PPP]). He became a suspect in the corruption case in the procurement of sewing machines, sarongs and cattle imports at the Ministry of Social Affairs, which cost the state Rp. 33.7 billion when he was no longer the ministerial candidate last year (2010). He was sentenced to one year and eight months in prison and a fine of Rp. 50 million (Margianto 2011).

Era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2009 and 2009–2014)

This sixth president has a solid commitment to law enforcement and eradicating corruption. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) even swallowed the 'bitter pill' of his dedication. Furthermore, the elements from the Democrat Party themselves were eventually caught by the KPK, such as Andi Malarangeng, Anas Urbaningrum, Muhammad Nazaruddin, Angelina Sondakh, Sutan Bhatoegana, Amrun Daulay, Sarjan Taher and other prominent figures. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's serious efforts were not in vain. He was the president who succeeded in raising the score of Indonesia's Corruption Perceptions Index to the best in the world. According to the Stable Trend and Continuous Increasing-ASEAN data released by the KPK, it shows an excellent trend, where Indonesia's grade point average (GPA) surpasses that of China, which for 19 years could only increase 5 points from 34 to 39. If calculated in the same period, Indonesia experienced a significant increase from 17 to 38 points, up 21 points. In comparison, during Megawati's time, GPA only rose 1 point and during the 2014–2018 period of President Jokowi's rule, it only rose 4 points (Setiawan 2019).

Several ministers in President's SBY era who were caught because of corruption were the Health Minister, Siti Fadilah Supari (2004–2009); the minister of Youth and Sport, Andi Mallarangeng (2009–2012); the minister of ESDM, Jero Wacik (2011–2013) and Religion minister, Suryadharma Ali (2011–2014) (Yanas 2020). Some legislative people were caught because of corruption from 2009 to 2014 by KPK and they came from many parties. It is from the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), such as Izedrik Emir Moeis, Agus Chondro Prayitno, Max Moein, Rusman Lumbantoruan, Poltak Sitorus, Williem Tutuarima, Panda Nababan, dan sebagainya, partai Golkar misalnya, Chairun Nisa, Zulkarnaen Djabar, Prasetia Zulkarnaen Putra, Ahmad Hafiz Zawawi, Muhammad Nurlif, Reza Kamarullah, Baharuddin Aritonang and others. They also came from the Partai Bintang Reformasi (PAN), such as Sofyan Usman, Endin Aj Soefihara

and M. Al Amin Nur Nasution from Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR HM). Yusuf Erwin Faisal and from PKS Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq (LHI) (Aliansyah 2014).

Among the figures involved in the corruption cases above, it turns out that many are from among Islamic leaders and devout Muslim politicians. For example, former Minister of Cooperatives and Minister of Religion Suryadharma Ali (SDA), besides being known as a cleric, former Executive Board of the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PB PMII), is also the former chairman of PPP, a party known to be very consistent in defending Islam. Suryadharma Ali was sentenced to six years in prison, fined Rp. 300 million and returned replacement money of Rp. 1.821 billion for being proven guilty of corruption in implementing the 2010–2013 pilgrimage and misuse of ministerial operational funds (DOM) in 2011–2013, which cost the state Rp. 27,283. billion, Rp. 17,967,405 SR, and Rp. 1.82 billion (Ferdinan 2016).

The corruption that shocked the public was a militant Islamic figure and former president of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), LHI, and his party partner, Ahmad Fathanah. Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq was sentenced to 16 years in prison and a fine of Rp. 1 billion, which was later aggravated by the Supreme Court's decision to 18 years in jail and revoked of political rights because it was proven that he accepted a bribe from PT Indoguna Utama in the amount of Rp. 1.3 billion to pass an additional beef import quota as 8,000 tons on January 29, 2013 (Maharani 2013).

In the era of President SBY, efforts to eradicate corruption targeted officials and politicians at the centre and hit local officials. During 2004–2006, six regional heads were caught in corruption, including the Governor of Aceh Abdullah Puteh (2004). During 2007–2009, the number of regional directors entangled in corruption tripled to 19 people, including the Governor of South Sumatra Syahrial Oesman (2009) and Riau Saleh Djasit (2007). During 2010–2012, only 10 regional heads were arrested, including Bekasi Mayor Mochtar Mohamad (2010) and Semarang Mayor Soemarmo Hadi Saputro (2012). During 2013–2014, corruption increased again. There were 18 cases of corruption of regional heads, including the Governor of Riau Rusli Zaenal (2013) and the Regent of Bangkalan H. Fuad Amin (2014) (Hutasoit 2018).

One of the regional officials caught by the KPK at the end of 2014 that shocked the public, especially Muslims, was the Bangkalan Regent, KH Fuad Amin. Before becoming the Regent, Fuad Amin, one of the grandchildren of the charismatic cleric Mbah Cholil Bangkalan, was a member of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) RI from 1999 to 2004 and was later elected Regent of Bangkalan for two terms from 2003 to 2013. Fuad Amin was arrested at the end of 2014. Moreover, the KPK was suspected of committing various acts of corruption, such as receiving gifts (hadyah, gratification, and bribe) related to the sale and purchase of natural gas supplies for gas-fired power plants in Madura and several areas in East Java, buying and selling of civil servant decrees, cuts to the Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah (APBD) and money laundering. Fuad Amin was sentenced to 13 years in prison and all of his assets were confiscated by the state according to the Supreme Court's cassation decision because it was deemed to have harmed the state Rp. 414 billion (Meilisa 2019).

Era of President Joko Widodo (2014–2019 and 2019 – present)

During the Jokowi era, corrupt practices carried out by state officials remained rife. The names of the ministers arrested by the KPK were, for example, Edhy Prabowo (Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries), Juliari P Batubara (Minister of Social Affairs), Imam Nahrawi (Minister of Youth and Sports) and Idrus Marham (Minister of Social Affairs) (Garjito 2020). According to a report by Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), during President Jokowi's term (2014–2019), 254 members of the legislature were arrested for corruption. Of this number, 22 are members of the DPR RI, including the Chairman of the DPR, Setya Novanto and the Deputy Speaker of the DPR, Taufiq Kurniawan (Sihombing 2019).

Heads of regions, regents, mayors and governors in the Jokowi era during 2015–2021 who were entangled in corruption totalled 54 people. In 2015, there were six people, including Gatot Pujo Nugroho (Governor of North Sumatra) from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). In 2016, there were eight people, including Nur Alam (Governor of Southeast Sulawesi). In 2017, 9 people were recorded, including Taufiqurrahman (Regent of Nganjuk) and Siti Masitha (Regent of Tegal), both of whom are pious and religious. In 2018, regional heads caught in corruption sharply increased to 30 people, including Irwandi Yusuf (Governor of Aceh) and Ahmad Marzuki (Regent of Jepara). In 2019, there were 14 people, including Amiril Mukminin (Bengkalis Regent) and Tengku Dzulmi Eldin (Mayor of Medan). In 2020, regional heads saw a sharp decline in crime. Only four people were recorded, including Saifulilah (Regent of Sidoarjo) and Khairuddin Syah Sitorus (Regent of North Lampung). In early 2021, two people were arrested by the KPK, namely Juarsah (Muara Enim Regent) and Nurdin Abdullah (South Sulawesi Governor) (cnnindonesia.com 2021).

At least two Muslim politicians in the Jokowi era were involved in corruption cases, namely Idrus Marham and Imam Nahrawi. Idrus is a *santri* from Makassar who graduated from the Sharia Faculty of Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) who had a successful political career. Unfortunately, his career was destroyed because he was involved in the corruption case of the Riau I Mine Mouth Steam Power Producer (IPP) project. Idrus was sentenced to three years in prison and fined Rp. 150 million because he was deemed to have received a Rp. 2,250 billion bribe from PT Pembangkitan Jawa Bali Investment (Aji 2020). Meanwhile, Imam Nahrawi, a religious scholar from IAIN, was sentenced to seven years in prison and fined Rp. 400 million for accepting bribes of Rp. 8.3 billion in a project proposed by the Indonesian National Sports Committee (cnnindonesia.com 2020).

Discussion

Corruption is an extraordinary crime that has not been resolved until now (Pohan 2018). According to KPK Chair Firli Bahuri, corruption cases in Indonesia since the birth of the KPK from 2004 to 2021 have reached 1126 cases (Sucipto 2021). Perpetrators of corruption are evenly carried out by all executive, legislative and judicial lines and at all levels, from central to regional officials. From village head to ministers, from members of the village consultative body (BPD) to members of the Central People's Representative Council (DPR), from security, police, prosecutors, judges to advocates. Some have been released, others have spent the rest of their lives in prison, some are still facing court proceedings and others have just been arrested, even those released then run for office, then become corrupt and are arrested again (Kudus Regent). Some are having fun enjoying the results of corruption and have not been caught. The latter case is probably even higher. This condition is like an iceberg phenomenon that appears on the surface while the most significant part sinks. The phenomenon of corruption has become a global problem experienced by almost all countries (Akhmetov, Zhamuldinov & Komarov 2018; Dion 2011; Monteverde 2020).

Throughout the reform, especially since the birth of the KPK as an institution that plays an active role in eradicating corruption in Indonesia (Daya 2019; Sosiawan 2019; Suwana 2020), the KPK has arrested hundreds of politicians from various backgrounds, including Muslim politicians. Muslim politicians who have a high religiosity level participate in corruption (Mumtazah, Abdul Rahman & Sarbini 2020). The scholars and figures of Islamic organisations who later entered the world of politics were expected to be the vanguard of the moral guardians of the rulers. It turned out that there was no difference. Several people such as LHI, Bachtiar Chamsah, Suryadharma Ali, Ramahurmuzi and others previously known in the public as 'clean' people also turned out to be closed by Shu'ul Khatimah by being in prison. The question is, 'why does the attitude of religiosity do not affect anti-corruption behaviour?' Then what other factors trigger a person to corruption or can prevent corruption. It is something that needs attention in preventing corruption.

The doctrine of Islamic teachings about corruption is obvious (Azra 2010). Corruption or *risywah* is one way to falsely take other people's property, whether private or institutional or state (Surah Al Baqarah: 188; Al Maidah: 42). This act of corruption is strictly prohibited in Islam and the perpetrators will be cursed and threatened with hell (Sunan At Turmudzi, No. 1336, Al Mustadrak, No. 7066) (Haryono 2016). The prohibition of corruption has been memorised and understood by Muslims, both ordinary people, especially pious people. The ulama and kyai teach anti-corruption lessons every day. But at the same time, it is the political clerics who commit corruption. So there has been an inconsistency between religious attitudes and actual behaviour. There is a paradox between what is believed to be accurate but is not reflected in behaviour (Widyatmoko, Pabbajah & Widyanti 2020). His behaviour did not prove his belief because he talks differently from his action. A paradoxical condition establishes no relationship between one's religiosity and anti-corruption behaviour in Indonesia. It may be different outside Indonesia. In other words, there is no guarantee that politicians and officials who have a good level of knowledge and religious observance do not commit corruption. It means that other factors cause someone to commit corruption.

According to Siroj's conclusion, several factors that cause corrupt behaviour are a materialistic-consumerist lifestyle, an expensive political system, weak leadership and lack of religious and ethical education, social systems and laws that support unethical behaviour (Siroj 2017). The lifestyle of politicians or officials that the KPK has uncovered is quite surprising. It turned out that the money from corruption was used to fulfil an unnecessary modern lifestyle, such as travelling abroad by buying expensive jewellery and furniture, purchasing land and property, collecting luxury cars and even partly to finance mistresses.

Political motives are also suspected of having a substantial role in corrupt behaviour. Most of the intentions of political people are to get a livelihood (job), increase income and improve social and economic status. People are attracted to become politicians, both to gain legislative (DPR) and executive (regional) powers because power is synonymous with prosperity and stability. It is proven that all politicians' or officials' lives have become elevated with goods confiscated by corruption that is classified as luxurious (Parlindungan 2018). Whereas previously, he was an ordinary person and had nothing. This phenomenon motivates people to fight for power, even though they must spend significant capital and justify all means. Ideally, emphasis should be placed on a means of service and not a job for material gain (Monteverde 2019). To reduce the practice of corruption, a candidate for the post of politician should have an established economic level so that when he is in power, he can serve the community to the maximum and not be greedy for wealth while accelerating economic development in a region (Akkoyunlu & Ramella 2020; Alfada 2019).

In addition, an expensive political recruitment system is a vital driving factor for a politician to be forced to commit corruption. How come? According to one person who sits as a member of the DPRD, a capital of at least Rp. 3 billion is required to become a Regency/City DPRD, Rp. 4–6 billion for the Provincial DPRD and Rp. 7–10 billion for the DPR RI. Meanwhile, becoming mayor or regent required Rp. 30–50 billion, depending on the number of candidates and voters in an area. This capital is used for advertising and socialisation, campaign props, honorariums for the successful teams and witnesses, social donations, political dowries, and to buy votes (pers comm., 18 June 2021). This high-cost political system forces politicians and officials to think about turning their capital back and saving money for the upcoming elections.

So far, the eradication of corruption in Indonesia seems to be sporadic, arbitrary and uneven. Allegedly, the corruptors caught by the KPK were just unlucky. Because actually the others who were not caught were more numerous. Some are not seen because it has not been revealed, but sometimes it is deliberately hidden because it involves or is protected by an influential person. In this case, the KPK has the power as a form of resistance to corruption, which is indeed elite behaviour (Sitompul 2014). Not all parties with indications of corruption are followed up because they have specific political interests. This selective, non-transparent and unfair law enforcement has also provoked people to try the sensation of corruption (Griffith & Lee 2019; Tamin 2018). So efforts to eradicate corruption through legal, humanitarian and religious approaches must continue (Michael 2020; North, Orman & Gwin 2013).

Various studies have concluded that corruption in Indonesia has become a culture (Fawaid 2010). Political corruption has become a taboo social phenomenon. It violates the law, but in practice, it has become increasingly prevalent among policymakers in the Indonesian State Government since the New Order and post-Reformation (Abiansyah 2019). The community considers corruption to be commonplace and not a violation of disgrace that needs to be hidden. In public services by government offices, people feel embarrassed or have some bad feeling if they don't give money as a thank you. In managing a SIM, for example, people who go through the correct procedure encounter various difficulties and obstacles. While people who use the services of an insider by tipping a small amount of money is served immediately. So the practice of corruption has become a part of everyday life that is no longer perceived as corruption. Therefore, eradicating corruption is not enough to arrest corruptors and punish them in prison, but it must start from the roots that trigger corruption itself (Kaaba 2007). The culture of corruption that has penetrated various sectors of life needs careful attention with the support of a strong government commitment and the community.

Conclusion

The assumption that has been understood so far that politicians or officials who have a high level of religiosity also have a high anti-corruption attitude has not been proven. Ideally, politicians or state administrators who have good knowledge and religious observance will become personal guarantees that are clean from disgraceful behaviour, including not committing corruption. However, the results of this study indicate that many of the perpetrators of corruption arrested by KPK came from religious circles (ulama/kyai) during the reform era to this day. Religious doctrines can indeed influence a person's behaviour, but they are not the only ones. Other factors trigger someone to commit corruption, namely political motivation to want power, a high-cost political system, a hedonic lifestyle, an unfair law enforcement system, the punishments that are not deterrent and a culture of corruption that has been rooted in society.

Efforts to eradicate corruption through religious motivation, as has been done so far – such as through the school curriculum, sermons, religious lectures and other approaches – are still deemed necessary to continue. But what is more important is improving the political system and effective oversight. Political recruitment through direct general elections, which has been running so far, forces candidates to have a large capital. As a result, the chosen one is not the best cadre but has the most wealth. Therefore, the selected candidate will automatically think 'return and raise capital'. This factor is the dominant trigger of corruption, which must be changed immediately. Several factors cause a person to fall into acts of corruption that are detrimental to the country. Because this study only discusses the relationship between religiosity and anti-corruption behaviour, it is necessary to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the most dominant factors of corruption. Therefore, the result of this study is helpful as an effort to eradicate corruption.

The limitation of this study lies in the fact that data were collected only from online media on a relatively small scale, not yet looking at corruption cases as a whole. Therefore, further studies are needed to discover more extensive data related to corruption cases in Indonesia. Likewise, this study only uses the concept of religiosity in looking at corruption cases of Muslim politicians, so it still requires a more comprehensive comparative approach. It refers to the high intensity of corruption in Indonesia, which has not shown a positive trend. Thus, it requires careful attention and cooperation of all parties not only through one religious approach but also involves multi-approach, starting from an integrated legal, political, economic and cultural system and integrated culture to minimise the corruption from the beginning.

Acknowledgements

Data availability

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analysed in this study.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated agency of the authors.

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