ON STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN NIGERIA: THE 'INTEGRATIVE / CO-OPERTIVE' MODEL TO THE RESCUE

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ABSTRACT

Policy implementation is about the most critical dimension in the policy process given the fact that success or failure of any given policy is, to a high degree, a function of implementation. The need for effective implementation strategy (ies) is emphasized in this paper. The need, the paper argues, is an urgent one and more acute for the rural areas where the quality of life remain abysmally poor due largely to long period of neglect and unrewarding implementation of most policies directed at addressing the problem of rural underdevelopment in Nigeria. Analysis of dominant conceptual models (Grindle's, Iglesias' and Smith's) and strategies for implementing rural development policies, namely, the 'government –led' and the 'community –led' show gross inadequacies arising from their basic nature. The noted inadequacies compelled a search for appropriate alternative. The outcome of the search is the 'Integrative / Co – operative' strategy proposed in the paper. The hope is that, regardless of whatever shortcoming that may be associated with it, the 'Integrative / Co – operative' strategy holds the greater promise in our drive towards a more effective implementation of rural development policies in Nigeria.

We in the Planning commission and others concerned have grown more expert in planning. But the real question is not planning. But the real question is not planning but implementing the Plan. That is the real question before the country. I fear we are not quite as expert implementation as at planning. Nehru, on Indian situation

KEYWORDS: Effective Policy Implementation, Strategy/Model, Integrative/ Co-operative.

INTRODUCTION

When George Honadle and Rudi Klauss, contributing to the discourse on the paralytic problem of public policy implementation failure especially in the underdeveloped countries, described implementation as:

"... the nemesis of designers , (that) conjures up images of plans gone awry and of social carpenters and masons who fail to build to specification and, thereby, distort the beautiful blueprints for progress which were handed to them. It provokes memories of a good idea that did not work and places the blame on the second member of the policy administration team " (1979)

Policy observes had little difficulty appreciating the situation that pervades underdeveloped countries where, more often than not, faulty implementation turns out to be the graveyard of public policies.

Despite the ostensible concern of scholars, national (and regional) governments and international actors (donors, planners , observers , etc.) the record of implementing rural development policies and programmes in Nigeria has not been encouraging .The inevitable consequence of this trend is lack of desired impact on the rural sector. It is

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this relative failure to impact positively on the rural areas that has generated attention on a number of constraints militating against the drive towards rural development. Policy planners and makers, as well as students of development administration , faced by complex political , economic and socio- ecological systems , have shown great concern over the high rate of failure in policy implementation in Nigeria.

The critical role of implementation in the policy process is not lost on any informed policy observer. The right thinking is that the scourge of policy implementation failure should be, as much as possible, put under check. This need implies that appropriate strategies must be evolved and put in place to ensure effective implementation of rural development policies and programme. Before proceeding to examining the various dimensions of strategies for implementation of rural development policies and programmes, it is considered useful to provide conceptual clarification of the object of our discussion – policy implementation process and strategies.

ISSUES I POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation, often times, is used interchangeably to mean execution or even administration of policy. By and large, implementation involves interaction between " the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them " (Jones, 1977) and especially, "the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtained desired results " (Pressman and Wildavsky , 1973: 167). Policy implementation may well include the administrative process, the behavior (compliant and non – compliant) of the people engaged the execution of the policy and result-seeking actions in the policy process. In terms of results, how a policy is implemented is acutely important and, of cause, course, depends in part, on what agency and who executes it. Policy implementers and implementation agencies differ from one another and operate in different environments that may well have forces capable of exerting distorting influence on their activities.

Theoretically, once adopted, the next stage in the policy process is its implementation –directing activities at translating goals and objectives into desired reality This is perhaps the most difficult aspect of the policy process which inextricably hinges on a number of considerations. In this regard, there

has to be, first, an institutional capability for interpreting the intentions of the policy into acceptable concrete programmes with a promise of producing desired goals Second, there have to be sufficient resources, human and material, to give effect to the policies and programmes.

Challenges and problems still abound even when these critical conditions are satisfied. The problem, which must be surmounted for effective policy implementation to be achieved, include the complex socio-political context of the policy. The issue of appropriateness of available resources, timing and mix of inputs must be addressed. Political and bureaucratic leadership must not only be supportive in terms of sustaining the spirit of the policy but also in the area of ensuring institutional capability and performance, the absence of which grossly undermines policy implementation. Target group resistance (non –compliant behavior) must be accommodated or contained.

Doing all these and accomplishing intended results is no mean task, even though it is a necessary condition for national development which putatively public policies aim at. We are, on account of this fact, faced by the fact that implementation remain the stage in the policy process when assumptions, plans, designs, analysis and preparations are subjected to practical test for validation or invalidation. This is the critical region where important policy issues in the policy formulation and implementation nexus are thrown up and some held assumptions stripped of value. We are aware that the basic assumption in most policy process is that, once   made by appropriate authorities, implementation is a fait accompli and that policy output and outcome approximate , if not equal to, desired intention of the makers. The dismal failure of such policies as war on poverty in the USA and EDA programme in Oakland (USA) (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) and the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) and the Green Revolution in Nigeria provides a valid basis to knock off the bottom of such assumptions in policy process.

Often, the ' intention-result ' gap arises as the intentions behind the policy are scarcely realized, thus making tenable Thomas Eliot's assertion that " between the idea and the reality …the notion and the act… the conception and the creation …the emotion and the response, fall the shadow" (see Eguma, 1992:64). It is this 'mysterious shadow' responsible for the formulation implementation gap that provides

us concern. There is every need to de-mystify the shadow mystery. This can only come about through better understanding of the dynamic processes that cause it. This is, in part, the central concern of this essay.

The fact, that, whether viewed as 'pressure politics' or 'massing of assent', ' administrative control process or 'intergovernmental bargaining' , or even as ' system of games '(Bardach , 1977), implementation process involves putting together (and making it run)a 'result – inducing' or 'effect – creating' policy machinery or machine and demands a better understanding of the nature and dynamics of the machine. The sorts of parts that go into this policy machine, according the Bardach (1977:36-7), include but not limited to:

> Administrative and financial accountability mechanisms; the willing participation of presumptive beneficiaries or clients; private developers of goods and services : professional service workers , developers, landholders; clearances or permits by public regulatory agencies or elected officials; innovations in the realm of programme conception and design; sources of funds; trouble- shooters who iron out difficulties and assist in co-coordinating the more routine activities of the assembly process; political support that sustains and protects the assembly process.

Bardach warns us that his list is not exhaustive and indeed should be taken as suggestive rather than as definitive. What is acutely important, in the final analysis, is that the implementation process be understood as a process of assembling numerous and often diverse policy elements.

An important question that arises is whether it is meaningful to separate policy formulation and policy implementation activities in a mutually exclusive manner. Sadly, the general thinking is affirmative. This view is held, I think, due largely to lack of or poor appreciation of the fact that mobilizing support for policies forms an important part of designing and creating them. This tendency to separate policy formulation and policy implementation in mutually exclusive way have received appropriate critical response from Pressman and Wildavsky in the following words:

"The separation of policy from implementation is fatal. It is not better than mindless implementation without a sense of direction .Though we can isolate policy and implementation for separate discussion, the purpose of   our analysis is to bring them into closer correspondence with one another" (1973;26).

Upon achieving better knowledge of the policy implementation ' machine ' whose operations may, for good results, be decidedly inseparable from- indeed inextricably tied to –policy formulation , our klieg light necessarily turns to the factors that impinge on and affect policy implementation. Most analysts point out many factors that cast dark shadows on policy implementation generally and in underdeveloped countries in particular. These can be summed up as:

1.   Resource base;
2.   Institutional base; and
3.   Social context

Resource   mobilization,   role   allocation, application of controls and distribution of costs and benefits are variously addressed by the factors of *resource base*. The *institutional base* refers to man – made structures (mainly administrative) and power instruments   (including   normative   ,   legal, remunerative and coercive ones) at the disposal of those charged with the implementation of policy .The *social context* refers to the socio- economic, political and cultural configuration of the society including class   structure   and   social   relations,   ethnic, ideological and belief structures as well as other socio cultural elements and forces whose activities mediates in the policy process.

Egonmwan (2000:155) re – states these set of factors somewhat differently .The check – list of sorts include:

1.   Inadequate definition of goals;
2.   Over – ambitious policy goals;
3.   Lack of well defined programmes for a attainment of goals;
4.   Choice of inappropriate organization structures in implementation of policies;
5.   Lack of continuity in commitment to policy;
6.   Lack of clear definition of responsibility';

7.   Political opposition during implementation;
8.   Compromises during implementation capable of defeating policy purposes;
9.   Political insensitivity to demands;
10.   Factor of timing in implementation, and
11.   Corruption;

The search for strategies for effect implementation of rural development policies begins here.

EVOLVING STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

In the face of these obviously limiting factors, the challenge before us is how to ensure effective policy implementation in our society and indeed other underdeveloped areas of the world. In effect, how do we, against these odds, devise a strategy or strategies to enhance effective implementation of rural development policies? This is an important focal point of this essay. A search for a strategy is a search for a comparatively better serving ' ways and means ' of achieving specified desired goals. For our purpose, this search must begin with a look at some known models of policy implementation found in policy literature.

Beyond theoretical value, in the real world of public policy process, a ' programme of action '- policy – is decidedly not complete until it is backed by a clear 'plan for action ' – strategy- that is, advantage –seeking and success –winning plan . Stripped of all technicalities, implementation strategy refers to game plan adopted to ensure success in the policy process. From empirical standpoint, various strategies underline the various rural development policies and programmes in Nigeria, past and present .It is not the goal of this essay to embark on a detailed discussion of such past and present strategies for implementing rural development policies in Nigeria, as this purpose is served elsewhere (See, Ollawa, 1977, Idode 1989; Egwu, 1991; Aninnashaun, 1991; Ikeji, 2002). Before embarking on the task of proposing policy implementation strategy for rural development in Nigeria, the purpose of this essay will be served a great deal by turning attention to some models of policy implementation now.

Analysts identify three main models of public policy implementation process in the underdeveloped countries of the world. These models are behavioural ; that is , they derive from theoretical orientations of the Behavioral school of policy analysis whose hall – mark is adherence to descriptive and explanatory research and analytic commitment . It is generally believed that despite their utility for undertaking policy related research, they are less useful in designing policy implementation strategies. These three models are:

1.   Grindle's Model (see, grindle 1980)
2   Iglesias Model (see, Iglesians 1976:15-39)
3   Smith's Model (see, smith 1973:197-209)

The aforementioned references are to guide and give us access to literature where the three models were comprehensively treated. For our purpose though, one or two brief comments on those models is considered useful. To be sure, Grindles model explains how policy content and contextual variables actively intervene in the policy process, especially the implementation. Questions such as : how does policy content affect its implementation? how does socio – political and cultural context or ecology of administration affect policy implementation? are of interest to the Grindle's model. Iglesias' model is principally concerned with administrative implications of policy or programme implementation once the policy formulation is over. Concern for implementation process is reduced to a concern for, and basically a function of administrative capability of the agency charged with policy implementation. Smith model views implementation process as one of tension creation and management especially between the implementers, those for whom the policy is implemented and those affected by the policy. The model identifies four components of the implementation process, namely:

1   Idealized Policy
2   Implementing organization
3   Target Group; and
4   Environmental Factors

It is pertinent to reiterate the fact that, as essentially behavioural models, the three conceptual models are of limited value in addressing problems of real life in the underdeveloped countries of the world. We must, however, concede to them their high academic value, in terms of their capacity to describe and explain policy phenomena. Whatever their strengths, they cannot be adopted as basis for designing functional strategies for effective implementation of rural development policies in Nigeria. Where do we move to from here? I think the answer is that we evolve environment -- related model induced and shaped by our ecological imperatives.

The starting point in this direction should be a reconsideration of the two major strategies that had dominated the rural development landscape over the decades in Nigeria. These two major prongs are:-

1.   Government-led strategy and
2.   Community – led strategy.

A review of these two strategies will lead us to a third one that possess the character of a synthesis of the first two. This we shall call the 'integrative strategy .'

1.   GOVERNMENT-LED STRATEGY (Top–bottom Model)

In the 'government – led 'approach policy process, the guiding philosophy and practice I planning and working for the people. Behind this strategy is an ideology of development which, first and foremost, views the rural dwellers as being incapable of rational policy-decision making and effectively implementing programmes of development on account of perceived ignorance and conservative disposition of the rural man; second, holds that the sheer magnitude and lumpiness of cost of providing and maintaining rural infrastructure resources that are usually beyond the reach of the rural dwellers or ordinary individuals; and third, weighs the 'social advantage' factor, in which case, the benefits accruing to the entire society from a range of infrastructures exceeds those accruing to potential individual sponsors.

Under the above circumstances, the government assumes a leadership role and acts as the maker and implementer of rural development polices and programmes with the use of state structures and agencies. Implementation of rural development policies becomes an extension of public administration; and policy outcomes becomes a function of the administrative capability of state agencies in line with Iglesias' (1976) thesis. Most efforts towards the implementation of rural Development Plicies by successive government in Nigeria had been pursued on this strategy path .A look at past National development plans will provide evidence in support of this position.

In specific terms, more handy examples of programmes pursued along the 'Government led' or 'Top–Bottom 'policy strategy include: the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP), River Basin and Rural Development Authority (RBRDA), Agricultural Development Project (ADP), Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) and Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) whose generally poor outing is now history.

Evidence of the many problems (or indeed poor performance rating) associated with 'Government-Led ' policy implementation strategy could be found in a number of cross –cultural empirical referents. A few examples here will serve our purpose. Describing the uninspiring South Korean experience with 'Government led 'implementation strategy, Kihl (1979:138) reported that "decisions are rarely subject to bargaining and negotiation among autonomous actors; rather, they reflect the will and desire of the leadership in an elaborate chain of command that is based on the explicit differentiation of superior and subordinate roles". He adds that policy process, in almost all cases, was an affair of the top political elite and their staff, to the exclusion of the people for whom the policies and programmes are ostensibly meant.

Tanzania's Ujamaa Project -- built mainly on 'Government/led' strategy – suffered similar set back largely because its conception and implementation was based on the ruling elites' 'perception of the Tanzanian problem and its solutions (Ergas, 1980). In concrete terms, Ergas (1980:398) illustrates this point succinctly: the

Mbabara and Kibeya people of Tanzania were forced by government agents to start cattle breeding instead of food crop cultivation .The people had argued that their region was not suitable for cattle breeding .Not too long after, their cows died as they had feared. After an investigation by government it was decided, that the villagers were right in refusing to breed cattle and, as such, should be paid compensation for their losses, while the government agents responsible for the decision and its implementation were sanctioned.

In the same vein, Uma Lele (1975;152) has this to say of the same Tanzanian Ujamaa Project.
Programmes for villagers were prepared, priorities worked out, budgets allocated and personnel deployed by the sectoral ministries in Dar-es-Salaam ... Decisions took and inordinately long time to reach resource endowments an environmental factors.
Consequently, farmer (rural) initiative and co-operation were often strangled.
Similar problems were faced by Kenya in its bid to pursue rural development through ' government – led' strategy .The Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) in Kenya was pursued without meaningful involvement of the local people. The poor outcome has been reported by various studies , two of which are noteworthy. In obvious reference to the reason for the poor outing of Kenya's SRDP, Lele (1975:147) reports that the rural people were " neither consulted during the programme planning nor informed , in advance, of programme implementation ". In a separate study of the SRDP in the Kapenguria district of Kenya, Barnes (1973:163) made the following observation:

Community participation is seriously lacking. At times, the people of a given area are not even Informed of project implementation in their area. At other times, after plans are made, the community is informed through formal meetings (at which a few questions are permitted) where The officers justify their plans, but modification is not considered Writing on the Sudanese experience with administration and rural development planning, John Howell (1977) identifies lack of proper participation by the people in policy process as a major obstacle to success. The observes that: The participation problem is

seen as the failure to Arouse either the interest in, or long – term

commitment towards, development programmes on the part of those who are expected to gain most. This has two aspects: firstly, the failure
to explain adequately the nature of changes and benefits to the unhappily designated 'target groups '; and secondly; and more importantly – the failure to activate institutions of community involvement that could allow a genuinely creative participation in planning and implementation.

The above revelations underline the inherent weakness of the 'Government – led 'or Top –Bottom 'strategy; and underscores the pressing need to move towards a model that diminishes the weakness and advances its strength (s). Let it be known that, in principle, not everything is wrong in the 'Government – led' implementation strategy or efforts. If anything, the advantages of deploying enormous state resources cannot be ignored and, in my thinking, constitute a plus to organized development efforts. What, however, is patently objectionable is the obviously faulty assumptions and perceptions by the state policy planners and implementers. Sadly, the choice of what should be done for the rural man, when, where, and how they should be done is made by and on the paternalistic assumptions of the urban- based public policy makers . This is what in many circles, is referred to as 'planning from above' – anchored on the ' Top –Bottom ' model in the policy process – with the inevitable dire consequences associated with it. The self – explanatory fig. 1 below offers a graphic illumination of the attributes and features of 'government –led' model.

2.   COMMUNITY–LED STRATEGY (Mass – Mobilization Model)

In the strictly ' community – led' approach to implementing rural; development programmes , the underlying philosophy is that the resources of the community are mobilized by the community for the good of the community The over – riding

principle is 'mass participation' or 'participation by all' and is anchored on c- operative efforts of the people with or without any external stimulus/i. For purposes of clarity, 'community – led 'strategy is otherwise called 'self-help' strategy. As the self explanatory Fig.2 shows, 'community – led 'approach requires that rural development

(Policy Making)   (Policy Implementation and Output)   (Policy Outcome)

| Policy on Rural Dev. By Govt. | Resources from Govt./Support Agencies e.g. - ADP - RBRDA (River Basins) - DFRRI - Ministries | DGR in the execution/evaluation of CDPs e.g. - Roads - Water - Electricity | CBPs e.g. - Roads - Water - Electricity |

PFB

Key:

DGR - Direct Government Role

**CDP** - Community Development Projects (Potential)

CBP - Community Based Projects (Actual)

PFB - Policy Feed Back

Fig. 1

A Simple Systems Model of 'Government-Led'
Rural Development Process.

SOURCE : Author's Creation.

(Policy Making)   (Policy Implementation and Output)   (Policy Outcome)

| Policy on Rural Dev. By Community | Resources of Community through:-
 - CDA's
 - Age Grade Groups
 - Self-Help Groups
 - Individuals | Execution/Eva- luation of CDPs e.g.
 - Roads
 - Water
 - Electricity | CBPs e.g.
 - Roads
 - Water
 - Electricity |

PFB

KEY:

CDA   -   Community Development Association
CDP   -   Community Development Project (potential)
CBP   -   Community Based Project (Actual)

Fig. 2   -   A Simple Systems Model of 'Community-Led' Rural Development Process

Source: Author's Creation.

programmes or projects *be conceived, planned, chosen and executed primarily by the community* for the benefit of the community. External assistance, such as ' matching grants' from government, for ' community- led' programmes, does not re-define the substance.

of the approach, provided that the major element of community initiative and over –riding control over the implementation of their rural development programmes is not undermined.

Community – led strategy in rural development drive is not new in Nigeria/Although studies of implementation of 'community – led 'strategy of rural development are scanty, available reports and evidenceindicate remarkable successes in the outcome of such efforts. For instance, in a yet to be published study of 'community – led ' efforts in rural development in Imo state of Nigeria, we identified two main phases in the use of this strategy. The first phase had its focus on agricultural – co-operative movements, while, the second was, and still remain, dominated by efforts to provide social and physical in frastructures in the rural areas .It is remarkable that between 1980 and 1985, various communities in Imo State embarked successfully on some 5,720 rural development – related projects on the basis of ' community – led ' strategy (see, Annual Reports , 1980 – 85 , ministry of Local government and social Development, Owerri). Fig. 2 is a graphic representation of the ' community – led ' strategy

of rural development including the implementation process anchored on community resources and agencies such as community Development Associations (CDAs) , Age Grade Groups , Self – help Groups and individuals.

For all its strengths, the ' community – led' strategy is bedeviled by an array of development– inhibiting problems including :

    inadequacy of administrative and organizational capacity on the part of the local communities;

-     inadequacy of organizational support from government;
-     lack of proper integration of local self –

help or community efforts into wider government's rural development programme framework; and

The fact that community self – help efforts have been characterized by haphazard, unco – ordinated and laisez faire pursuits leading to wasteful duplication of scarce energies and resources .

The net consequence of these conditions ids poor planning conceptualization, costing, prioritization and implementation (including project completion rate) or self – help projects.

3.   INTEGRATIVE /CO OPERATIVE STARTEGY TO THE RESCUE

The major element in this approach is that rural development is viewed as a joint business of the government on the one hand and the community on other hand. Effective co-operation between these two actors is the key philosophy and driving force in the strategy. This is to say that government goes into real partnership with the people ; that is, planning and working with and for the people. As Fig. 3 shows, both the government and the community are involved in the policy making , policy implementation (including mobilization of resources and the use of government and community development agencies), policy monitoring and evaluation, and policy dividend sharing (in terms of outcomes).

To be sure, this strategy had not been in vogue in the past as a survey of past rural development efforts in Nigeria will reveal. For instance , until the coming of the Fourth National Development Plan in Nigeria, the emphasis had been on either ' community-led' self – help strategy or strategy of direct ' government – led ' initiative .The emphasis of the Fourth national Development Plan and other subsequent plans was no longer on ' community – led strategy ('self – help approach) – as was the case in the Third National Development Plan , 1975-80: 320 – but on 'Integrated Rural Development strategy involving , as noted earlier , the mobilization and Participation of rural dwellers in a joint task of rural development .The coming of the Direct participation Scheme (DPS) pursued within the framework of the

(Policy Making)   (Policy Implementation and Output)   (Policy Outcomes)

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┌──────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐   ┌────────────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐
│ Policy on    │   ┌─▶│ Resources    │   │ Execution/Evalua-  │   │ CBPs  e.g.     │
│ Rural Dev.   │   │  │ from CDAs    │──┐│ tion of CDPs e.g.  │   │                │
│ By Govt. &   │───┤  └──────────────┘  ││                    │   │ - Roads        │
│ Community    │   │  ┌──────────────┐  ││ - Roads            │──▶│ - Water        │
│ participation│   └─▶│ Resources    │  ││ - Water            │   │ - Electricity  │
└──────────────┘      │ from Ministry│──┘│ - Electricity on the│  └────────────────┘
                      │ of Rural Dev.,│  │ platform of DPS    │
                      │ DFRRI, etc.  │   └────────────────────┘
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Key:

CDA - Community Development Association
CDP - Community Development Projects (Potential)
CBP - Community Based Projects (Actual)
PFB - Policy Feed Back

Fig. 3 – A Simple Systems Model of 'Integrative'/'Co-operative' Rural
Development Process

Source: Author's creation

Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI), marked a new orientation in government / community co-operation in the areas of rural development .As a concept, the DPS was designed to conform to the character of the 'Integrative ' strategy with its marked emphasis on ' co-operative ' approach to rural development .

Integrative / co-operative strategy socializes the policy process – making implementation and monitoring / evaluation .Socializing the policy process implies participation of communities at all levels of rural development polices / programmes. The utility of this approach , had long been recognized as an essential ingredient to the envisaged success of development policies, even though official responses in this regard had been sadly poor over the years .It thus becomes imperative that community involvement in rural development policy process should ideally feature at every stage. A problem we envisage in this strategy is how to reconcile differences in perception of what constitutes involvement among the communities on the one hand and government agents on the other hand. In other words, what if community's perception of

involvement and participation is at variance with that of government agents ?
As a response, we propose a social marketing strategy which essentially involves bridging communication gap through a two – way mass education and enlightenment for both the communities and government agents, operatives and policy markers. The use of skilled community – based development extension workers, to my mind, is a sine qua for success of the strategy being proposed here. The strategy is non – interventionist, non- authoritarian and non –prescriptive as 'government –led' strategy; and is stripped of encumbrances such as poor planning, conservatism and ignorance of dynamics of modernization associated with 'community – led 'strategy. Proper political will and sincererity on the part of government , no doubt, is a critical element in the scheme called 'Integrative/Co-operative' strategy considered inevitable for successful implementation of rural development policies.
A somewhat related, though theoretically different, strategy is the kissi Cattle Dip Project in the Kisii district in Kenya. This programme entailed the amalgamation of our first , (government –led and second (community –led) strategies in a somewhat peculiar way. To be sure, the programme which was clearly government led, 'co-opted' the community self-help strategy. Frank Holmquist (1970) reported the encouraging success the programme achieved; pointing out that :

Certain advantages accrue to policy implementation by including a self – help component (as well as other local components) within central government policy: local resources are extracted, the citizenry is educated

about the programme and they grow committed to its use. Past success with self- help made it appear likely that. The Kisii District would respond well with such a component included .Infact, Kisii responded too well and there were far more self –help collections on hand than the Ministry of Agriculture could provide matching funds for (221-222)

Kisii experience provides a good example of where policy implementation – indeed policy process – was not the responsibility of any single coherent agency .In point of fact, each of the participants (the initiators or the co-opted) had its own idea of how the policy should evolve and saw to it that certain amount of power it had was deployed to exert

initiators or the co-opted) had its own idea of how the policy should evolve and saw to it that certain amount of power it had was deployed to exert pressure on rival co-participants. By so doing, stakes grew higher for the participants; and with that came commitment from them that otherwise may have been absent.
The 'Integrative' or Co-operative model being proposed here may well be viewed as a qualitatively superior re –invention or re-discovering of the Kisii experiment , with theoretical and practical modifications which ensures that all parties – government or non- governmental development agencies and communities – are active partners in progress and are meaningfully involved in policy process.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Policy implementation is the critical dimension in the policy process given the fact that success or failure of any given policy is , to a high degree, a function of implementation. There is a need for **good**

implementation strategy / ies for the success of policies. The need is an urgent one and more acute for the rural areas where the quality of life remain abysmally poor due largely to long period of neglect and unrewarding implementation of most policies directed at addressing the problem or rural under-development in Nigeria.

Analysis of dominant conceptual models (grindles', Iglesias' and Smith's) and strategies for implementing rural development policies , namely the ' government – led' and the ' community –led' show gross inadequacies arising from their basic nature. The noted inadequacies led to the search for appropriate alternative. The outcome of the search is the 'Integrative /Co-operative' strategy proposed here. The hope is that regardless of whatever shortcoming that may be associated with it, the 'Integrative/Co-operative' strategy holds the greatest promise in our drive towards a more effective implementation of rural development policies in Nigeria. Envisaged obstacles to policy implementation in general (outlined earlier in this work) and the smooth application of this strategy to our rural development policy process can, hopefully be moderated, if not contained, by mechanisms such as: proper orientation for all actors ; adoption of inter-agency (community and government) co-ordinating organs; meaningful decentralization of policy structures and process; appropriate political will and commitment on the part of government; healthy funding arrangements; and , above all, institutionalizing community involvement by way of mass participation in the policy process.

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